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In  the  present  thesis  the  author  professes  to  offer  neither  a  systematic 
account  of  Sophoclean  theology  (if  indeed  there  is  such  a  thing)  nor  a  study 
of  the  epistemological  problem  per  se  in  Sophoclean  tragedy.  His  purpose  is 
rather  to  illuminate  -  partly  expanding  on  a  brief  but  suggestive  study  by 
Hans  Diller  ("Göttliches  and  menschliches  Wissen  bei  Sophokles",  Kiel  1950) 
-  the  ways  in  which  the  epistemological  chasm  between  Man  and  God  in 
Sophoclean  tragedy  becomes  manifest  through  a  `collision'  between  the 
incompleteness  and  limitedness  of  human  knowledge  on  the  one  hand  and 
the  transcendence  and  the  unknowability  of  the  gods  on  the  other.  An 
introductory  chapter  is  prefixed  which  deals  with  the  development  of  the 
idea  of  divine  unknowability  in  archaic  Greek  literature  and  in  Presocratic 
philosophy.  There  follows  a  detailed  examination  of  the  extant  plays  one  by 
one  (with  special  emphasis  on  the  close  reading  of  practically  all  the  choral 
odes),  by  means  of  which  the  author  endeavours  to  demonstrate  that  the 
centrality  of  the  epistemological  problem  (in  relation,  always,  to  the 
inscrutability  of  the  Godhead)  in  Sophocles,  far  from  reducing  his  dramas  to 
abstract  philosophical  treatises,  contains  a  tremendous  tragic  potential  and 
makes  for  powerful  plays.  Aspects  of  each  play's  structure,  of  its  thematic 
articulation  and  of  its  vocabulary  are  studied,  while  a  variety  of 
methodological  approaches  are  employed  in  order  to  illuminate  problems 
of  interpretation.  All  important  secondary  literature  is  cited  and  /  or 
discussed.  Thus,  while  never  losing  sight  of  its  central  concern  (divine 
unknowability,  limitedness  of  human  knowledge),  the  present  thesis  also 
aims  to  be  a  thorough  study  of  Sophocean  tragedy  as  a  whole. For  my  family; 
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FOREWORD 
It  seems  customary  for  authors  of  works  on  subjects  as  well-worn  as,  say, 
Sophoclean  tragedy  to  offer  their  apologies  for  producing  "yet  another 
book"  about  such  an  unoriginal  topic.  I  wish  to  offer  none:  for  one  thing, 
as  we  have  long  realized,  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  a  `definitive 
interpretation'  of  a  literary  work  -  or  of  any  work  of  art,  for  that  matter; 
every  new  interpretation  should  be  welcome,  no  matter  how  widely  (or 
even  well)  explored  the  subject  may  be.  For,  another,  Sophocles  has  long 
suffered  from  exposure  to  the  harmful  radiation  of  his  supposed  `classical' 
halo:  one  of  the  aims  of  this  work  is  to  show  that  the  `pious'  Sophocles, 
the  `serene'  Sophocles  can  be  more  subversive  and  more  disturbing  than, 
say,  Euripides  was  in  his  most  `anarchic'  moments.  When  all  has  been 
said  and  done,  however,  one  feels  that  a  work  on  Sophocles  should  need 
no  further  justification  than  the  famous  line  of  Kostis  Palamas,  one  of 
modern  Greece's  national  poets:  "the  nightingale  of  Colonus  still  sings 
on". 
A  word  on  method:  as  will  no  doubt  be  evident  to  the  careful 
reader,  I  have  been  eclectic,  and  have  drawn  freely  from  various 
theoretical  `schools'  of  literary  criticism:  my  close  reading  of  the  text,  and 
especially  of  the  ways  that  the  selection  and  organization  of  its 
vocabulary  point  to  central  themes  of  the  play,  is  basically  along  the 
lines  of  the  New  Criticism,  while  incorporating  to  a  large  extent  the 
precepts  of  the  School  of  Prague  (mainly  as  propounded  in  the  works  of 
its  founder  and  most  brilliant  exponent,  Roman  Jacobson).  It  will  also  be 
apparent  that  I  have  been  unable  to  resist  the  temptations  of  the 
structuralist  grid  and  its  ubiquitous  binary  oppositions,  especially  as 
these  can  often  square  so  nicely  with  the  more  traditional  approaches 
mentioned  above.  In  a  few  places  I  have  also  made  use  (sometimes,  as  in 
the  Ajax,  extensive  use)  of  recent  sociological  and  /  or  anthropological 
research  (especially  the  study  of  ritual).  Although  my  approach  is iii 
basically  a  literary  one,  I  have  made  every  effort  to  avoid  the  text-centred 
and  a-historical  excesses  of  New  Criticism  (or  of  modern  narratological 
approaches,  for  that  matter).  Thus,  a  certain  predilection  for  the 
historical  aspects  of  the  plays  will  be  noted  (notably  in  the  Antigone). 
Nonetheless,  the  word  `historical'  should  not  be  taken,  to  refer  to  the,  now 
largely  outfashioned,  trend  of  discovering  (or  rather  devising)  historical 
or  political  allegories  in  the  plays,  but  to  the  application,  where  possible, 
of  the  study  of  institutions  and  ideology  to  the  interpretation  of  the 
plays. 
It  is,  as  always,  a  pleasant  task  to  record  my  debt  of  gratitude  to  all 
those  who  have  helped  me  bear  the  burden  of  writing  this  study.  First 
and  foremost,  my  warmest  thanks  go  to  my  supervisor,  Mr  A.  F.  Garvie, 
who  has  stoically  borne  with  my  importunacy  and  has  always  been 
happy  to  go  through  tediously  lengthy  drafts  and  discuss  my  outlandish 
ideas.  His  exemplary  scholarship,  his  careful  reading  of  texts,  as  well  as 
his  well-known  kindness  and  generosity  saved  me  from  numerous 
embarrassing  errors  (many  of  his  suggestions  are  duly  acknowledged, 
although  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  mention  all  of  them).  I  am 
also  grateful  to  Professor  D.  M.  MacDowell  who  has  spared  time  and  effort 
to  discuss  various  problems,  and  to  teach  me  to  be  careful  in  my 
handling  of  the  sources  and  not  to  jump  into  conclusions  (which  I  am 
prone  to  do  by  nature).  These  two  persons  have  put  me  further  in  their 
debt  by  earnestly  supporting  my  applications  for  financial  support  - 
first  to  the  Department  of  Classics,  which  granted  me  a  generous 
scholarship  for  the  first  year  of  my  studies,  and  then  to  the  Higher 
Degrees  Committee  of  the  Faculty  of  Arts,  which  extended  the  scholarship, 
with  equal  generosity,  for  two  more  years. 
Special  thanks  are  also  due  to  Professor  P.  E.  Easterling,  who  offered 
helpful  criticisms  and  kindly  provided  me  with  an  unpublished  paper  of 
hers  on  the  OC;  to  Drs  E.  Moignard  and  H.  Breckenridge  for  archaeological 
advice;  to  Ms  P.  Karavia  for  bibliographical  help;  to  Mr  A.  F.  L.  Hurlstone 
for  letting  me  avail  myself  of  his  impeccable  knowledge  of  English;  and  to 
Dr  S.  Greger,  Dr  K.  Kapparis,  and  Ms  T.  Gergel  for  sharing  with  me 
valuable  written  material.  Of  my  academic  tutors  in  Athens,  Greece,  I iv 
should  like  to  thank  Assistant  Professors  N.  Georgantzoglou,  A. 
Panagopoulos  and  I.  K.  Probonas  who  kindly  supported  with  reference 
letters  my  application  for  postgraduate  study  at  the  University  of 
Glasgow,  I  am  also  deeply  grateful  to  Professors  J.  -Th.  A.  Papademetriou 
and  G.  A.  Christodoulou  for  their  unfailing  support  and,  encouragement. 
On  a  more  personal  level,  I  wish  warmly  to  thank  my  friend  Dr 
Costas  Panayotakis,  who  eased  me  into  the  academic  life  of  Glasgow 
University  and  showed  unremitting  interest  in  the  progress  of  my  work 
throughout  my  three-year  study.  His  kindness  and  supportiveness,  as 
well  as  his  exemplary  devotion  to  his  vocation,  did  a  lot  to  boost  my 
enthusiasm.  Moreover,  my  colleagues  and  friends  Alexis  Alexiou  and 
Giana  Tsailakopoulou,  apart  from  their  usual  geniality,  offered  valuable 
ideas  and  drew  my  attention  to  important  literature.  A  debt  of  a  very 
different  nature  is  owed  to  Katerina  Stebili,  who  managed  to  persuade  me 
that  there  is  also  a  life  to  be  lived.  Finally,  I  wish  to  thank  ab  imo  pectore 
my  parents  and  first  teachers  of  Greek,  Eleni  and  Yannis,  and  my  sister 
Nadia  for  their  warm  love  and  support.  The  dedication  is  a  small  token 
of  affection  to  those  wv  ävEU  015. 
Glasgow,  September  1997 
V.  L. V 
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Some  more  technicalities: 
For  references  to  the  bibliography  I  have  adopted  the  Harvard  system,  e.  g. 
Edmunds  (1996:  53).  Exceptionally,  standard  Sophoclean  commentaries 
are  referred  to  without  date:  thus,  e.  g.,  in  Chapter  One  (Electra) 
"Kamerbeek  (ad  957)"  means  "Kamerbeek  (1974:  ad  957)";  in  Chapter 
Three  (Trachiniae)  "Easterling  (p.  133)"  means  "Easterling  (1982:  133)  "; 
and  so  forth.  When  reference  Is  made  to  a  commentary  on  a  play  other 
than  the  one  dealt  with  in  the  chapter,  then  the  full  date  is  given;  thus,  a 
reference,  in  the  Trachiniae  chapter,  to  Kamerbeek's  commentary  on  the 
OT  will  appear  as  "Kamerbeek  (1967)  ". 
Names  of  ancient  authors  and  of  their  works  are  generally  abbreviated  as 
in  LSJ;  so  are  papyrological  and  epigraphical  publications.  Otherwise  the 
abbreviations  should  be  self-explanatory. 
For  scholarly  periodicals  the  abbreviations  of  L'  Annee  Philologique  have 
been  used. 
Finally,  reports  of  MSS.  readings  are  reproduced  from  Dawe  (1996).  The 
grouping  according  to  MSS.  families  adopted  by  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson 
(1990a)  is  perhaps  more  economical,  but  often  results  in  overlapping 
which  can  be  confusing  and  sometimes  misleading. vii 
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(1976)  71-78  &  fig.  15  =  LIMC  I.  1,  No  105.  Note  the  round  hoplite  shield 
at  the  left  hand-side. 
Plate  V.  1:  Marble  relief  (ca.  525)  from  Delphi,  Treasury  of  the  Siphnians. 
Delphi,  Museum.  Apollo  (at  the  left  hand-side,  together  with  Artemis) 
bears  the  quiver  and  obviously  stretches  the  bow  (now  lost). 
Plate  V.  2:  Marble  relief  (ca.  525)  from  Delphi,  Treasury  of  the  Siphnians. 
Delphi,  Museum.  Ares  is  represented  as  a  hoplite.  The  contradistinction 
from  the  bowman  Apollo,  on  the  same  relief,  is  I  think  deliberate  and 
significant. viii 
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INTRODUCTION 
'lle  musicainotation  of  another  world 
the  ancient  belief  that  there  always  exists 
the  very  near  ye  t  still  unseen 
Odysseus  Elytis,  5e  moron  Esti 
(transl.  E.  xee(ey  &  G.  Savidis) 
0.0.1  Preliminary  remarks 
As  the  title  of  this  thesis  implies,  my  subject  is  neither  "gods  in 
Sophocles"  nor  "knowledge  in  Sophocles";  the  former  topic  has  been  dealt 
with,  cursorily  or  in  detail,  by  almost  every  scholar  who  has  written  on 
Sophocles;  while  of  the  latter  we  have  a  splendid  examination  in 
Lawrence  (1978)  as  well  as  a  detailed  study  of  the  words  belonging  to  the 
Wortfeld  "Wissen  and  Erkennen"  by  Marina  Coray  (1993).  That  means 
that  I  pretend  to  offer  neither  a  systematic  account  of  Sophoclean 
theology  (if  indeed  there  is  such  a  thing)  nor  a  study  of  the 
epistemological  problem  per  se  in  Sophoclean  tragedy.  My  purpose  is 
rather  to  illuminate  -  partly  expanding  on  a  brief  but  suggestive  study 
by  Hans  Diller  (1950)  -  the  ways  in  which  the  epistemological  chasm 
between  Man  and  God  in  Sophoclean  tragedy  becomes  manifest  through 
an  Auseinandersetzung  (Diller  [1950:  11)  between  the  incompleteness  and 
limitedness  of  human  knowledge  on  the  one  hand  and  the  transcendence 
and  the  unknowability  of  the  gods'  on  the  other.  Through  a  detailed 
examination  of  the  extant  plays,  I  shall  endeavour  to  demonstrate  that 
the  centrality  of  the  epistemological  problem  (in  relation,  always,  to  the 
inscrutability  of  the  Godhead)  in  Sophocles,  far  from  reducing  his  dramas 
to  abstract  philosophical  treatises,  contains  a  tremendous  tragic  potential 
I  "The  gods",  "divinity",  "God",  "the  Godhead"  are  treated  throughout  as 
essentially  synonymous. xiv 
and  makes  for  powerful  plays.  For  as  E.  R.  Dodds  (1966:  47)  has  seen  with 
admirable  clarity,  the  Sophoclean  dramatic  universe  is  beset  by  the 
irresoluble  contradiction  between,  on  the  one  hand,  the  existence  of  an 
objective  world-order  which  Man  must  respect  and,  ý  on  the  other,  Man's 
failure  fully  to  understand  this  world-order.  This  contradiction  produces 
a  fundamental  tragic  paradox:  to  quote  Diller  (1950:  10)  again,  "im 
sophokleishen  Drama  wird  das  Geschehen  in  seiner  Unentrinnbarkeit 
ohne  Rest  durchschaubar  gemacht,  nicht  aber  der  Zweifel  an  der 
Gerechtigkeit  oder  der  Moralität  der  Weltordnung,  soweit  er  überhaupt 
ausgesprochen  wird,  geklärt". 
In  emphasizing  the  epistemological  `alterity'  of  the  Godhead 
Sophocles  seems  to  take  over  and  develop  a  trend  first  found  in  some 
Presocratics,  according  to  which  God  is  above  and  beyond  the  confines  of 
human  mind,  on  a  wholly  different  plane  from  men  and  essentially 
inaccessible  to  their  mode  of  thinking.  To  put  this  in  epistemological 
terms,  God  transcends  the  reality  (or,  more  accurately,  its  organization 
into  an,  ontological  system)  which  the  human  intellect  is  accustomed  to 
regard  as  `natural';  therefore  God  resists  any  attempt  to  be  circumscribed 
by  the  ontological  attributes  through  which  we  conceptualize  this  world 
of  ours.  This  view  of  divinity  we  shall  be  calling,  for  reasons  of 
convenience,  `apophatism',  despite  the  glaring  anachronism.  '  Such  a 
perception  of  the  epistemological  chasm  between  Man  and  God  is  a  far 
cry  from  the  older  Greek  idea  that  the  gods'  knowledge  is  simply  broader 
(in  terms  of  the  sheer  quantity  of  received  information)  than  men's  (see 
I  By  the  anachronistic  use  of  the  term  `apophatism'  /  `apophatic'  I  indicate  the 
refusal  to  assign  to  God  any  ontological  attribute  whatsoever  (cf.  Yannaras 
[1988:  691:  il  äpvBTq  va  ätroSwvovµc  o'TÖV  OEÖ  TOUT  trpoaSLopLvµovs  Tov 
ovTos);  cf.  Lossky  (1957:  38-9):  apophatism  "is,  above  all,  an  attitude  of  mind 
which  refuses  to  form  concepts  about  God".  The  apophatic  approach  to  divinity 
has  found  its  fullest  expression  in  the  so-called  `Areopagitic'  writings,  i.  e.  the 
theological  treatises  attributed  to  St  Denys  the  Areopagite.  These  writings  have 
exerted  a  tremendous  shaping  influence  on  the  theology  of  both  the  Eastern 
Orthodox  and  the  Roman  Catholic  Churches.  See  further  Yannaras  (1988: 
Passim). xv 
below  section  0.1.1  for  instances);  for  such  an  idea  naively  implies  that 
both  gods  and  men  do  possess  knowledge,  except  that  the  former  possess 
it  in  larger  quantities.  However,  the  difference  is  not  one  of  quantity,  but 
of  quality.  divine  knowledge  is  of  a  wholly  different  order  or  kind  from 
human  knowledge.  This  realization  that  our  knowledge  is  totally  unlike 
that  of  the  gods  has  mainly  ý  two  important  implications: 
a)  only  divine  knowledge  must  be  truly,  perfect  knowledge;  human  beings 
have  got  only  an  imperfect  (and  all  too  often  illusory)  kind  of  knowledge. 
b)  what  we  humans  can  know  about  the  gods  (their,  nature,  their 
function,  etc.  )  must  therefore  be  only  partial  and  fragmentary. 
As  my  title  indicates,  these  two  points  are  obviously  interconnected:  the 
fundamental  `alterity'  of  the  Godhead  both  -  implies  its  essential 
unknowability  and  sets  the  limits  within  which  human  knowledge  must 
be  inescapably  circumscribed. 
0.1.1  The  literary  background 
That  divine  knowledge  is  immensely  broader  than  human  knowledge  is 
one  of  the  most  traditional  concepts  in  Greek  literature,  appearing  as 
early  as  Homer.  In  Ii.  2.484-92,  "the  most  sober  section  of  the  Iliad",  as 
Bruno  Snell  (1975:  127)  has  called  it,  we  are  presented  with  what  seems  to 
be  the  archaic  view  on  the  epistemological  aspect  of  the  difference 
between  Man  and  God.  The  poet  finds  himself  compelled  to  invoke  the 
Muses  to  assist  him  in  his  arduous  task  of  naming  the  Achaean  leaders 
who  took  part  in  the  war  -a  task  that  no  one  could  accomplish  by 
relying  solely  on  his  own  capacity.  This  is  because  men  know  nothing, 
they  must  rely  on  hearsay  (486  K)909  oIov  äKOÜOµEV  oÜBE  TL  T8[160- 
The  Muses,  on  the  other  hand,  do  possess  true  knowledge,  because  they xvi 
have  first-hand  evidence:  they  are  eye-witnesses,  they  are  able  to  run 
everywhere  and  witness  everything  (485  TrapE(TTE  TE  LOTE  TE  TrävTa); 
the  very  fact  that  they  can  experience  more  things  than  men  can 
guarantees  that  they  also  know  more  things  than  men  do.  3  So,  it  seems 
that,  for  Homer,  the  gods  are,  epistemologically  speaking,  simply  men 
brought  to  perfection:  their  knowledge  covers  a  much  wider  field;  their 
difference  is  one  of  quantity,  not  quality;  one  of  range,  not  of  kind.  A 
second  point  that  emerges  from  the  Homeric  passage  is  that  the  only  way 
for  men  to  enhance  their  knowledge  is  through  divine  revelation; 
intellectual  effort  or  special  insight  seem  not  to  count  as  possibilities. 
This  chasm  between  human  and  divine  knowledge  is  also  a 
recurrent  theme  in  lyric  poetry,  but  it  seems  that  it  is  there  felt  more 
intensely,  with  greater  pathos.  For  Solon,  our  inability  to  have  insight 
into  the  noos  of  the  gods  (17W:  Träv7  8'  &0avämn.  '  ä  av'  vöos 
ävOptTroLQLV)  means  practically  that  we  have  almost  no  access  to  true 
knowledge  at  all:  "It  is  most  difficult  to  have  insight  into  the  Invisible 
measure  of  judgement,  which  yet  alone  holds  the  boundaries  of 
everything"  (16W:  yvc  iiowivi  8'  ä  avE  XaAETic'TaTÖV  EßTL  vofjaaL 
µE  TpOV,  6  8T'l  TTaVTWV  TrE  tpaTa  µoüvov  E  XE  L)  .6 
There  is  a  similar  feeling 
In  Simon.  21  (PMG  526  Page):  OE09  ö  Träp4n]TLc"  aTnj-  I  µavTov  8' 
I  See  further  Snell's  (1975:  127-8)  excellent  analysis  (with  essential  older 
bibliography). 
4  On  the  omniscience  (in  `quantitative'  terms  only!  )  of  the  gods  see  also  Qi.  4. 
379,468.  Pi.  N.  6.1-7  is  perhaps  an  exception  in  that  he  regards  human  noos  as 
`similar',  in  some  (unspecified)  respects  to  divine  noon  v  äv8p  iv,  v  OEwv 
. YEVos- 
[...  ]  8LELp'YEL  8E  Tr&  Ta  KEKpLtEVa  18üvaµls,  c109  TO  iEV  Oi8EV,  6  8E  I 
XOKEOc  a'cr4  a  Es  aLEV 
E8os  I  µEVEL  OÜpavÖc.  6)J/  TL  ITpoo4  poµEV  Eµrrav  f1 
p.  E'yaV  I  VOOV  11TOL  4)15ULV  60aVa'TOL9,  I  KQL1TEp  E4apEp(av  O  UK  E186TEc  OÜ8E 
IETCI  VVKTas  I  äµµE  TTÖTµOs  I  ciVTLV  E  YpaLpE 
8paµELV  TrOTL  OTäBµav.  Cf.  also  P.  8. 
96  (a  suggestion  I  owe  to  Mr  Garvie). 
5  On  the  word  see  Jäger  (1947:  233  n.  58). 
6  Translation  according  to  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  104). xvii 
OÜBEV  EQTL  OvaTOts,  7  or  in  20  (PMG  525  Page):  pEta  O¬oL  KAETrTOUQLV 
ävOptim  v  vöov;  in  both  these  fragments  the  clear  and  unadulterated 
knowledge  of  the  Godhead  (Trä  i  nyrLs)  is  contrasted  with  the  limitedness 
of  the  human  intellectual  resources  -  which  inevitably  leads  to  illusion 
(KAETTTOUaLV  ävOpw'Trcov  vöov)  and,  ultimately,  to  misery  (ä1  IavTov  8' 
oi8EV  EQTL  OvaTots).  The  most  memorable  formulation  of  this  feeling  is, 
perhaps,  given  in  the  following  Theognidean  verses  (133-42): 
OÜSELS  KÜpV  'i-q$  KQL  KEpSEOs  QLTLOS  CIÜTÖs, 
äýCJI  BEOL  TOÜTWV  SU')TOpEs  %1.  ýOTEpWV' 
135  OÜÜE  TLS  C(.  VepCi1'iTWV  Ep'YG.  ýETQ.  L  EV  (ýpEQLV  E'LMS 
140 
ES  TA09  EIH  Q'YaeÖV  'LVETQL  EILTE  KaKÖV. 
TTOJIMKL  'Yäp  BoKýWv 
"aELV  KaKÖV  EaeXÖV  EßflKEV, 
KaL  TE  SOK(.  i)V  "aELV  EaeÄÖV  ENKE  KQKÖV. 
OÜSE  T(x)  äv6pwTrwv  TrapayLvETaL 
ÖaQ  EeEX-qaLV' 
I,  aXEL  'Yäp  XuAETfflS  TTELpaT'  äu.  rlxaVLnS. 
äv6pwTroL  U  äTaLa  VOµI,  COµEV,  ELSÖTES  OÜF)EV' 
eE01,  &  KaTQ  #ETEPOV  '{TQVTQ  TEAOÜQL  VÖOV. 
The  achievement  of  a  set  goal  (137  TA  03,142  TE  XOVQl)  is  a  matter  not 
of  active  effort  (135  Ep'yä  ETaL),  but  of  knowledge:  Man  cannot  know  how 
his  efforts  will  fare;  in  other  words,  Man,  despite  his  perpetual  struggle, 
cannot  control  the  outcome  of  his  actions  (135-38;  cf.  esp.  135  oüR  ... 
EV  4pEQLV  EL863;  137  8OKEWV,  138  80K(ýV;  141  I  tTaLa 
...  E  60TES 
oü8Ev),  because  of  the  limitations  imposed  on  him  by  his  helplessness 
I  give,  exempli  gratia,  the  text  as  emended  by  Bergk  (Page  prints  the  MSS  b' 
ov84v  EQTLV  Ev  a  rrotS  inter  cruces). xviii 
(140'LQXEL 
...  TTELpa-r  äµIjXavLris).  The  gods,  on  the  other  hand,  achieve 
all  their  goals  (142  TEAo1QL)  according  to  the  plan  conceived  by  their 
mind  (142  Karä  a4ETEpoV  ...  vöov).  The  practical  character  of  these 
lines  is  obvious:  the  human  praxis  is  hampered  by  the  limitedness  of  our 
means  and  resources,  our  %LTIXavta,  which  is  in  the  final  analysis  a  lack 
of  complete  and  accurate  knowledge.  How  close  to  some  well-known 
formulations  of  `traditional  wisdom'  these  lines  are,  becomes  immediately 
obvious  by  the  mere  quotation  of  a  few  parallels: 
Semon.  1.1-5  W.:  w  tra7L,  TEÄOS  µEv  ZEÜs  ýXEL  ßapüKTUtros  I  TTävTWv 
0(7' ff  I 
ETMI.  d.  EpOLB  IQ  811  ßOTQ 
C60vaLV,  OÜSEV  El.  S6TEs 
I  ÖKCAs  9KaQTOV 
EKTEAEUTt'IaEL  eEbs. 
Solon  13.63-70  W.  (esp.  65-6):  TräQL  8E  TOL  Kl.  VBUVOs  ETr'  ¬pyµaQLV, 
OÜSE  TLS  OISE  VI  TTý  I.  1E  ýE  L  O'X1ýQE  LV  XpljµaTOs  äpXoµE  vou. 
Simon.  22  (PMG  527  Page):  OÜK  EUTLV  KQKÖV  I 
QVETrLSÖKqTOV 
ävep6TfOL9'  ÖYLy(;  )  U  XPÖV() 
I  TTäVTa  µETQppLTrTEL  eEÖS. 
Xen.  Cyr.  1.6.19:  QVePCOTTOL 
µEV  CLLPOÜVTCIL  'TTPQýELS  ELKÜCOVTES, 
ELSÖTES  $E  OÜ$EV  Q1T0  "  1TOl,  Cts  ECTTaL 
- 
aÜTOLs  TQ'YCLeÖV.  9 
Cf.  also  the  epigram'apud  Dem.  18.289:  I1.71SEV  Q  LaPTEtV 
EQTL  6E(WV  KQL 
TräVTQ  KQTOp0OÜV. 
s  With  the  idea  expressed  here  cf.  Q1.18.136-7. 
9  Mimnermus  2.4-5  W.  seems  to  provide  a  concise  formulation  of  the  same  idea: 
"the  gods  have  revealed  to  us  neither  the  bad  nor  the  good  things"  (that  are  to 
happen,  we  may  understand).  For  further  parallels  (esp.  Pi.  Q  7.24f.  )  see  van 
Groningen  (1966:  57).  Similarly  conventional  conceptions  are  also  to  be  found 
in  Diogenes  of  Apollonia,  a  second-rate  Presocratic,  who  naively  asserts  that 
air,  the  divine  Urstoff  (see  64B  5  D.  -K.  ),  as  well  as  being  great  and  powerful  and 
eternal  and  immortal  (i.  e.  God's  traditional  attributes  from  Homer  onwards),  is 
also  rrok  äA  EdSbs  (64B  8  D.  -K.  ):  again  divinity  is  epistemologically  differentiated 
from  the  human  sphere  in'purely  `quantitative'  -terms. xix 
Such  a  conception  of  human  intellect,  as  opposed  to  divine  noos,  allows 
for  the  possibility'  that,  if  we  had  more  knowledge  (e.  g.  about  the 
parameters  conditioning  our  actions,  about  their  outcome  etc.  ),  we  would 
achieve  our  purposes  Kcrrä  voov,  as  the  gods  do.  In  other  words,  if  the 
gods  are  but  men  writ  large,  and  their  knowledge  differs  from  the  human 
one  only  in  terms  of  quantity  (range),  it  follows  that  men  may  have  the 
potential  to  acquire  god-like  knowledge.  However,  such  a  possibility 
remains  purely  theoretical  and,  logically  consistent  though  it  is,  seems 
never  to  be  taken  into  account  in  archaic  poetry:  hence  the  incessant 
lament  over  the  human  inability  to  attain  true  knowledge  or  insight  into 
the  divine  noos.  The  traditional  view  is,  therefore,  not  only  crude  and 
naive,  but  also  illogical  and  self-contradictory.  '° 
0.2.1  The  philosophical  background.  Some  Presocratic  ideas 
This  picture,  however,  seems  to  change  radically  with  the  Presocratics  - 
which  in  this  case  means  basically  Xenophanes  and  Heraclitus  (and,  to  a 
lesser  extent,  Alcmaeon,  Parmenides,  Empedocles  and  Philolaus).  In  those 
surviving  fragments  that  may  be  taken  to  bear  on  the  relation  of  human 
and  divine  knowledge"  there  emerges  a  new  idea  of  God  as  being, 
epistemologically  speaking,  of  a  wholly  different  order  from  Man;  the 
crude  and  superficial  conceptions  of  God  as  merely  more  knowledgeable 
(in  `quantitative'  terms)  than  Man  are  radically  reconsidered,  and  the 
chasm  separating  human  from  divine  knowledge  is  now  viewed,  much 
10  It  goes  without  saying  that  Bowra's  (1944:  376)  attempt  to  foist  on  Sophocles 
such  archaic  ideas  cannot  stand. 
11  I  am  concerned  here  neither  with  Presocratic  epistemology  in  general  (in 
which  case  I  should  have  devoted  a  good  part  of  this  Introduction  to  the 
epistemological  views  of  Democritus,  Protagoras  and  Gorgias)  nor  with 
Presocratic  theology  (in  which  case  I  should  have  dealt  practically  with  the 
entirety  of  the  surviving  fragments,  especially  in  the  case  of  the  early  Ionian 
thinkers  as  well  as  of  the  thinkers  of  the  Italian  colonies). xx 
more  subtly,  in  terms  of  quality.  divine  noos  differs  from  Man's  not  in 
that  it  contains  a  larger  quantity  of  information,  but  in  that  its  nature 
and  order  is  wholly  alien,  inconceivable  and  indescribable. 
0.2.2  Xenophanes 
I  begin  with  three  fragments  in  which  Xenophanes'  view  on  the 
epistemological  aspect  of  the  chasm  between  Man  and  God  is  most 
clearly  stated: 
21  B  23  D.  -K.: 
E`l.  s  eEÖs,  'EV  TE  eEOLQL  KQL  QVePW1TOLQL  ý1.  E'YLQTOS, 
OÜTL  8Eµas  BV7ITOLQLV  öµo'LLOs  OvBE  vöTJµa.  - 
B  24  D.  -K.: 
OÜXOS  öpä,  OÜÄOS  SE 
VOE  L,  013A09  SE  T  QKOÜE  L. 
B  25  D.  -K.: 
6  )a'  äTrävEU6E  növoLo  Vöou  ýpEVý  TrävTa  Kpa8a'LvEL. 
What  is  so  remarkable  about  these  fragments  is  that  they  explicitly  place 
God  on  a  totally  different,  transcendent  plane:  he  is,  as  B  23  puts  it, 
"nothing  like  mortals,  either  in  shape  or  in  thought".  God  is  not  simply 
stronger,  bigger,  swifter  or,  for  that  matter,  more  knowledgeable  than  Man, 
as  Homeric  gods  are;  God  is  simply  other.  12  Thus,  for  instance,  it  is 
12  Therefore,  views  that  ascribe  a  specific  (spherical)  shape  to  Xenophanes'  god 
must  be  discarded  (cf.  Lesher  [1992:  100-2]).  The  fundamental  `alterity'  of  the XXJ 
meaningless  to  imagine  that  God  is  anthropomorphic  or  theriomorphic 
(21  B  14,  B  15,  B  16;  cf.  also  Empedocles  31  B  29,  B  134),  or  that  he  has  the 
moral  fabric  or  attitude  of  a  mortal  (21  B  11,  B  12);  13  likewise,  it  is  also 
meaningless  to  imagine  that  God's  perceptual  modes  or  the  nature  of  his 
mind  can  be  compared  to  human  ones:  as  B  24  makes  clear,  God's 
faculties  of  perception,  being  of  a  wholly  different  order  than  Man's, 
cannot  be  located  in  specific  sensory  organs;  14  God  has  a  `holistic',  15 
`synthetic'  (and,  we  must  assume,  perfect)  perception,  whereas  Man's 
perception  is  partial  (as  it  depends  on  the  data  provided  by  his  specific 
sensory  organs)  and  therefore  imperfect  (for  the  idea  cf.  also  Empedocles 
31  B  2:  QTELVWTrOI,  LV  'YQP  TraAäµaL  KaTQ  yUta.,  K4XUVT  LL  KTX.,  where 
TraXdgaL  =  `sensory  organs',  "Sinneswerkzeuge"  [D.  -K.  ]16).  To  quote 
divine  noos  is  further  emphasized  in  21  B  25  (quoted  above)  where,  as  Lesher 
(1992:  110)  has  finely  demonstrated,  Xenophanes  is  contradistinguishing  his 
novel  idea  of  an  "effortlessly  telekinetic  divine  noos"  from  such  a  crudely 
physical  image  as  e.  g.  that  of  Homeric  Zeus  shaking  Olympus  with  a  single  nod 
of  his  brow  (Il.  1.528-30). 
13  See  von  Fritz  (1993:  31  with  nn.  26  &  27).  Note  that  when  Xenophanes  claims 
that  gods  cannot  have  human  vices  he  cannot  mean  merely  that  gods  are  moral 
by  human  measures.  This  would  merely  turn  the  gods  into  perfect  counterparts 
of  us  imperfect  humans.  Xenophanes  explicitly  stresses  that  God  is  not  merely 
superior  to  Man  in  his  shape  (µop4  i)  or  in  his  mind  (v0r1µa):  he  says  that  God  is, 
in  these  respects,  nothing  like  Man. 
11  The  verb  voEty  seems  at  first  sight  to  keep  strange  company  with  the  other 
two  verbs  of  the  fragment;  however,  as  von  Fritz  (1993:  32-3)  has  excellently 
demonstrated,  voety  is  not  here  particularly  associated  with  intellectual 
activity,  but  preserves  its  Homeric  meaning  ("perceiving  through  the 
senses"). 
15  Cf.  Fränkel  (1993a:  130  n.  51);  Jäger  (1947:  44). 
16  For  this  meaning  of  the  word  in  Empedocles  cf.  31  B  3.9  äepEL  1rä0,  nakiµi 
immediately  followed  by  an  enumeration  of  the  senses  which  shows  that 
1Takiµn  is  here  a  generic  term  for  all  organs  of  sensual  preception:  von  Fritz 
(1993:  58),  Wright  (1981:  ad  loc.  ).  That  Empedocles  defended  the  evidence  of  the 
senses  as  a  means  for  the  acquisition  of  true  knowledge  (Kirk,  Raven  & 
Schofield  [1983:  284-5])  does  not  cancel  his  reservations  in  31  B2  about  the 
sufficiency  of  such  evidence. mdi 
Fränkel  (1993a:  130),  for  Xenophanes  "the  absolute  does  not  fit  into 
human  modes  of  representation  precisely  because  -  they  are  especially 
adapted  to  the  grasping  of  what  is  earthly.  Xenophanes  separates  these 
two  regions  from  one  another  plainly  and  fundamentally.  "17 
The  above  thoughts  can  be  excellently  supplemented  by  some  very 
perceptive  remarks  offered  by  H.  Fränkel  (1993a:  130)  and  K.  von  Fritz 
(1993:  34-5).  The  former  draws  our  attention  to  two  testimonia  (21  A  52 
D.  -K.  ),  according  to  which  Xenophanes  denied  "that  divinity  speaks  to 
men  in  signs  and  oracles  [...  ].  In  this  way  he  made  the  chasm  between 
the  here  and  the  beyond  unbridgeable"  (Fränkel  l.  c.  ).  Indeed,  this  squares 
p?  ectly  with  Xenophanes'  view  on  the  epistemological  `otherness'  of  God: 
if  God's  knowledge  is  perfect,  and  Man's  only  partial  and  imperfect,  then 
it  follows  that  the  idea  of  a  rapprochement  between  these  two 
incommensurably  different  cognitive  levels  is  a  non  sequitur.  "' 
Moreover,  K.  von  Fritz  (1993:  34-5)  notes  that  nowhere  in  the 
extant  fragments  does  Xenophanes  use  vöos  in  connection  with  human 
beings;  he  reserves  the  word  exclusively  for  the  divine  mind.  If.  this  is  not 
accidental,  then  it  may  indicate  yet  another  important  deviation  from 
Homeric  epistemology:  it  is  no  longer  the  case,  as  it  is  in  Homer,  that  all 
people  have  vöos  (of  varying  quality  and  degree),  while  the  gods,  with 
their  omniscient  vöos,  are  simply  perfected  men  (epistemologically 
speaking).  For  Xenophanes,  human  knowledge,  qua  inherently  imperfect 
and  illusory,  is  so  incommensurably  inferior  to  divine  knowledge  that  it 
seems  virtually  non-existent  in  comparison  to  it;  divine  modes  of 
17  On  the  chasm  between  human  and  divine  knowledge,  in  terms  of  quality,  not 
quantity  (a  point  missed  by  Lesher  [1992:  106]),  see  further  my  remarks  on 
Heraclitus  22  B  78  D.  -K.  (p.  xxx  below). 
18  Cf.  also  Lesher  (1978:  7-8,15-6).  It  follows  that  I  cannot  agree  with  Snell 
(1975:  130)  when  he  remarks:  "Und  doch  gleicht  der  Gott,  den  er  [sc. 
Xenophanes]  begreift,  noch  sichtlich  ihm  selbst  und  dem,  was  er  erstrebt:  Das 
Göttliche  ist  das  Komplement  zu  dem  Menschlichen  [...  ]:  da  ihm  die  Weisheit  das 
Höchste  am  Menschen  ist,  ist  sie  es  ihm  auch  an  der  Gottheit;  nur  hat  der 
Mensch  unvollkommenes  Wissn,  Gott  aber  desto  volkommeneres  [...  ]". X)ciii 
perception  deserve  to  be  termed  vOos,  whereas  human  ones  do  not.  19 
Xenophanes'  "extreme  skepticism  concerning  the  capacity  of  human 
beings  for  true  insight"  (von  Fritz  [1993:  34])  is  also  illustrated  by  such 
fragments  as  21  B  35  (TavTa  8E8o  äa6W  µEV  EOLK6Ta  Tots  ETÜ  WLQL 
... 
)20 
and  36  (6TrTr6aa  8iß  Ov1jTOtaL  TrE#'VaOLV  ELQOpäaaüaL  ...  ),  21  but 
above  all  by  the  celebrated  21  B  34: 
KQt,  TO,  ý.,  I.  EV  OÜV  QQýES  OÜTLS  C[Vijp  1ýBEV  OÜSE  TLS  EQTQL 
EISGJS  QV(VL 
OE 
(ZV  TE  KQL 
*  QQQ'Q  M  yW  1TEpl,  TTELVTWV 
EL  yäp  Kai  TCL  E161i1L0Ta  TÜXOL  TETEXEQýIEVOV  EI7ttiJV, 
QÜTÖS  Ö[1G)S  OüK  OIBE'  86KOS  H'  E7TL  7TQQL  TETUKTQL. 
That  the  imperfect  knowledge  (cf.  4:  8OK09,  "assumptions")  of  men  must 
have  been  here  contrasted  with  the  perfect  knowledge  of  the  gods  seems  a 
probable  inference  from  the  closely  resembling  postscripts  to  the 
quotations  of  this  passage  by  Areius  Didymus  (apud  Stob.  II.  1.17  [II,  p. 
6,16-8  Wachsmuth]  =  21  A  24  D.  -K.:  JG  äpa  OEÖS  µßv  018E  TiJv 
&Xi  OELQV,  80KOS  8'  ETr6  TrdaL  TETVKTaL)  and  by  Varro  (apud  St 
Augustine,  De  Civ.  Del  7.17:  hominis  est  enim  haec  opinari,  Del  scire)  2Z 
After  all,  a  similar  contrast  between  the  completeness  of  divine  and  the 
incompleteness  of  human  knowledge  is  made  In  21  B  18.  It  is  now 
interesting  to  see  how  this  contrast  between  the  a#E3  (fully  accessible 
only  to  divine  knowledge)  and  the  8OK09  (human  assumptions)  is 
formulated  in  the  above  quoted  B  34:  as  Barnes  (1979:  143)  has 
demonstrated,  "Xenophanes'  point  is  that  many  of  my  beliefs  are 
explicable  by  a  causal  hypothesis  which  has  no  direct  connexion  with  the 
content  of  those  beliefs.  I  believe  that  P  [where  P=  any  proposition]  and  P 
19  Heraclitus  seems  also  to  have  adopted  a  similar  point  of  view:  see  p.  xxix  ff. 
20  On  B  35  see  Lesher  (1992:  169-76). 
21  On  the  epistemological  import  of  B  36  see  Fränkel  (1993a:  123);  more 
perceptively  Lesher  (1992:  176-9). }ociv 
is  true:  yet  there  is  a  causal  chain  explaining  my  belief  which  was  neither 
originated  nor  at  any  stage  supplemented  by  the  fact  that  P.  And  that  is 
why  my  belief  is  not  knowledge.  "  Thus,  there  is  a.  causal  chain  explaining 
the  Thracians'  belief  that  gods  are  blue-eyed  and  red-haired,  or  the 
Ethiopians'  own  belief  that  gods  are  black  and  snub-nosed  (21  B  16)  :  the 
Thracians  themselves  having  blue  eyes  and  red  hair,  and  the  Ethiopians 
being  black  and  snub-nosed,  they  assume  that  the  gods  look  like  them; 
similarly,  a  person  who  has  never  tasted  honey  thinks  that  figs  are 
sweetest  by  far  (21  B  38).  23  The  fact  that  such  beliefs  are  causally 
explicable  has  nothing  to  do  with,  the  fact  that  their  content  is  true 
(which  it  is  not).  Likewise,  our  belief  that  the  First  World  War  took  place 
-  which  is,  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  a  true  belief  (Xenophanes' 
TE  TE  AE  ap.  VOV  24) 
-  can  be  explained  by  our  possessing  evidence 
suggesting  that  there  was  a  World  War  between  1914  and  1918;  this  belief 
does  not,  however,  stem  directly  from  the  fact  that  the  First  World  War 
did  actually  take  place.  What  must  be  stressed  here,  especially  as  it  is  not 
made  clear  by  Barnes,  25  is  that,  when  Xenophanes  criticizes  the  beliefs  of 
the  Thracians  or-the  Ethiopians,  it  is  his-own  vantage  point  'that  enables 
him  to  appreciate  how  the  inescapable  limitedness  of  human  experience, 
the  inherently  partial  and  incomplete  nature  of  human  knowledge,  can 
lead  to  false  assumptions.  26  Scholars27  have  rightly  compared  this  to  the 
end  of  the  first  chapter  of  the  Hippocratic  On  Ancient  Medicine  I.  3  (I. 
572,4-8  Littre):  6  (sc.  Tä  äýavEa  Kai  änopEöREva),  ET  TLS  AEyoL  Kai 
22  See  Fränkel  (1993a:  128-9),  Barnes  (1979:  139),  Lesher  (1992:  167). 
23  On  B  38  see  Lesher  (1992:  180-2). 
24  On  the  word  see  Fränkel  (1993a:  126),  Snell  (1975:  131),  Lesher  (1992:  158). 
25  On  this  shortcoming  of  Barnes'  exposition  see  also  Lesher  (1992:  166). 
26  See  further  Fränkel  (1975:  332-3)  and  cf.  below  n.  31.  Wiesner  (1997:  24-5,29, 
31)  stresses  the  polemic  tone  of  B  34  (a  point  already  made  by  C.  J.  Classen  and  by 
S.  Yonezawa:  full  references  in  Wiesner  [1997:  24  nn.  32,33])  and  thinks  that 
Xenophanes  exempts  himself  from  the  cognitive  limitations  imposed  on  other 
people;  but  this  is  surely  an  exaggeration. 
27  See  most  recently  Finkelberg  (1990:  134  n.  84)  and  Lesher  (1992:  168);  cf.  also 
J.  Jouanna  (ed.  ),  Hippocrate,  vol.  II.  1  (Paris:  Les  Belles  Lettres  1990),  158  n.  6  for 
further  material. yLV6CfKOL28  (ýS  E)CEL,  OÜT  C(.  V  CLÜT(Z  TW  AEryOVTL  GÜTE  TOI,  S  QKOÜOUCfL 
STjXC(.  QV  ETTJ  EI,  TE  ä.  ATIBECL  ECtTLV  EI.  TE  117j'  Ob  yQp 
ECfTL  1Tp6s 
Ö,  TL  Xp11 
EITCLVEVEyKCLVTCt  E'LSEVCLL  TO'  CiCL(Ns.  Further  illustration  may  be  provided 
by  Empedocles  (31  B2D.  -K.  ): 
Traüpov  8'  Ev  CWýQL  ß'Lov  µEpos  ä6pTjQavTEs  [sc.  äv6pWTroL] 
W9KÜýI.  OPOL  KQTTVOIA  8LK1IV  QPeEVTEs  QTTETTTQV 
QÜTÖ  uÖVOV  1TELQ6EVTE9,  ÖTco  TrpOQEKUpQEV  gKQQTOS 
1TCI.  VTOQ  EXCI,  UVÖ[l.  EVOL'  TO'  8'  Ö%OV  <TLS  Qp>z9  EÜ)(ETQL  EÜpELV; 
OÜT(ý)S  OÜT  ETTL8EpKTQ  T68'  äv8päQLV  Ol'1T  E'fýQKOUO'Tä 
OÜTE  VÖ(p  TIE  PLÄflITTQ... 
Men's  beliefs  are  formed  according  to  their  individual  experiences,  which 
are  by  nature  partial  and  incomplete,  i.  e.  cannot  provide  insight  into  the 
entirety  of  knowledge  (Td  ö  ov)  . 
30  Enlightened  people  like  Xenophanes 
may  have  access  to  a  privileged  vantage  point  (thanks  to  their  broader 
range  of  experience,  their  intelligence  etc.  )  which  allows  them  to  realize 
and  criticize  the  false  beliefs  of  mortals;  nonetheless,  even  the  insights  of 
such  exceptional  people  are  bound  to  appear  hopelessly  limited  in 
comparison  with  divine  knowledge.  For  the  gods,  by  definition,  occupy 
the  ultimate  vantage  point,  epistemologically  speaking,  as  only  they  have 
complete  knowledge  of  TO  aa4  c;  in  other  words,  their  position  in 
relation  to  the  clouded  human  knowledge  is  analogous  to  Xenophanes' 
position  in  relation  to  the  false  assumptions  of  the  Thracians  or  the 
28  Littre  in  his  app.  crit.  ad  loc.  proposed  ä,  E1.  )%yoL  TLS  Kai  yLVWQKE6v. 
29  T1S  äp'  H.  Fränkel,  followed  by  Kirk,  Raven  &  Schofield  (1983:  284)  :  irds 
Bergk,  followed  by  D.  -K.  (in  the  latter  case  the  phrase  is  a  statement,  not  a 
question). 
30  Cf.  Wright  (1981:  156);  for  further  possible  instances  of  the  idea  in  ancient 
literature  see  Lesher  (1992:  181). xxvi 
Ethiopians,  or  those  who  have  never  tasted  honey.  This  analogy  makes 
Xenophanes  realize  that,  even  if  some  of  our  assumptions  may 
correspond  to  what  is  actually  the  case  (TETEAEQµEVOV),  still  we  can 
never  securely  assess  their  truth  or  their  untruth  (aüTÖS  811wg  OüK 
oL8E  ),  because  we  have  no  means  of  checking  them  against  the  true  and 
complete  knowledge  possessed  by  the  gods:  in  other  words,  due  to  our 
inherently  limited  circle  of  experience,  we  can  never  boast  to  have  known 
what  Empedocles  called  TO'  öXov;  we  can  never  be  sure  that  we  are  not 
like  those  who  assume  figs  to  be  sweetest  because  they  have  never  tasted 
honey.  "  An  important  implication  of  the  above  considerations  is  that 
one  could  not  possibly  hope  to  attain  to  positive  knowledge  of  divinity; 
one  can,  at  best,  point  out  what  God  is  not  (as  Xenophanes  himself  does 
in  B  23  [p.  xx]),  because  human  intellect  is  fundamentally  incapable  of 
understanding  what  God  actually  is.  32  Even  when  Xenophanes  ventures  a 
description  of  what  God  is  (B  24-26),  it  is  to  stress  his  fundamental 
alterity  rather  than  to  give  a  positive  picture  of  him:  as  we  saw,  God, 
unlike  humans,  has  a  `holistic'  perception  (B  24);  he  does  not  move,  but 
he  moves  everything  with  the  power  of  his  thought  (B  25,26);  etc.  Thus, 
there  is  no  real  contradiction  between  the  `apophatic'  B  34  (quoted  above, 
31  See  further  Heitsch's  (1983:  177-84)  most  excellent  exposition,  closely 
followed  by  Lesher  (1992:  166-69);  Finkelberg  (1990:  134  n.  83)  adopts  an 
unnecessarily  restrictive  approach.  I  fully  agree  with  Barnes  (1979:  138)  and 
Lesher  (1978:  5-6),  (1992:  157-8,160,162-3)  that  Fränkel's  (1993a)  attempt  to 
strain  the  Greek  of  B  34  in  order  to  turn  it  into  a  defence  of  empirically  gained 
knowledge  cannot  stand.  See  also  Finkelberg  (1990:  131  n.  73)  for  further 
literature  on  the  correct  interpretation  of  the  fragment;  full  doxography  in 
Lesher  (1992:  161-66). 
32  This  is  of  course  another  instance  of  `apophatic'  theology;  the  idea  reappears 
in  a  far  more  elaborate  form  in  Plotinus,  e.  g.  Enn.  VI.  9,3.  In  Christian 
philosophy  this  point  would  be  further  developed  to  the  effect  that  God  eludes 
all  affirmation  as  well  as  all  negation:  see-esp.  Pseudo-Dionysius  Areopagita,  Le 
myst.  theol.  chs.  IV  &V  with  the  commentary  of  Lossky  (1957:  29,31),  who  also 
provides  further  instances  of  this  idea  in  Christian  fathers  (op.  cit.,  pp.  34-7). xacvii 
/ 
p.  xxiii)  and  B  23-26,  as  it  has  been  sometimes  argued  -  most  recently  by 
Finkelberg  (1990:  131-6).  33 
With  the  above  interpretation  it  would  appear  that  B  34  should 
shatter  our  confidence  in  the  reliability  of  human  cognition:  just  as  the 
Thracians  could  realize  the  erroneousness  of  their  beliefs  only  if  they  had 
Xenophanes'  comparative  material  and  viewed  things  from  his  vantage 
point,  so  men  can  check  the  validity  of  their  beliefs  only  if  they  assume 
the  vantage  point  of  the  gods.  This  would  seem  practically  to  deny  the 
possibility  of  obtaining  secure  knowledge.  Nonetheless,  Xenophanes  does 
not  seem  to  have  been  a  hard-core  sceptic  avant  la  lettre;  and  there  is 
much  to  commend  Barnes'  (1979:  136-43)  view,  34  who  sees  Xenophanes  as 
a  mild,  John  Locke-style,  sceptic.  The  following  fragment  (21  B  18)  asserts 
that  some  kind  of  knowledge  is  attainable: 
OüTOL  äTr'  äpXTjs  TTävTa  eEOIL  evT)TOI. 
Q  vTrEBELýav 
G(iýl.  XPÖVCý)  C7ITOÜVTE3  EýEUpLQKOUQ6V  Qý.  1.  EI,  VOV.  3S 
Although  the  ultimate  vantage  point,  that  provides  full,  accurate  and 
perfect  knowledge,  is  an  exclusive  prerogative  of  divinity,  still  people  can 
33  See  further  Heitsch's  (1983:  175-6)  excellent  remarks;  also  Wiesner  (1997:  20- 
22,29-30,32).  Finkelberg  (1990:  156  with  n.  113)  underplays  the  importance  of 
divine  alterity  in  Xenophanes,  and  assumes  (1990:  146-7  n.  101,  and  160)  that 
Xenophanes  denied  the  possibility  of  certain  knowledge  about  natural 
phenomena  (which  cannot  be  apodeictically  argued  to),  but  not  about  the  gods 
(who  can  be  apodeictically  argued  to).  But  what  about  the  unknowability  of  the 
gods  propounded  in  B  34  (cf.  1TEpL  6EC,  3v)?  It  is  "merely  the  archaic  description 
of  the  domain  later  known  as  meteorology",  answers  Finkelberg  (1990:  147  n. 
101),  thus  demonstrating  to  what  extent  one  is  capable  of  going  in  order  to 
`prove'  an  erroneous  thesis.  Further  criticism  of  Finkelberg  in  Lesher  (1992: 
163-4). 
34  See  already  Jager  (1947:  43  with  n.  20);  most  recently  Wiesner  (1997). 
35  On  the  interpretation  of  this  fragment  I  am  in  essential  agreement  with 
Lesher  (1992:  153-5). xxviii 
attain,  if  gradually,  to  relatively  safe  assumptions  about  things  -  with 
the  proviso,  of  course,  that  these  assumptions  may  be  superseded  (due  to 
new  evidence  or  new  insights  etc.  )  by  even  more  reliable  ones,  and  so 
forth.  We  are  always  bound  to  think  that  figs  are  sweetest,  until  we 
discover  honey.  36 
0.2.3  Heraclitus 
The  immeasurably  superior,  `holistic'  /  synthetical  and  transcendent 
(and 
.  therefore  essentially  inconceivable,  indescribable  and  unknowable) 
nature  of  God's  noos  as  against  Man's  clouded,  partial  and  imperfect 
knowledge  is  a  fundamental  idea  in  the  extant  fragments  of  Heraclitus.  In 
fact,  the  `apophatic'  (see  p.  xiv  with  n.  2)  approach  to  divinity  seems  to 
have  constituted  the  core  of  Heraclitus'  epistemology.  37  The  refusal  to 
attribute  ontological  predicates  to  the  transcendental  God  is  excellently 
illustrated,  in  a  quaint  and  graphic  manner,  in  22  B  79  D.  -K.: 
äviIp  VT1TTIAs  7jKOUQE  'fTpös  8aLµovos  ÖK(ýJa'TTE  p  1TaLs  Trpös  äv8pös. 
Bearing  in  mind  that,  as  Petersen  (1879)  was  the  first  to  show,  7qKOUQE 
should  be  taken  here  as  equivalent  to  KQAE  tTaL,  then  the  point  of  the 
fragment  is  that,  just  as  a  child  seems  infantile  to  a  grown-up,  so  human 
knowledge  would  appear  puerile  in  comparison  with  divine  knowledge;  in 
D.  -K.  's  translation:  "Der  Mann  heißt  kindisch  von  der  Gottheit  so  wie  der 
Knabe  vor  dem  Manne".  This  use  of  analogical  modes  of  expression  (e.  g. 
36  I  cannot  agree  with  Gigon  (1954:  143-4,161-2)  when  he  thinks  he  detects 
grains  of  hard-core  scepticism  in  Xenophanes.  Contra  rightly  Snell  (apud  Gigon 
[1954:  160]),  who  manages  to  encapsulate  the  essence  of  Xenophanean 
epistemology,  particularly  in  relation  to  the  gods,  in  a  few  admirably  terse 
lines. 
37  On  Heraclitus  as  a  precursor  of  the  later  (Christian)  apophatism  see  Yannaras 
(1988:  19  n.  2,22). "God  is  to  Man  what  Man  is  to  child",  or:  God  /  Man  =  Man  /  child,  or 
more  abstractly  still:  A/B=B/  C),  38  in  order  to  illustrate  the  immense 
gap  separating  the  here-and-now  from  the  Absolute  and  the  Beyond,  is 
typical  of  Heraclitus.  See,  for  instance,  fr.  22  B  83: 
äv6p6TTwv  o  QOýCi)TQTOS  'iTpÖs  6E6V  1TL6TlKOs  ýQVELTQL  KQL  QOýLCI.  KQL 
KäI)v\EL  KQL  TOLS  Q\XOLS  TTäQLV.  39 
As  Frankel  (1993b:  217)  has  aptly  demonstrated,  in  such  analogical 
patterns  of  thought  the  term  C  (child,  ape  etc.  )  is  a  well-known  thing 
with  notorious  defects;  the  term  B  (ordinary  Man)  is  supposed  to  be  the 
commonly  accepted  standard,  i.  e.  a  well-known  magnitude  and  a  worthy 
subject.  And  yet  Heraclitus'  analogies  show  that  Man,  when  compared 
with  term  A  (the  Absolute,  or  God),  proves  to  be  as  unworthy  as  a  child  or 
an  ape  is  to  him.  The  true  standard,  that  dwarfs  Man's  aspirations  to 
excellence,  is  God,  whose  nature  is  completely  beyond  the  ken  of  common 
experience,  essentially  inaccessible  to  human  imagination  and 
description.  The  only  way  for  Man  to  have  a  measure  of  God's  `otherness' 
and  superiority  is  by  means  of  Heraclitus'  expressive  analogies  (or  "the 
scheme  of  the  geometrical  mean",  as  Frankel  has  called  it)  -  these 
analogies,  indeed  are  as  close  as  human  beings  can  come  to  expressing  the 
inexpressible  and  explaining  the  inexplicable:  "What  is  God?  God  is  that 
compared  to  which  the  most  perfect  man  will  appear  as  an  infant  or  as  a 
hideous  and  ridiculous  ape"  (Frankel  [1993b:  217]).  1 
38  See  Petersen  (1879:  306)  and,  more  systematically,  Fränkel  (1993b:  214).. 
"The  authenticity  of  this  fragment  has  been  doubted  by  Marcovich  (1967:  488- 
9),  T.  M.  Robinson  (1987:  ad  loc.  )  and  others;  see  however  Kahn's  (1979:  174) 
defence  of  it. 
°O  Cf.  also  Fränkel  (1975:  381-2)  and  Kahn  (1979:  174);  for  a  useful  caveat 
regarding  Fränkel's  interpretation  see,  however,  Marcovich  (1967:  488).  Thus, 
one  should  be  reluctant  to  agree  with  Snell  (1975:  134)  that  "Heraklit  nur  von 
verschiedenen  Graden  der  Einsicht  bei  Tier;  Mensch  und  Gott  spricht,  so  daß 
ihr  Verhältnis  zueinander  in  einer  Proportion  ausdrückbar  ist...  ":  such  a Further  insight  into  this  alterity  of  divine  noos  is  provided  by  22  B 
78  D.  -K.,  which  seems  closely  connected  with  B  79  (quoted  above  on  p. 
xxviii);  1 
ý@os  yäp  äv9pýnELov  µýv  oüK  E  XE  L  yvcýµas,  4Z  eE  zov  8E  E  XE  L. 
The  traditional  (Homeric  etc.  )  view  that  the  divine  knowledge  is  simply 
wider  than  the  human  one  is  here  most  radically  modified,  perhaps 
along  the  lines  of  Xenophanes:  polymathy,  after  all,  is  not  conducive  to 
true  noos  (22  B  40  TroXuµ(1OLtl  VOOV  E  XE  LV  ov  8L8äaKE  L  ... 
)  43  What  really 
differentiates  Man  from  God  is  that  only  God  has  true  judgement 
(yyvc'  it  ),  whereas  men  do  not;  the  difference  between  divine  and  human 
knowledge  is  one  not  of  quantity,  but  of  quality;  not  of  range  (or  scope), 
but  of  kind  (or  nature).  In  other  words,  as  I  suggested  above  (p.  xiv),  it  is 
not  the  case  that  knowledge  is  something  that  both  gods  and  men 
possess,  except  that  the  former  have  it  in  larger  quantities:  knowledge  is, 
quite  simply,  something  that  gods  do  possess,  whereas  men  virtually  do 
not.  To  be  more  precise,  what  knowledge  men  possess  is  so  inferior  to  the 
true  and  perfect  knowledge  possessed  only  by  the  gods  that  it  appears,  to 
all  intents  and  purposes,  as  inexistent  in  comparison  with  that44  As  Kirk, 
statement  implies  that  the  difference  between  human  and  divine  knowledge  is 
only  one  of  quantity,  of  `grade'. 
41  That  B  79  is  closely  connected  with  B  78  is  also  the  view  of  D.  -K.,  as  appears 
from  their  (slightly  cryptic)  note  on  the  former  fragment:  "nach  78". 
42  On  the  word  see  Jäger  (1947:  233  n.  58). 
43  See  further  Kahn  (1979:  108);  K.  Pritzl,  Phoenix  39  (1985)  308.  We  saw  above 
(p.  xxii)  that  Xenophanes  seems  to  have  refrained  from  using  noos  to  designate 
the  perceptual  faculties  of  human  beings;  he  probably  reserved  the  word  for 
the  gods  only,  thus  paving,  perhaps,  the  way  for  Heraclitus'  sharp  divorcing  of 
polymathy  from  true  noos.  It  is  ironical,  however,  that  one  of  the  polymaths 
attacked  in  the  rest  of  22  B  40  (not  quoted  here)  is  Xenophanes  himself! 
44  This  is  very  emphatically  -and  rightly  -urged  by  Marcovich  (1967:  479, 
488);  see  also  Kirk  (1954:  385,387,399).  Cf.  my  similar  remarks  on  Xenophanes 
above,  p.  xxii. Raven  &  Schofield  (1983:  191  n.  1)  further  remark,  Heraclitus  here  avers 
"the  superiority  [...  ]  of  the  divine  synthetic  view  of  things  to  the  human 
chaotic  view  [...  ]  One  saying  specifically  asserts  that  for  god  the 
separateness  implied  by  opposites  does  not  exist:  [22  B  102  D.  -K.  ]  Tw  µhV 
eE({  Ka)  t  TraVTQ  KQL  8LKQLa,  45  avOPWTTOL  8E  ä  µEV  c&LKa,  5TrELX14ct0LV 
ti  8E  8LKaLa"  46 
Along  similar  lines  is  also  another  important  fragment,  namely  22 
B  108: 
ÖKÖQWV  AÖ'YOUS  7IKOUQQ,  OÜsELS  QýLKVELTQL  ES  TOIJTO,  W",  UTE 
'YLV(i)QKELV  ÖTL  QOýÖV  EQTL  TTQVTWV  KE)(WPLQýI.  EVOV. 
Pace  D.  -K.,  who  prefer  to  interpret  this  fragment  along  the  lines  of  B  102 
(quoted  above,  p.  xxxi),  47  I  should  plump  for  Kahn's  (1979:  309  n.  83) 
interpretation:  "none  has  got  so  far  as  this:  to  recognize  that  the  wise  is 
set  apart  from  all";  48  this  rendering,  which.  (pace  Fatouros  [1994:  68  n. 
4s  Before  KaL  SLKaLa  the  MSS  give  Kai  üya@ä,  which  was  deleted  by  Marcovich 
(1967:  481)  on  very  reasonable  grounds. 
460n  God's  synoptic  view  of  things  cf.  also  22  B  67  D.  -K.  See  also  Fränkel's  (1975: 
375)  admirable  analysis,  and  cf.  Diller  (1950:  26).  Kirk,  Raven  &  Schofield  (l.  c.  ) 
also  compare  the  Hebrew  concept  (Isaiah  55.8-9):  "For  `my  thoughts  are  not 
your  thoughts,  neither  are  your  ways  my  ways',  saith  the  LORD,  `for  as  the 
heavens  are  higher  than  the  earth,  so  are  my  ways  higher  than  your  ways,  and 
my  thoughts  than  your  thoughts.  '"  -On  the  relevance  of  22  B  78  to  Sophocles' 
view  of  divinity  cf.  E.  Dönt,  A&A  17  (1971)  45-55,  albeit  with  some  excesses 
rightly  criticized  by  Strohm  (1971:  162). 
47  See  their  app.  crit.  ad  loc.  "Die  ä4aviý  äpµovta  Gottes  (B67)  and  seine  im 
k6yos  verkörperte  Einheit  tritt  der  irdischen  Dissonanz  and  ihrem  steten 
Wechsel  als  das  Absolute  gegenüber;  vgl.  B102  [...  ].  " 
48  This  is  actually  Kahn's  second-best  interpretation,  which  I  prefer 
nonetheless  on  stylistic  grounds  (cf.  Fatouros  [1994:  68  n.  11]).  As  Marcovich 
(1967:  441)  explains,  KEXWPLQµEVOV  means  `qualitatively  different  from',  and wadi 
11])  aptly  preserves  the  ambiguity,  of  TrävTwv  (='all  people'  /  `all  things'), 
emphasizes  that  true  wisdom  is,  in  its  totality,  inaccessible  to  humans  by 
virtue  of  its  transcendent  separateness,  qua  cosmic  or  divine  principle, 
from  all  things.  For  the  idea  (which  I  shall  attempt  to  clarify 
immediately  below)  cf.  '  Anaxagoras  59  B  12  D.  -K.  voüs  ...  µE  µE  LKTaL 
O  )6EVL  Xp4LaTL,  cXXh  µÖVOs  aÜTÖS  Elf  Eü)UTOÜ  EO'TLV;  ?  Philolaus  44  B 
20  D.  -K.  (EQTL  yap  rlyEµwv  KQL  aPXÜV  aTraVTwv  OEOs,  ELs,  &EL  WV, 
rrýtta  tr  v 
ýLOVLý.  LOS,  QKLVTITOS,  QUTOS  EQUT(J  0ý.  1.  OLOS,  ETEpOs  TwV  6,  )V\(AV)  and 
Apollonius  of  Tyana  apud  Euseb.  P.  E.  IV  13  (6Ew  ... 
EVL  TE  ÖVTL 
KEXGJpLQýLEVy  TfüVT(AV)  a9 
Now,  this  sophon,  which  "stands  apart  from  everything",  can  be 
relatively  safely  identified  with  Divinity  (which  is  similarly  pronounced 
"the  only  sophon"  in  B  32  D.  -K.  )  and  the  Logos  (knowledge  of  which  is 
conducive  to  sophia,  as  appears  from  B  50  D.  -K.  ).  50  At  the  same  time, 
however,  this  KEXWPLCTREVOs  Logos  is  called  in  B2D.  -K.  Uv6  (TOß 
XÖyoU  8' 
EOVTOS  ýVVOii  (d)OUCTLV  OL  TrO)XOL  c  L8LCLV  EXOVTES 
4pÖvriaLV;  cf.  also  B1D.  -K.;  B  113  D.  -K.: 
ýUVOV  ECTTL  TTdCTLS1  TO 
4povE  E  Lv)  . 
52  This  is  far  from  self-contradictory:  the  Logos  /  Divinity  / 
not  `to  be  separated  from',  as  it  is  usually  taken.  Differently  Kirk  (1954:  398-400) 
and  T.  M.  Robinson  (1987:  ad  loc.  ). 
49  In  fact  D.  -K.  curiously  cite  these  two  fragments  in  support  of  their  own 
interpretation  of  B  108  (see  previous  note),  but  I  fail  to  see  how  they  could  be 
right. 
50  Cf.  Darcus  Sullivan  (1984)  -with  the  older  literature  on  the  relation  between 
Td  aoýov  and  the  divinity  (ibid.  292  n.  37)  -notwithstanding  her  `quantitative' 
view  of  the  epistemological  difference  between  Man  and  God(cf.  n.  53). 
51  I  take  zräaL  to  mean  "to  all  people",  not  "to  all  things",  pace  Kahn  (1979:  119) 
and  T.  M.  Robinson  (1987:  ad  loc.  ).  To  credit  Heraclitus  with  believing  in  some 
kind  of  `awareness'  (4povEELv)  innate  in  all  things,  as  Robinson  and  Kahn  do, 
would  be  to  turn  him,  unwarrantably,  into  a  hylozoist-panpsychist.  As  many 
have  remarked,  the  sense  of  this  fragment  is,  of  course,  not  that  all  people  are 
wise,  but  that  all  people  have  the  potential  for  true  wisdom. 
52  The  authenticity  of  B  113  is  doubted  by  Kirk  (1954:  55-6,63)  and  Marcovich 
(1967:  89). xxaciii 
sophon  is  xynon,  `shared',  insofar  as  every  single  individual  has, 
potentially,  his  share  of  it  -  in  other  words,  insofar  as  he  can  have 
(partial)  access  to  the  inexhaustible  common  repository  that  is  the  Logos 
(cf.  on  this  idea  B  114  D.  -K.,  quoted  below  on  p.  xxxiv).  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Logos  /  Divinity  /  sophon  is  also  `separate'  in  that  no  single 
individual  can  have  full  access  to  it,  as  this  is  a  transcendental  entity 
that  lies  beyond  the  cognitive  capacity  of  single  individuals  -a  capacity 
that  is  inescapably  limited.  Thus,  the  partial  and  imperfect  knowledge 
possessed  by  human  individuals  is  again  contrasted  to  the  full  and 
perfect  knowledge  possessed  only  by  God.  "  This  concept  may  be  better 
illustrated  through  a  comparison  with  the  concepts  of  langue  and  parole 
introduced  by  the  founding  father  of  modern  linguistics,  Ferdinand  de 
Saussure:  parole  is  a  term  for  language  as  manifested  in  the  individual 
speech  acts  of  individual  speakers;  It  is  the  Verwirklichung  of  every  single 
individual's  knowledge  of  a  language  -a  knowledge  that  is  inescapably 
imperfect,  for  no  one  (not  even  a  native  speaker)  can  claim  full  and 
perfect  knowledge  of  every  aspect  of  a  language  (morphology,  syntax, 
vocabulary,  usage  etc.  ).  On  the  other  hand,  langue  (the  Heraclitean  Logos, 
mutatis  mutandis)  is  an  abstraction  that  extends  far  beyond  the  mere 
sum  of  the  individual  paroles,  it  is  language  considered  not  as  individual 
manifestation,  but  as  common  possession  of  a  speech  community.  54  Thus, 
as  in  de  Saussure  the  individual  paroles  are  partial  and  imperfect 
manifestations  of  the  abstract  langue,  so  are  in  Heraclitus  the  individual 
intellects  partial  and  imperfect  manifestations  of  the  abstract  system  of 
the  Logos,  which  is  thus  both  ýuvös  and  KEXwpLQµEV0s.  55 
53  Cf.  Axelos  (1962:  62,70-1,83).  For  Darcus  Sullivan  (1984)  such  manifestations 
of  divinity  as  ?  öyos,  yv(,  )RTI,  vOgos  or  TO'  vo4ov  can  be  described  as  tvvöv  in 
that  they  can  be  `shared',  in  differing  degrees,  both  by  humans  and  by  the 
divinity.  This,  however,  leads  her  to  define  the  epistemological  difference 
between  Man  and  God  in  purely  `quantitative'  terms  (Darcus  Sullivan  [1984: 
292]),  which  I  find  unacceptable. 
54  See  the  relevant  passage  from  de  Saussure's  Cours  de  linguistique  generale 
quoted  in  the  Appendix. 
ss  Cf.  also  Yannaras  (1988:  22):  the  Heraclitean  Logos  is  a  peculiarly  Greek  way 
(TpöTros)  of  verifying  knowledge  through  the  experience  of  relationship  or This  interpretation  of  Heraclitus  through  de  Saussure  is  not  as 
anachronistic  as  it  may  seem.  It  can  be  justified  by  B  114  D.  -K.: 
ývv  vöw  VyovTas  'LQXvpLCEQeaL  XpiI  TW  ývvCO  TTävTwv  [note  the 
telling  word-play  eÜv  vöw  -  ývvw!  ],  ÖKwQTrE  p  vöµ(;  ý  TTÖALs,  KQL  TroXü 
LQ)(UpOTEpws.  TPEýOVTaL  yip  TrELVTEs  OL 
äVepW'TTELOL  VÖµOL  ÜTTÖ  EVÖS 
TOO  eEI,  OU'  KpaTEI,  yip  TOQOOTOV  ÖK6QOV  E6EXEL  KG[L  EeapKEL  TräQL 
KüL  'iTEPL'YI,  VETQL. 
A  polis,  qua  communal  institution,  must  base  its  laws  on  the  universal 
divine  law  that  is  superior  to  all  individual  laws,  since  it  exists 
independently  of  them  (this  I  take  to  be  the  implication  of  KpaTEt 
TOCaOÜTOV  OKOCfOV  EBEAEL  Kai  EýapKEt  lTdaL  Kai  TrEplytvETaL).  s6 
Similarly,  individual  intellectual  activity,  in  order  to  be  truly  ý  iv  voq  , 
must  be  based  on  the  ývvOv  -  or  the  Logos,  the  abstraction  which  is  the 
ultimate  source  of  each  and  every  individual  intellect,  while  being  itself 
beyond  and  above  them.  To  put  it  in  Saussurean  terms,  individual 
intellectual  activity,  like  parole,  depending  as  it  does  on  each  subject's 
individual  volition,  is  but  a  partial,  imperfect  and  shadowy 
manifestation  of  the  abstraction  that  is  the  Logos  (or  the  langue),  without 
being  in  any  way  identical  to  it.  For  Logos,  like  langue,  exists 
independently  of  the  will  of  individuals;  it  not  only  comprises  all  its 
individual  realizations,  but  it  also  transcends  them.  And  it  is  for  this 
reason  that  the  Logos,  despite  being  partly  `materialized'  in  individual 
through  the  social  dynamics  of  relationships  ("...  TTjc  Ei1X1lvLK7lc 
KaTaVÖrlaTIS 
TOO  MYOU 
... 
WS 
...  TOO  TPÖITOU  TTOÜ  EITaXTOEÜEL  T71  yVc 
aT 
L 
UO)  T  LTr¬LpLKf 
vXEm1S  f  TfS  KOLVWVLKfiT  8UVap1.  LKfj3  TWV  OXE(TEWV  (TOO  -fipaKAELTELOU  "KOLVOO 
kiyou")").  Jäger  (1947:  125)  adopts  an  extreme  interpretation  both  of  this 
fragment  and  of  B  78  as  downright  agnostic  statements. 
56  OnireplyLVETaL  see  T.  M.  Robinson  (1987:  156).  The  political  metaphor  is  not  the 
main  point  of  the  fragment  (as  Kirk,  Raven  &  Schofield  [1984:  212])  seem  to 
think,  but  merely  an  analogy  that  illustrates  the  dependence  of  every 
individual  noos  on  the  communal  (xynos)  property  that  is  the  Logos:  see  von 
Fritz  (1993:  37-8),  and  cf.  Axelos  (1962:  131). intellects,  remains  essentially  inaccessible  to  the  human  minds?  This  is  a 
revolutionary,  radically  new  approach  to  an  age-old  problem:  Heraclitus, 
on  the  one  hand,  refuses  to  adopt  a  downright  agnostic  position,  for  he 
allows  for  the  possibility  that  human  thought  partakes  of  true  knowledge, 
insofar  as  it  stems  from  the  transcendent  Logos.  At  the  same  time,  he 
successfully  avoids  compromising  in  any  respect  the  epistemological 
`alterity'  of  the  divine  sphere  (a  sine  qua  non,  to  be  sure):  the  Logos,  as 
well  as  being  the  ultimate  source  of  individual  intellect,  is  also  an 
abstraction,  a  philosophical  projection  of  human  noos  taken  as  a  totality, 
Logos,  true  and  perfect  knowledge,  is  a  transcendent  entity  of  an 
essentially  alien  order,  accessible  in  its  entirety  solely  to  the  Godhead. 
0.2.4  Some  other  Presocratics 
It  seems  that  much  of  Presocratic  thought  was  more  or  less  in  the  same 
vein:  clear  and  unimpaired  knowledge  is  a  divine  preserve,  but  men  can 
still  attain,  through  persistent  and  systematic  effort,  to  some  scraps  of 
true  knowledge. 
Alcmaeon 
Such  a  view  is  expressed  in  a  famous  fragment  of  Alcmaeon  (24  B1D.  - 
K.  ): 
57  Cf.  Axelos  (1962:  131):  "Jamals  la  sagesse  humaine  n'  atteindra  la  sagesse 
divine,  et  eile  n'  est  vraie  sagesse  que  si  eile  se  reconnait  comme  manifestation 
particuliere  de  la  sagesse  universelle.  [...  ]  L'  homme,  en  prenant  äprement 
conscience  de  sa  particularite,  peut,  puisque  sa  part  est  la  partie  d'  un  Tout, 
atteindre  la  Totalite,  sans  pouvoir  jamais  s'  identifier  ä  eile.  " ...  1TEpL  T(iJV  #QVE(x)V,  TiEpL  T(ýV  eVTIT(iJV  QQý1jVELaV  oV  eEOL  EXOVTL, 
(i)S  SE  58  ävepc'07roL9  TEKµQLpEQeaL  ... 
The  best  commentary  on  this  fragment  known  to  me  is  Snell's  (1975: 
134):  "Den  alten  Gegensatz  von  göttlichem  und  menschlichem  Wissen 
verbindet  er  [sc.  Alcmaeon]  mit  dem  Gegensatz  vom  Unsichtbaren  und 
Sichtbaren,  denn  man  darf  der  zugrundeliegenden  Gedanken  dahin 
ergänzen,  daß  die  Menschen  über  das  Sichtbare  einige  Kenntnisse  haben; 
aber  über  das  `Nicht-Erscheinende',  wie  es  wörtlich  heißt,  wissen  nur  die 
Götter  Klares.  [...  ]  Dem  Nicht-Gesehenen  steht  nun  aber  nicht  wie  für 
Homer  das  nur  vom  Hörensagen  Bekannte  gegenüber  oder  das,  was  dem 
Wähnen  und  dem  `Schein'  verfallen  ist  wie  bei  Xenophanes,  sondern  das 
nicht  Offenbare,  das  noch  nicht  Offenbare,  wie  man  sagen  darf,  denn 
Alkmaion  gibt  einen  Weg  an,  auf  dem  der  Mensch,  wenn  auch  vielleicht 
unvollkommen,  an  das  Unsichtbare  gelangen  kann,  das  `Schließen',  das 
Folgen  aus  bestimmten  Zeichen.  " 
Philolaus 
Along  the  same  lines  is  a  fragment  by  Philolaus  (44  B6D.  -K.  )  : 
...  ä  µýV  EQTW  T(i)v  TrpayµäTWV  äLSLOs 
EQQa  KäL  avTä  µEv  äýüQLs 
6ELQV  ya  Kai  OÜK  äv6pWTrLVTIv  EVSEXETQL  yV(iJQLV  TrýVC(V  ya  ýl 
ÖTL  OÜX 
O`LÖV  T  ýV  OÜeEV  TCOV  EÖVTWV  KQL  yLyVWQKOµEVWV 
Üý'  QE.  A.  (,  i)V  ya 
yEVEQeaL  ý1.7j  ÜTrQpXOÜQQs  TQS  EQTOÜS  TCi)V  TrpayµäTWV, 
Eý  WV 
QUVEQTa  0  KÖ 
59  Qý1.  Os,  KQL 
TGJV  'iTEpaLVÖVTWV  KQL  TWV  äl1TELpWV 
... 
58  "Über  das  Unsichtbare  wie  über  das  Irdische  haben  Gewißheit  die  Götter,  uns 
aber  als  Menschen  ist  nur  das  Erschließen  gestattet.  "  (D.  -K.  );  so  also  Snell 
(1975:  134). 
s9  "The  being  of  the  objects,  being  eternal,  and  nature  itself  admit  of  divine,  not 
human,  knowledge  -except  that  it  was  not  possible  for  any  of  the  things  that 
exist  and  are  known  by  us  to  have  come  into  being,  without  there  existing  the Without  going  into  further  detail  about  Philolaus'  views  on  the  limiters 
and  the  unlimiteds,  we  may  remark  that  this  fragment  stands  in  the 
tradition  of  Xenophanes,  Heraclitus  and  Alcmaeon  in  that  it  represents  a 
deep  awareness  of  the  limitedness  of  human  knowledge  in  relation  to  the 
gods'  clear  and  perfect  knowledge,  but  also  in  that  it  argues  that  we  can 
know  something  about  the  real  substance  of  things  (namely  that  "it  must 
be  such  as  to  supply  the  necessary  conditions  of  the  existence  of  the 
temporal  things  with  which  we  are  acquainted"60). 
EmDedocles 
The  same  intellectual  current  runs  through  Empedoclean  thought  as  well: 
following  the  `apophatici61  trend  that  we  have  identified  in  many 
Presocratics,  he  asserts  the  immeasurable  difference  between  the  Godhead 
on  the  one  hand  and  the  conceptions  and  categories  with  which  the 
limited  noos  of  human  beings  is  familiar  on  the  other  (31  B  134): 
OÜSE  'Yap  äv8poµET  KEýaAq  KaTQ  yuAa  KEKaQTQL, 
01)  ý1.  EV  Q7TQL  VWTOLO  SÜO  KA(JLSOL  QLQQOVTaL, 
OÜ  TTÖSEs,  Oll  6oä  yoiDv',  OÜ  µ01BEa 
AaXV7jEVT(l, 
Q)Aq,  #1jV  LEpil  KQL  QBE#aTOs  ETTAETO  [1oÜVOV, 
ýpOVTLQL  KÖQýIAV  QTTaVTa  KQTdLQQOUQa  6q 
ýJQLV. 
This  is  why,  according  to  another  Empedoclean  fragment  (B  133)  God 
cannot  be  comprehended  by  the  senses  -  which  otherwise  are  the  main 
vehicles  of  knowledge: 
being  of  those  things  from  which  the  universe  was  composed,  the  limiters  and 
the  unlimiteds.  "  (Kirk,  Raven  &  Schofield  [1983:  3271). 
60  Quotation  from  Kirk,  Raven  &  Schofield  (1983:  328). 
61  For  the  term  see  again  p.  xiv  with  n.  2. OÜK  EQTLV  TTEXCLQaQeaL  EV  Öýea)41.  Ol,  QLV  EýLKTÖV 
lIRETEPOLs  7j 
XEPQL 
XaßELV,  ýTTEp  TE  µEy'LQ7 
TTELeOÜs  äVepGJTTOLQLV  äµaýLTÖs  EIS  #EVa  71'LTTTEL. 
As  was  the  case  with  other  Presocratics,  however,  Empedocles' 
philosophical  system  seems  to  have  allowed  for  the  possibility  that 
human  beings  attain  to  some  knowledge  of  the  true  nature  of  divinity; 
this  is  the  point  of  B  132: 
ÖiPLOs  ÖS  eEL(x)V  TrpaTTLBWv 
EKTq'QaTO  1TXO1DTOV, 
8ELA6S  8'  c;  )  QKOTÖEQQa  eE(ýlV  TTEpL  86ýa  µEµ11AEV.  s2 
Parmenides 
Parmenides'  position  as  to  the  possibility  of  true  human  knowledge 
appears  to  have  represented  a  deviation  from  the  Presocratic  trend:  he 
too  maintains,  like  Xenophanes  or  Heraclitus,  that  ordinary  mortals  are 
ignorant  and  misguided  (28  B  6,4-7  PPOTOL  Ei60TEg  o1')8ev  ...  Ku  4oß 
... 
TU$XOL  TE,  TEffijTTÖTEs,  a'KPLTa  4ÜAa;  B  1,30  (3P0T(3V  8Ö  as,  TQLS  OÜK 
"S.  ),  63  but  he  goes  much  further  than  other  Presocratics  in  EvL  Tf  LQTLs  QA  11 
claiming  that  full  and  complete  knowledge  of  the  ultimate  truth  is 
possible  and  that  it  assumes  the  form  of  divine  revelation,  reserved  for 
62  "[Empedocles]  knows  [...  ]  that  bliss  and  doom  for  any  man  depend  upon  his 
approach,  right  or  wrong,  to  the  gods  -as  the  expounders  of  the  mysteries 
were  wont  to  assert,  a  basic  formula  of  whose  preaching  (65)4(3ios  ös 
... 
)  he 
makes  his  own":  Zuntz  (1971:  258).  On  the  echoes  from  the  language  of  the 
Mysteries  in  this  passage  see  also  Norden  (1913:  100n.  1). 
63  Cf.  Snell  (1975:  134-5),  Coxon  (1986:  ad  loc.  ). exceptional  individuals  like  him  (28B  1,  B2D.  -K.  ).  64  In  this  point 
Parmenidean  thought  represents  a  retrogression  to  earlier  modes  of 
mystical  /  apocalyptic  cognition,  an  example  of  which  is  the  Muses' 
visitation  to  Hesiod  in  the  Theogony.  65  Nonetheless,  even  Parmenides  is 
encouraged  by  the  goddess  to  submit  his  newly  acquired  knowledge  to 
critical  scrutiny  (B  7  D.  -K.:  KptvaL  8E  X6ycp...  );  66  it  is  Parmenides'  faculty 
of  reason  (Xöyoc)  that  helps  him  distinguish  himself  from  the  mob  of 
äKpLTOL  (cf.  B  6.7)  men. 
0.3.1  Some  conclusions 
As  a  conclusion  (and  bearing  in  mind  that  any  conclusions  we  draw  are 
bound  to  be  provisional,  given  the  fragmentary  state  of  the  evidence)  we 
may  state  that,  as  far  as  the  philosophers  we  have  been  examining  are 
concerned,  one  main  point  can  be  established:  contrary  to  Homer  and, 
especially,  to  early  lyric  poetry,  in  which  Man  can  only  deplore,  in  a 
mood  of  grim  resignation,  the  incomprehensibility  of  the  divine  noos,  the 
Presocratics  in  general  accept  the  chasm  between  the  gods'  clear  and 
complete  knowledge  and  man's  chaotic  view  as  a  fact  of  life;  indeed,  as 
we  saw,  their  philosophical  activity  redefined  the  nature  of  this  chasm  in 
much  subtler  and  sounder  terms:  transcendent  entities  like  the  gods  are 
essentially  unknowable,  inaccessible  to  the  limited  intellectual  resources 
of  human  beings.  To  ascertain,  as  earlier  thought  did,  their  superiority  by 
means  of  crudely  `quantitative'  criteria  (gods  are  superior  because,  quite 
64  Such  ideas,  being  thoroughly  un-Greek,  may  be  implicitly  criticized  by 
Empedocles,  when  he  asks  the  Muse  to  reveal  to  him  "as  much  as  it  is  permitted 
ephemeral  beings  to  hear"  (31  B  3.4wv  OEiLs  EQTI.  V  Eý1IµEPLOLULV  cuco)ELV):  see 
further  Jäger  (1947:  134);  contra  Wright  (1981:  158). 
65  Snell  (1975:  135). 
66  See  Barnes'  (1979:  297-8)  excellent  commentary;  cf.  Coxon  (1986:  ad  loc.  ).  Most 
fully  J.  H.  Lesher,  OSAPh  2  (1984)  1-30. X1 
simply,  they  are  more  knowledgeable  than  men)  means  to  circumscribe 
them  within  the  unacceptably  narrow  confines  of  purely  human,  earthly 
conceptions,  to  entrap  them  within  the  here-and-now  of  humanly 
defined  (and  therefore  conventional)  categories,  and  thus  to  cancel  their 
transcendental  character  -  their  very  divinity. 
This,  however,  does  not  lead  the  Presocratics  to  a  wholesale  denial 
of  the  possibility  of  human  knowledge:  on  the  contrary,  they  adopt,  in 
general,  a  more  energetic  approach,  as  they  wholeheartedly  engage  in  a 
systematic  philosophical  activity  whose  ultimate  goal  is  evidently  to  gain 
(no  doubt,  limited  and  imperfect)  insights  into  true  knowledge.  The 
Presocratics  greatly  value  the  use  of  the  intellect  and,  to  some  extent,  of 
the  senses  as  pathways  to  true  knowledge,  but  they  are  also  aware  that  it 
is  humanly  impossible  to  have  clear,  complete  and  perfect  knowledge. 
The  sensory  data  or  the  power  of  the  intellect  are  useful  and  relatively 
reliable  tools,  so  far  as  they  go  -  which  may  not  be  very  far.  To  put  it 
briefly,  the  Presocratics  believe  that  human  knowledge  is  possible,  but  also 
limited.  We  have  seen  (p.  xix  above)  that  earlier  thought  (e.  g.  Homer  or 
archaic  lyric  poetry)  viewed  human  knowledge  as  impossible:  Homer  asks 
the  Muse  for  reliable  information,  for  men  know  nothing  whatsoever, 
whereas  the  deplorable  human  ignorance  is  a  recurrent  theme  in  lyric 
poetry.  We  have  also  suggested  that  such  an  attitude  is  illogical,  for  the 
perception  of  the  inferiority  of  human  knowledge  in  purely  `quantitative' 
terms  (i.  e.  in  terms  of  the  sheer  information  possessed)  allowed,  logically, 
for  the  possibility  that  Man  can  have  true  knowledge  (see  again  p.  xix). 
By  contrast,  the  Presocratics'  position  on  the  matter  can  be  argued,  with 
complete  logical  consistency,  from  the  premises  of  their  philosophical 
systems  (different  though  these  systems  may  be  in  a  variety  of  other 
respects);  it  stems  naturally  from  them  and  it  can  be  fully  supported  by 
their  logic.  This  can  be  most  clearly  illustrated  by  another  look  at  a  few 
examples  of  what  we  called  `analogical  mode  of  thought'  (see  p.  xxix)  -a 
mode  of  thought  and  expression  so  dear  both  to  Xenophanes  and  to 
Heraclitus.  When  Heraclitus  says  that  a  man  is  to  God  what  a  child  is  to 
man  (22B  79;  see  p.  xxx),  the  implication  is  not  only  that  Man's  intellect 
appears  puerile  in  comparison  to  God's,  but  also  that  Man  does  possess xli 
intellect  (as  a  child  does),  if  only  Ev  8UV%IEL  and  in  'undeveloped  and 
elementary  form;  after  all,  Heraclitus'  complaints  that  ordinary  people 
are  like  sleepers  (B  1,  B  73)  or  deaf  (B  34),  or  his  criticism  against  people 
who  lay  false  claims  on  knowledge  (B  17,  B  40)  acquire  their  full  meaning 
only  if  his  philosophical  system  did  allow  for  a  (limited)  possibility  of 
true  knowledge  (a  possibility  implied  also  in:  B  1,  B  2,  B  41,  B  50,  B  72)  - 
a  goal  attainable  only  by  people  who  manage  to  rise  above  the  mob  of 
sleepers  or  deaf  people.  7 
0.4.1  Divine  and  human  knowledp-e  in  Sonhocles 
We  suggested  in  section  0.0.1  that  Sophocles  is  an  expounder  of  the 
'apophatic  '68  approach  to  divinity  initiated  by  Presocratic  philosophers 
like  Xenophanes  and  Heraclitus  -  no  matter  whether  he  was  actually 
familiar  with  their  philosophy  or  not.  69  It  should  be  clear  by  now  that 
apophatism,  as  opposed  to  agnosticism,  does  not  entirely  deny  the 
possibility  that  the  human  mind  might  attain  to  some  knowledge  of 
divinity  (we  have  already  seen  how  this  idea  presents  itself  in  some  of  the 
most  eminent  Presocratics).  That  means  that  Sophocles  would  probably 
67  On  Xenophanes  21  B  38  as  implying  that  improvements  on  the  state  of  human 
knowledge  are  indeed  possible  (an  idea  that  is  explicit  in  21  B  18)  see  p.  xxvii 
above. 
68  See  again  p.  xiv  with  n.  2. 
69  As  Diller  (1950:  27)  excellently  remarked,  "es  ist  nicht  einmal  enscheidend, 
ob  Sophokles  den  Heraklit  tatsächlich  gekannt  hat  oder  nicht.  Wesentlich  ist 
aber  zu  sehen,  daß  zwischen  Heraklit  und  die  älteren  Tragödien  des  Sophokles 
[I  should  say:  all  Sophoclean  tragedies]  eine  tiefgehende  Gleichartigkeit  in  der 
Auffassung  des  Verhältnisses  von  göttlichem  und  menschlichem  Wissen 
besteht.  Diese  Feststellung  diene  nicht  zum  Nachweis  literarischer  oder 
geistgeschichtlicher  Abhängigkeiten,  wohl  aber  zur  Befestigung  der  Einsicht, 
wie  sehr  in  einer  geistig  geschlossenen  Zeit  das  Werk  des  Philosophen  und  des 
Tragikers  von  denselben  Kräften  bewegt  wird.  "  For  further  possible  affinities 
between  Heraclitus  and  Sophocles  see  Diller  (1950:  26-7);  Kamerbeek  (1948)  is 
hesitant. xlii 
not  have  endorsed  Protagoras'  famous  statement  about  the  ultimate 
unknowability  of  the  gods  -  and  indeed  of  their  very  existence  (80  B4 
D.  -K.:  TTEpL  pv  6E(JV  OÜK  EXU)  EI,  SEVai,  0166  W'9  EL(TI.  V  '  OW  GJS'  OÜK 
ELQLv  ... 
).  What  the  apophatic  approach  does  deny  is  the  assumption 
that  the  essence  of  the  Godhead  can  be  completely  and  fully  described  by 
ontological  attributes  -  that  the  limited  intellectual  resources  of  human 
beings  can  provide  exhaustive  and  unimpaired  knowledge  of  divinity  in 
its  totality.  This  means  that  Sophocles,  like  many  Presocratics,  does  not 
completely  deny  the  possibility  of  catching  some  glimpses  of  true 
knowledge  through  oracles  or  prophecies.  As  Sophocles  himself  has  put  it 
in  fr.  771  R.:  KQL  TO'V  6E6V  TOLOOTOV  EýETT1aTaIIaL,  I  aOýOLS  µEV 
aLVLKTýpa  OEa$TWV  ad,  I  QKQLOtc  8E  ýaÜAoV  KQV  PpaXEt 
&SäaKaXOV.  70  Indeed,  one  of  our  sources  for  this  fragment,  namely 
Clement  of  Alexandria  (Strom.  S.  4.24.2  [II,  p.  341  Stählin-Früchtel]),  In 
what  may  not  be  an  entirely  distorting  Christian  interpretation,  took  its 
meaning  to  be  that  human  beings  do  have,  at  least  in  posse,  the  ability  to 
reach  the  truth  by  means  of  cryptic  divine  signs:  O'VELpOL  TE  Kai 
QvµßoXa  äcaV&TTEpa  TrävTa  TOtS  aV6ptTTOL9  ov  406vq)  (o)  yap  6EµLs 
EýITTa0fj  VOEtV  TOV  OEM,  &V  0'TTÜ)S  ELS  TT'jV  T()V  aLVL'yµäTU)V  EVVOLQV 
. 
11  CTj1-gGLs  1TapELa8Üouaa  ETT1  T'nV  EÜpEQLV  Trjs  GXriO¬Lac  äva6päu1.1 
All  surviving  Sophoclean  plays  are  concerned,  in  one  way  or 
another,  with  the  problem  of  knowing  the  Godhead  and  its  will  -a 
problem  that  is  often  expressed  as  Man's  struggle  to  communicate  with 
divinity  by  means  of  oracles  (or  kindred  rituals,  such  as  ornithomancy, 
empyroskopia  etc.  ).  The  gods  send  us  QrjµEta  containing  `dues',  as  it 
were,  that  can,  theoretically,  lead  to  true  knowledge;  71  and  whereas  the 
possibility  of  a  complete  and  accurate  interpretation  of  such  ark  .E 
to  is 
70  Pearson  (1917:  III.  ad  loc.  )  seems  to  take  Ev  ßpaXet  5L6äcKaXov  to  mean  "a 
plain  person,  of  few  words  [...  ]  an  expounder  in  brief";  another  alternative 
would  be  Naber's  Kä1/  ßpäXTj  ("even  if  [the  god]  roars":  cf.  Radt's  app.  crit.  ). 
71  On  oracles  as  manifestations  of  an  all-encompassing  (though  not  entirely 
intelligible)  order  see  Kitto  (1954:  176-80). xliii 
not  excluded  (cf.  e.  g.  exceptional  cases  like  Themistocles'  famous 
interr'tation  of  the  Delphic  oracle  about  the  "wooden  walls":  Hdt.  8. 
141-43;  Plut.  Them.  10.2),  it  is  their  misinterpretation  that  contains,  for 
obvious  reasons,  an  immense  tragic  potential.  It  is  precisely  because  true 
knowledge  of  divinity  can,  to  a  certain  extent,  be  acquired  that 
Sophoclean  tragic  individuals  are  carried  away  into  assuming  that 
divinity  can  be  fully  and  perfectly  known  in  its  entirety,  this  leads 
invariably  to  the  all-too-late  realization  that  the  Godhead  is  essentially 
unknowable;  that  it  cannot  be  exhaustively  understood  by  the  human 
intellect  nor  can  human  ontological  categories  be  foisted  upon  it,  as  this 
would  amount  to  an  ipso  facto  compromise  of  its  transcendental  nature. 
Any  attempt  of  the  human  intellect  to  inquire  any  further  into  the 
nature  of  divinity  and  divine  will,  to  delve  into  the  infiniteness  of  the 
Beyond,  is  bound  to  fail:  &V  oÜ  yap  äV  Ta  eELQ  KpV1TT6VTWV  eEGJV  I 
µäOOLS  QV,  O  l')8'  EL  1TäVT  E7TEýE'XOOL9  QKOTR3V  (S.  fr.  919  R.  ).  72 
As  the  chronology  of  most  of  the  extant  Sophoclean  plays  remains  a 
notoriously  insoluble  conundrum,  I  have  preferred  not  to  treat  them  in 
what  would  be  a  necessarily  arbitrary  chronological  order,  but  to  divide 
them  into  two  groups,  according  to  criteria  which  I  shall  presently 
explain. 
In  the  first  group  of  plays,  which  contains  Electra,  Philoctetes  and 
Trachiniae,  the  understanding  or  the  implementation  of  the  terms  of  an 
oracle  /  prophecy  is  a  theme  of  capital  importance.  The  central 
characters  either  try  to  acquire,  or  even  presume  to  have,  complete  and 
unimpaired  knowledge  of  the  gods  and  their  plans.  Eventually,  however, 
v 
72  The  idea  is  present  also  in  Euripides,  e.  g.  E.  Hel.  711-12:  6  6EÖs  (  Cw#  TL 
TrOLKLXOV  I  Kal,  8UaTEKIQPTOV;  1137-50:  Ö,  TL  OeÖ  11  µiß 
O¬O  T  TÖ  µEUOV, 
I  TLS 
Ora  EPEVVTIaac  IPOTCJV  I  II.  aKPP  TaTOV  TCEpac  6PELV  KTX.  In  E.  Ba.  199-203  (del. 
Diggle),  395,427-31,890-96,1150-52  the  implication  seems  to  be  that  we  humans, 
with  our  limited  intellectual  resources  (cf.  E.  Su.  216-8),  had  better  not 
scrutinize  an  essentially  inscrutable  divinity,  but  observe  the  established 
ordinances  related  to  it. xliv 
the  imperviousness  of  divinity  to  the  cognitive  attempts  of  the  human 
mind  is  once  again  established  as  an  undeniable  fact. 
Thus,  in  the  Electra  (Chapter  One),  Orestes  relies  on  what  he  thinks 
is  Apollo's  clear  and  unambiguous  oracle,  only  to  find  out  at  the  end  that 
the  god's  advice  may  not  have  been,  after  all,  entirely  Ka)1W3  (1425),  as  it 
does  not  guarantee  (nor  does  it  profess  to  guarantee)  that  the  IIEXoiTl8C3v 
KaKä  (1498)  are  over.  Nonetheless,  the  playwright  has  taken  care  to  show 
us  that  following  the  god's  advice,  unknowable  though  it  was,  was 
practically  the  only  viable  solution:  the  best  part  of  the  play's  1510  lines 
is  devoted  to  presenting,  in  an  elaborately  emotional  fashion,  Electra's 
wretchedness,.  as  well  as  to  establishing  that  (since  Electra's  heroic 
decision  to  kill  Aegisthus  would  be  merely  an  act  of  suicidal  bravado)  the 
only  way  out  of  her  plight  is  Orestes'  homecoming  -a  homecoming 
which,  however,  turns  out  not  to  guarantee  a  complete  deliverance  from 
evils!  So,  misery  prevails,  whether  Apollo's  oracle  is  implemented  or  not. 
To  be  sure,  this  is  a  most  desperate  deadlock:  obeying  divinity  seems 
imperative,  but  such  an  obedience  can  by  no  means  secure  us  what  a 
Christian  would  call  divine  succour  or  safe  guidance.  This  is  not  to  say 
that  gods  are  conceived  as  malevolent  entities,  having  their  sport  with 
human  beings:  the  gods  are  neither  benevolent  nor  malevolent;  such 
categories  are  only  conventions  of  the  human  mind  which  struggles  to 
create  taxonomies,  a  mental  framework,  that  is,  wherein  divinity  could  be 
accommodated  and  explained.  But  the  gods  are  not  explicable:  they  are 
just  divine. 
In  the  Philoctetes  (Chapter  Two)  we  encounter,  in  a  somewhat 
different  form,  the  same  divine  transcendence  of  human  moral 
categories.  Odysseus,  I  argue,  far  from  misunderstanding  or  self-servingly 
distorting  Helenus'  prophecy,  is  the  person  who  knows  it  best  and  adheres 
to  it  most  closely.  This  is  certainly  provocative,  but  I  believe  that  this  is 
precisely  the  point  of  the  play:  divinity  is  not  concerned  with  secular 
morality;  divine  will  can  be  known  to,  and  carried  out  by,  a  person  whose 
moral  calibre  is,  to  say  the  least,  doubtful.  This  is,  after  all,  the  reason 
why  the  divine  plan,  whose  human  agent  Odysseus  is,  was  bound  to  be x1v 
severely  encumbered  by  the  ethical  considerations  of  the  other  two 
characters:  Philoctetes,  who  adheres  to  his  heroic  pride,  and  Neoptolemus, 
who  becomes  increasingly  aware  how  cruel  and  inconsiderate,  by  human 
measures,  this  plan  was.  These  two  characters  are  deliberately  cast  as 
undeniably  attractive  figures:  the  audience,  sympathizing  with  their  (and 
especially  Neoptolemus')  moral  struggle,  identify  themselves  with  them, 
until  they  realize,  at  the  end,  that  the  tragedy  of  Philoctetes  is  also  their 
own  tragedy:  while  watching  the  play,  they  have  been  involved  in  a 
fruitless  struggle  to  understand  the  divine  will  and  to  explain  it  by 
human  moral  measures.  Yet,  the  gods  are  unknowable,  which  also  means 
that  they  are  above  such  categories  as  morality,  justice,  fairness  or  their 
opposites.  73  The  eventual  implementation  of  the  divine  plan  with  the 
intervention  of  Heracles  confirms  this  view,  foiling  as  it  does  the  two 
heroes'  opposition  to  it  as  well  as  frustrating  the  audience's  sympathies 
and  expectations. 
The  belief  that  divine  will,  as  expressed  in  oracles,  is  not  fully 
accessible  to  the  human  mind,  unless  when  it  is  too  late,  informs  also  the 
Trachiniae  (Chapter  Three).  The  oracles  regarding  Heracles'  future  after 
the  sack  of  Oechalia  are  put  in  the  form  of  a  disjunction  between  two 
alternatives:  either  death  or  a  life  of  ease.  So,  when  the  good  tidings  of  his 
safe  homecoming  arrive  in  Trachis,  it  is  naturally  assumed  that  the 
disjunctive  form  of  the  oracle  in  fact  amounts  to  a  single  categoric 
statement:  Heracles  has  won  a  life  free  from  1TÖVOL.  However,  it  soon  turns 
73  Thus,  Bowra's  (1944:  365-7,377-8)  generalization  that  all  Sophoclean  plays 
(and  especially  those  of  the  later  period)  end  in  a  realization  of  the  essential 
justice  of  the  gods  cannot  be  accepted.  The  same  must  hold  for  Lloyd-Jones' 
(1983:  109,128)  contention  that  the  Sophoclean  conception  of  justice  included 
the  idea  that  the  gods  are  just  "and  just  in  a  sense  in  which  the  word  was  in 
[Sophocles']  day  applied  to  men".  To  suggest,  as  these  scholars  seem  to  do,  that 
justice  was  held  to  be  a  divine  attribute  as  if  by  default  is  a  misleading 
generalization:  Mikalson  (1991:  ch.  1&  178-9)  remarks  that,  contrary  to  literary 
or  philosophical  speculation,  popular  religion  seems  not  to  have  been 
concerned  with  whether  the  gods  were  just  with  a  justice  similar  or  identical  to 
that  expected  in  human  affairs.  And  at  least  this  aspect  of  popular  religion 
informs,  I  argue,  Sophocles'  plays. xlvi 
out  that  the  oikos,  to  which  Heracles  has  finally  returned,  far  from  being 
a  civilized  place  of  repose  and  insouciance,  as  it  well  should  be,  is 
paradoxically  transformed  into  a  locus  where  the  wild  (in  the  shape, 
primarily,  of  Nessus'  ointment),  in  spite  of  Heracles'  life-long  struggle  to 
tame  it,  will  eventually  defeat  the  civilizing  hero.  So,  the  oracle's 
mutually  exclusive  alternatives  do  indeed  turn  out  to  amount  to  one  and 
the  same  thing  -  but  in  a  very  sinister  way:  Heracles'  colossal  civilizing 
effort  is  annihilated  as  the  boundaries  between  civilization  (oikos)  and 
savagery  (the  wild)  collapse,  and  the  world  of  untamed  '  wilderness 
prevails.  Release  from  toils  is  now  possible  only  beyond  this  world; 
deliverance  from  1r6voL  can  come  only  with  death.  Oracles,  though  not 
unreliable  in  themselves,  are  nonetheless  potentially  deceptive:  they 
often  appear  under  a  veneer  of  clarity  and  precision,  thus  giving  the 
impression  that  they  can  be  interpreted  by  means  of  the  human  mind's 
limited  resources  in  a  monosemous,  unambiguous,  straightforward  way; 
at  the  end,  however,  it  is  revealed  that  the  gods'  signs  are  disastrously 
polysemous,  ambiguous,  polymorphic,  only  partly  accessible  to  human 
mental  faculties.  Indeed,  the  farthest  point  that  the  human  mind  can 
reach  is  the  realization  of  our  inability  to  comprehend  divinity  and 
cosmic  order  In  their  entirety.  The  Chorus'  resigned  acceptance  of  divine 
presence  in  all  the  frightful  events  that  have  happened  (1278  K01')8ev 
TOÜTWV  ö  TL  µiß  ZEVs)74  expresses  exactly  this  feeling  of  utter  desolation 
in  front  of  the  tremendously  overwhelming,  yet  entirely  incomprehensible 
and  unaccountable,  ways  of  the  gods. 
The  essence  of  the  epistemological  chasm  between  God  and  Man  as 
presented  in  the  plays  of  this  first  group  is  well  formulated  by  Oudemans 
&  Lardinois  (1987:  78-80):  "From  the  human  point  of  view,  [`true']  reality 
is  not  clear  and  distinct  (...  1  but  dangerous,  ambiguous  and  paradoxical. 
This  state  of  affairs  may  be  inferred  from  contact  with  power  by  means  of 
74  I  hasten  to  make  clear  (the  more  so  as  an  English  rendering  of  this  phrase 
forms  part  of  my  title)  that,  pace  West  (1979:  112)  who  understands  ýrrpaýEv  as 
the  verb  of  this  clause,  I  adhere  to  the  traditional  view  that  the  verb  to  be 
mentally  supplied  here  is  &UTIV:  see  Davies  (1991:  ad  1278). xlvii 
oracles  and  divination.  In  both  cases  the  resulting  knowledge,  supposed 
to  be  truer  than  ordinary  knowledge,  is  multi-interpretable  and 
potentially  dangerous.  [...  ]  Man's  problem  is  that  he  realizes  that  divine 
truth  exists,  that  his  cosmological  order  is  not  all  there  is,  but  that  he  is 
unable  to  endure  the  dangerous  contact  with  true  power.  Truth  exceeds 
his  finite  endurance.  Therefore  man  has  to  resort  to  the  ordering  of 
experience  [...  ].  When  man  is  confronted  with  ambiguous  reality  outside 
his  own  conception,  he  realizes  that  his  human  order  in  reality  is 
disorder.  his  conceptions  of  true  and  false,  of  good  and  evil  are 
constantly  overthrown.  Because  man  ignores  the  true  designs  of  the  gods 
(but  knows  that  they  are  there),  his  life  consists  of  inevitable  tragic  erring. 
[...  ]  This  tragic  position  may  be  reflected  in  the  language  embodying 
ambiguous  truth.  This  language  contains  surface  meanings  on  a  purely 
human  level,  concealing  the  real  meaning  hidden  from  man's  finite 
understanding  and  only  revealed  after  disaster  has  overtaken  him.  " 
In  the  second  group  of  plays,  the  limitedness  of  human  knowledge 
is  highlighted  in  a  subtler  and  rather  more  complex  way:  divinity  is 
shown  to  defy  all  attempts  of  the  human  mind  to  bring  it  under  its  all- 
too  crisply  defined  categories;  thus  the  Gegenüberstellung  with  the 
absolute,  transcendent  character  of  divinity  helps  set  off  the  ephemeral 
and  imperfect  nature  of  such  categories  all  the  more  sharply. 
In  the  Oedipus  at  Colonus  (Chapter  Four),  the  irroXLs  central 
character  has  to  effect  his  integration  into  his  new  home,  Athens,  by 
wholeheartedly  accepting  the  city's  vöµtµa  -  an  acceptance  exemplified 
in  the  performance,  on  his  behalf,  of  an  (elaborately  described)  expiatory 
ritual,  a  vöµUµov  par  excellence.  However,  it  soon  transpires  that  the 
heroic  status  he  is  about  to  assume  requires  him  to  throw  all  human 
vöp  Ia  into  disarray:  apart  from  severing  his  bonds  with  the  polls  of 
Thebes  (by  discomfiting  its  representative,  Creon)  and  with  his  own 
family  (by  cursing  his  sons  to  die  at  the  hands  of  each  other),  he  also 
upsets  several  ritual  ordinances  -  most  notably,  he  gives  specific 
instructions  for  his  tomb  to  remain  secret,  which  blatantly  violates  Greek 
vöµLµa,  as  tombs  (including  those  of  heroes)  were  prominent  places  and xlviii 
centres  of  (funeral  or  heroic)  cult.  What  is  more,  his  passing  away  is 
associated,  in  many  respects,  with  the  notorious  sin  of  his  champion 
Theseus,  namely  his  anomic  K6O0809  to  the  Underworld  in  order  to 
abduct  Persephone.  This  play,  quite  in  keeping  with  what  I  have  termed 
Sophoclean  `apophatism',  demonstrates  that  vöµLµa,  venerable  though 
they  may  be,  are  nevertheless  merely  human  conventions:  they  represent 
the  construction  only  of  a  single  mental  and  social  reality  out  of  the 
chaos  of  innumerable  possibilities  that  can  potentially  be  substantiated 
-  structured  and  conceptualized  -  as  mental  and  social  categories.  An 
exceptional  individual  like  a  hero  must  transcend  the  coherence  and 
predictability  of  the  social  framework,  notably  as  substantiated  in  its 
vöµLµa,  in  order  to  pass  over,  as  a  hero,  into  the  obscure  inscrutability  of 
the  Beyond. 
In  the  Ajax  (Chapter  Five)  the  hero  becomes  entrapped  in  an 
impossible  situation:  he  is  as  if  excluded  both  from  the  civilized  space  of 
the  polls  /  encampment  and  from  the  wild  /  outdoors.  This  impasse  is 
more  specifically  expressed,  inter  alia,  in  his  inability  to  remain  the 
exemplary  hoplite  (symbol  of  the  organized  polls)  that  he  has  always 
been,  as  he  abnormally  regresses  to  a  perverse  ephebate:  he  displays,  in  a 
distorted  form,  traits  normally  associated  with  that  antipode  of  the 
hoplite,  the  `black  hunter'.  Thus,  he  can  be  neither  a  proper  hoplite  nor  a 
proper  `black  hunter';  he  belongs  neither  to  the  polls  nor  to  the  wild.  This 
collapse  of  the  ubiquitous,  all-encompassing  polarity  "polls  :  wild" 
signifies,  on  a  deeper  level,  an  essential  failure  to  comply  with  the  social 
categories  and  taxonomies  by  which  humans  lend  coherence  and 
accountability  to  what  would  be  otherwise  a  chaos  of  innumerable 
possible  forms  of  social  structuralization.  But  refusing  to  adopt  what  is 
the  currently  valid  conceptualization  of  the  world  comes  down  to  being 
incapable  of  living  in  this  world;  and  incapable  of  bringing  himself  under 
any  of  this  world's  taxonomies  is  exactly  what  Ajax  is  (hence  he  opts  for 
the  only  possible  way  out,  namely  suicide)  and,  what  is  more,  this  is  what xlix 
;  p` 
he  remains  even  after  his  death  -  thus  being  translated  to  a  status  that 
lies  beyond  the  Diesseits,  i.  e.  to  the  praeterhuman  status  of  the  hero.  " 
Finally,  the  Antigone  (Chapter  Six),  although  it  stands  somewhat 
apart  from  the  other  plays  of  its  group  (namely  the  Ajax  and  the  OC),  as 
it  is  not  concerned  with  a  hero's  transition  from  the  here-and-now  into 
the  Beyond,  still  belongs  with  them,  because  its  main  preoccupation  is 
with  what  was  for  the  5th  century  Athenian  a  central  category,  a  central 
mode  of  ordering  human  experience,  namely  the  polls.  The  play 
dramatizes  the  clash  between  an  accursed  aristocratic  genos,  the 
Labdacids,  and  the  polls  of  Thebes  that  is  struggling  to  release  itself  from 
the  sequence  of  woes  that  successive  generations  of  that  very  family  have 
accumulated  on  it.  This  clash  develops  into  an  impasse  that  is  left 
unresolved:  on  the  one  hand,  Antigone,  the  representative  of  the  accursed 
housel  ends  up  like  all  the  members  of  her  natal  family:,  she  destroys 
herself  (see  esp.  875);  on  the  other  hand,  Creon,  the  champion  of  the 
common  cause  (the  aurnIpLa  of  the  polls),  '  despite  proclaiming  sound 
political  principles  at.  the  beginning  of  the  play,  ends  up  identifying  the 
city  with  himself,  thus  negating  its  very  essence,  namely  its  communal 
character  (see  esp.  736-9).  The  impasse  which  the  play  presents  runs 
deeper  still:  the  polis  appropriates  and  controls  funerary  ritual  in  an 
earnest  attempt  to  serve  long-term  political  ends,  i.  e.  to  crack  down  on 
anti-polls  practices  like  Polyneices'  treachery;  the  political  and  the 
religious  spheres  are  assumed  unproblematically  to  coincide,  and  so  a 
traitor  is  ipso  facto  held  guilty  for  offences  not  only  against  the  state,  but 
also  against  religion.  By  thus  appropriating  religion,  however,  the  state 
runs  the  risk  of  secularizing  things  that  are  by  definition  transcendental. 
'S  The  concept  of  the  divinity's  transcendence  of  the  human  categories  and 
taxonomies  has  been  much  explored,  along  the  lines  set  by  L.  Gernet,  by  the 
Paris  school  (esp.  J.  -P.  Vernant  and  M.  Detienne),  who  have  given  it  the  now 
fashionable  term  `alterite'.  Nonetheless,  they  have  focused  mainly  on 
Dionsysus'  `alterity',  thus  ignoring  the  fact  that  -as  was  subsequently  shown 
by  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989a:  137,148),  (1989b:  164),  (1990:  303)  and  by 
Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  198-9)  -unknowability  is  a  fundamental  and  all- 
encompassing  category  in  Greek  religion  generally. 1 
So  Creon,  trying  to  keep  the  polis  in  good  order,  finds  himself  subverting 
the  cosmic  order,  whereas  Antigone's  persistence  in  championing  the 
funerary  rights  of  a  traitorous  brother  is  eventually  justified.  The  tragic, 
and  unresolved,  dilemma  of  this  play  may  be  a  reflection  of  a  historical 
fact,  namely  of  a  very  frail  balance  that  the  Athenian  polls  had  to 
maintain:  on  the  one  hand,  it  was  imperative  for  the  state  to  safeguard 
the  communal  character  of  the  polis,  which  means  that  religion  -  the 
`royal  way'  for  the  few  aristocratic  families  to  confirm  their  solidarity  and 
power  -  had  to  be  subsumed  under  the  control  of  the  state;  on  the  other 
hand,  special  care  should  be  taken  against  any  secularizing  trends  that 
might  mar  the  essential  attribute  of  divinity,  i.  e.  transcendence:  the 
dialectic  between  these  two  opposing  tendencies  is  what  consitutes  the 
tragic  world  of  the  Antigone. 
As  a  general  comment  on  the  plays  of  this  second  category  I  should 
quote  Segal's  (1978:  1184)  very  apposite  remarks:  "Eternity,  being  and 
non-being,  cannot  be  confined  or  comprehended  within  the  categories  of 
human  reason.  The  power  of  Sophocles'  tragic  heroism  lies  in  its 
passionate  and  fearless  openness  to  the  forces  which  challenge  and 
threaten  the  orderly  framework  of  human  existence:  time,  death,  hatred, 
love.  For  this  reason  the  tragic  hero  is  always  in  some  sense  beyond  the 
pale  of  civilization  which  can  exist  only  by  blocking  out  or  delimiting 
those  forces.  It  is  part  of  the  greatness  of  the  fifth  century  that  it  allows 
the  dialogue  between  the  two  sides  to  develop  so  fully.  Tragedy  is  the 
outgrowth  of  this  dialogue,  this  irresolvable  dialectic,  between  the  limited 
and  the  infinite,  between  man's  civilizing,  ordering  energies  and  all  that 
those  energies  cannot  comprehend  and  master  in  the  structures  they  so 
ambitiously  create.  " 
The  Epilogue  (Chapter  Seven)  deals  briefly  with  the  antithesis 
between  human  rationality  and  divine  supra-rationality  as  manifested  in 
the  Oedipus  Tyrann  us.  As  it  shows  how  the  carefully  constructed  schemes 
and  categories  of  the  human  reason  collapse  before  the  inscrutability  of 
the  Godhead,  it  can  also  be  seen  as  a  summary  of  the  central  point  of 
this  thesis. 11 
0.4.2  Sophoclean  `anophatism',  and  the  problem  of  language: 
conditional  and  interrogative  clauses 
The  `apophatic'  approach,  as  we  saw,  precludes  the  use  of  ontological 
attributes  as  a  descriptive  framework  within  the  confines  of  which  to 
circumscribe  the  essence  of  the  Godhead.  This  means  that  sentences  like 
"God  is  just",  "God  is  benevolent",  "God  willed  it  this  way",  or  their 
negations,  are  simply  meaningless,  for  they  seek  to  conceive  and  describe 
God  In  terms  of  human  qualities,  which  Is  Impossible.  If  we  take  this 
`apophatic'  principle  to  its  logical  extremes,  we  will  have  to  admit  that 
even  the  use  of  language  is,  in  the  case  of  transcendent  entities  like  the 
gods,  inappropriate  and,  in  fact,  equally  meaningless;  for  even  simply  to 
speak  of  God  entails  an  encroachment  into  spheres  that  cannot  be 
reduced  to  human  terms,  so  as  to  be  described  by  human  language.  76 
Admittedly,  we  do  not  often  find  this  idea  explicitly  stated  in  ancient 
texts;  there  is,  however,  a  famous  Pindaric  passage  that  provides  a  striking 
instance  thereof:  it  is  O.  1.35.  The  poet  chastises  the  tradition  about  the 
Olympians'  unwittingly  eating  part  of  Pelops  and  offers  his  own  `cleansed' 
version  of  the  story,  in  which  there  is  no  trace  of  Olympian  cannibalism; 
nonetheless,  Pindar  still  feels  obliged  to  apologize  for  speaking  of  the  gods 
at  all:  EQTL  8'  Qv8pl  4%LEV  EOLKös  äµL  8aLµövu  v  K&ý  1E'wV  yap 
aLTLa.  Pace  Verdenius,  77  I  fully  endorse  Gerber's78  (1982:  71)  exegetical 
note  on  these  lines:  "When  Pindar  says  that  the  `blame  is  less',  he 
presumably  means  that  the  risk  of  incurring  blame  is  less,  and  the 
Implication  seems  to  be  that  such  a  risk  is  always  present  whenever  one 
says  anything  about  the  gods,  but  that  the  risk  is  diminished  if  what  one 
says  is  KaXöv".  A  similar  idea  can  also  be  detected  in  Aeschylus  too:  79  In 
76  The  impossibility  of  using  language  in  relation  to  the  Godhead  was  fully 
argued  for  by  Christian  thinkers:  see  Lossky  (1957:  37). 
77  W.  J.  Verdenius,  Commentaries  on  Pindar,  Vol.  II  (Leiden  1988),  p.  22. 
78  D.  E.  Gerber,  Pindar's  Olympian  One:  A  Commentary  (Toronto  1982),  p.  71. 
79  See  Fraenkel  (1950:  11.112)  with  bibliography. iii 
passages  like  Ag.  182  (SaLµövwv  8E  Trou  XäpL9  3LaL09),  Pers.  740-1, 
Suppl.  101-103  ([Zeus]  ijµEvos  ov  4p6v%t  Tress  ... 
EýETrpaýEV 
...  )  the 
use  of  Trov  and  Tress  suggests  a  tendency  to  avoid  absolute  statements 
regarding  the  gods.  This  is  put  much  more  explicitly  in  e.  g.  A.  Su.  1057-8 
(Ti  8E  µE»w  4p4Va  OLav  I  KaOopdv,  öJLV  ä3u(Taov;  )  or  A.  Su.  87-90 
(A  L6!  9  `LµEpos  OÜK  E  )&T  paTOs  ETVX0'  8avXoi.  'äp  TrpaTTLSuV  86LQKLOL 
TE  TELVOUQLV  TTÖpOL  K  LTL8EtV  Q4paaTOL).  80 
The  origin  of  such  ideas  may.  be  detected  in  the  liturgical  tradition, 
and  especially  in  cultic  hymns.  Thus,  e.  g.,  in  the  fifth  stasimon  of  the 
Antigone  (which  is  evidently  modelled  on  liturgical  forms)  Dionysus  Is 
addressed  as  "god  of  many  names"  (1115  TroXvthvvµE  );  in  ?  A.  PV  209-10 
Prometheus'  mother  is  etc  I  Kai  rata,  Tro»  v  övoµäTwv  µopýf 
pia;  81  similarly,  Pindar  (1.5.1)  says  µ.  dTEp`AAiov  TroXvw'vvµE  OE(a,  while 
in  Call.  Dian.  3.7  Artemis  asks  for  TroXvu  vvµdrly,  `(va  pi  µoL  (Doi(3oc 
E  p((rj  (cf.  also  idem,  Ap.  69-71),  an  d  Aphrodite  is  addressed  as 
TroXvchvvµE  Kai,  TroXvvaE  in  Theocr.  15.109.82  In  all  these  cases  the 
implication  seems  to  be  that  to  address  the  god  by  a  single  name  would 
appear  to  circumscribe  him  within  the  all-too-narrow  confines  of  a  single 
attribute,  thus  compromising  his  essential  quality,  which  is  the 
transcendence  of  all  attributes;  so,  the  plurality  of  names  corresponds  to 
the  elusive  multifariousness  of  the  god's  essence.  A  similar  feeling  seems 
to  underlie  Heraclitus'  statement  (22  B  32  D.  -K.  ):  ?v  TO'  aoýöv  µoüvov 
811  According  to  Fraenkel  (1950:  II.  112  n.  1)  both  these  passages  are  influenced 
by  Hesiod,  G'.  483f.  CLAAOTE  8'  &XoioS  ZiIv6  '  vöo  aL'YLOXOLO,  äpyaMMEos  8' 
äv8pEQaL  KaTaOVTITOtcL  vo  =L. 
81  See  Griffith  (1983:  ad  loc.  ). 
82  Many  of  the  instances  have  been  drawn  from  Gow  (1952:  ad  loc.  ).  One  may 
also  compare  the  somewhat  different  S.  fr.  941  R.  and  Ar.  Plut.  1164.  And  in  the 
Derveni  papyrus  (col.  xviii.  12,  as  published,  provisionally,  in  ZPE  47  [1982] 
following  p.  300)  we  read  Ai.  jRijTijp  [  `P]Ea  ri  M1  [T]1  p  `EaT'La  ATIu  (,  which 
implies  the  existence  of  a  single  deity  behind  those  different  names:  West 
(1983b:  81,93). 'iii 
AEyEQeaL  OÜK  EeEXEL  KQL  EeEAEL  ZgvÖs  ÖVOµa: 
83 
the  name  "Zeus"  of  the 
traditional  religion  does  convey  something  of  the  God's  real  essence,  84  but 
is  also  inappropriate  insofar  as  it  implies  the  attribution  of  a  limiting 
predicate  to  an  entity  that  is  beyond  attributes.  8S  This  idea  is  even  clearer 
in  a  celebrated  passage  from  A.  Ag.  160-1:  ZEÜs  öQTLs  1TOT  EQTLV,  El, 
T68'  aÜTW  4LAoV  KEKX11ýtEvq):  as  Fraenkel  (1950:  11.99-100)  points  out,  it 
is  an  age-old  religious  practice  to  invoke  a  god  by  a  plurality  of  names,  in 
order  to  make  sure  one  does  not  offend  him  or  fail  to  attract  his 
attention  by  using  the  wrong  name.  86  What  is  of  great  importance, 
however,  is  that  "Aeschylus  here  takes  over  the  heritage  of  a  more 
primitive  belief  because  he  can  make  it  serve  his  own  advanced 
convictions.  öQTLs  'ITOT  EQTLV:  that  means  here  not  merely  the  god's 
name  and  identity  but  his  real  nature  and  character.  [...  ]  Of  the  true 
nature  of  the  almighty  Lord  of  justice  we  possess  no  real  knowledge  [...  ]" 
83  Pace  Fatouros  (1994:  69-70),  I  stick  to  D.  -K.  's  translation:  "Eins,  das  allein 
Weise,  will  nicht  und  will  doch  mit  dem  Namen  des  Zeus  benannt  werden.  " 
84  Cf.  Axelos  (1962:  124).  Perhaps  Heraclitus  "in  dem  Namen  des  Zeus  (Zrvös 
5vopa)  einen  Hinweis  auf  das  Urprinzip  des  Lebens  (Cfv)  sieht":  Verdenius 
apud  Gigon  (1954:  159);  Verdenius  (and  other  scholars  before  him:  see  e.  g.  the 
literature  cited  by  Marcovich  [1967:  445]  and  Darcus  Sullivan  [1984:  288  n.  17]) 
seems  to  have  been  anticipated  by  Clement  of  Alexandria  (Strom.  5.14.115.1  [II, 
p.  404  Stählin-Früchtel])  who  associates  this  Heraclitean  fragment  with  a 
Platonic  passage  (oi8a  Eyw  Kai  fl  «ITWVa  TrpovµapTUpovvTa`  HpaKAEiTm 
... 
)  which 
maybe  Crat.  396a-b:  ouµßaivEL  ovv  öpOws  6voR6ZEaOaL  OÜTOS  b  66's  [sc.  Zeus] 
ELVQL,  Si'  ÖV  [cf.  OLa]  V  äEL  TCäaL  Toys  C(JULV  'TrQpXEL.  On  Zeus  as  a  "speaking 
name"  revealing  (part  of)  the  god's  essence  cf.  also  Hes.  Cp.  2-4  Di'  EVVETTETE 
... 
OV  TE  81a  IPOT  fL  äv8pE'  8µw9  ä4aTOL  TE  4  tT01.  TE,  PT1TOL  T  appT1TOL  TE  _L_S 
LEyä)OLO  E"TL  (see  further  Norden  [1913:  259  n.  1],  West  ad  loc.  and  Snell  [1975: 
53],  especially  for  the  accentuation  8La,  not  8LCL);  also  A.  Ag.  1485  8LdL  OL6S 
TravaLTLou  ... 
(with  the  excellent  commentary  of  Fraenkel  [1950:  111.  ad  1495f.  ]). 
85  Cf.  Kirk  (1954:  392-3). 
86  See  also  Lloyd-Jones  (1983:  85),  who  '  overstresses  however  the  traditional 
element  in  the  Aeschylean  passage.  For  a  classic  typological  analysis  of  such 
modes  of  address  see  Norden  (1913:  144-47);  on  addresses,  to  gods  in  general  in 
Greek  religion  see  again  Norden  (1913:  143-76). liv 
(Fraenkel,  1.  c.  ).  "7  Later,  Euripides,  in  a  typically  philosophizing  manner, 
takes  up  this  idea  in  a  famous  passage  (Tro.  884ff.  ):  (l  yfc  6r  is  KäTrL 
y11s  EXWV  EBpaV,  I  ÖQTLS  1TOT'  EL  QÜ,  8UQTO1TaaTOs  ELUVQL,  I  ZEUS, 
E'LT'  QVQYK11  4Ü  YEOS  EI,  TE  VOÜS  ßpOT(ZV,  I  TrpornlvýäµllV  UE'  TravTa 
yap  8L'  #0J  0U  I  PCLLV(AV  KEAEVOOU  KaTa  8'LK11V  Ta  eVTiT'  äyELs.  88  Cf. 
also  E.  Or.  418:  80UAEV%tEV  eEOts, 
O',  TL  TrOT'  ELQLV  OL  eEOL;  Ba.  894  O',  TL 
87  Cf.  also  Snell  apud  Kitto  (1954:  200):  "Es  steckt  [...  ]  offenbar  ursprünglich  die 
Angst  darin,  dass  es  nicht  der  richtige  Name  ist.  Aber  ich  glaube  auch  dass 
Äschylus  diese  populäre  Volksmeinung  dazu  benützte  um  zu  sagen  [...  ]  dass  Zeus 
etwas  so  Grosses  ist,  das  es  für  uns  nicht  vorstellbar  ist".  See  also  L.  Golden, 
"Zeus,  whoever  he  is...  ",  TAPhA  92  (1961)  163-4.  Lloyd-Jones  (1983:  85-6)  doubts 
the  relation  of  the  Aeschylean  passage  with  the  Heraclitean  fragment  B  32  D.  -K. 
quoted  above  in  the  text;  but  he  barely  offers  any  argument  for  that.  -  Mr 
Garvie  suggests  to  me  that  the  widely  attested  idea  that  men  use  one  name  for  a 
person  or  a  thing  whereas  gods  use  another  (abundant  material  in  West  [1966: 
ad  831];  Kirk  [1985:  ad  1.403-4])  may  also  reflect  a  belief  in  the  fundamental 
epistemological  /  cognitive  alterity  of  the  gods:  if  the  name  reveals  the  nature 
(for  instances  of  this  idea  see  e.  g.  Kirk  [1954:  117-20]),  then  the  fact  that  men 
and  gods  use  different  names  for  the  same  persons  or  objects  might  imply  that 
they  also  perceive  the  nature  of  this  person  or  object  differently. 
88  True,  this  last  sentence,  with  its  asseveration  of  Zeus'  justice,  diverges  from 
the  general  stream  of  `apophatism'  which  we  have  established  as  characteristic 
of  Greek  thought;  cf.  also  e.  g.  Eur.  IT  380-91:  [Artemis  cannot  rejoice  in  human 
blood]  oi6Eva  -yap  oiµa=  8atp6vwv  dvaL  KaKOV  (391);  also  HF  1341-6(despite  the 
stories  of  the  poets,  the  gods  cannot  have  human  vices  and  weaknesses);  fr. 
292.7  N.:  J  6EOL  TL  8p6aLV  aLaXp6v,  OÜK  EtQLV  OEOi;  Tro.  969-82.  Such  views  go 
as  far  back  as  Hesiod  who  makes  Zeus  the  protector  of  dike  (Op.  36,23  8-9,252-4, 
256-73,279-85  etc.  );  indeed,  Dike  is  Zeus'  daughter  (Tb.  902;  Cp.  256).  On  the 
moral  integrity  of  the  gods  see  also  e.  g.  Pl.  Euthphr.  6a;  R.  377e-383c(this  idea  is 
indeed  a  hallmark  of  Platonic  theology);  Isocr.  11.41.  Nonetheless,  in  both 
Euripides  and  Plato  the  presentation  of  such  views  has  a  polemic  character  (e.  g. 
HF  1346  explicitly  mentions  the  `wretched  words'  of  the  äoL8oL;  Pl.  R.  377e-383c 
also  castigates  the  singers'  blasphemous  tales),  which  implies  that  it  is  the  a- 
moral  (or  supra-moral)  character  of  the  gods  that  must  have  been  prevalent  in 
earlier  religious  thought;  cf.  again  Mikalson  (1991:  ch.  1&  178-9),  cited  in  n.  73. lv 
TTOT'  äpa  TO  8atµÖVLOV;  89  HF  1263  ZEUS  8',  ÖQTLS  Ö  ZEÜ9;  90  also  fr.  480 
N.:  ZEUS,  öJTLS  ö  ZEVs,  ov  yap  otsa  TrX  v)  yw,  which,  despite 
Chapouthier  (1954:  213)  and  Rose  (apud  Kitto  [1954:  199]),  far  from 
indicating  an  atheist  (or  even  agnostic)  point  of  view,  is  perfectly  along 
the  lines  of  the  tradition  whose  earliest  poetic  expression  is  the  above 
quoted  A.  Ag.  160-1  9' 
Although  I  am  not  generally  concerned  here  with  post-Sophoclean 
literature  or  thought,  I  think  it  useful  to  point  to  a  manifestation  of  this 
idea  in  Plato  (Crat.  400d-e),  because  it  most  categorically  confirms  the 
interpretation  propounded  here:  the  plurality  of  divine  names  implies 
that  the  essence  of  the  gods  cannot  be  contained  in  a  single  attribute; 
gods  have  many  names  because  none  of  them  suffices  to  describe  their 
true  nature. 
EPMOI'DNHE.  ...  TTEpIL  &  T6V  BE(ýV  T(iJV  ÖVOµäTWV  [...  ] 
ExOLµEV 
QV  1TOU  KQTQ  TOV  QU,  TOV,  TpOTTOV  ETTLQKEiSQQeQL,  KüTQ  T,  LVQ  1TOTE 
9  Ope07TQ  QÜTCJV  TQ  ÖVÖµnTQ  KE  I,  TQL; 
ES2KPATHE.  NaL  µä 
OI,  CL  %tEts  'YE  [...  ]  ELTTEp  'YE  VOÜV  EXOµEV, 
Eva  4.,  1.  ýV  TÖV  KC()vNLCTTOV  TpÖTTOV,  ÖTL  1TEPL  eE(.  i)V  OÜUV  LCT[I.  EV,  OÜTE 
89  Dodds  (1960:  ad  893-4)  cites  Dem.  21.126  TÖ  -n  g  6ULas-  OTL51  ITOT  EUTL,  TO 
aCLLVÖV  KUL  'TO'  8aLgIOVLOV. 
90  Cf.  Bond  (1981:  ad  loc.  ),  on  whose  remarks  I  have  drawn. 
91  Curiously  enough  Chapouthier  (l.  c.  )  sees  the  connection  with  the  Aeschylean 
passage,  but  fails  to  appreciate  its  true  significance:  "mais  comme  it  ya  loin 
dans  1'  intention  de  1'  une  ä  1'  autre  formule:  ce  qui  n'  etait  qu'  embarras 
devant  les  multiples  aspects  de  Zeus  [sc.  in  A.  Ag.  160]  devient  incertitude  sur  sa 
propre  existence  [sc.  in  E.  fr.  480  N.  ];  meme  intention  dans  Oreste  418:  "nous 
sommes  esciaves  des  dieux,  quels  que  soient  ces  dieux".  Similarly  Rose  (apud 
Kitto  [1954:  1991):  "[E.  fr.  480  N.  ]  implies  that  the  speaker  does  not  even  know  if 
Zeus  exists;  for  Aeschylus,  his  existence  is  certain,  the  doubt  extending  only  to 
the  detail  of  whether  he  should  be  called  Zeus  or  by  some  other  name.  "  Far 
from  that:  for  Aeschylus  the  use  of  a  name  implies  the  assignment  of  certain 
attributes  to  the  god,  which  unavoidably  compromises  the  god's  transcendence; 
basically  the  same  idea  underlies  the  Euripidean  passages  too. lvi 
1TEpL  CLÜTCOV  OÜTE  TrEpL  T(i)V  '  ÖVOgüTGJV,  CLTTa  1TOTE  aÜTOL  ECLUTOÜS 
KCG\OÜCiLV'  8AXOV  yäp 
ÖTL  EKELVOL  'YE  TQ46ý  KCLAOÜCiL.  8E157EpOs  8'  aÜ 
TpÖTTOs  Öpe0T11TO9,  (ýCf1TEp  EV  TaiS  EÜ)(aLs  V64.101g'  ECiTLV  11º11.  V 
EÜ)(ECfeaL,  Ö(TLVES  TE  Kai  ÖTTÖeEV  )(aLpOUCiLV  6VO9aZ64.1.  EVOL,  TQ.  ÜTa  Kai 
h4..  LC"LS  aÜTOÜs  KaAELV,  (i)s  'aMO  9718EV  ELBciTCLS'  KaXLJs  yäp  8i1  gµoLyE 
80KEL  VEVOý1.  LCfeaL  92 
Sophocles  evades  this  problem  by  couching  references  to  gods  or 
anything  supernatural  or  transcendent  In  conditional  or  interrogative 
terms;  direct  assertions  (or  direct  negations)  are  carefully  avoided.  A  good 
and  simple  example  of  this  usus  is  OT  904:  i)X,  d  Kpa  uvwv,  ELTrEp  öp6' 
äKOVE  Ls,  ZE  V  Tray-  äväaawv 
... 
93  The  speaker  feels  compelled  to  qualify 
his  absolute  statement  about  the  gods  with  an  almost  formulaic 
conditional  clause,  because  such  statements  run  counter  to  the  apophatic 
view  of  divinity  (God  does  not  admit  of  humanly  defined  attributes)  94 
Perhaps  the  most  famous  instance  of  this  Sophoclean  use  of  conditional 
clauses  is  Orestes'  sinister  reply  to  his  sister's  inquiry  after  the  matricide 
has  been  performed  (El.  1424-5):  Ev  80µoLQL  µEV  I  Ka)LZs,  'ATröxxwv  El, 
K043  EO  aTt1aev.  The  implications  of  this  conditional  clause  are  fully 
discussed  in  Chapter  One,  section  1.5.1;  here  I  must  confine  myself  to 
stressing  that  Orestes'  frightful  realization  that  he  cannot  know  whether 
92  Plato,  of  course,  in  other  places  does  indeed  make  assertions  about  the  gods' 
nature  (e.  g.  Phdr.  246d-247e;  R.  377e-383c);  but  he  must  have  felt  this  to  be  an 
unusual  deviation  from  traditional  Greek  attitudes  on  the  matter,  for  he  almost 
always  took  care  to  emphasize  that  such  assertions  are  bound  to  be  provisional, 
by  reason  of  the  irremediable  limitedness  and  uncertainty  of  all  human 
knowledge:  e.  g.  Phdr.  246a;  Phd.  85c-d;  Ti.  29c  (I  owe  these  references  to  Ms 
Tania  Gergel). 
93  I  see  no  reason  for  Kane's  (1975:  200)  heretical  translation:  "if  you  truly 
deserve  this  name".  For  the  mainstream  interpretation,  which  I  follow  here, 
see  Bollack  (1990:  111.588-90). 
94Cf.  the  similar  thought  in  S.  fr.  368  R.: 
6EOL 
yap  OvrroT,  ET  TL  )(ph 
ßQOT6V 
%EyELV,  [ 
... 
I  tUVaLVEQOVTaL. lvii 
Apollo's  oracle  was  Ka)  L  3S'  or  not  is-  set  against  his  previous  over- 
confidence  that  he  has  the  god  on  his  side. 
Such  a  use  of  conditional  clauses  (especially  with  Et+indic.  )  may  of 
course  represent  the  equivalent  of  a  causal  clause  with  assertive  force;  cf. 
Moorhouse  (1982:  279-80).  There  are,  however,  instances  in  which  this 
syntagm  may  express  an  open  condition  (e.  g.  E.  fr.  292.7  N2  Et  OEO'L  TL 
8p6CTLV  adaXpöv,  ovK  Etcty  OEO'L),  or  even  a  negation  of  the  content  of 
the  protasis  (e.  g.  Pl.  Phdr.  228a  Et  4aL8pov  äyvow,  KäL  E  tauTOO 
ETTLXEXrIQµaL,  where  the  adynaton  in  the  apodosis  cancels  the  truth  of  the 
protasis).  The  definition  given  by  Ellendt-Genthe  (1872:  198  s.  v.  Et,  II) 
neatly  preserves  the  balance  between  the  assertive  and  the  conditional 
force  of  such  clauses:  "Et  significat  siquidem  et  quandoquidem,  quod  ubi 
fit,  non  fit  ratiocinatio,  sed  refertur  Et  ad  unum  quiddam  vocabulum 
alterius  enuntiati,  quod  circumlocutione  amplius  exponitur  cum 
dubitandi  quadam  adsignificatione"  (emphasis  mine).,  Of  course,  in 
theological  contexts  this  dubitandi  quaedam  adsignificatio95  implicit  in 
the  use  of  Et  does  not  express  literal  doubts  as  to  the  existence  of  the  gods 
(Sophocles  is  neither  an  agnostic  nor  an  atheist);  rather,  it  represents  a 
refusal  to  make  absolute  statements  about  divinity.  Such  a  refusal  seems 
to  me  to  be  present  even  in  passages  like  OC  621-3TV'  ovµös  ...  VE  KUS 
... 
a  is  TTLETaL,  Et  ZEÜS  ETL  ZEÜS  XGJ  ALÖS  (Dot(3os  aa41's:  96  granted, 
the  events  of  the  play  may  indicate  that  Zeus  is  still  existent  and 
Phoebus'  oracles  true;  it  is  interesting,  however,  that  this  is  never  said  in 
so  many  words,  and  that  the  conditional  modality  is  preferred  instead 
95  On  which  see  also  Chapouthier  (1954:  214)  ä  propos  of  Euripides:  "  `EV  est  un 
autre  mot,  d'  une  ambiguite  perfide,  car  it  signifie  ä  la  fois  'si'  et  `puisque';  it 
est  susceptible  d'  appuyer  la  croyance  ou  de  1'  ebranler  [...  ]  `EL  aoýös  zrE4UKas' 
(Ph  en.  86)  signifie-t-il  `puisque  tu  es  sage,  etant  donne  to  sagesse',  ou  au 
contraire,  'Si  to  es  sage,  si  1'  on  doit  croire  ä  to  sagesse'". 
96  The  prophetess  Cassandra  speaks  with  similar  caution  in  E.  Tro.  356-8:  Et  yap 
EQTL  AoýLaS,  I'  EAEvrjc  yalLEt  µE  8UQXEPEUTEP0V  yäµov  1ö  TwV  'AXau  v  K>ELVÖS 
'AyaµEµvwv  ävat. lviii 
(cf.  also  628  E'LnEp  µiß  OEOl,  ýEÜBova(  µE).  Speaking  of  divinity  in 
assertive  terms,  even  in  order  to  affirm  the  validity  of  its  decrees,  is 
carefully  avoided. 
Much  less  commendable  is  to  assume  that  manifestations  of  divine 
will  in  oracles,  prophecies  or  dreams  can  be  fully  understood  by  humans. 
Even  the  ruthless  Clytaemestra  hesitates  to  give  a  definite  interpretation 
of  the  frightening  dream  she  has  had  (El.  646)  :  EL  µE  V  TtE  4TIvE  vE  aO  4 
8Ös  TEXEß4Öpa,  I  EL  8'  EXepä,  TO  Z!  9  EXOPOtaLV  Eµrr&iv  pAOEs,  she 
prays  to  Apollo.  97  By  contrast,  the  sympathetic  Chorus  rashly  draw 
conclusions  out  of  this  dream:  it  seems  to  them  to  guarantee  an 
unequivocally  happy  outcome  (Chrysothemis,  however,  has  repeatedly 
stressed  that  her  report  of  the  dream  only  partially  reveals  its  content 
[e.  g.  414,4261  -  and  therefore  its  significance  is  not  patent).  Granted, 
they  do  express  this  confidence  in  the  conditional  modality:  EL  µil  "yW" 
Trap#pwv  16VTLS  '#V  Kai  yvchµas  AELTroµEVa  ao4ds,  ELQLV  ä 
TTpÖ(laVTLS  ALKa  (El.  472ff.  )  ;  98  also:  'fjTOL  µaVTEtaL  ßpOTGV  O1)  'K  ELaLV  Ev 
BELVO  g  öVELpOLS  oÜ8'  &  eEa4GTOLS  EL  µ71  T08E  ýäaµa  VUKTÖS  EÜ 
KaTaaXi$YEL  (El.  498).  Nonetheless,  one  may  safely  assume  that  their  use 
of  conditional  clauses  is  a  mere  formality,  and  that  they  do  in  fact  regard 
themselves  as  seers  able  to  utilize  oracular  divination  and  the 
interpretation  of  dreams  as  safe  guides  to  the  truth:  after  all,  their  over- 
confidence  in  their  cognitive  potential  is  all  too  clear  in  the  rest  of  the 
song,  where  their  certainty  about  the  dream  as  an  unproblematically 
good  portent  is  expressed  in  the  most  unambiguous  terms:  cf.  esp.  479-81 
... 
ÜTTEQTL  µWL  OapaOs  ä6U1TV000v  KXüouQav  ... 
övELpäm)v;  489-91  i  ¬L 
... 
'EpLVV9;  495-8  Trpö  TWVBE  TOL  eäpaOc  In  TrOTE  p.  iiTro6'  ... 
I  a4iEyEs 
91  For  reasons  why  the  dream  is  ambiguous  see  Bowra  (1944:  224-25);  cf. 
Devereux  (1976:  229). 
98  Cf.  Qf  1086-7  ELTTEp  Eyd  RthVTI,  s  EL-  ß.  41L  KQI  Kara  yvci)µav  18ptc;  again  the 
Chorus  couch  their  (evident)  self-assuredness  in  conditional  terms.  They  will, 
of  course,  prove  woefully  wrong. lix 
TrEXdV  TEpaS  I  Toil  8pwai  Ka.  auv8pC5cTLv.  99  Yet,  the  far  from 
unequivocal  ending  of  the  play  severely  qualifies  their  certainty. 
Much  the  same  is  the  use  of  the  interrogative  mode  in  Ant.  522, 
where  Antigone's  reply  to  Creon's  carefully  argued  thesis  is  a  mere 
question:  TLS  oLBEV  El  KäTC)  '(7TLV  EV'ayfj  Tä6E;  The  divine  law  which 
the  heroine  claims  to  value  more  than  human  laws  is  deliberately  left 
unspecified:  all  things  divine  are  by  definition  inscrutable, 
unapproachable  by  the  cognitive  faculties  of  the  human  intellect.  It  is 
this  same  idea  of  the  unknowability  of  divinity  that  also  underlies 
Antigone's  conditional  clauses  at  925:  E  µE  V  ovv  T68'  E  QTLY  EV  OE  Og 
KaXCZ,  ... 
J  8'  6(8'  %1apTC  vovCTLv...  No  one  can  know  for  sure  which 
things  are  approved  by  the  gods  and  which  are  not.  The  only  person  who 
professes  to  have  full  and  secure  knowledge  (cf.  1044-5  Ev  yap  o18'...  ) 
that  surpasses  even  that  of  seers  (cf.  631:  TaX'  ELQöµEaOa  µäVTEWV 
vnE  pTE  pov)  is  Creon,  who  eventually  finds  his  over-confidence  shattered: 
the  seer  Teiresias  points  out  to  him  that,  far  from  having  superior 
knowledge,  he  suffers  from  the  disease  of  folly  (1051-2). 
There  is  a  similar  situation  in  the  Oedipus  at  Colon  us.  At  OC  1267- 
8  Polynices  claims  with  excessive  confidence  that  EQT1  yap  Kai  ZrvL 
of  vOaKos  Opövuw  A1861)3  ETr'  EpyoLs  TrdaL.  Yet  little  does  he  know  about 
the  grim  destiny  that  his  father  is  about  to  impose  on  him  with  his 
curses.  Oedipus,  who  has  acquired  prophetic  power,  enjoins  what  we 
know  is  the  truth  (1381-2):  [you  and  your  brother  will  perish]  ELTrEp 
EUTI.  V  it  Trakc[4aTos  AL"  ýVVE8pos  Z1]v6s  äpxa(oLs  vö  IoLs. 
Amazingly,  even  he  who  has  now  acquired  prophetic  power  carefully 
avoids  making  categorical  statements  about  divinity:  he  uses  conditional 
clauses!  And  Polyneices,  as  if  realizing  now  that  no  assertion  about  things 
transcendental  can  be  valid,  adopts,  in  his  parting  words,  the  conditional 
99  Text  according  to  I1oyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990a).  Cf.  Kaibel  (1896:  ad  498):  "was 
der  Chor  Anfangs  als  Ahnung  und  Vermuthung,  dann  immer  zuversichtlicher 
ausgesprochen,  das  wird  ihm  zum  Schluss  unumstössliche  Sicherheit". lx 
modality  (OC  1407):  EQV  M  TOÜS'  QPQL  1TQTP6s  TEA(i)VTQL 
QTL[1QaMTE  'YE. 
The  same  excessive  certainty  about  the  gods  turns  out  to  be 
erroneous  in  the  Philoctetes  too.  The  hero  vehemently  asserts  in  the  most 
categoric  terms  his  secure  knowledge  of  the  divine  plan  (Phil.  1035-39): 
6O  EtaOE  8'  1ý8LKTjK6TES  I  TÖV  äv8pa  TÖVSE,  OEOtaLV  E'L  &KTIS  µEýEL.  I 
E  OL8a  8'  WS  JIEAEL  'Y"  ETTEL  OU'TTOT'  CLV  O'TOXOV  I  ETAEÜQaT'  QV  T6VS' 
OÜVEK'  äv8p6Os  &WOU  -I  EL  µ1j  TL  KEVTpOV  OetOV  ý'Y'  i  tds  -E  ioO. 
True,  the  KEVTpoV  that  spurred  on  the  Greeks  was  indeed  OE  Lov;  still, 
despite  Philoctetes'  Eýoi8a,  it  is  far  from  certain  that  the  gods  have 
incited  the  Greek  expedition  because  they  care  about  Philoctetes:  his 
intention  to  go  back  to  Greece  with  the  help  of  Neoptolemus  is  thwarted 
by  Heracles,  who  leaves  him  with  no  other  alternative  but  to  endure  what 
he  has  been  most  loath  to  do,  namely  fight  on  the  side  of  the  Greeks.  100 
100  I  have  found  only  one  apparent  exception  to  the  Sophoclean,  use  of 
conditional  or  interrogative  clauses  with  reference  to  divinity:  it  is  the  famous 
second  stasimon  of  OF,  esp.  863-72.  The  laws  "generated  in  aether",  "by 
Olympus",  and  having  a  "great  immortal  god  in  them"  have  been  taken  by  most 
commentators  (Jebb  [1893:  ad  865];  Kamerbeek  [1967:  ad  866];  Bollack  [1990:  III. 
544-6])  to  mean  the  human  `unwritten  laws'  (cf.  also  e.  g.  Krause  [1976:  180-1]). 
With  this  view,  the  Chorus  would  attribute  divine  character  to  what  is  plainly  a 
human  construction,  projecting,  as  it  were,  human  moral  preoccupations  on 
the  divine  plane  -an  idea  that  would  be  surprisingly  un-Sophoclean.  Such  a 
view  can  be  discarded:  the  Chorus'  concern  throughout  this  stasimon  is  with 
the  demonstration  of  the  validity  of  oracles,  and  I  should  rather  think  that  it  is 
this  validity  that  the  Chorus  present  as  the  universal  `divine  law  generated  in 
aether'  etc.  Thus  interpreted,  the  passage  fits  nicely  into  the  general  picture 
we  have  created  so  far:  Sophocles  makes  no  direct  statements  about  the  gods, 
save  to  assert  their  existence  and  the  validity  of  their  pronouncements. lxi 
0.4.3  Some  conclusions  on  divine  and  human  knowledge  in 
Sophocles  - 
A  fundamental  principle  of  the  Sophoclean  tragic  cosmology  is  that 
divinity  is  essentially  unapproachable  to  the  human  mind;  that  means 
that  divine  will  cannot  be  communicated  in  its  entirety  by  any  means  - 
oracles,  dreams,  prophecies  etc.  Nevertheless,  we  should  not  go  as  far  as  to 
suggest  that  Sophocles  (qua  dramatist,  at  least)  shared  Xenophanes' 
extreme  position  that  communication  between  God  and  Man  through 
oracles  is  entirely  impossible  (see  again  p.  xxii).  Far  from  arriving  at  a 
wholesale  denial  of  the  validity  of  oracular  divination,  he  asseverates  it 
either  explicitly  (as  e.  g.  in  the  first  stasimon  of  Oedipus  Tyrannus)  or 
implicitly,  through  the  oracles'  eventual  coming-to-pass  as  represented 
in  the  development  of  individual  plays.  "'  Nonetheless,  for  Sophocles 
divine  noos  and  human  mind  still  represent  two  incommensurably 
different  cognitive  levels,  which  means  that  oracles,  qua  manifestation  of 
the  divine  will,  do  not,  as  a  rule,  fit  completely  into  the  human  modes  of 
perception  and  understanding  -  that  they  normally  transcend  the 
narrow  confines  of  human  mental  categories.  102  It  is  precisely  this  point 
that  Sophocles  chooses  to  exploit  dramatically:  the  tension  between  the 
natural  human  tendency  to  assume  that  oracles  -  and  therefore  divine 
will,  and  even  divinity  itself  -  can  be  fully  and  perfectly  known  to  Man, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  essential  impossibility  thereof  on  the  other. 
Oracles  do  contain  the  truth,  but  only  in  posse:  as  they  are  almost 
invariably  couched  in  ambiguous,  multi-interpretable  terms,  Man  should 
101  1  am  not  suggesting  that  Sophocles  qua  person  believed  in  oracles:  this  is  not 
only  impossible  to  know,  but  is  also  of  no  importance  to  my  argument.  What  I 
am  concerned  with  is  rather  the  use  Sophocles  makes  of  oracles  in  his  plays, 
and  the  tragic  world-view  that  this  use  evinces;  such  a  world-view  is  primarily 
an  artistic  means,  away  of  moulding  the  human  experience  of  the  world  into  a 
specific  artistic  form;  it  may  therefore  not  coincide  with  Sophocles'  personal 
Weltanschauung.  On  the  artistic  function  of  oracles  in  epic  and  tragedy  see 
further  Bushnell  (1988:  Ch.  1  passim,  esp.  4-5). 
102  Cf.  Ehrenberg  (1954:  27). lxii 
beware  of  assuming  all-too-easily  that  he  can  attain  to  a  complete 
understanding  of  divine  will.  And  even  when  an  oracle  is  clear  in  its 
phrasing  (as  is  the  case  with  Apollo's  oracle  in  the  Electra),  this  is  no 
guarantee  that  full  and  clear  insight  can  be  gained  into  the  plans  of  the 
gods:  the  human  perspective  still  remains  too  limited,  incapable  of 
gaining  a  synthetic  view  of  things;  yet,  we  are  all  too  often  tempted 
uncritically  to  assume  that  the  essence  of  divinity  can  be  exhaustively 
conceived  by  our  limited  intellectual  faculties,  or  described  by  the  poor 
resources  of  our  language  -  thereby  reducing  the  infiniteness  and 
incomprehensibility  of  divine  noos  to  the  level  of  our  limited  view,  only 
to  realize,  too  late,  that  we  are  ineluctably  prey  to  our  limited 
understanding. 
APPENDIX 
Logos  in  Heraclitus 
Lan  gue  and  parole  in  F.  de  Saussure 
The  following  are  quoted  from  Ferdinand  de  Saussure,  Cours  de 
linguistique  generale  (ed.  by  C.  Bally  &  A.  Sechehaye).  Lausanne  &  Paris: 
Payot  1916,  p.  39.  Emphasis  added. 
"La  langue  existe  dans  la  collectivite  sous  la  forme  d'  une  somme  d' 
empreints  deposees  dans  chaque  cerveau,  ä  peu  pres  comme  un 
dictionnaire  dont  tous  les  exemplaires,  identiques,  seralent  repartis  entre 
les  individus  [...  ]  C  est  donc  quelque  chose  qui  est  dans  chaqun  d'  eux, 
tout  en  etant  commun  ä  tous  et  place  en  dehors  de  la  volonte  des 
depositaires.  Ce  mode  d'  existence  de  la  langue  peut  etre  represente  par  la 
formule: lxiii 
1+1+1+1  ...  =I  (modele  collectif). 
De  quelle  maniere  la  parole  est-elle  presente  dans  cette  meine 
collectivite?  Elle  est  la  somme  de  ce  que  les  gens  disent,  et  eile  comprend: 
a)  des  combinaisons  individuelles  dependant  de  la  volonte  de  ceux  qui 
parlent,  b)  des  actes  de  phonation  egalement  volontaires,  necessaires 
pour  1'  execution  de  ces  combinaisons. 
Il  n'  ya  donc  Tien  de  collectif  daps  la  parole;  les,  manifestations  en 
sont  individuelles  et  momentanees.  Ici  il  n'  ya  rien  de  plus  que  la 
somme  des  ces  particuliers  selon  la  formule: 
(1+1'+1"+l»f 
... 
).  " CHAPTER  ONE 
AIIOAAQN  EI  KAAQE  EOEE  TEEN: 
KNOWLEDGE  AND  UNKNOWABILITY 
IN  THE  ELECTRA 
Somebody  will  have  to  be  Agamemnon,  somebody  the  murderess 
Odysseus  Elytis,  "Agamemnon" 
1.0.1  Introduction.  Orestes  in  Attic  tradition  and  in  the  Electra 
If  an  Athenian  spectator,  already  familiar  with  the  Homeric  version  of 
Orestes'  legend,  expected  to  see  a  similarly  heroic  Orestes  in  the 
Sophoclean,  version  too,  then  surely  the  first  lines  of  the  play  would 
confirm  his  expectations.  '  The  Paedagogus,  emphasizing  that  Orestes  is 
the  offspring  of  the  glorious  leader  of  the  Greek  army  at  Troy  (1-2),  shows 
to  the  young  man  his  native  city,  which  he  had  always  been  craving  to 
see  (2-3).  The  "old  Argos,  sacred  land  of  Inachus'  daughter"  (4-5),  the 
"agora  of  the  wolf-slaying  god"  (6-7),  the  "glorious  temple  of  Hera"  (7-8), 
and  the  markedly  Homeric  rroXüXpuaOL  Mudjvai  (cf.  9)  all  of  them 
create  a  heroic  atmosphere  and  recall  a  heroic  past  which  Orestes 
supposedly  has  come  back  to  restore  to  its  ancient  glory.  However,  it  is 
this  very  description  of  the  action's  setting  that  contains  the  first  sinister 
1  See  Qi.  1.298-300  (cf.  40-41),  3.196-98.  Orestes  is  there  presented  as  a  paragon 
of  male  virtue.  The  similarity  of  language  between  the  Homeric  passages  and 
our  play  is,  perhaps,  significant:  e.  g.  Qi.  1.298otov  KMO9  EX\a.  (3E  &oc'OpEO  c 
El.  60  K&  EV&YKWµaL  K?  os;  Qi. 
1.299-30OEKTaVE  TraTpo4OVýa 
...  bs  OL  TraTEpa 
KÄUT6V  EKTa  (cf.  Qi.  3.197-98)  -  El.  141TaTpL  TL.  WpÖV  46vou;  Q1.1.41  öwrrÖT  äV 
j1ßýQ?  1  ^ý  El.  159  EV  1jß¢;  Qi. 
1.41  Kai  1?  js  t  Lei  pETQL  a  r7  El.  4  TÖ  TrakzLÖV  "Apyoc 
o&TrÖGctc.  For  a  detailed  account  of  the  Homeric  reminiscences  in  the  prologue 
see  Davidson  (1988:  50). 2 
hints:  2  Argos  is  further  defined  by  an  one-line  apposition  (5  Trjs 
oUTTpoTrXfyoc  äXaos  '  IVäXou  K6pTls)  which  unexpectedly  obscures  the 
heroic  splendour  of  the  passage,  since  the  ensuing  reference  to  Hera's 
temple  inevitably  recalls  Io's  nightmarish  pursuit  by  her  jealous  rival. 
Moreover,  the  derivation  (perhaps  pseudo-etymologizing)  of  Apollo's 
cult-epithet  Lykeios  from  his  slaughtering  of  a  wolf3  (6)  is  an  appositely 
bloody  preamble  to  the  apex  of  this  series  of  ambiguities,  namely  the 
juxtaposition  of  MuKi  vas  Tag  TroXUXpüaous  (9)  with  TroM46opov  [...  ] 
863µa  IIEXOTn863v  (10),  where  the  chiasmus  and  the  use  of  TroXu-  as  first 
component  underscore  the  paradox  of  Orestes'  mission:  4  he  will  try  to  re- 
store  the  wealth  and  prosperity  of  his  race  (cf.  72)  but  only  by,  bloodshed 
and  destruction  (37  ac)ayäs).  5  What  is  more,  this  bloody  struggle  will  not 
be  a  heroic  battle  in  the  Iliadic  mould,  but  an  act  of  sheer  86Aos  (36-37). 
By  this  point  the  audience  must  have  suspected  that  Orestes 
perhaps  will  not  perform  an  unblemished  act  of  happy  heroism.  Later  in 
the  prologue  the  disturbing  forebodings  are  intensified.  However,  in  order 
fully  to  understand  them,  it  will  be  necessary  to  make  a  digression  at  this 
point  and  make  a  rough  survey  of  Orestes'  image  in  Attic  folklore.  In  gen- 
2  On  these  hints  cf.  Segal's  (1981:  268-69)  different  perspective. 
3  For  Apollo  Lykeios  see  Jebb  (205-206),  Farnell  (1907b:  113-23),  Nilsson  (1967: 
536-38).  Farrell  (1907b:  113-16)  rejects  the  derivation  (accepted  by  Jebb, 
among  others)  of  AÜKELOS  from  root  *xuK-(=`light',  cf.  äµuLXI 
, 
XvKäßac)  and 
associates  it  with  X  KOS  (familiar  animal  of  the  god,  a  remnant,  perhaps,  of 
direct  animal-worship).  Contra  Nilsson  (1967:  537):  "es  ist  ausgeschlossen,  daß 
Apollon  einmal  in  Wolfgestalt  auftrat".  However,  this  did  not  prevent  the  poets 
from  associating  the  name  Lykeios  with  the  wolf;  cf.  Nilsson  (1967:  536  with 
nn.  12,13),  Segal  (1966:  477  with  n.  11),  (1981:  465  n.  57).  Jebb  (205)  also 
correctly  remarks:  "The  sense  which  Sophocles  here  affixes  to  AVKEL09  was 
undoubtedly  that  which  had  the  widest  acceptance  in  ancient  Greece:  the 
`wolf-god'  was  the  `wolf-slayer'". 
4  Cf.  Kamerbeek  (ad  10).  On  the  modification  of  the  Homeric,  colouring  of 
TroXvXpiaouc  because  of  its  juxtaposition  with  the  sinister  TroX14  Oopov  see  also 
Davidson  (1988:  51  n.  44). 
5  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  252;  cf.  268).  For  a  different  interpretation  of  the  Paedagogus' 
speech  see  Sheppard  (1918:  82). 3 
eral,  it  seems  that  in  Attic  popular  belief  Orestes  was  a  most  malicious 
and  most  fearsome  Tjpws.  Far  from  being  a  heroic  (in  our  meaning  of  the 
word)  model,  he  was  believed  to  wander  at  night  (presumably  as  a  ghost), 
beating  Athenian  passers-by  and,  perhaps,  stripping  them  of  their 
clothes. 
Three  passages  from  Aristophanes  are  particularly  illuminating: 
a)  Ar.  Av.  1482ff.:  EQTL  8'  aü  XWpa  TTpös  W)TW  I  T(3  QKÖTcp  Tröppc. 
TLS  EV  I  Tý  X  XVCOV  Epi  iict, 
I  EVea  TOLS  TIpüXJLV  ävOpW-  I  TTOL 
eVVapLQT()QL  Kai  ýVV-  I  ELUL  TTX7  V  Tfs  EaTr4pas.  17VLKaOTa  8'  OÜKET 
ýV  I  Qa4a)1E'S  ýUVTU'YXQVELV.  I  EL  'Yap  EVTVXOL  TLS  Tjp(P  I  TGJV  1POTGJV 
VÜKTü)p  'OpEc  -n  ,I  yu  ivoc  lv  TTXTjlELs  nr  a1JTOÜ 
I  TTQVTa  TQTTLSEýLa. 
b)  Ar.  Av.  712:  ELTa  6"OpEQTrI  Xaa.  Lvav  Ü4atVELV,  `LVa  if  ýLywV 
aTTOSÜ-n. 
c)  Ar.  Ach.  1162  ff.:  TOÜTO  I.,  LEV  aÜT(3  KQKÖV  9V,  K  &Y  9TEpOV 
VUKTEpLVÖV  y4VOLTO. 
1ýTTL&L3V  yäp  0TKa6'  E  LlMaaLas  ßa&LCWV,  I 
ELTa  KaTQ  ELE  TLS  a1  TOÜ  I.  LEO'Ü)V  Tf  KE4aXlis  'OpEQTIIs  I 
µaLV%IEVOs. 
Many  controversial  interpretations  have  been  proposed  for  the  above 
cited  passages.  According  to  the  scholiast  on  Ar.  Av.  1484b  and  1490a  (p. 
215  Holwerda),  who  is  followed  by  some  modern  scholars,  6  we  have  to 
assume  here  a  reference  to  a  certain  (Athenian?  )  Orestes,  son  of 
Timocrates,  who  at  nights  used  to  strip  passers-by  of  their  clothes;  in  that 
case,  the  phrase  ijpq  'OpEairn  would  jocularly  associate  him  with  the 
homonymous  son  of  Agamemnon  (cf.  schol.  on  1490a:  TlpLVa  aüTbv  4rjaL 
8Lä  i-nv  öpi  vuptav  Tnv  lTpös  Töv  'AyaµEµvovos  vLö%  v  'OpEai  v). 
Others  suppose  that  "Orestes"  had  become  a  nickname  for  highwaymen 
or  drunken  hooligans  who  used  to  attack  and  rob  passers-by  (cf.  Alex.  fr. 
112  K.  -A.  ).  This  could  be  confirmed  by  Is.  viii.  3  (,  &LOKAa  Töv  4  XuEa 
TÖV  '  OpEQTr1V  ETTLKaXo  tEVOV;  ibid.  44:  TÖV  '  OpEa-  rIv  TOÜTOV  TOV 
6  E.  g.  Rogers  (1906:  ad  1482);  Lesky  (RE  18.1  [1939]  col.  982);  Sommerstein  (1987: 
ad  1490-3);  Dunbar  (1995:  ad  712,1490-93  ).  Cf.  also  Woodard  (1964:  165). 4 
KaKC09  äTroXcn  ievOV).  This  latter  view  seems  to  me  more  plausible,  7  but  I 
should;  at  any  rate,  fully  endorse  Nilsson's  (1967:  183)  prudently  cautious 
conclusion  on  Ar.  Av.  1482ff.:  "Der  Witz,  der  dahinter  steckt,  entgeht  uns, 
echter  Volksglaube  muß  dem  aber  zugrunde  liegen"  (cf.  also  Wilamowitz 
[1959:  II,  14]).  Whether  a  man  named  (or  nicknamed)  Orestes  once  lived 
in  Athens  or  whether  "Orestes"  was  a  generic  name  for  violent  revellers, 
Aristophanes'  jokes  would  probably  not  work  unless  a  popular  belief 
existed  that  the  Mycenaean  hero  Orestes'  ghost  appeared  at  nights  and 
harmed  the  people. 
One  further  point:  the  belief  was  current  in  antiquity  that  ilpwEs  In 
general  were  evil-doers,  and  would  especially  harm  whoever  would  pass 
by  their  tombs.  One  should  consider,  inter  alia,  the  following  passages: 
a)  Men.  fr.  394  Koerte:  oL  yap  ijpoEc 
.  ...  .I  KaKOVV  gTOLµoL 
1.1dXN0V  7jTrEp  L  4EXEtV  [f  EÜEpyETEI,  V  VUIg.  ].  8 
b)  Chamael.  apud  Ath.  11.461  c:  Xu)  TTovs  yap  KaL  TTX  KTas 
TOÜS  1jpwas  VOµlCOUQL  Kai  I1Cl»üv  VÜKTwp  >1  µE6'  f  thpaV. 
c)  Hsch.  K  4040  Latte:  KpELTTOVas:  TOÜS  11pü  is  oÜT)  AyOUQLV. 
8OKOÜQL  U  KQK(TLKOL  TLVES  JvaL.  8La  TOOTO  Kai  OL  TrapLÖVTEs  Ta 
7jpcýa  QL'Y7lV  ýXOUQL  µ7j  TL  ßilaßWQLV.  Cf.  also  Phot.  S.  V.  KPELTTOVES  (I, 
7  Arguments  in  favour  of  this  view  have  been  provided  by  e.  g.  Zanetto  &  Del 
Como  (1987:  ad  712,1482/3-92/3)  and,  with  very  sound  argumentation,  by 
Rennie  (1909:  ad  1166)  and  Starkie  (1909:  ad  1168);  cf.  Rogers  (1910:  ad  1163) 
and  Higham  (1932:  103,  cf.  105).  Van  Leeuwen  (1901:  ad  1166sq.  )  accepts  that 
Orestes  is  a  nickname  but  still  thinks  that  it  refers  to  a  real  person  (coll.  Eupol. 
fr.  *179  K.  -A.,  Suid.  P  374  [I,  479  Adler]).  His  arguments  however  (cf.  also  van 
Leeuwen  [1902:  ad  712,1485-1493])  are  unconvincing.  Hofmann  (1976:  201-202) 
agrees  that  "Orestes"  must  be  here  "ein  Spitzname  oder  Stereotyp"  but  does  not 
accept  any  relation  with  Agamemnon's  son;  he  would  rather  follow  Müller- 
Strübing's  (Aristophanes  und  die  historische  Kritik,  Leipzig  1873,  p.  33) 
suggestion  that  the  nickname  stemmed  from  Echecratidas'  son  Orestes,  the 
Thessalian  pretender  to  the  throne  (Thuc.  1.111).  Nonetheless,  I  cannot  see 
any  reason  why,  as  Hofmann  (1976:  201-202)  puts  it,  "der  Name  Orestes  aber 
rühre  sicher  nicht  von  dem  tragischen  Heros  her,  auf  den  mit  µatvogcvoc  und 
ijpws  angespielt  sei...  "  [cf.  Ar.  Ach.  1165]. 5 
350  Naber). 
Of  course,  the  ijpWES  were  not  imagined  only  as  malicious  revenants 
their  power  to  harm  was  complemented  by  a  beneficent  function,  with 
the  resulting  duality  being  a  typical  trait  of  cult-heroes  qua  chthonic 
figures.  9  Thus  e.  g.  Oedipus  in  S.  OC  (1518ff.  )  promises  that  his  tomb  will 
help  the  Athenians  against  the  Thebans,  while  we  are  told  that  Cimon 
transferred  Theseus'  relics  from  Scyros  to  Athens;  10  moreover,  according  to 
Herodotus  (i.  67-68)  the  Spartans  (NB:  not  the  Athenians!  )  had  to  bring 
Orestes'  bones  from  Tegea  to  Sparta,  in  the  belief  that  they  were  thus 
enlisting  his  help  in  the  war  against  Arcadia.  11  Therefore,  one  should  not 
suppose  that  in  the  Aves  passage  Orestes  is  presented  as  an  evil-doer 
merely  because  heroes  were  believed  to  be  evil-doers:  it  must  have  been 
particularly  Orestes'  name  itself  that  bore  sinister  connotations.  A  passage 
from  Pl.  Cra.  (394e)  excellently  illuminates  what  must  have  been  the 
typical  Attic  view  of  Orestes:  GJQ1TE  p  'yE  Kal  O'  OpE  QT11S  [...  ]  KLV8  UVE  VE  L 
ÖpO  c  EXELV,  ELTE  TLS  TrJXTj  EeETO  QÜTC;  v  TO  övoµa  ELTE  KaL  1TouynI9 
TLS,  TO  NpL(i)8ES  ÜQEWS  KQL  TO  QYPLOV  IXÜTOÜ  KQL  TO  O'PELVO'V12  'ýS  ý 
EVBELKVÜ!.  I.  EVOS  T(  O'V%IaTL. 
Turning  now  to  our  main  argument,  I  think  that  these  disturbing 
connotations  of  Orestes'  name,  along  with  his  peculiarly  Attic  aspect  as  a 
malicious  spirit  of  the  Underworld,  are  exploited  in  this  play.  First  of  all, 
Orestes  himself  devotes  nine  lines  (56-64)  to  show,  with  a  strikingly 
emphatic  phrasing,  that  spreading  the  tidings  of  one's  own  death  is  of 
8  Cf.  Zenob.  V.  60  (CPG  I,  p.  145  Leutsch  &  Schneidewin). 
9  On  this  dual  power  of  the  chthonians,  including  cult-heroes,  see  above  all  A. 
Henrichs  in  H.  Hofmann  &  A.  Harder  (eds),  Fragmenta  Dramatica  (Göttingen 
1991),  161-201,  esp.  192-3.  Hofmann  (1976:  204  n.  3)  feasibly  argues  that  in 
Aristophanes'  lost  play  "Hpwec  the  heroes  themselves  explicitly  claimed  to 
punish  evil-doers  but  also  to  reward  good  people;  cf.  R.  Merkelbach  ZPE  1 
(1967)  161-2. 
10  Plu.  Thes.  36,  Um.  8;  Paus.  iii.  3.7. 
11  Cf.  e.  g.  Nilsson  (1967:  189). 
12  Cf.  Phot.  (II,  26  Naber):  bpEQTrls  ('Op-Porson)"  Ev  ÖpEQL  3LaLTCi)pEVO$;  also 
Suid.  o  537  (I11,554Adler). 6 
course  ominous,  but  when  such  false  news  results  in  salvation,  glory  (60) 
and  KEp8os  (61),  one  must  not  hesitate.  13  So,  by  line  65  the  audience 
have  realized  that  Orestes'  death  will  be  a  sham.  However,  at  65-66  a 
suprisingly  contradictory  statement  comes  forth:  as  a  result  of  those  false 
tidings  (65  ýljµýs),  alive  (66  8E8opKÖ-ra)  as  he  will  be,  he  will  shine  like  a 
star  upon  his  foes  (66).  Most  critics  have  seen  here  an  allusion  to  the 
Homeric  image  of  a  star  as  a  sign  of  disaster  (Il.  11.62,22.26ff.  ).  14  It 
should  be  added  that  this  image  is  here  combined  with  the  popular  belief 
that  people  become  stars  after  their  death  (cf.  Ar.  Pax  832-33:  Ok  ýv  äp' 
oÜ8'  ÖX  youQL,  KaTa"  TÖV  QEpa  I  ws  QQTEpEs  'YL'yvÖtIEO',  ÖTaV  TLS 
änoOäv1  ;  also  AP  7.670  ['Plato'],,  imitated  by  the  anonymous  funeral 
epigram  585  Peek).  15  So,  Orestes  will  be  a  living  dead  (this  must  be  the 
point  of  the  juxtaposition  of  8E8opKC's  with  äaTpov  [66]),  and  indeed  a 
maleficent  one,  recalling  the  Homeric  oüXLos  äaTgp. 
My  hypothesis  that  Sophocles  exploits  Attic  popular  perceptions  of 
Orestes  may  be  further  corroborated.  At  1228-29  Electra  suggestively 
remarks  that  both  her  brother's  death  and  his  `resurrection'  have  been 
effected  by  means  of  tricks,  µ1Xavai.  This,  as  well  as  the  Paedagogus' 
ambivalent  phrase  at  1342  (he  says  that  Orestes  is,  for  those  in  the 
palace,  do  Twv  Ev  "ALBou,  carefully  avoiding  the  word  TE6v-qKÖTa  used 
by  Orestes  one  line  before),  are  consistent  with  the  folk  belief  that  Orestes, 
as  a  ijpwc,  was  neither  dead  nor  alive:  he  was  a  revenant.  Likewise,  as 
Segal  (1966:  524)  has  remarked,  the  image  of  Hermes  leading  Orestes  into 
13  Cf.  Jebb  (ad  59f.  )  with  the  parallel  E.  Hel.  1050  there  cited.  See  also 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  236  with  n.  63).  Adams  (1957:  64)  curiously  suggests 
that  Orestes'  "misgivings"  about  being  reported  dead  stem  from  his  "scruples" 
about  killing  his  mother;  but  as  Linforth  (1963:  91  n.  1)  has  remarked,  "there  is 
not  the  slightest  hint  [...  ]  that  he  feels  any  such  scruple  until  the  deed  is  done". 
14  E.  g.  Jebb  (ad  65f.  ),  Davidson  (1988:  60).  Of  course,  a  star  is  also  a  stock  image  of 
beauty  and  splendour  (e.  g.  I1.6.401;  cf.  Hor.  Caren  3.9.21);  however,  Orestes' 
beauty  is  manifestly  irrelevant  here! 
15  For  discussion  see  D.  L.  Page,  Further  Greek  Epigrams  (Cambridge  1981),  161. 
Cf.  also  Segal  (1966:  491).  Seaford  (1994b:  278-9)  sees  here  allusions  to  mystic 
ritual. 7 
the  dark  palace  (1396  QKÖTq)  may  recall  the  god's  function  as 
vE  Kpono  L  rrös,  conductor  of  souls  to  the  dark  Hades.  Finally,  the 
statement  of  the  Chorus  at  1417-8  (Cc3Qiv  0f  I  yäs  ll  dL  KEiµEVOL  16)  as 
well  as  the  riddle  of  Orestes  at  1477-78  (as  interpreted  by  Longman 
[1954:  193-94]17)  seem  further  to  confirm  the  view  expounded  here. 
Still,  it  could  be  objected  that  in  Athens  of  Sophocles'  time  these 
disturbing  associations  of  Orestes'  persona  might  have  been  less  acutely 
felt  in  the  light  of  A.  Eu.,  produced  only  a  generation  earlier,  which 
dramatized  Orestes'  acquittal  before  the  Areopagus  court  (thus  e.  g. 
Linforth  [1963:  122],  endorsed  by  Stinton  [1990:  476]);  18  indeed, 
Aeschylus  specifically  refers  to  Orestes'  posthumous  status  as  a  protector 
of  Athens  against  its  enemies  (Eu.  762ff.,  esp.  767  Ev  Tä4ois).  However, 
Jacoby  (FGrHist  3b  Suppl.  [vol.  I]  pp.  24-25  with  the  relevant  notes)  has 
convincingly  shown,  I  think,  19  that  Orestes'  acquittal  before  the  Areopagus 
seems  to  have  been  not  the  common  Attic  belief,  but  only  Aeschylus'  per- 
sonal  solution  to  the  dilemma  between  vengeance  for  a  father's  death  on 
one  hand  and  the  horror  of  matricide  on  the  other,  between  paternal  and 
maternal  rights,  between  new  and  old  gods.  20  Clearly,  a  literary  work, 
16  ürra1  KEEREVOL  Brunck:  ÜTrOKEI.  µEVOL  codd. 
17  "thou,  a  living  man,  art  replying  to  the  dead  on  equal  terms",  i.  e.  not  being 
superior  to  them  as  you  had  previously  thought.  For  the  idea  of  the  dead 
(Agamemnon)  taking  revenge  through  the  living  (Orestes)  cf.  A.  Cho.  886. 
18  Other  ancient  sources:  Hellanic.  FGrHist  4F  169  Jacoby;  Dem.  23.66,74;  Aristid. 
Or.  1.48  (1.1,  p.  24  Lenz)  etc.  For  more  references  see  e.  g.  Sommerstein  (1989:  4 
with  nn.  ). 
19  Those  who,  like  e.  g.  Parker  (1983:  386)  or  Sommerstein  (1989:  5),  reject 
Jacoby's  theory  do  so  without  any  arguments.  Podlecki  (1989:  4-5)  understands 
that  Jacoby  was  right. 
20  Sheppard's  (1927a:  3)  view  on  the  matter  is  also  worth  considering.  As  to  an 
allegedly  older  version  about  an  ýýEVLau-rLaI1  s-a  purificatory  exile  -  of 
Orestes  (to  be  inferred  from  E.  Or.  1643ff.  ),  it  does  not  seem  to  have  been  an 
Athenian  tradition.  Lesky  (RE  18.1  [1939]  col.  985)  speaks  of  an  "Arkadische 
Version",  since  it  is  well  known  that  "...  Euripides  gerne  entlegenere 
Lokalsagen  aufgreift...  ".  Besides,  the  possibility  that  the  Athenian  clan  of 
Eupatridae  claimed  to  be  Orestes'  descendants  is  no  argument  against  my  view 
of  Orestes  as  a  harmful  revenant  in  Athenian  folklore:  such  a  descent  was 8 
however  influential,  would  hardly  be  likely  to  alter  so  '  fundamentally  a 
feeling  entrenched,  no  doubt,  in  the  Athenian  psyche21  -  especially  since 
this  feeling  was  conceivably  associated  with,  and  regularly  expressed 
through,  established  Athenian  cult  practices.  For  Orestes'  unpurified  guilt 
was  arguably  kept  alive  in  the  memory  of  the  Athenians  by  the  festival  of 
the  Choes.  On  that  day,  everyone  had  to  drink  the  new  wine  from  a 
separate  jug;  the  aition  for  this  custom,  according  to  our  sources,  22  was 
that  the  Athenian  king  Demophon  (or  Pandion)  offered  hospitality  to 
Orestes  who  had  sought  refuge  in  Athens,  but  had  him  drink  from  a 
separate  cup,  so  as  not  to  pollute  his  fellow-drinkers,  defiled  as  he  was 
from  matricide.  23  Now,  as  Jacoby  (FGrHist  3b  Suppl.  [vol.  II]  p.  28  n.  28) 
remarks,  "the  aition  of  the  Choes,  like  all  these  aitia,  originally  was  an 
independent  story,  invented  for  explaining  the  custom,  with  nothing  in 
view  beyond  that";  therefore,  it  is  possible  that  the  story  had  no 
conclusion  (although  Jacoby  [l.  c.  ]  thinks  it  might  have  had  one),  thus 
focusing  exclusively  on  Orestes'  religious  impurity.  Even  if  we  assume  that 
the  story  did  have  a  conclusion  (presumably  Orestes'  purification  by  the 
king  Demophon  /  Pandion),  there  is  still  another  aspect  of  the  Choes 
festival  that  verifies  Orestes'  associations  with  the  harmful  spirits  of  the 
Underworld:  the  day  of  the  Choes  was  a  µ1apa  %i  pa,  on  which  the  souls 
were  believed  to  come  up  on  the  earth  from  Hades,  24  so  the  people  used  a 
never  claimed,  as  has  been  conclusively  shown,  on  independent  grounds,  by  F. 
Jacoby,  Atthis.  The  Local  Chronicles  of  Ancient  Athens  (Oxford  1949)  263  n.  156. 
21  Euripides,  for  one,  felt  free  to  deviate  from  the  Aeschylean  precedent  at  least 
once:  at  IT  968-82  only  some  of  the  Erinyes  accept  the  Areopagus'  verdict, 
whereas  the  others  carry  on  persecuting  Orestes. 
22  E.  g.  E.  IT  947-60;  Phanodem.  FGrHist  325  F  11  Jacoby;  Plu.  Mor.  613b,  643a; 
schol.  Ar.  Eq.  95  (p.  34  Mervyn  Jones  &  Wilson);  schol.  Ar.  Ach.  961a  (p.  122 
Wilson).  A  full  list  of  references  is  provided  by  Pickard-Cambridge  (1968:  1-8). 
23  See  Burkert  (1983:  221-22),  (1985a:  238).  Cf.  also  Knox  (1979:  185);  Brelich 
(1958:  228  n.  5):  "...  proprio  ad  Atene  it  personaggio  di  Oreste  era  circondato  da 
un'  atmosfera  inquietante:  si  pensi  all'  aition  della  festa  Choes  ..  ".  Contra 
Stinton  (1990:  473). 
24  Photius  s.  v.  µLaph  ijt  pa  (I,  423  Naber),  Deubner  (1932:  111-12).  Photius  (l.  c.  ) 
says  that  the  IUX(L  T6  V  TEAEUTflaC  VTWV  were  believed  to  ascend  during  the 
whole  month  Anthesterion,  and  Hesychius  (µ  1314  Latte)  speaks  of  all  the  days 9 
number  of  apotropaic  means  (such  as  chewing  on  hawthorn,  xfµvog, 
painting  the  doors  with  pitch  etc.;  perhaps  also  Ta  EK  T(iv  &µa  %V,  Sc. 
QKwµµaTa:  Phot.  s.  v.  [II,  197  Naber])  in  order  to  ward  off  ghosts.  25  There 
was  also  perhaps  on  the  same  day  (although  it  seems  to  have  formally 
belonged  to  the  next  day,  that  of  the  Chytroi)  a  sacrifice  to  Hermes 
Chthonios.  26  Therefore,  the  Anthesteria  festival,  and  particularly  the  day 
of  the  Choes,  would  not  only  recall  Orestes  as  a  defiled  murderer  but  also 
place  him  on  a  par  with  the  spirits  of  the  Underworld  imagined  to  haunt 
Athens  on  that  day  -  an  association  that  would  nicely  square  with 
Orestes'  status  as  a  revenant. 
1.0.2  Agamemnon  and  Orestes:  hero  and  anti-hero 
Before  I  proceed  to  my  main  argument,  I  would  like  to  refer  briefly  to  the 
important  passage  from  Plato's  Cratylus  mentioned  above  (p.  5).  This 
passage  makes  clear  that  Agamemnon  was  considered  a  paradigm  of 
of  Anthesterion  as  uapaL.  At  any  rate,  Burkert  (1983:  218  with  n.  11)  is  right  to 
criticize  the  view  (held  by  e.  g.  Pickard-Cambridge  [1968:  13-14])  that  the  Choes 
were  the  day  of  merriment,  and  the  Chytroi  the  day  of  the  dead  (RLapa  fi  tEpa). 
25  See  Phot.  l.  c.  and  s.  v.  päµvos  (II,  128  Naber).  Significant  is  also  the  phrase 
6vpa  c  Kdpec  (or  KfjpEs),  whether  it  refers  to  the  dead  souls  that  were  imagined 
to  haunt  the  city  at  the  Anthesteria  (thus  e.  g.  Deubner  [1932:  113-14])  or,  as 
Burkert  (1983:  228-29)  suggests,  to  mummers  viewed  as  spirits  of  the  dead  (or 
"aboriginal  inhabitants";  cf.  Burkert  [1985a:  238]). 
26  See  Theopomp.  Hist.  FGrHist  115  F  347b  Jacoby  with  Wilfstrand's  emendation 
Tots  Xouaiv  for  the  MSS.  EXouvLV  (apud  Nilsson  [1967:  594  n.  7],  who  brilliantly 
defends  the  correction);  cf.  Burkert  (1983:  239-40  with  nn.  4  &  6).  In  view  of 
Didymus'  information  (ap.  schol.  Ar.  Ach.  1076a(li),  p.  134  Wilson)  that  the 
Choes  and  the  Chytroi  took  place  on  the  same  day,  Nilsson's  (1967:  594  n.  7,596) 
explanation  seems  quite  plausible:  the  sacrifice  to  Hermes  "an  dem  Vorabend 
der  Chytren,  d.  h.  dem  Abend  nach  dem  Choentag,  stattfand"  (cf.  also  Burkert 
[1983:  2391),  because,  according  to  the  religious  calendar,  the  new  day  (Chytroi) 
began  in  the  evening  of  the  previous  day  (Choes);  so,  a  ritual  that  formally  took 
place  on  the  Chytroi  day  (i.  e.  in  the  Choes  evening)  "wurde  [...  ]  volkstümlich 
dem  Choentag  zugerechnet"  (my  emphasis). 10 
heroic  virtue  and  loftiness,  so  that  in  comparison  to  him  Orestes  seemed 
to  be  an  abnormality  (Trapä  4üaLV).  P1.  Cra.  394d-395b  is  worth  quoting: 
XSZKPATHE.  TOLE;  µýV  8iß  KaTQ  ývOLV  YLYVO  VOLS  Tä  aüTCL 
äTTO8OTEOV  6v%taTa.  EPMOrENHE.  TrävU  yE.  X).  TL  8e  TOLc  Trapä 
4c  MV,  OL 
QV  EV  TEpaTOS  E'LSEL  y4VWVTaL;  OLOV  O'TCLV  Eý  &V80ä9 
Qya60O  KCLL  eE  OCaE  ß0O9  aaE  ß1l9  y4  VTnTaL,  &p'  oÜX  WCTTTE  pEV  TOI 
E  InrpoaOE  V,  K&V  TTTTTOS  ß069  E  K'YOVOV  TE  K1  ,  OÜ  TOO  TE  K6VTOS  8111TOU 
E8EL  T11v  ETTWVUI.  1LaV  EXELV,  ä).  Th.  TOO  YEVOUS  OÜ  EL7J;  EPM.  TTävu  ye. 
[...  ]  fl.  (i)aTTEp  yE  KQL  O'OpECTTTj9  [...  ]  KLV8UVEÜEL  Öp6(Z)S  EXELV,  EILTE 
TLS  TÜXTI 
EeETO  aÜT4S  TO  0'VOµa  ELTE  KQL  TTOL11T9'  TLS,  TÖ  ETlPLCJSES 
Tf  4VCTEWS  KCIL  TO  äypLOV  aÜTOO  KaL  TO  OpELVÖV  EV8ELKVÜµEVO9  To 
ÖV6µaTL.  [...  ]  EOLKEV  Be  'YE  KCIL  T4  TTaTpL  aÜTOO  KCLTä  4UCrLV  TO 
ÖV%Ia  ELVCLL.  [...  ]  KLVBUVEÜEL  yä0  TOLOOT69  TLS'  EL  VaL  Ö'AyaµEµvWV,  11 
dLO9  Q  86ýELEV  aU'T(jJ  SLQTTOVEtCfeaL 
KCIL  KapTEpEtV,  TAÄOS'  ETTLTLOEL9 
TO  g  80ýaat 
Si'  apETgV.  oq  ietOV  SC  aüTöO 
Tf  Ev  TpoLgL  µOVý  TOO 
TrX  OoUc  TE  Kai  KapTEpLa.  O'TL  o?  )v 
C(yaQTÖS  KaTC  TqV  ETTL`.  1.  OV1ýV 
OUTOS  6  äv11P  EVQTJµaLVEL  TO  övoµa  ö'Ayaµ4µvwv. 
This  view  about  Agamemnon  is,  I  think,  confirmed  in  our  play  as 
well,  and  indeed  at  its  first  line,  where,  as  I  remarked  above  (p.  1), 
Agamemnon  is  honourably  mentioned.  27  Besides,  365-66  (Eýöv  TTaTpOc  I 
TTQVTWV  äpLaTOU  TratSa  KEKXT1CreaL;  cf.  341  TTaTpös  ob  Cnv  TTaLs  E4US), 
and  694-95  (TOO  TO  KAELVOV  `EW8os  I  'Ayaµhµvovos 
(TTpäTEUµ 
äyE  LpavT6S  TroTE)  importantly  add  to  Agamemnon's  heroic  image.  This 
fact  will  serve  as  a  foil  to  highlight  the  unheroic  deed  undertaken  by 
Orestes,  who  thus  turns  out  to  be  a  Trapä  fraLV  offspring  of  a  heroic 
father,  just  as  Plato  saw  him.  28 
27  It  follows  that  I  consider  Haslam's  (1975:  166-68)  deletion  of  line  1  -accepted 
unfortunately  by  Dawe  in  the  2nd  (1984)  and  3rd  (1996)  editions  of  his  Teubner 
text  -to  be,  to  say  the  least,  unwarranted.  See  the  just  criticism  of  Seale  (1982: 
80  n.  1)  and  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  42). 
28  In  the  light  of  this  evidence  I  think  that  any  attempt  to  see  in  Orestes  an 
admirable  Sophoclean  hero  (thus  e.  g.  Woodard  [1964:  171-72]  and  Davidson 11 
1.1.1  Electra's  (ineffective)  heroism 
In  110-20  Electra  asks  the  deities  of  the  Underworld  to  send  her  brother 
to  her;  the  invocation  of  those  deities  -  especially  of  '  Apä  and  the 
Erinyes  (emphatically  mentioned  in  112)  -  along  with  the  significant 
TE  LQaa  OE  (115),  initiates,  on  the  part  of  Electra,  the  all-important  theme 
of  revenge.  Thus,  this  basic  notion  of  retaliatory  justice,  clearly 
established  in  the  prologue  with  regard  to  Orestes  (14,34,37,70),  is  now 
mirrored  in  Electra's  lyrical  lament,  but  in  a  completely  different  way. 
while  Orestes  has  come  to  kill,  Electra  is  not  yet  prepared  actively  to 
avenge  her  father.  While,  that  is,  she  lives  up  to  the  audience's 
expectations  by  heroically  fulfilling  her  filial  duty  towards  her  dead 
father  -  that  is,  by  lamenting  him  in  spite  of  the  potential  dangers  of 
such  an  act  (cf.  213-20)  and  by  fervidly  desiring  the  punishment  of  his 
murderers  as  an  act  of  a`L&;  h29  and  E)QE3ELa  (cf.  245-50)  -  she  does  not 
envisage  taking  any  action  against  her  father's  murderers,  which  would 
most  likely  entail  matricide.  The  initiative  in  taking  avenging  action  is 
transferred  to  Orestes  (118-20,303-306,319,323);  as  for  Electra's  stance 
on  the  matricide  issue  there  is  deliberate  vagueness.  The  themes 
prevailing  in  the  whole  parodos  and  in  the  first  episode  serve  to  extol  her 
heroism  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  underscore  its  practical  ineffectiveness 
[1988:  53-54],  who  find  similarities  with  the  Homeric  Odysseus;  Machin  [1981: 
427])  will  be  in  vain.  On  Orestes'  unheroic  persona  in  the  Electra  see  Segal 
(1981:  253-54),  (1966:  510-12),  who  aptly  opposes  him  to  his  heroic  sister;  also 
Seale  (1982:  56-7)  and  Blundell  (1989:  173  with  nn.  84,85).  Di  Benedetto  (1983: 
161-64)  has  rightly  perceived  that  Sophocles  does  not  present  Orestes  under  a 
favourable  light;  nevertheless,  I  would  not  agree  that  the  playwright,  by 
distancing  his  Orestes  from  the  Aeschylean  one,  "ha  avuto  it  coraggio  di 
compiere  una  radicale  opera  di  ristrutturazione  a  proposito  di  un  personaggio 
come  Oreste,  the  pure  sembrava  indelebilmente  marcato  [...  ]  dal  mito  e  dalla 
tradizione  letteraria  precedente"  (Di  Benedetto  l.  c.  p.  164).  The  evidence  I  have 
adduced  demonstrates  that,  on  the  contrary,  Orestes  was  an  anti-hero  already  in 
Attic  tradition,  so  (for  an  Athenian  audience)  no  "ristrutturazione"  was  needed. 
29  Cf.  Cairns  (1993:  247-8). 12 
on  the  other.  It  would  be  useful  to  examine  those  themes,  especially  as 
they  are  often  in  significant  contrast  with  the  themes  dominating  the 
prologue. 
First,  Electra  in  her  lyric  monologue  (86-109)  displays  a  marked 
lack  of  concern  for  time:  even  the  rudimentary  distinction  between  night 
and  day  is  virtually  inexistent  for  her,  since  her  incessant  lamentation 
extends  indiscriminately  over  day  and  night  (see  esp.  86-95,103-106). 
She  prefers  to  live  with  the  memories  of  the  past  (100-102,124  lTd  aL, 
145-46,236-50);  for  her  time  is  an  undifferentiated  sequence  of  undistin- 
guishable  moments.  30  This  is  in  diametric  antithesis  with  Orestes'  and  the 
Paedagogus'  anxiety  about  KaLp6s,  31  the  right  time  for  action  (21-22,32  39, 
75-76;  cf.  1259,1292,1368)  and,  what  is  more,  with  their  sharp  awareness 
of  the  distinction  between  night  and  day  (17-19).  33  Electra  is  repeatedly 
admonished  by  the  Chorus  for  her  timeless  dirge  (122-23,140-41)  and 
she  herself  recognizes  this  (131-32,222)  but  refuses  to  refrain  from  her 
30  Cf.  Woodard  (1965:  '199).  Segal  (1966:  505-506)  stresses  the  destructive  effects 
past  time  has  had  on  Electra's  physical  condition;  I  would  not  agree,  however, 
that  those  effects  have  also  affected  her  moral  being:  what  I  am  arguing  is 
exactly  that  Electra's  physical  reduction  is  to  be  viewed  in  contradistinction  to 
her  high-minded  heroism. 
31  Cf.  Kells  (87)  and  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  163)  who  rightly  associate  Orestes'  care 
about  KaLpbc  with  his  deceitful  practices.  Smith  (1990)  explores  the  irony 
resulting  from  the  semantic  association  of  the  word  KaLpös  (in  its  older  sense 
`mark',  `boundary  line')  with  the  notion  of  justice,  which  is  problematic  in  this 
play.  According  to  Trede  (1993:  203),  of  the  twenty-two  occurAnces  of  the  word 
KaLpöc  in  Sophocles  seven  appear  in  the  Electra,  and  indeed  with  markedly 
temporal  nuances  (Trede  [1993:  208-209]).  On  the  antithesis  between  Orestes' 
and  the  Paedagogus'  opportunistic  obsession  with  KaLpös  on  the  one  hand  and 
Electra's  `timelessness'  on  the  other  see  Woodard  (1965:  196-204);  Segal  (1981: 
265-67);  Schein  (1982:  72);  Trede  (1993:  210). 
32  X6yoL(Lv  (21)  is  not  opposed  to  Epya  but  preparatory  to  them;  cf.  Kells  (ad  21): 
"these  XöyoL  are  only  preparatory  to  action,  and  their  effect  is  immediately 
overshadowed  by  the  insistence  on  KaLpö  (time  for  action,  also  at  39),  and 
Epyww  &  p.  i  in  the  following  line.  "  On  kiyoL  as  preliminary  to  Epya  see  also 
Woodard  (1964:  175-76);  cf.  Kitzinger  (1993:  302-4). 
33  Cf.  Woodard  (1965:  198  with  n.  8). 13 
ceaseless  wail  (103  ff.,  132-36,223-25,34  23035-32):  she  sets  up  Procne 
(147-49,  cf.  107)  and  Niobe  (150-52)  as  examples  of  eternal  lamentation, 
to  which  she  is  prepared  to  adhere  (147  äpapEV  4pEVas).  36 
These  two  mythological  paradigms  illustrate  also  another  aspect  of 
Electra's  attitude:  its  fruitlessness,  its  sterility  and  its  ineffectiveness.  Both 
the  nightingale37  and  Niobe  are  legendary  archetypes  of  eternal  dirge38 
and  sterility.  39  Similarly,  Electra's  misfortunes  are  endless  (166-67),  and 
her  sterility  (164-65  ?  TEKVOc  ... 
a  VI')  LI  )EUTOS;  Cf.  187  aVEU  TEK4(a)V40) 
34  Here  the  ambivalence  of  ärac  (-`plaints'  [Jebb  39],  but  also  `calamitous  ways' 
[L.  Campbell  ad  223,4])  underscores  the  disastrous  nature  of  Electra's  laments. 
35  Fröhlich's  KEK?  aÜQETaL  (cf.  KEKAÜUETQL  R,  Zc)  would  highlight  Electra's 
obstinate  persistence  (lXuTa)  in  her  lament. 
36  Cf.  Bowra  (1944:  243-44),  Gellie  (1972:  109).  Seaford  (1985:  316)  sets  the 
anomalous  prolongation  of  Electra's  dirge  against  normal  funerary  practice, 
while  Davidson  (1988:  55)  finds  parallels  with  Penelope's  grief  in  the  Odyssey. 
37  It  is  significantly  called  OLÖc  äyyeXoc  at  149:  Electra  thinks  that  the 
nightingale  is  an  öpvtc,  a  sign  indicating  that  Zeus  himself  approves  of  her 
eternal  wail;  see  Kaibel  (p.  94)  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  147-149),  who  rightly 
dismiss  the  interpretation  "harbinger  of  spring"  (favoured,  among  others,  by 
Jebb  [ad  149])  as  an  irrelevance;  cf.  also  Bowra  (1944:  243);  an  intermediate 
opinion  is  held  by  Segal  (1966:  492-93with  n.  25).  If  Kaibel  and  Kamerbeek  are 
correct,  then  the  Chorus'  OLdS  64povL  I  (3ijµaTL  (162-63)  is  perhaps  meant  to 
refute  Electra's  assertion,  by  implying  that  what  Zeus  really  wants  is  not 
inactive  lament  but  the  restoration  of  Orestes  to  his  ancestral  power. 
38  Thus,  a'EI  (cf.  a'Ev  V)  at  152  is  perhaps  to  be  preferred  to  d  at  (cert.  ),  because 
it  makes  clearer  the  idea  of  unceasing  lament  (see  Jebb  [ad  152]),  although  it 
destroys  the  verbal  symmetry  with  the  strophe  (136  dal):  as  Dawe  (1973:  177) 
remarks,  such  symmetries  are  not  always  exact.  The  need  for  dat  to  be 
changed  into  aid  has  been  understood  also  by  Woodard  (1965:  198  with  n.  10) 
and  Segal  (1966:  496). 
39  I  think  that  Jebb  (ad  107)  is  not  right  in  maintaining  that  TEKVOMTELpa  (107) 
means  "slayer  of  her  child"  rather  than  "she  who  has  lost  a  child";  of  course 
Procne  did  kill  Itys,  but  if  one  presses  this  too  far,  then  the  parallelism  with 
Niobe's  myth  is  destroyed.  Cf.  Kells'  (ad  107ff.  )  right  remarks.  Segal  (1966:  495 
with  n.  30)  accepts  both  meanings;  cf.  L.  Campbell  (ad  107). 
40  TEKEWV  Wa  (s.  l.  ),  Vind.  phil.  gr.  281  (already  conjectured  by  Meineke):  TOKEWV 
rell.  The  pseudo-etymologizing  derivation  of  Electra's  name  ('  HAEKTpa  / 14 
always  dire.  She  begets  only  war  and  misfortunes  (218-19  TLKTOUa'  aiEL  I 
[...  ]  iroVtour,  235  TLKTELV  a' 
QTQV  aTaLS), 
and  it  is  only  her  woes  that 
are  over-abundant  (217  TToX)  yap  TL  KQK(Sv  ÜTrE  pE  KTtIOW,  Cf.  260 
[TTt[IaTa]  eG)%XovTa  µdXXOV  Tj  KaT#e[vovO').  Sterility  also  dominates  her 
life  on  a  more  material  level,  as  she  is  denied  basic  goods  (note  the 
abundance  of  words  denoting  deprivation:  186  ävEXTrLaTOs,  187  ävEU, 
188  O3TLS,  189  ävaýLa,  191  äELKet,  192  KEVaLS),  whereas  the  murderous 
act  of  Aegisthus  and  Clytaemestra  is,  surprisingly,  phrased  in  terms  of 
fecundity  (197  Epos,  4'  198  Tr  p#UTEÜaaVTEs)!  We  recall  that  Orestes  is 
going  to  restore  prosperity  (cf.  72  äpXETrXouTov)  and  `fertility'  (in  the 
widest  sense  of  the  word)  by  murderous  revenge  (14)  -a  paradox 
encapsulated  in  the  antithesis  MuKTjvas  Tag  TroXuXpüaouc  (9) 
1roX14eopov  [...  ]  6  is  IIEXOTrL8G3V  (10).  42  He  initiates  his  murderous 
plan  by  offering  his  luxurious  hair  (52  KapaTdµoLc  XXL8ats)  at  his 
father's  tomb;  but  his  sister's  offerings  are  limited  to  her  unanointed  hair 
(451  7'v8'  ä)u.  TTapTj43  TpLXa)  and  her  poorly-decorated  belt  (452  Cwµa 
T01  *6V  Ob  XXi8a7Ls  71aKTJI.  IEVOV;  the  repetition  of  XX,  Bats  creates  a 
contrast  with  52).  '  Thus,  both  Clytaemestra  /  Aegisthus  and  Orestes  are 
'A?  KTpa)  from  Ü)1EKTpOj'  (Ael.  VH  4.26  =  Xanth.  PMG  700  Page)  implies  that 
infertility  was  probably  thought  of  as  a  typical  feature  of  Electra's  mythical 
image.  Cf.  962äXE  KTpa  yl  päcKOVQav.  See  Jebb  (pp.  xix-xx). 
41  Notice  especially  the  striking  oxymoron  Zpos  ö  KTEivas  (against  Wakefield's 
swapping  of  1poc  and  8öooc  see  Kaibel  [ad  197]).  For  a  different  interpretation 
see  Minadeo  (1967:  137-3  8);  his  views  on  1rpo4uTEÜaavTE9  I  do  not  accept. 
42  Cf.  above  p.  2. 
43  &)u.  TrapT  codd.:  &).  %Tmpov  Hartung.  Renehan  (1992:  354-6)  powerfully  argues 
that  &.  LTrapf  (&vTt  TOV  au'Xp.  T)päv  Schol.  )  is  a  prefectly  possible  formation. 
Stinton  (1990:  277)  argued  in  favour  of  &XiTrapov  which,  pace  Dawe  (1976:  231) 
and  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  50),  is  certainly  possible  but  (as  Renehan 
shows)  unnecessary.  In  relation  to  Electra's  plight,  note  also  her  brother's 
surprise  at  1177. 
44  Cf.  Kells  (ad  452),  Segal  (1981:  261).  To  `undo  a  new  bride's  belt'  is  an  epic 
euphemism  for  sexual  congress  (e.  g.  at.  11.245;  Pi.  I.  8.45);  also  a  belt  was  typi- 
cally  dedicated  by  newly-wed  women  as  a  symbol  of  their  lost  virginity:  J.  H. 15 
markedly  prosperous  and  `fertile',  while  being  vengeful  and  murderous  at 
the  same  time;  whereas  Electra  remains  confined  in  her  sterility  and  her 
reluctance  to  take  real  action.  What  is  more,  both  Orestes  and  the 
murderous  couple  indulge  (or  have  indulged)  in  underhand  practices 
(37;  124-25,197),  whereas  Electra  characteristically  rejects  with  disdain 
the  advice  that  she  should  prudently  refrain  . 
from  voicing  her  true 
feelings  for  Clytaemestra  and  Aegisthus  (cf.  e.  g.  213-20,328-37).  45 
The  ineffectiveness  of  Electra's  behaviour,  but,  also  her  admirable 
heroism,  are  ultimately  stressed  by  the  fact  that  she  paradoxically 
conceives  her  inert  contentment  with  words  as  effective  activity.  46  When 
Chrysothemis  admonishes  her  for  her  incautious  shower  of  words  (328- 
36),  Electra  answers  that  words  are  her  own  means  of  revenge  (355  XulT(Z 
8E  To1)TOUs),  47  and  that,  for  her,  they  are  equivalent  to  dutiful  deeds  to- 
wards  her  dead  father  (349-50  E  toü  8E  TraTpL  TräVTa  TLpc,  )pou  t  vrls  I 
OÜTOL  uVE  SEL 
TTIV  TE  Sp(ZGaV  EKTpETTELS).  However,  both  the  Chorus 
(369  Tots  Aöyoic)  and  Chrysothemis  (373  TWV  Tria8E  µüOwv)  remind  us 
that  the  deeds  which  Electra  claims  to  perform  are  mere  words. 
Chrysothemis  very  clearly  epitomizes  her  sister's  attitude  at  336:  KaL  jiM 
SOKEtV  11.  EV  Spdv 
TL,  TMT  MLVELV  SE  pij.  48  To  conclude,  Sophocles 
Oakley  &  R.  H.  Sinos,  The  Wedding  in  Ancient  Athens  (Madison,  Wisconsin  1993) 
14-5  with  nn.  21  &  27.  In  Electra's  case,  however,  her  poorly  wrought  belt  only 
highlights  her  enforced  celibacy.  On  the  infertility  theme  see  further  Segal 
(1966:  487-88,490,495-96and  passim);  Sorum  (1981-82:  208-10). 
45  See  Schein  (1982:  73). 
46  On  Electra's  world  as  one  of  words  see  Woodard's  (1964:  174ff.  )  excellent 
analysis.  On  the  &&m-theme  see  also  Minadeo  (1967:  116ff.  ),  and  Gellie  (1972: 
112,117,120).  Kitzinger  (1991:  301-2  with  n.  13,305-11  with  n.  34  etc.  ),  in  the 
spirit  of  J.  L.  Austin's  How  to  Do  Things  with  Words  (Oxford  1962),  sees  Electra's 
logoi  as  no  less  valid  than  erga. 
47  This  is  confirmed  later  by  Clytaemestra  herself  (784-87),  and  also  by  the  fact 
that  the  couple  want  to  imprison  her  in  a  subterranean  cavern,  so  that  she  will 
not  be  able  to  annoy  them  with  her  wails  (379-82). 
48  Moreover,  as  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  169-70)  points  out,  the  persistent  use  of  the 
verb  opdv  in  Electra's  thesis  (258,260,267,268,271,282)  may  underline  her 
"passivitä".  On  Electra's  not  taking  any  real  action  see  again  Di  Benedetto  (1983: 16 
manages  to  have  it  both  ways:  his  heroine  is  not  forgetful  of  her  filial 
duty  towards  her  father,  because  she  keeps  his  memory  alive  with  her 
wails,  i.  e.  with  words,  and  she  voices  her  desire  for  the  punishment  of  the 
killers.  At  the  same  time,  however,  words  are  not  deeds,  so  Electra  is  not, 
as  yet,  in  danger  of  being  defiled  by  the  only  conceivable  end  of  non- 
verbal  revenge,  namely  matricide.  49  The  audience  are  prevented  from 
thinking  too  early  of  the  horror  that  is  to  come,  and  their  attention  is 
focused  exclusively  on  Electra's  desperate  heroic  struggle. 
Electra  has  to  carry  out  her  struggle  all  alone:  Orestes  seems  to  have 
forgotten  her  (168-69).  She  lives  in  a  state  of  permanent  ignorance  as  to 
whether  she  is  to  reckon  on  her  brother's  assistance,  since  the  tidings 
about  his  homecoming  are,  in  the  event,  invariably  belied  (169-70). 
Hearsay  is,  in  Greek  thought,  notoriously  untrustworthy:  it  is  one's  eyes, 
and  not  one's  ears,  that  one  should  regard  as  reliable  sources  of 
information50  (cf.  Electra's  complaint  at  172:  015K  &ýLot  4av  "vai);  so,  as 
long  as  she  does  not  see  her  brother,  he  is  inexistent  for  her.  Apart  from 
having  given  up  hope  as  regards  the  living,  Electra  does  not  expect  any 
help  from  the  dead  either:  although  she  appeals  to  the  chthonic  deities 
at  110-14,  it  is  significant  that  she  faces  the  possibility  of  her  father  being 
yd  TE  Kai  oi8EV  (245).  51  The  Chorus  had  already  expressed  this  idea  in 
183).  Contrast  the  use  of  words  as  preparatory  to  action  in  Orestes'  world  (above, 
n.  32). 
49  Cf.  Gardiner  (1987:  170).  Lines  245-50  must  not  be  perceived  as  implying  that 
Electra  is  prepared  for  active  vengeance:  Electra  is  merely  justifying.  (cf.  245 
yap)  her  outpouring  of  words  (242-43)  which,  as  we  saw,  she  thinks  to  be 
equivalent  to  deeds.  Contra  Segal  (1966:  532-33),  and  Winnington-Ingram  (1980: 
221  n.  19,222-23  with  n.  22,225)  who  deny  that  Electra's  use  of  words  instead  of 
deeds  preserves  her  heroic  stature. 
50  This  typical  Greek  belief  is  illustrated  by  e.  g.  Heraclitus  22  B  101a  D.  -K. 
64Oa)4101  'Yap  T(JV  (.  i)TWV  CKpLf  EQTEpOL 
µapTupEc;  Hdt.  1.8  wTa  yap  TUYXdV¬L 
aVepWTTOLQL 
EOVTa  üTTLQTÖTEpa  64  0a4i(Sv;  Dio  Chrys.  12.71;  Polyb.  12.27.1;  Luc.  45. 
78.  In  Apost.  18.71  and  Arsen.  56.18  we  find  the  proverb  (hTLWV  nLQTöTEpOL 
600410L  For  more  references  see  CPG  (II,  p.  744  Leutsch). 
51  The  conditional  clause  denotes  something  possible  with  no  commitment  on 
the  issue  of  realization  (Et+ind.  fut.  in  the  hypoth.  -opt.  with  äv  in  the  apod.  ): 17 
the  form  of  an  adynaton,  a  traditional  topos  of  consolation:  "you  cannot 
bring  the  dead  back"  (137-39);  52  but  while  they  at  least  try  to  persuade 
her  that  neither  her  brother  nor  her  dead  father  are  forgetful  of  her  (180- 
84),  she  firmly  declares  that  she  no  longer  expects  such  help  (185-86).  53 
The  themes  of  Electra's  misery  having  been  established  in  this 
lengthy  lament,  they  are  further  elaborated  in  her  ensuing  rhesis  (251ff.  ), 
in  which  the  impression  that  her  plight  makes  on  us  is  greatly  deepened 
by  an  interesting  dramatic  technique:  the  themes  that  have  marked 
Electra's  destitution  are  now  presented  from  the  viewpoint  of  her  enemies; 
in  other  words,  her  plight  is  presented  as  Aegisthus'  and  Clytaemestra's 
prosperity  and  power,  thus  being  all  the  more  boldly  highlighted.  We  now 
learn  that  Electra  is  absolutely  dependent,  for  her  maintenance,  on  her 
enemies  (264-65)  -  who  on  the  contrary  prosper,  as  we  are  left  to  infer 
by  implication.  54  Furthermore,  whereas  in  the  parodos'  lyrical  lament 
Electra's  misery  was  causally  associated  with  the  theme  of  absence  of 
potential  helpers  (e.  g.  172),  now  it  is  rather  connected  with  her  enemies' 
distasteful  presence  (264  ýüvELµL).  That  Aegisthus  is  temporarily  (313 
vüv)  absent  only  underscores  Orestes'  and  Agamemnon's  permanent 
absence  -  an  absence  all  the  more  stressed  by  Aegisthus'  being 
oyý 
Agamemnon's  replacement  not  only.  y  the  throne  (267-68)-but  also  in 
every  aspect  of  the  former  king's  everyday  life:  he  wears  his  clothes  (268- 
69),  he  offers  libations  by  the  very  hearth  where  he  slew  him  (269-70), 
and  he  is  his  widow's  sexual  partner  (a  fact  particularly  emphasized: 
271-74).  The  lamentation,  in  the  parodos,  for  a  glorious  father  and  king 
has  now  given  way  to  indignation  at  a  despicable  step-father  and 
Moorhouse  (1982:  277).  Cf.  Jebb  (ad  244ff.  )  and,  more  cautiously,  Kamerbeek  (ad 
245-248). 
52  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  462n.  18). 
53  Only  at  1315-17,  i.  e.  after  the  Recognition,  does  Electra  take  into  account  the 
possibility  of  her  father  being  alive  again. 
54  As  Machin  (1981:  208-209)  remarks,  Electra  had  already  hinted  at  her 
destitution  in  her  lyrical  lament  (191-92),  but  those  responsible  for  her  state 
were  there  left  unspecified,  whereas  at  264-65  they  are  explicitly  mentioned. 
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usurper.  55  Moreover,  even  Electra's  incessant  bpi  voL  (a  theme  so 
dominant  in  the  parodos)  appear  to  have  been  rendered  impossible:  for 
one  thing,  she  is  obliged  to  lament  air  ý  Trpbs  airn  v  (285)56  in  order 
not  to  incur  her  mother's  wrath  and  insults  (282-93;  esp.  293  ýýußpL(EL); 
what  is  more,  her  laments'  markedly  ritual  quality  (cf.  88  6pijvwv  c  8äs, 
94  Op-gvO,  57  92  TravvUX'L8UV,  58  139  y6OLaLV  ... 
XLTaLS,  283  KaTrLKWKVW59),  as 
well  as  their  commemorative  function,  is  counterpoised  by  the  rites 
Clytaemestra  has  established  to  celebrate  Agamemnon's  murder  (277- 
81).  60  The  contrast  between  Electra's  misfortunes  and  her  enemies' 
happiness  is  rounded  off  in  the  ensuing  first  Chrysothemis'  scene:  61  there, 
s5  Cf.  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  170):  "la  figura  del  padre  viene  contrapposta,  come 
dato  positivo  a  dato  negativo,  a  quella  di  Egisto". 
56  However,  the  Opi  oS  is  by  definition  "an  expression  of  communal  or  familial 
grief"  (Segal  [1981:  273]). 
57  On  Opf  voc  as  ritual  dirge  see  Alexiou  (1974:  11-13,102ff.  ).  Woodard  (1964:  178) 
too  recognizes  the  ritual  character  of  Electra's  laments.  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  175) 
remarks  that  "1'  Elettra  c  la  tragedia  di  Sofocle  dove  it  gruppo  OpTjvoc/Oprrvi  e 
maggiormente  attestato". 
58  codd.:  TravvvXiiw  Blaydes,  accepted  by  Dawe,  who  was  bothered  by  "the  joyous 
sense  of  TravvvX'LBwv"  (Dawe  [1976:  230]).  However,  for  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson 
(1990b:  45)  and  Segal  (1981:  272),  this  is  precisely  the  point:  TravvvX'L8Es  ('joyous 
religious  festivals')  in  a  context  of  lamentation  is  ironical.  Alternatively,  the 
word  may  be  meant  to  recall  the  ritual  wake  in  honour  of  the  dead  which  was, 
and  still  is,  an  indispensable  part  of  Greek  funerary  practice  (Alexiou  [1974:  15, 
27ff.,  42]).  On  the  markedly  ritual  connotations  of  the  word  TravvvX'L8ES  see  L. 
Campbell  (ad  92,3),  Kells  (ad  86ff.  ). 
59  For  the  ritual  nuances  of  KWKVELV  cf.  e.  g.  II.  22.407  (cf.  409);  Qi.  24.295  (where 
WS  i1rECJKE6  indicates  the  formal,  ritual  aspect  of  the  dirge);  A.  Ag.  1313;  S.  Ant. 
28,204,1302;  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  170n.  21). 
60  For  the  probably  historical  background  of  these  rites  see  Jebb  (ad  280f.  ). 
Seyffert's  conjecture  (278)  I.  Epoia'  (MSS.  Evpoüa'),  accepted  by  Dawe  (1996), 
would  pinpoint  all  the  more  clearly  the  ritual  aspect  of  Clytaemestra's 
festivities.  See  further  Seaford's  (1985:  316  n.  20,317)  interesting  remarks. 
61  Chrysothemis  should  not,  strictly  speaking,  be  called  an  `enemy'  of  Electra: 
her  position  is  "intermediaire  entre  les  amies  et  1'  ennemie"  (Jouanna  [1993: 19 
Electra's  heroism  and  its  concomitant  hardships  (189-92)  are  sharply 
opposed  to  her  sister's  care  for  expediency  (359-64).  The  image  is  now 
complete,  and  the  audience  must  surely  think  that  they  have  seen  Electra 
in  the  non  plus  ultra  of  her  plight.  This  is  something  particularly  stressed 
by  Electra  herself:  CEP'  ELTfE  8iß  T6  SELV6V*  EL  'Op  TG3v8E  µoL  I  µEtCöv 
TL  M  ELS...  (376-77). 
1.1.2  The  first  Chrvsothemis  scene 
However,  that  is  not  all:  the  worst  is  still  to  come.  Sophocles,  having  just 
established  the  motifs  of  Electra's  misery  (both  per  se  and  in  contrast  to 
her  enemies'  prosperity),  now  surprises  us  by  an  unexpected  twist:  Electra 
will  no  longer  be  able  even  to  be  miserable,  because  she  simply  will  no 
longer  be  able  to  be  alive.  In  her  speech  (341-68)  Electra  had  declared 
that  she  is  prepared  to  heroically  continue  that  miserable  life  of  hers 
(354,359-63),  as  long  as  she  keeps  her  father's  memory  alive  (341-42, 
346,349,355-56)  and  vexes  her  enemies  (355).  Nevertheless,  the  news  an- 
nounced  by  Chrysothemis  makes  clear  that  it  is  exactly  the  remaining 
morsels  of  her  life  (with  which  she  had  been  content)  that  she  is  going  to 
lose,  since  she  will  be  imprisoned  in  a  KaTr1PE4ýs  QTEyi  (381-82)  and  be 
left  to  die  there  (380-81  p  rob'  IIXLOu  14Eyyos  TrpoaÖ,  62  cf.  392). 
Electra  will  have,  finally,  to  stop  her  ceaseless  wails  (375  Twv  µaKp6Sv 
178-79]).  However,  in  Electra's  system  of  values  those  who  do  not  share  her 
absolute  devotion  to  her  4iAoL  are  bound  to  be  her  enemies  (cf.  esp.  1027UTUy6). 
62  Electra's  prospective  death  is  only  allusively  but  (I  think)  unmistakably 
hinted  at  p  1roU  hX[ov  4Eyyos  irpoaögM  can  be  a  euphemism  for  "you  will  die" 
(cpcý  6pdv  and  sim.  are  standard  Greek  phrases  for  `being  alive');  and  C  oa 
(381)  is  no  indication  that  Electra  will  remain  alive  in  her  subterranean 
enclosure:  one  might  compare  the  (deceptively  disjunctive)  phrasing  used  at 
Ant.  887-8  (ETTE  Xp?  l  OCtvEtV  I  EtT[E]  ... 
c&a  TUµ1EÜELV),  where  nonetheless 
there  are  no  other  prospects  for  Antigone  than  imminent  death  (cf.  esp. 
806ff.  ).  On  the  linguistic  resemblance  with  Antigone's  immurement  see 
Musurillo  (1967:  96)  and,  most  importantly,  Seaford  (1990:  80). 20 
aXIia¬L  yOwv)  -  carrying  on  her  peculiar  verbal  revenge  will  be,  of 
course,  out  of  the  question.  Nonetheless,  one  single  theme  is  not 
cancelled:  Electra's  heroism.  On  the  contrary,  she  appears  prepared  to 
lose  her  life  if  it  is  for  her  father,  (399);  it  is  indicative  that  as  recently  as 
352-54  she  considered  life  a  Kdp8os,  whereas  now  she  calls  for  death 
(387,63  389)  as  a  delivery  from  her  woes  (393).  Both  her  misery  and  her 
heroism  are  now  at  their  zenith. 
Electra's  heroism  is  all  the  more  exalted  by  another  motif  (already 
present,  but  not  stressed,  in  the  parodos)  that  is  picked  up  and  rounded 
off  in  this  scene,  namely  Electra's  heroic  6L4  pornnrj  (cf.  e.  g.  213  4p6ou, 
214  ob  yvc'  iav  LQXELS).  Now  Chrysothemis  lays  particular  emphasis  on 
that:  330  8L8aX9rjvaL,  383  4päiou,  384  4povE  tv,  390  rrov  zrOT'  EIL  4pEVWV, 
394  Ev  4povEty  I'lMuTaao,  398  apovXLas,  429  äßouXlg64  etc.  What, 
however,  is  of  great  interest  is  that  Electra  does  not  admit  that  she  is 
foolish.  65  She  defends  her  case  not  by  appealing  to  heroic  moral  values 
but  by  claiming  that  she  is  the  one  who  is  really  wise:  145  vijrrLOs,  227-28 
... 
4pOVOÜVTL  KQLpLa,  345  4poVEIV  KQK(3s,  66  365  ath4  pwv  y'  ovaa,  403 
63  Cf.  Kells  (ad  387):  "At  385  she  was  unprepared  for  death.  At  386  she  is  ready 
and  eager  for  it".  I  cannot  understand  Machin's  (1981:  219)  labour  to  prove  that 
Electra  is  not  being  entirely  sincere.  . 
64  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  49-50)  accept  Morstadt's  deletion  of  428-30.  For 
discussion  see  Jebb  (ad  428-430)  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  428-430),  both  of  whom 
retain  the  lines. 
65  Contrast  Antigone  whose  admission  of  her  self-destructive  folly  (Ant.  95), 
even  if  it  is  sarcastic,  points  to  an  important  theme  of  that  play,  namely  the 
heroine's  being  under  the  baneful  influence  of  her  clan's  hereditary  folly  (cf. 
esp.  the  second  stasimon,  Ant  582-625).  See  further  Chapter  Six,  esp.  section 
6.4.1;  cf.  Huys  (1993:  311-12). 
66I  would  tend  to  recognize  a  more  or  less  intellectual,  not  moral,  meaning  in 
4povely  Kaxcx;  thus  Jebb  (ad  345),  Kamerbeek  (ad  345,6)  and,  most  recently, 
Coray  (1993:  158).  Electra's  point  is  that  Chrysothemis  indulges  in  intellectual 
fallacy:  she  claims  on  the  one  hand  to  be  willing  to  express  her  hatred  against 
the  murderers  (347-8)  but  fails  to  assist  her  sister  who  does  exactly  this  (349- 
50).  Alexanderson  (1966:  84)  wrongly  thinks  that  Electra  uses  4povEiv  KaKCý,  in 
bitter  irony,  with  reference  to  herself. 21 
n  iru  voü  ToaÖVB'  ELi]V  KEVý.  Nonetheless,  we  have  seen  that  Electra  is 
actually  in  a  state  of  sheer  ignorance,  as  her  only  source  of  information  is 
the  scarcely  reliable  tidings  of  her  brother's  homecoming.  Thus,  we  are 
presented  with  an  all-important  paradox  (which  will  be  further  clarified 
later  [cf.  section  1.4.3]):  Electra  claims  to  possess  good  sense  and  true 
knowledge,  while  at  the  same  time  she  is  actually  ignorant  of  important 
facts  concerning  herself.  67 
1.2.1  The  first  reversal:  Clytaemestra's  dream 
The  second  part  of  the  Chrysothemis  scene  (404ff.  )  signals  an  important 
twist  of  events.  Reportedly,  Clytaemestra  has  had  a  frightening  dream 
(410),  whose  content  Chrysothemis  has  partly  overheard  (414,424-6). 
The  dream  seems  manifestly  to  foreshadow  a  major  reversal  of  the 
dramatic  situation,  as  it  stands  thematically  in  sharp  opposition  to  the 
motifs  of  Electra's  misery  with  which  we  are  by  now  familiar.  68 
Agamemnon  comes  up  from  the  darkness  of  Hades  to  the  light  (419 
67  Cf.  Kells  (ad  403).  On  `good  sense'  in  the  Electra  see  Kirkwood  (1958:  137,233), 
Winnigton-Ingram  (1980:  239-40);  on  the  inherent  paradox  of  Electra's  claims 
to  good  sense  see  Blundell  (1989:  156  with  n.  34;  158-59;  160).  Segal  (1966:  489) 
perceives  the  paradox  but  fails  to  see  its  point.  Woodard  (1965:  212-13  with  nn. 
57-58)  holds  that  "Electra  asserts  her  own  lack  of  to  phronein  and  noun"  and 
that  "she  is  willing  to  be  considered  insane";  but  in  absolutely  no  passage  of 
those  he  adduces  does  Electra  speak  of  herself  as  foolish  (135  ä)  ELv  and  149 
&TvCoµEva  merely  mean  to  be  distraught  of  grief'  and  are,  of  course, 
figurative).  Jouan's  (1993:  273-74)  argument  that  Chrysothemis  is  the  one  who 
"invoque  le  plus  souvent  les  arguments  de  la  raison",  whereas  such  words  are 
"beaucoup  plus  rares  dans  la  bouche  d'  Electre"  proves  nothing:  what  really 
matters  is  not  statistics  but  the  fact  that  Electra's  contention  that  her  stance 
`makes  sense'  is  set  emphatically  against  what  the  audience  know  to  be  her 
complete  and  utter  ignorance.  Thus  the  playwright  calls  attention  to  his 
heroine's  paradoxical  behaviour  and  makes  sure  that  it  will  be  remembered 
until  the  last  scenes  of  the  play,  where  its  significance  is  fully  revealed. 
68  On  the  reversal  with  which  the  dream  is  associated  see  also  Vernant's  (1983: 
134-6)  perspective. 22 
EXOÖVTOS  Es  ýws),  whereas  Electra  would,  inversely,  descend  from  the 
daylight  to  the  darkness  of  her  underground  prison  (380-82). 
Furthermore,  Agamemnon's  resurrection  in  the  dream,  indicating  as  it 
does  his  concern  (459  µEAELV,  cf.  482),  belles  Electra's  strong  disbelief  in 
the  possibility  of  help  from  Hades  (185-86,245,  cf.  137-39),  as  well  as 
counterbalancing,  thematically,  Electra's  living  death  that  we  have 
witnessed  in  the  parodos  (cf.  esp.  141  8LÖXXUQaL,  185-86  b  TroXvs 
aTroMXOLTTEV  1f8TJ  I  ß[OTOS,  187  KaTaTQKO  laL,  207-8  TaV  E  idv  EtXoV 
ß[oTOV 
... 
äiTthAEaav,  304  an&XvµaL).  Besides,  the  dream  seems  to  be  a 
good  omen  as  regards  Electra's  deplorable  powerlessness  too  (219-20,264- 
65,285-86,312-13):  Agamemnon  is  restored  to  his  royal  power  (420). 
What  is  more,  the  dream  reverses  the  theme  of  Electra's  infertility,  so 
clearly  described  in  the  parodos  (see  above  p.  13f.  ):  the  barren  piece  of 
wood  (420  aKf  rTpov)  puts  out  a  fresh  shoot  (422  Oa)X6v69)  which  blooms 
in  such  profusion  as  to  overshadow  the  entire  Mycenae.  70 
Most  importantly,  however,  the  dream  marks  the  enactment  of  the 
retaliatory  process:  it  is  strongly  stressed  that  Agamemnon  has  taken 
again  the  sceptre  which  was  wielded  once  by  himself  (420-21),  but  now 
by  Aegisthus  (421).  This  (otherwise  pointless)  mention  of  facts  already 
known  must  be  meant  to  emphasize  that  retaliation  is  again  at  work. 
Electra  makes  this  clear  in  her  ensuing  speech:  an  unbridgeable  gulf 
yawns  between  4[ksL  (431,442,453,462)  and  EXOpo[  (433,440,444,454, 
456);  should  Orestes  surpass  his  enemies  in  power  (455  Eý  ÜTTE  pTE  paS 
XEpös,  456  EXOpotaLV  [...  ]  ETrEµ3fvaL  Tro&[),  they  would  all  be  restored  to 
69  At  951-52  Electra  uses  the  phrase  13L  e&UOVT'  for  Orestes'  being  alive  (cf. 
Kamerbeek  [ad  952]). 
70  Jebb  (ad  421ff.  )  aptly  refers  to  IL  1.234ff.  (cf.  Devereux  [1976:  239]).  The 
dream  has  strong  sexual  connotations:  see  Devereux  (1976:  231-33,246-48), 
Kamerbeek  (ad  417-419,419-421)  and  especially  Kells  (ad  417ff);  so  the  sceptre 
may  perhaps  carry  phallic  connotations  (Devereux  [1976:  238-46])  -  another 
possible  aspect  of  its  transparent  fertility-symbolism.  Moreover,  as  Devereux 
(1976:  223)  has  remarked,  the  wooden  sceptre  harks  back  to  98-99:  Agamemnon, 
who  has  been  compared  with  a  felled  oak,  now  returns  as  a  piece  of  wood  that 
sprouts  unexpectedly. 23 
prosperity  (457-58  äýVEwTEpaLs  I  XEpat).  The  Chorus  in  the  first 
stasimon  (472-515)  confirm  this:  they  see  the  dream  as  a  sign  from  Dike 
(retaliatory  justice7l)  itself  (475-77),  and  anticipate  that  the  Erinys  will 
eventually  come  (489-91).  The  emphasis,  in  the  above  passages,  on  hands 
and  feet  as  symbols  of  power  and  superiority  (476  ýEpoµEva  E  otv 
Kpä-n1,489  TroX  ,  Trovs72  ...  TroXiXELp,  491  Xa)K6Trovs)  provides  a  thematic 
contrast  with  the  all-important  EµaaXaXiaEhj  (445):  73  Agamemnon's 
corpse  was  mutilated  so  that  his  spirit  should  be  incapable  of  taking 
revenge,  but  now  Revenge  itself  (Dike,  Erinys)  and  Orestes,  their  human 
agent,  are  coming  with  overwhelming  power  in'  their  hands  and  feet.  74 
Moreover,  this  stasimon  contains  one  or  two  cryptic  but  significant  al- 
lusions  to  the  revengeful  plan  of  Orestes  as  expounded  in  the  prologue: 
the  axe  with  which  Agamemnon  was  murdered  is  referred  to  by  a  heavy 
circumlocution  (484-5  ä  TraAaLä  Xa)K6TrXT1-  I  KT09  äµ4TIKT1s  'yEVUs) 
which  recalls  the  similarly  heavy  Tü1rwµa  X6uc6TrXEUpov  (54)  used  of  the 
urn,  the  instrument  of  deceit  and  revenge.  What  is  more,  the  reference  to 
Pelops'  chariot-race  in  504ff.  evokes  25-28  where  the 
, 
Paedagogus, 
rigorously  devoted  to  revenge,  is  likened  to  a  horse.  These  thematic  and 
verbal  Fernverbindungen  between  this  stasimon  and  the  prologue  are 
evidently  meant  to  remind  us  that  the  revenge  announced  in  the 
prologue  is  already  under  way  and  should  soon  provide  the  much 
longed-for  release  from  toils. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  the  very  mention  of  Pelops'  chariot-race  that 
taints  the  cheerful  tone  of  the  song  (as  expressed  esp.  in  480  h8u1rvowv, 
71  Kitto  (1958:  47-50),  (1961:  134-37)  has  pointed  out  that  the  retaliatory  aspect  of 
Siici  is  prevalent  in  this  play:  it  is  that  universal  force  that  tends  to  make 
amends  for  every  deviation  from  normal  order. 
72  West's  (1979:  104)  conjecture  TroXi  pww  is  unfortunate. 
73  On  µaaXa)  wiiµ  c  see  Jebb  (ad  444ff.,  also  pp.  211-12);  Rohde  (1925:  582-6). 
Detailed  analysis  with  comparative  material  in  G.  L.  Kittredge,  AJPh  6(1885)  151- 
69. 
74  The  same  hands-and-feet  imagery  will  recur  later,  when  Orestes  will 
announce  his  and  Pylades'  arrival  as  icoLvöTrovs  Trapovaia  (1104),  and  when 
Electra  will  bless  the  Paedagogus'  hands  and  feet  (1357-58). 24 
495  Oäpaos7S):  defeated  at  the  chariot-race  against  Pelops,  the  dying 
Oenomaus  cursed  the  person  responsible  for  his  death,  namely  his 
charioteer  Myrtilus,  to  die;  when  the  latter  was  in  turn  killed  by  Pelops, 
he  cursed  his  murderer's  whole  race  to  perish.  76  The  over-abundance  of 
ominous  words  (505  7roXüzrovos,  506  davijs,  77  511  BuaTävoLS  a  KE'LaLs, 
515  7roXlnrovos  a'LKELa78)  warns  us  that  the  hereditary  curse  of  the 
Pelopids,  which  has  accumulated  so  many  grievous  misfortunes  on  their 
house,  is  still  at  work.  79  So,  Orestes'  avenging  action  (note  that  a  chariot- 
race  will  be  at  the  centre  of  the  Paedagogus'  fictitious  story,  which  is  one 
of  the  main  instruments  of  the  revenge)  is  not  auspiciously  launched:  the 
first  stasimon  may  suggestively  reproduce  basic  themes  associated  with 
the  forthcoming  revenge;  nevertheless,  the  epode  (504ff.  )  casts  an 
ominous  light  on  those  themes,  by  associating  them  with  the  story  of 
Pelops,  a  story  similarly  involving  revenge,  and  moreover  closely 
connected  with  Orestes  through  the  hereditary  curse  besetting  the 
Pelopids.  80 
75  Oäpooc  Wunder  (accepted  by  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  [1990a]);  µ'  EXEL  Oapooc 
PGR;  µ'  EXEL  cett. 
76  See  e.  g.  schol.  E.  '  Or.  990  (I,  196-7  Schwartz);  schol.  A.  R.  1.752  (p.  345  Keil, 
citing  Pherecydes  FGrHist  3F37  Jacoby);  Apollod.  Epit  2.7  (with  Frazer  [1921:  161 
n.  3]);  Tz.  ad  Lyc.  157.  Cf.  also  G.  Scherling,  "Myrtilos",  RE  16.1  (1933)  1152-1164; 
Stinton  (1990:  246  n.  25);  I.  Triantis,  "Myrtilos",  LIMC  VI.  1  (1992)  693-96;  Gantz 
(1993:  541-3). 
77  Cf.  Jebb  (ad  506):  "davifjs  suits  the  idea  of  persistent  calamity.  Whatever  its 
etymology,  it  was  associated  with  aEI". 
78  I  think  Kells  (ad  487)  is  wrong  in  holding  that  the  repetition  of  a'KE(.  a  is  idle. 
See  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  219  n.  10);  McDevitt  (1983b:  5-6). 
79  See  Sheppard  (1927a:  7),  Kells  (ad  504ff).  Contra  Alexanderson  (1966:  85), 
Stinton  (1990:  471). 
80  On  the  sinister  analogies  between  Pelops'  legendary  chariot-race  and 
Orestes'  fictitious  one  see  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  219  with  n.  10),  with 
special  reference  to  retributive  justice;  also  Burton  (1980:  201-203),  Segal  (1981: 
267-9),  and  especially  Schein  (1982:  76).  Errandonea  (1955:  380-1),  Musurillo 
(1967:  99)  and  McDevitt  (1983b:  9)  perceive  the  connection  but  fail  to  see  its 
meaning.  Di  Benedetto's  (1983:  166)  objections  as  to  these  connotations  of  the 
story  of  Pelops  are  entirely  inadequate  (similarly  Lesky  [1972:  232]).  Gardiner 25 
Pelops'  story  is  one  not  only  of  revenge  but  also  of  deceit:  Pelops 
bribed  Myrtilus  to  tamper  deceitfully  with  the  linchpin  of  Oenomaus' 
chariot;  then  Myrtilus  deceitfully  tried  to  rape  Hippodameia.  81  Thus,  this 
story  also  has  ominous  implications  for  the  instrument  of  Orestes' 
revenge,  namely  deceit  (36-7).  Still,  deceit  is  also  the  first  step  towards 
effective  action  that  Electra  takes:  82  for  immediately  before  the  first 
stasimon  with  its  disturbing  reference  to  Pelops'  story  Electra  suddenly 
abandoned  her  heroic  (but  ineffective)  abstention  from  deeds  that  might 
lead  to  morally  questionable  results  (cf.  above  p.  15f.  ),  and  decided  to 
take  guileful  action.  By  appealing  to  the  "help  friends  -  harm  enemies" 
maxim  (432-47),  83  i.  e.  to  the  epitome  of  vengeance  ideology,  she  asks  her 
sister  not  to  deposit  Clytaemestra's  offerings  at  Agamemnon's  tomb.  The 
demand  that  the  Chorus  keep  silence  (in  significant  opposition  to 
Electra's  previous  heroic  carelessness,  cf.  213-20,328-37)  is  an 
indisputable  sign  that  the  obstruction  of  the  rite  that  is  about  to  'take 
place  is  an  unheroic  instance  of  86Xos  requiring  secrecy.  Having  now 
resorted  for  the  first  time  to  deceitful  deeds,  Electra  significantly 
relinquishes  her  fondness  for  A6yoL,  which  have  been  so  far  equivalent  to 
deeds  of  reverence  to  her  father  (cf.  again  p.  15f.  ).  Thus,  in  her  ensuing 
debate  with  Clytaemestra  she  not  only  condemns  Clytaemestra's  X6yOL  as 
aLQXpoi  (559,593)  but  also  admits  that  her  own  words  are  shameful  too 
(597,606-9,  to  be  read  in  conjunction  with  616-18)  and  equivalent  to 
Clytaemestra's  foul  deeds  (621,624-25).  84  So,  X6yoL,  that  used  to  preserve 
(1987:  148-49)  places  too  much  emphasis  on  its  sexual  aspect.  On  the  ominous 
character  of  the  Pelops-Myrtilus  exemplum  in  Euripides'  Orestes  plays  see 
Myrick  (1994:  135-8). 
81  According  to  Apoll.  Epit.  2.8,  Myrtilus  insulted  Hippodameia  while  Pelops  had 
gone  to  fetch  water  for  his  thirsty  wife.  See  also  Tz.  ad  Lyc.  157. 
82  Cf.  Minadeo  (1967:  122). 
83  For  instances  of  this  maxim  in  the  Electra  see  Blundell  (1989:  149-57). 
84  On  words  and  deeds  in  the  Electra-Clytaemestra  debate  see  Woodard's  (1964: 
184-86)  very  perceptive  remarks,  on  which  I  have  in  part  drawn  for  this 
paragraph.  Sheppard  (1918:  85)  had  already  perceived  Electra's  "tragic  relation 
to  her  mother"  as  highlighted  in  this  scene.  See  also  Kirkwood  (1958:  140-41, 
228-29),  Friis  Johansen  (1964:  16-17),  Cairns  (1993;  246-8). 26 
Electra's  heroic  decency  before  the  revelation  of  Clytaemestra's  dream, 
now  degenerate  into  instruments  and  symbols  of  her  assimilation  with 
her  mother's  deceitful  and  immoral  practices. 
The  fact  that  the  Chorus  (464-65)  congratulate  Electra  on  her 
E  iaE  ßE  is  and  aw4poavvr  must  be  unsettling  for  an  alert  audience:  the 
Chorus  have  been  constantly  admonishing  Electra  for  her  `folly'  (213-20), 
advocating  expediency  (370  KEpsos)  exactly  like  Orestes  (61),  and 
contenting  themselves  with  conventional  piety  (121-28,137-44,173- 
84);  85  now,  however,  they  suddenly  decide  that  Electra  is  being  ac&J  pwv 
and  EvaEßijs!  This  use  of  Qc4)povEty  (evidently  an  exception  to  Coray's 
[1993:  184]  definition:  "bedeutet  [...  ]  'vernünftig,  besonnen  sein'  and 
bezeichnet  eine  Haltung  die  mit  Kompromissfähigkeit  and  dem 
Zurückstellen  der  eigenen  Interessen  verbunden  ist")86  comes  down  to 
serving  expediency  by  committing  a  66Xos;  while  their  praise  of  Electra's 
EÜQEßEia  (apart  from  indicating  their  approval  of  her  fulfilment  of  a 
pious  duty  towards  her  dead  father)  refers  to  the  simple  `piety'  of 
contenting  herself  with  the  authority  of  such  an  unquestionable,  qua 
supernatural,  source  of  knowledge  as  a  dream  (note  that  at  500  the 
prophetic  dream  is  viewed  as  being  on  a  par  with  divine  decrees, 
04x4  a;  we  shall  see,  however,  on  p.  57ff.  that  the  knowledge  provided 
by  the  dream  is  anything  but  certain).  Thus,  the  praise  of  a  Chorus  who 
have  been  constantly  advocating  mediocrity,  conventional  common  sense 
and  convenient  piety  is  rather  to  be  taken  as  a  sign,  of  Electra's 
debasement  from  a  status  of  all-defying  heroism  to  disgraceful 
connivance.  What  is  more,  Electra  herself  had  stated  (307-309)  that 
retaliation  on  the  one  hand  and  ac&x  porn  Ti  /  EüQE  ßE  is  on  the  other 
are  mutually  exclusive;  since,  however,  the  66Xos  in  which  she  is 
85  Likewise,  they  will  advocate  `good  sense'  at  990-91  and  1015-16  (again  with 
emphasis  on  KEpSoc)  when  Electra  is  being  again  as  heroic  as  could  be. 
86  Emphasis  mine.  H.  North,  Sophrosyne.  Self-Knowledge  and  Self-Restraint  in 
Greek  Literature  [Cornell  Stud.  Class.  Philol.  35]  (Ithaca,  NY  1966),  56  notes  that 
the  use  of  vw#ovcty  here  is  highly  conventional,  "a  cliche  in  comedy  and 
oratory  towards  the  close  of  the  fifth  century.  " 27, 
indulging  is  manifestly  a  form  of  retaliation  (the  murderers  had  also 
resorted  to  it,  cf.  197),  it  follows  that  the  E1')a9ßE  La  and  aw#oaVVTI  for 
which  the  Chorus  praise  her  are  simply  impossible.  After  all,  we  have  just 
seen  that  Electra,  in  the  quarrel  with  her  mother,  admitted  her 
debasement.  To  quote  Cairns  (1993:  244),  "injustice,  wrong,  or  insult 
against  oneself  or  a  member  of  one's  family  calls  forth  retribution  (dike), 
and  the  requirement  to  pursue  dike  is  a  powerful  one,  but  to  pursue  it 
within  one's  family  must  inevitably  involve  an  action  which  is 
aischron.  "87  Nonetheless,  Electra,  for  all  her  unheroic  disgrace,  is  now  for 
the  first  time  (albeit  unawares)  in  accordance  with  Apollo's  oracle  who 
ordered  guileful  revenge!  This  paradox  (upon  which  I  shill  attempt  to 
elaborate  later  in  this  chapter)  will  underlie  the  whole  play  and  define  its 
basic  meaning. 
1.2.2  The  lex  talionis  on  a  scale 
Thus,  the  two  basic  themes  dominant  in  Orestes'  world  as  glimpsed  in  the 
prologue,  namely  guile  (37,56)  and  avenging,  deeds  (34,37,70),  are  now 
present  in  Electra's  world  as  well.  88  Electra's  world  appears  now  as  a 
microcosm  that  condenses  basic  themes  and  shows  remarkable  analogies 
with  Orestes'  full-scale  avenging  enterprise:  action  generated  by  a 
supernatural  source  of  knowledge  (Clytaemestra's  dream,  Apollo's  oracle), 
as  well  as  involving  deceit  against  the  mother  along  with  revenge  for  the 
father.  Another  analogy  is  that  Electra's  deceitful  action  leads 
paradoxically  (if  accidentally)  to  true  knowledge  (Chrysothemis  discovers 
Orestes'  offerings),  which  is  however  rendered  ineffective  because  of  the 
Paedagogus'  deceitful  story;  likewise,  Orestes'  guile  leads  paradoxically  (if 
accidentally)  to  the  Recognition,  where  however,  as  we  shall  see,  the 
restoration  of  true  knowledge  over  illusion  is  soon  counteracted  by  the 
87  See  further  Cairns  (1993:  243-4,246-9);  cf.  Stinton  (1990:  477-8) 
88  As  noted  above  (section  1.1.1)  the  invocation  of  avenging  spirits  at  115  does 
not  mean  active  revenge  on  Electra's  part  -and,  at  any  rate,  it  does  not  mean 
guile. 28 
revelation  of  the  siblings'  defective  knowledge  (section  1.4.3).  In  both 
cases  it  is  the  finiteness,  fragility  and  relativity  of  human  knowledge  that 
is  pinpointed.  For  the  time  being,  however,  it  would  be  interesting  to  see 
how  the  course  of  events  in  Electra's  microcosm  anticipates  the  outcome 
of  Orestes'  action  -  i.  e.  of  the  plot's  central  thread. 
When  Clytaemestra  appears  on  stage,  the  audience  expects  a 
confirmation  of  what  Electra  had  said  about  her  at  254ff.  Sophocles 
however  loves  to  belie  the  audience's  expectations:  in  the  debate  between 
mother  and  daughter  the  playwright  will  furnish  Clytaemestra  with  such 
arguments  as  to  counterbalance  Electra's  assertions  one  by  one.  Thus,  at 
the  end  of  the  debate  (which  we  are  clearly  meant  to  perceive  as 
representative  of  an  everyday  situation89)  we  are  presented  with  two 
diametrically  opposed  and  exactly  equivalent  cases.  There  are  no  winners 
and  no  losers:  we  find  ourselves  totally  unable  to  decide  which  one  of 
them  is  right.  There  is  only  a  strong  polar  antithesis  between  two  people 
who  claim  to  have  justice  on  their  part,  and  act  accordingly.  Most 
recently,  Cairns  (1993:  245)  has  rightly  emphasized  "the  equilibrium  and 
parallelism  which  exists  in  the  arguments  of  both  parties".  90  Electra  had 
justified  her  unfilial  behaviour  in  terms  of  retributive  justice:  it  is  her 
mother's  insults  (she  argued)  that  she  has  been  compelled  to  reciprocate 
with  further  insults  (221  Ev  8ELVOLc  8E(v'  fjvayKäae1jV,  91  25611  ß'La  [...  ] 
TaÜT'  ävayKd  EL  µE  8pdv,  308-309  Ev  TOLS  KQKOLS  I  TTOXX  'QT'  aV  'KTT 
KäTrLTTISEÜELV  KQKa;  cf.  also  618-20).  Clytaemestra,  however,  argues  for 
exactly  the  opposite:  KaK(ýS  SE  QE  I  %E'yCJ  KQK(JS  KÄÜOUQa  Trpas  a4eEV 
8aµä  (523-24).  Significantly,  immediately  after  the  Chorus  have  sung 
about  the  forthcoming  Dike  that  will  vindicate  Electra's  cause  (475f.  ), 
Clytaemestra  strongly  appeals  to  it  too  (528,  cf.  538,551).  92  Furthermore, 
89  See  e.  g.  Cairns  (1993:  242  with  n.  95). 
90  See  further  Cairns  (1993:  241-9passim,  esp.  242-3). 
91  I  adopt  Kaibel's  (p.  105)  tentative  emendation  (printed  by  Lloyd-Jones  & 
Wilson  [1990a])  for  the  impossible  MSS.  Ev  8ELVOis  7fVayKäaOriv  Ev  8ELVOts 
(Triclinius  [cod.  T]  conjectured  Ev  8ELVOLs  i'IvayKhaOrJV  871). 
92  Commentators  rightly  adduce  as  parallels  A.  Ag.  1432f.,  1497ff.  (Jebb  [ad  528], 
Kamerbeek  [ad  528];  cf.  Kaibel  [p.  156]).  For  Dike  as  an  avenger  see  Jebb  (ad 29 
it  is  highly  ironical  that  Electra  herself  undermines  her  own  cause:  having 
appealed  (at  the  above  cited  passages)  to  the  retaliation  axiom,  she 
comes  suddenly  forth  (577ff.  )  with  a  severe  censuring  of  it,  thus 
contradicting  her  proclaimed  beliefs  and  rendering  her  excuse  for  her 
unfilial  behaviour  baseless  93  Even  as  she  condemns  the  lex  talionis, 
Electra  steadfastly  adheres  to  It,  as  appears  further  from  her  self-avowed 
desire  to  see  Orestes  acting  as  a  µudaT  p  (601-605).  94  That  Electra  self- 
contradictorily  indulges  In  the  same  retaliatory  practices  of  which  she 
accuses  her  mother,  is  also  pointed  out  by  Clytaemestra:  at  784-86  she 
insinuates  that  her  daughter  has  been  a  blood-drinking  ß)uä.  ß7)  (most 
probably  an  Erinys,  an  instrument  of  vindictive  retribution)95  to  her  -  at 
least  upon  the  mental  plane,  as  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  233)  has 
argued.  After  all,  Orestes,  for  whose  return  Electra  has  been  praying,  is 
characteristically  associated  (either  explicitly  or  implicitly)  with  the 
Erinyes  (e.  g.  110-18,489-91  with  455-56,96  1386-88,97  1420,1475-7898). 
475f.,  528).  The  Chorus  themselves  had  strangely  foreshadowed  Clytaemestra's 
allegations  that  she  had  had  some  supernatural  assistance  in  Agamemnon's 
murder:  see  199-200  EI.  T'  OÜV  66$  ELTE  ßpOTWV  ITV6  TaOTa  trpäaawv  and  cf. 
Jebb  (198f.  );  Burton  (1980:  193);  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  224);  Machin  (1981: 
214  with  n.  398);  contra  Minadeo  (1967:  135-36);  Lesky's  (1972:  230  n.  98) 
explanation  is  insufficient. 
93  Cf.  Segal  (1966:  537),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  221  with  n.  19),  Cairns  (1993: 
245  with  n.  107).  This  is  undeniable  even  if  we  assume  -as  Machin  (1981:  223) 
does  (cf.  also  Kitzinger  [1991:  315-6])  -that  Electra  is  here  resorting  merely  to  a 
"procede  de  rhetorique".  See  rightly  Blundell  (1989:  168  with  n.  64). 
94  On  the  sinister  implications  of  Orestes'  designation  as  ILäaTwp  see  below  p.  38 
with  n.  127. 
95  The  Erinyes  were  similarly  imagined  as  drinkers  of  human  blood  (e.  g.  A.  Cho. 
577-8,  Eu.  183-4)  and  were  called  euphemistically'  Ap  aplaL  (E.  Wüst,  RE  Suppl.  8 
[1956],  86).  It  may  even  be  that  BAä(3aL  was  perhaps  another  name  for  them  (S. 
Ant.  1104  is  a  possible  instance,  cf.  Dawe  [1968:  104]).  So  perhaps  (3kxßi  at  784 
should  be  capitalized. 
96  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  219)  rightly  interprets  489-91  as  referring  to  the 
Erinyes  who  are  "embodied  in  the  avenging  son  and  his  helpers". 
97  The  reference  to  Erinyes  is  almost  universally  admitted  for  this  passage;  see 
Burton  (1980:  216)  and  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  218).  Cf.  below  n.  228. 30 
The  chain  of  counterbalanced  arguments  does  not  end  here.  We 
remember  Electra's  asseverations  that  she  is  completely  under  her 
mother's  and  Aegisthus'  power  (262-65);  now,  however,  Clytaemestra 
avows  her  inability  to  control  her  daughter  (517,519-20).  Besides,  Electra 
had  accused  her  mother  of  vßpLc  (271,  cf.  522),  but  Clytaemestra  now 
forcefully  denies  the  charge  (523;  the  contrast  with  Menelaus'  freely 
admitting  his  hybristic  attitude  in  Aj.  1088  is  instructive99).  This 
balanced  contrast  between  two  equally  valid  positions  extends  also  to  the 
opponents'  way  of  life  and  values.  Electra  has  proclaimed  that  she 
struggles  for  her  kin's  (4LAoL)  benefit  (346,368,395  etc.  )  but  Clytaemestra 
accuses  her  of  bringing  disgrace  on  her  4'LAoL  (518).  Furthermore,  Electra's 
ý  eý 
infertility  has  been  a  central  theme,  but  now  Clytaemestra  reminds  us 
that  she  has  lost  a  child  too  (530-33).  Finally,  the  fruitlessness  of  the 
retaliatory  process  is  prominent  also  in  the  central  arguments  of  the  two 
parts:  neither  manages  to  refute  her  opponent's  basic  arguments.  For  we 
must  realize  that  Clytaemestra's  main  thesis,  namely  that  there  was  no 
force  majeure  to  justify  Agamemnon's  killing  of  his  own  daughter,  is 
never  adequately  answered:  it  is  evident  from  Electra's  narrative  that 
Agamemnon  was  not  actually  forced  by  Artemis  to  sacrifice  Iphigeneia;  it 
was  not  the  case  that  he  was  left  with  no  other  choice  but  to  sacrifice  his 
daughter.  In  point  of  fact,  what  Artemis  threatened  to  do  was  that  she 
would  not  let  the  fleet  depart  unless  Iphigeneia  was  sacrificed  (570-72).  It 
follows  that  Agamemnon  could  have  forgotten  about  Troy  and,  quite 
simply,  dismissed  the  troops,  thus  avoiding  the  death  of  his  daughter; 
nonetheless,  he  preferred  the  success  of  the  enterprise  to  his  daughter's 
life.  And  Electra's  fleetingly  introduced  argument  (573-74)  that  the  Greek 
army,  stalled  in  Aulis,  could  not  go  back  home  (a  contention  termed 
"artificial  or  inhuman"  by  Bowra  [1944:  238])100  Is  specious:  for  in  the 
98  For  the  significance  of  these  lines  see  Winning  ton-Ingram  (1980:  237  with 
n.  69),  whose  careful  and  detailed  analysis  of  the  importance  of  the  Erinys- 
theme  is  indispensable  for  the  interpretation  of  this  play. 
99  I  owe  the  suggestion  to  Mr.  Garvie. 
100  Cf.  Jebb  (ad  573).  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  220  with  n.  15)  is  rightly 
reserved  as  to  how  cogent  Electra's  speech  is  meant  to  sound;  cf.  also 
Sheppard's  (1927a:  7),  and  Segal's  (1966:  536-37  with  nn.  ),  (1981:  271) 31 
event  Agamemnon  did  utilize  the  sacrifice  in  order  to  achieve  his  ulterior 
purpose  which  was,  of  course,  not  the  army's  release  and  homecoming, 
but  the  expedition  against  Troy  (exactly  as  Clytaemestra  has  argued: 
530ff.  ).  Hair-splitting  as  such  distinctions  may  seem  to  a  modem 
audience,  they  must  have  been  of  considerable  moment  for  the  Athenian 
spectators  -  people  well  versed  in  the  clever  subtleties  of  forensic 
speeches,  whose  structure  and  style  the  Electra-Clytaemestra  agon 
evidently  reproduces.  101  Such  an  audience  would,  of  course,  observe  that 
Electra  has  a  strong  case  toö:  her  argument  that  Clytaemestra  has  gone 
beyond  the  limits  of  retribution  by  marrying  Aegisthus  (585ff.  )  is 
undoubtedly  right;  and  Clytaemestra's  case  does  not  become  any,  stronger 
by  her  failure  to  use  the  argument  of  her  Aeschylean  counterpart,  namely 
that  Agamemnon  brought  Cassandra  into  her  house  (A.  Ag.  1440-6).  102 
Thus,  by  the  end  of  the  debate  there  has  been  created  an  unresolved 
tension  between  the  main  arguments  of  both  sides.  As  Winnington- 
Ingram  (1980:  222)  has  remarked,  "Sophocles  was  the  supreme  ironist, 
and  perhaps  we  can  now  see  that  he  was  making  ironical  use  of  the  form 
of  a  sophistic  (or  forensic)  debate,  the  entire  rational  aspect  of  which 
turns  out  to  be  a  sham.  "103 
All  in  all,  one  must  not  unproblematically  pronounce  Electra  the 
unequivocal  winner  of  the  debate,  as  many  a  critic  has  done.  104  The 
misgivings;  even  Waldock  (1951:  181-82)  and  Linforth  (1963:  97-98)  felt  uneasy 
about  Electra's  argumentation.  Contra  Kitto  (1961:  137)  and  van  Erp  Taalman 
Kip  (1996:  517-21). 
101  On  the  forensic  quality  of  the  debate  cf.  Woodard  (1964:  183-84). 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  219-20with  n.  13)  aptly  compares  it  (pace  Reinhardt 
[1979:  140,1471)  with  Euripides'  set  speeches;  cf.  esp.  the  striking  equibalänce 
he  observes  in  the  number  of  lines  that  are  attributed  to  Clytaemestra  (36  lines) 
and  of  those  that  are  commi'd  to  the  rational  part  (558-94)  of  Electra's  speech 
(37  lines). 
102  Cf.  e.  g.  Bowra  (1944:  237);  Letters  (1953:  257);  Segal  (1966:  495);  Gellie  (1972: 
114);  Erbse  (1978:  290);  Machin  (1981:  209-10,221). 
103  Cf.  also  Blundell's  (1989:  161-72)  detailed  analysis  of  the  debate  -esp.  pp.  163- 
64  and  171-72for  the  talio's  inherent  fruitlessness. 
104  E.  g.  Reinhardt  (1979:  149  with  n.  15);  Waldock  (1951:  180);  Friis  Johansen 
(1964:  16);  Gellie  (1972:  113-15);  Kells  (ad  626f);  Kamerbeek  (p.  79);  Machin 32 
abuse  and  threats  that  Clytaemestra  showers  on  Electra  at,  '  622ff.,  far  from 
indicating  frustration  at  her  supposed  defeat,  105  are  a  justified  reaction 
against  her  daughter's  practices:  for  Electra  has  swerved  from  her  main 
course,  and  instead  of  sticking  to  her  promised  argument  (554-55),  has 
launched  a  fierce,  all-encompassing  invective  against  her  mother  (595ff.  ); 
as  Jebb  (ad  610f.  )  remarks,  "Electra's  speech,  which  began  with  temperate 
argument,  has  passed  (at  v.  595)  into  a  strain  of  angry  reproach".  106  Even 
the  Chorus  themselves  (610-11)  express  serious  doubts  as  to  whether 
Electra  is  at  all  concerned  with  justice  any  more.  107  To  conclude:  lines 
405-659,  which  stand  for  a  scale  representation  of  the  wider  vengeance 
framework  (condensing  as  they  do  central  themes  of  Orestes'  world),  end 
with  the  two  opponents  being  level.  Each  one  claims  to  have  justice  on 
her  side,  and  each  one  appeals  to  the  retaliation  axiom  to  justify  her 
actions.  108  However,  this  practice  turns  out  to  be  completely  fruitless,  as 
it  does  not  lead  to  any  result  other  than  an  endless  chain  of  retribution 
that  does  not  allow  anyone  to  win  or  to  be  defeated.  Is  this  not  a  sinister 
but  clear  foreshadowing  of  the  outcome  that  is  to  be  expected  from 
Orestes'  revengeful  action  as  well?  If  in  the  microcosm  of  Electra  and 
(1981:  222,223);  Gardiner  (1987:  169).  An  honourable  exception  is  Blundell 
(1989:  172). 
105  As  e.  g.  Kaibel  (pp.  169-71),  Friis  Johansen  (1964:  16)  and  Gellie  (1972:  114) 
seem  to  have  thought. 
106  Cf.  Linforth  (1963:  98-99);  Woodard  (1964:  184);  Winnington-Ingram  (1980: 
222);  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  184-85).  Kitzinger  (1991:  316)  fails  to  see  this. 
107  See  Blundell  (1989:  169-70  with  n.  71).  Lines  610-11  must  refer  to  Electra;  see 
Jebb  (ad  610f.  );  Segal  (1966:  536n.  83);  Lilley  (1975:  310)  -but  his  assignment  of 
the  lines  to  Clytaemestra  I  cannot  accept  -D  awe  (1976:  232);  Machin  (1981: 
224);  Segal  (1981:  462  n.  13);  also  Gardiner  (1987:  149-51)  for  doxography  and 
literature  (however,  "Electra  seems  to  have  lost  all  fear  of  punishment"  is  not 
what  the  Greek  says).  Burton  (1980:  187)  seems  reserved.  Others  think  that  the 
lines  refer  to  Clytaemestra:  Gregor  (1950:  87-88),  Fitton  Brown  (1956:  38)  -who 
gives  the  lines  to  Electra  -,  Kells  (ad  610f),  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  610,11);  the 
latter,  like  virtually  all  the  scholars  of  this  second  group,  "cannot  imagine  the 
Chorus  calling  into  question  Electra's  concern  for  justice".  A  conclusive 
answer  to  this  and  other  pseudo-problems  has  been  given  by  Booth  (1977:  466- 
67). 33 
Clytaemestra  the  lex  talionis  results  in  a  sterile  recycling  of  the  same 
retributive  pattern,  why  then  should  things  be  different  in  Orestes' 
analogously  modelled  world?  This  has  been  noted,  from  a  different 
perspective,  by  Cairns  (1993:  242)  too:  "the  pattern  of  insult  and 
retaliation  exhibited  in  the  agon  and  adumbrated  elsewhere  in  the  play 
[...  ]  must  influence  our  attitude  towards  the  issues  raised  by  the  larger 
pattern  of  crime  and  revenge  within  the  family". 
1.3.1  The  Paedagogus'  scene 
The  Paedagogus'  coming  on  stage  marks  the  end  of  this  microcosm  and 
the  beginning  of  the  actual  course  of  deceitful  and  avenging  action. 
Complying  with  the  oracle's  demand  for  deceit,  the  Paedagogus'  narrative 
establishes  a  fictitious  world  that  is  completely  different  from  the  actual 
one  as  we  have  known  it  so  far.  109  The  most  striking  feature  of  this  fake 
world  is  that  Orestes'  image  is  here  as  heroic  as  could  be.  11b  He  does  not 
only  participate  in  the  Pythian  games,  "glorious  ornament  of  Greece" 
(681-82)  but  also  gains  everyone's  respect  (685)  and  wins  all  the  prizes 
(686-92).  The  pompous  mention  of  his  name,  his  native  city,  and  his 
father's  name111  (693-95)  contribute  to  the  splendour  of  this  fictitious 
108  Cf.  Winnington-Ingram  (1954-55:  22-3),  Blundell  (1989:  161-62). 
109  On  the  function  of  the  Paedagogus'  scene  see  Sheppard  (1918:  86);  also 
Musurillo  (1967:  98-99),  Reinhardt  (1979:  151)  -both  seeing  the  scene  as  little 
more  than  a  virtuoso  display  -,  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  236-37),  and 
especially  Blundell  (1989:  173-74).  Linforth  (1963:  99)  fails  to  see  any  meaning 
in  this  scene. 
110  On  the  contradiction  between  heroic  language  and  unheroic  purpose  in  the 
Paedagogus'  speech  see  Segal  (1981:  281-90  with  n.  94);  differently  Davidson 
(1988:  54). 
111  As  we  have  seen  (section  1.0.2),  Agamemnon  was  an  indisputably  heroic 
model;  and  as  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  162)  has  put  it,  "in  questo  ordine  di  idee 
affiora  ii  motivo  tradizionale  del  nesso  padre/figlio,  di  un  patrimonio  -a  livello 
del  KM  OT  -che  si  trasmette  dal  padre  al  figlio";  cf.  also  Masaracchia  (1978:  1030 
with  n.  16).  However,  if  the  Platonic  view  of  Orestes  as  a  zrapä  4vaLv  son  of 
Agamemnon  (see  again  section  1.0.2)  reflects  to  some  extent  the  typical  Attic 34 
image,  112  while  we  know  that  his  practices  are  anything  but  heroic.  113  The 
illusion  is  expanded  even  further:  Orestes  takes  part  in  a  chariot-race  in 
which  the  whole  Greek  world  is  represented;  even  his  Thessalian  horses, 
the  most  famous  in  antiquity,  114  add  to  his  pseudo-heroic  glamour  (698- 
708).  Significantly,  this  chariot-race  is  more  than  once  compared  to  a 
(naval)  battle:  vavayLWV  [...  ]  LMnLKC3v  (730),  KaVOKWXEVEL  (732),  115 
KXl'&w'  E4Onirov  (733).  116  The  use  of  QTpaTös  (749)  instead  of  Xaös,  the 
emphatic  of  Epya  Bpäaas  (751)117  as  well  as  the  suggestive  contrast  of 
Orestes'  µEyUQTOV  Qciµa  (758)  to  the  small  vessel  in  which  he  is 
contained  (757-58;  cf.  A.  Ag.  442-4),  further  contribute  to  the  military 
imagery  and  /  or  to  the  creation  of  a  distinctly  heroic  atmosphere.  118 
Moreover,  as  Jebb  (ad  712)  has  remarked,  in  the  narrative  of  Orestes' 
chariot-race  Sophocles  imitates  the  Homeric  description  of  the  chariot- 
race  in  honour  of  the  dead  Patroclus  (Il.  23.257ff.  ).  Here  is  a  selective 
view,  then  Orestes'  association  with  his  father  in  the  Paedagogus'  false 
narrative  would  -  in  the  eyes  of  an  Athenian  audience  -mar  the  heroic 
illusion;  cf.  Blundell  (1989:  173-74). 
112  Cf.  further  Masaracchia  (1978:  1032-3). 
113  Mantziou  (1994:  25  5-5  6,263-67)  strangely  argues  that  the  Sophoclean  Orestes 
represents  the  traditional  heroic-aristocratic  world,  and,  what  is  more,  that  the 
Paedagogus'  tale  reveals  this  inherent  nobility!  If,  as  she  argues  (op.  cit.:  256- 
58),  we  accept  Orestes'  `heroic'  guile  because  it  restores  the  unity  of  the  oikos, 
then  Clytaemestra's  guile  must  be  accepted  too,  since  it  counterbalanced  the 
disruption  of  the  oikos  generated  by  Iphigeneia's  sacrifice. 
114  For  the  Thessalians'  reputation  for  horsemanship  cf.  E.  El.  815-7;  Pl.  Men. 
70a;  Anon.  Iambi.  90.2.11  D.  -K. 
115  Cf.  Jebb  (ad  731ff.  ):  "[&VOK«XEUELV]  may  have  been  a  nautical  term".  Kells  (ad 
731ff.  )  aptly  cites  Hdt.  6.116:  "ävaKwXcVaavTEc  Täs  vEas". 
116  Ironically,  this  naval  battle-metaphor  will  be  repeated  by  Aegisthus  at  1444, 
at  the  high  point  of  Orestes'  unheroic  guile  (cf.  1493-94). 
117  on  E  pyov  in  military  contexts  ('deed  of  war')  see  ISJ  s.  v.  I.  1. 
118  See  Jebb  (ad  757f.  ).  Hdt.  1.68  remarks  ä  propos  of  Orestes'  alleged  grave  at 
Sparta:  ETTETUXOV  aoP,  4S  ETTTam1XE1.  '  ÜTTÖ  8E 
&1TLUTL1j6 
µT1  µEV  'YEVEaOaL  µT18aµx 
jlECOvac  aVeP61TOUc  TWV  VÜV  QVOLýa  a&r  v  Kai  E180V  TÖV  VEKPÖV  gKE1  tcOV 
EövTa 
TTl  aopCo. 35 
account  of  the  similarities  between  the  two  passages:  119  El.  698-99 
(L'TTTTLKGJV  I  ...  W'KÜTTOUS  äyty)  - 
Il.  262  (LTTTTEÜQLV 
...  TTOStKE(TLV)  /  Il.  504 
(LTnTTOLs  WKUTTÖFEQQLV);  the  contestants  in  the  Homeric  passage  are  five, 
whereas  in  Sophocles  their  number  is  exactly  doubled;  El.  710  (KXrjpous 
[C,  coni.  Wunder  :  -oLs  codd.  ]  ETMAav)  -  Il.  352-53  (Ev  U'  KX  pous 
EiQ)oVTO'  I  TTä)X'  'AXLAEÜS);  El.  712  (o  IoKXiaaVTES)  Il.  363 
(b  pÖKX1r(TaV);  El.  712-13  (ýVLas  XEPOtV  I  EQELQaV) 
-  Il.  363  (TTETTXTjyöv  0' 
L  id(YLV); 
El.  714-15  (KÖVLS  8'  ävW  14opEtO')  -  Il.  365-66  (KOVLrl  I  LUTaT' 
üELP%tEVT  W3  TE  v44  os  1fE  OÜE?  Xa);  El.  718-19  ( 
...  %t(L  VWTa  ... 
I 
... 
E'QEßa)XOV  LTTTTLKQL  TTVOaL)  ^-  Il.  380-81  (TTVOL',  8'  Ei  ti  oLO 
ItETd4  PEVOV  EÜpEE  T'  WI.  iW  I  OEpI.  LET');  El.  720-21  /  743-46  ^"  Il.  334-41;  El. 
745-48  -  I1.392-96. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  this  same  passage  we  can  detect  sinister 
hints  that  mar  ominously  the  heroic  illusion: 
a)  The  very  fact  that  the  Paedagogus'  story  concerns  a  Pelopid's 
participation  in  a  chariot-race  (albeit  a  fictitious  one)  is  bound  to 
remind  the  audience  that,  as  they  have  already  heard  in  504-15  (cf. 
above,  p.  24  with  n.  76),  the  endless  evils  besetting  the  Pelopids  can  be 
traced  back  to  another  chariot-race,  that  of  Pelops.  Pelops'  chariot-race 
apparently  ended  with  his  triumph  and  the  establishment  of  his  power, 
but  eventually  turned  out  to  be  disastrous;  conversely,  Orestes'  supposed 
chariot-race,  although  it  apparently  ends  with  his  death,  in  reality  marks 
the  beginning  of  his  triumph  over  his  enemies;  however,  the  Pelops- 
parallel  is  there  exactly  to  prevent  us  from  believing  that  Orestes' 
triumph  will  be  permanent  and  undisturbed.  Significantly  (and 
ominously)  Orestes'  murderous  enterprise  is  itself  envisaged,  later  in  the 
play,  as  a  chariot-race  (1397  TTpös  aüTÖ  TEp  µa)  . 
120 
b)  The  curious  emphasis  on  linchpins  (Xvoas  717,745;  QvpLyya  721121) 
119  For  most  of  the  parallels  I  have  consulted  Jebb's  edition.  Cf.  also  Davidson 
(1988:  65-67);  Masaracchia  (1978:  1030-1). 
120  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  260). 
121  "Here  [aüpLyý]  is  a  synonym  for  the  Xvöyl  (717)  or  nave  itself"  (Jebb  [ad 
721f.  ]). 36 
cannot,  I  think,  be  explained  unless  as  an  allusion  to  the  legend  of  Pelops' 
chariot-race:  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  Pelopids'  hereditary  evils  -  the 
apXf1  KaKC3v  -  was  their  patriarch's  decision  to  bribe  Myrtilus  in  order  to 
tamper  with  the  linchpin  of  Oenomaus'  chariot.  This  engineered  a  chain- 
reaction  of  revengeful  and  /  or  guileful  acts:  the  dying  Oenomaus 
retaliated  by  cursing  Myrtilus  to  die  by  Pelops'  hand;  Myrtilus  tried 
treacherously  to  rape  Hippodamela,  and  was  duly  punished  by  being 
thrown  into  the  sea  by  Pelops;  as  he  sank,  he  cursed  Pelops'  house  in 
revenge,  hence  the  misfortunes  of  the  Pelopids.  122 
c)  The  Paedagogus  emphatically  mentions  that  he  has  been  sent  by 
Phanoteus,  who  is  Clytaemestra's  and  Aegisthus'  ally  (667,671;  he  is 
called  a  8opüýEV09  [46],  a  friend  acquired  in  battle).  On  the  other  hand, 
Orestes  had  been  offered  hospitality  by  Strophius  (1111).  Now,  Sophocles' 
audience  might  well  have  been  familiar  with  the  story  according  to  which 
Strophius'  father  was  Crisus  whose  enmity  with  his  twin  brother 
Phanoteus  had  already  begun  when  they  were  both  in  their  mother's 
womb.  123  That  is  to  say,  Sophocles  provides  the  Paedagogus'  false 
narrative  with  a  background  of  endless  hostility.  Given  that  the  ensuing 
deceitful  story  is  supposed  to  smooth  the  ground  for  an  apparently 
happy  ending  (Orestes'  restoration  to  his  ancestral  power),  the  allusion  to 
the  perennial  strife  between  Phanoteus  and  Crisus  is  surely  a  grim  prelude 
to  what  one  might  expect  to  be  Orestes'  unproblematic  victory:  the 
retaliation  process  cannot  stop  so  easily.  We  are  clearly  not  encouraged  to 
envision  Orestes'  impending  revenge  as  the  final  blow  that  will  put  an 
end  to  the  self-renewing  and  self-reproducing  chain  of  revenge  and 
counter-revenge  that  has  been  besetting  the  Pelopids. 
All  in  all,  the  Paedagogus'  fake  story  provides  extremely  significant,  and 
ominous,  allusions  to  grim  legends  of  deceit,  murder  and  perpetuated 
retaliation.  This  should  warn  an  alert  audience  that  the  enprise 
undertaken  by  the  actual  Orestes,  who  is  indeed  concerned  with  deceit, 
122  It  might  also  be  significant  that  the  Paedagogus  says  Orestes  was  entangled 
in  the  reins  of  his  chariot  (746-7).  According  to  Apollod.  Epit.  2.7  Oenomaus  was 
killed  in  exactly  the  same  way. 
123  See  e.  g.  Lycophr.  939-42;  Tz.  ad  Lyc.  939.  Cf.  also  Jebb  (ad  45). 37 
murder  and  retaliation,  may  not  end  all  that  well. 
Clytaemestra's  unexpected  reaction  at  766-68,770-71  is  significant. 
Instead  of  exulting  over  her  son's  doom,  she  expresses  gloomy  thoughts 
about  the  dreadful  paradox  of  being  saved  by  the  death  of  one's 
offspring.  124  The  Paedagogus'  genuine  surprise  (769,125  772)  is  a 
spontaneous  reaction  to  this  unexpected  behaviour.  It  is  also  important 
that  even  in  her  expression  of  relief,  a  little  later,  at  her  son's  death, 
Clytaemestra  is  not  utterly  devoid  of  maternal  feelings:  at  775ff.  she 
complains  that  the  son  who  was  life  of  her  life  (775),  whom  her  own 
breasts  had  fed,  had  become  a  stranger  (777)  to  her  (later  [1400-1]  we 
hear  that  she  even  prepares  the  funeral  rites  for  her  supposedly  dead 
son).  Thus,  It  is  obvious  that  the  Electra  is  not  a  melodrama,  where  the 
characters  are  either  purely  good  or  purely  base;  126  and  if  black-and- 
white  distinctions  do  not  exist  -  if,  that  is,  Clytaemestra  is  not,  as  we 
might  have  thought,  a  totally  unmotherly  and  cruel  figure  -  then  why 
should  Orestes  be  a  wholly  admirable  hero,  bravely  performing  his  duty 
towards  his  dead  father?  This  lack  of  clear-cut  distinctions  is  also 
apparent  on  the  level  of  vocabulary:  Electra  (apparently  quoting 
Clytaemestra)  refers  to  Orestes  by  the  term  LL  TTWp  (603)  which  is 
ominously  ambivalent:  it  can  mean  "avenger  of  a  µtapös  act",  but  also 
124  There  Is  no  point  in  trying  to  deny  the  sincerity  of  her  reaction,  as  e.  g. 
Machin  (1981:  226)  does.  That  Clytaemestra's  maternal  feelings  are  eventually 
"stifled  by  an  over-mastering  relief  from  fear"  only  "brings  out  the  tragic 
character  of  the  situation"  (Winning  ton-Ingram  [1980:  232];  cf.  Reinhardt 
[1979:  152-53  with  n.  19],  Stevens  [1978:  115]).  Certainly  Clytaemestra  is  not  a 
mater  dolorosa,  but  the  sincere  expression  of  her  maternal  sorrow  surely 
prevents  us  from  regarding  her  merely  as  a  wholly  evil  character  set  against 
her  children's  moral  excellence.  On  Clytaemestra's  positive  aspects  see  Webster 
(1969:  77),  Segal  (1981:  260-61  with  n.  39);  on  her  mixed  reaction:  Tycho  von 
Wilamowitz  (1917:  187-8). 
125  See  Kells  (ad  769). 
126  See  Kitto  (1958:  14)  and  Kells  (227).  Machin  (1981:  208;  cf.  214-15)  seems  to 
take  the  opposite  view:  "...  dans  Electre,  [...  ]  1'  autoritd  morale  du  personnage 
principal  progresse  en  relation  etroite  avec  les  torts  de  ses  ennemis";  that  is  to 
say,  the  more  the  play  proceeds  the  more  odious  Aegisthus  and  Clytaemestra 
become,  and  the  more  we  tend  to  forgive  Electra's  and  Orestes'  attitude. 38 
"crime-stained  wretch  who  pollutes  others"127  -  and  so  it  was 
appropriately  used  of  Aegisthus  at  275!  This  sinister  blurring  of 
dichotomies  between  the  avengers  and  their  enemies  is  also  expressed  in 
the  use  of  words  like  6r  lvos  (121,806),  Tampa  (273),  TX]  IÜ  1'  (275) 
both  of  the  guilty  Clytaemestra  and  of  Electra  and  Agamemnon.  128  These 
words,  like  the  English  'wretch(ed)',  are  distinctly  ambiguous:  they  can 
Imply  both  an  expression  of  pity  and  an  adverse  moral  judgement.,  That 
they  are  used  with  reference  to  persons  whom  one  might  be  tempted  to 
regard  as  diametrically  opposed  (from  a  moral  point  of  view)  throws  a 
much  more  ambiguous  light  on  them,  thus  warning  us  against  moral 
over-simplifications:  both  Aegisthus  and  Clytaemestra  and  Orestes  and 
Electra  are  at  the  same  time  pitiable  and  despicable. 
I  think  that  we  can  now  appreciate  the  dramaturgical  importance 
both  of  the  debate  scene  and  of  the  Paedagogus'  narrative.  Had  the 
former  not  been  there,  the  retaliation  issue  would  not  have  been  given 
enough  scope,  and  the  audience  would  not  have  been  adequately  warned 
of  the  fruitlessness  of  self-perpetuating  revenge.  It  is  only  in  the  light  of 
this  scene  that  the  Paedagogus'  narrative  reveals  its  full  meaning:  apart 
from  creating  a  pseudo-heroic  image  of  Orestes  (deftly  opposed  to 
Electra's  genuine,  and  almost  self-destructive,  heroism  in  the  ensuing 
scenes),  it  also  warns  us  that  the  punishment  of  Aegisthus  and 
Clytaemestra  may  be  divinely  ordained,  but  we  are  not  naively  to  see  in 
it  the  triumph  of  virtue  against  vice.  We  realize  that  retribution  results 
only  in  its  endless  self-reproduction;  and  that  a  clear-cut  distinction 
between  the  evil  usurpers  and  the  good  Orestes  -a  distinction  that 
might  mitigate  the  unpleasant  effect  of  the  murderous  revenge  -  simply 
does  not  exist. 
127  LSJ  s.  v.,  Jebb  (ad  275f.  );  cf.  Winning  ton-Ingram  (1980:  245  n.  93),  Blundell 
(1989:  169  with  n.  69)  and  above  all  Parker  (1983:  108-9)  who  groups  itä  mwp 
with  such  words  as  npovrpbnaLos,  naaaµvaios,  WcrTwp,  &\LT  ploc  which  can 
designate  both  the  polluted  killer  and  the  victim  in  his  anger  or  his  avengers 
(human  or  superhuman):  as  examples  of  the  first  meaning  he  cites  A.  Cho.  944, 
S.  El.  275,  a  353,  E.  El.  683,  Andr.  615;  of  the  second:  A.  Eum.  176-8,  S.  El.  603,  E. 
Med.  1371. 39 
1.3.2  Electra's  heroism  once  more 
We  have  seen  that  the  heroic  image  of  Orestes  that  the  Paedagogus  tries  to 
present  in  his  false  story  is  adroitly  counterpoised  by  ominous  allusions 
to  the  possible  implications  of  his  unheroic  deeds.  However,  the  heroic 
motifs  of  that  narrative,  fictitious  though  they  may  be  as  far  as  Orestes  is 
concerned,  are  put  into  practice  by  Electra  immediately  afterwards.  This 
time  the  heroism  is  true  and  entirely  unmarred.  A  close  examination  of 
the  ensuing  scenes  will  show  how  the  heroic  themes  dominating  the 
parodos  and,  partly,  the  first  episode  (see  section  1.1.1)  now  recur,  129  but 
in  a  much  more  intense  fashion. 
First  of  all,  the  death  theme  undergoes  a  powerful  8E  LVÜXJLS 
,  and  is 
now  hammered  in  with  unremitting  persistence.  Electra  acknowledges 
that  she  is  virtually  dead  (808,  cf.  1152,130  1163-64)  and  announces  her 
intention  to  let  herself  physically  wither  away  (818-22,  cf.  1165-70).  131 
The  contrast  with  Orestes'  fictitious  death,  as  related  by  the  Paedagogus, 
is  tragically  bold:  while  for  the  revenan  t  Orestes  his  own  death  is  nothing 
more  than  a  jeu  d'  esprit  (as  Woodard  [1965:  2201  has  put  it),  for  Electra 
it  is  an  all  too  palpable  reality.  132  Moreover,  the  theme  of  Electra's  de- 
spair  and  disbelief  in  any  possibility  of  help  from  Hades  now  recurs  in  a 
much  more  intensified  form:  at  940-41  Electra  says  that  she  would  be 
d#wv  to  believe  that  the  dead  might  be  resurrected.  133  The  despair 
theme  is  elaborated  upon  in  823ff.:  not  only  has  Electra  lost  her  hopes 
but  she  even  forbids  the  Chorus  to  offer  any  consolation  to  her  (831-36, 
128  Cf.  Segal  (1966:  501  n.  34). 
129  On  the  thematic  analogy  of  the  two  scenes  see  Minadeo  (1967:  125),  and  cf. 
Segal's  (1966:  480)  ingenious  scheme,  justly  acclaimed  by  Lesky  (1972:  236 
n.  105). 
130  For  the  meaning  see  Kells  (ad  1151f)  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  1151,2). 
131  On  Electra's  passivity  in  this  scene  cf.  Huys  (1993:  309-10). 
132  See  Woodard  (1965:  220-22);  cf.  Reinhardt  (1979:  137-38). 
133  Ironically,  it  will  be  the  unheroic  Orestes  who  Tons  6avövTas,  ýCavaaT7ýQeL 
(940):  cf.  14170  3aLv  01  yäs 
ÜTTaL  Ke(  eVOL.  Cf.  Woodard  (1965:  224). 40 
854-59).  She  even  manages  to  reverse  the  mythological  example  of 
ä  Trµ4svXos  Amphiaraus  (841)  put  forward  by  the  Chorus  as  a 
consolation,  134  and  to  convert  it  into  an  argument  in  favour  of  her 
absolute  despair.  unlike  Amphiaraus,  Agamemnon  will  not  have  an 
avenger  to  care  for  him  (846  REMETwp),  and  therefore  he  will  be  anything 
but  TräµjuXos  (contr.  A.  Cho.  354-62).  The  same  applies  to  her  brother. 
she  is  so  sure  that  his  death  is  an  undeniable  fact,  that  she  refers  to  it  as 
though  it  were  something  visible  (831  4avep(Zs),  135  whereas  she  knows  it 
only  by  hearsay,  i.  e.  from  the  Paedagogus'  false  narrative.  136 
However,  one  must  have  always  in  mind  that  Electra's  despair  is 
only  another  aspect  of  her  heroism,  being  in  significant  contrast  with 
Orestes'  self-confident  guile.  Now  we  are  presented  with  a  Steigerung  of 
the  heroism-theme:  Electra,  no  longer  confining  herself  to  words  (as  she 
did  in  the  first  part  of  the  play),  decides  to  proceed  with  heroic  deeds  - 
she  will  kill  Aegisthus  (956-57).  The  notion  of  accomplishing  an  Epyov  is 
particularly  stressed:  943  (8p6aav),  947  (TEXEtv),  986-87  (au  rövEL  ... 
vüyKaµv'),  1019-20  (aÜTÖXeLpL  ... 
6paaTEov  I  TOÜpyov),  1045  (Trot  aw). 
At  the  same  time,  Electra  develops  a  new  attitude  towards  time:  at  951-4 
she  contrasts  her  indefinite,  'timeless'  hopes  of  the  past  with  the  concrete, 
pressing  necessities  of  the  present  (Ews  µßv  ...  vüv  8'  7IVLK'  OÜKET' 
EUTLV).  The  same  contrast  is  also  present  at  961,  where  suffering  in  length 
of  time  is  implicitly  opposed  to  the  exigencies  of  the  moment,  which 
demand  salutary  action.  Chrysothemis  is  mere  foil  to  her  sister's  heroism: 
134  For  the  myth  and  cult  of  Amphlaraus  see  Jebb  (ad  836f.,  837f.,  841,846).  For 
the  function  of  the  mythological  example  see  Lesky  (1972:  233),  Kamerbeek  (ad 
837-848,841)  and  esp.  Stanton  (1990:  474). 
135  The  Paedagogus  had  indeed  purported  to  be  an  eyewitness  of  Orestes'  death, 
but  this  only  makes  the  fictitiousness  of  his  speech  all  the  more  palpable  for 
the  audience  (cf.  Kamerbeek  [ad  762,3]). 
136  I  disagree  with  Jebb's  (ad  986f.  )  remark  that  986-87  Qv  LTrövei.  naTpt,  I 
a(yKaµv'  MC  W.  suggest  Electra's  belief  in  assistance  from  the  dead  (thus  also 
Kells  [1979:  ad  986ffj):  traTpt  and  SSE 
.  must  be  ethic  datives  (with  Iµot 
understood  as  dat.  obj.  from  the  two  avv-verbs);  thus  rightly  Kaibel  (ad  986),  L. 
Campbell  (ad  986),  Kamerbeek  (986-988). 41 
she  prefers  inaction  (1012  &TEXfj,  1026)  and  words  (1050),  while  she  views 
time  as  Infinite  repetition  (999-1000,1024,1030).  137  She  also  dwells  on 
her  female  Identity  (997;  cf.  1001),  whereas  her  sister's  masculinity 
receives  emphasis  (983  äv8pEtag).  In  the  parodos  /  first  episode  Electra's 
feminine  weakness  was  highlighted  by  the  emphasis  put  on  the  absence  of 
males  (cf.  esp.  117-20,164-6,188,303-6  etc.  ),  whereas  now  it  is  this  very 
absence  (951-7,961-6,986-7)  that  stimulates  her  manly  qualities.  138 
Chrysothemis'  promise  for  secrecy  (1011-12),  proudly  unheeded  by  her 
sister,  now  underlines  Electra's  heroic  carelessness  -a  telling  contrast 
with  her  preceding  dolos  of  preventing  Clytaemestra's  offerings  from 
reaching  Agamemnon's  tomb  (431ff.  ). 
Sophocles,  strongly  though  he  may  be  emphasizing  Electra's  resolu- 
tion  to  act,  again  makes  It  clear  that  it  is  unlikely  to  be  practically 
effective,  because  she  is  completely  impotent  -a  fact  that  is  especially 
emphasized  by  the  more  level-headed  Chrysothemis  and  the  Chorus:  998, 
1014,1091-95  (esp.  1092  n1r6XEtp).  139  This  Is  also  underscored  by  a 
feature  of  structure:  Electra's  resolution  to  act  is  framed  -  or  rather 
encased  -  by  two  explicit  mentions  of  her  intention  to  let  herself  wither 
away  (817-22,  and  1165-70);  thus,  on  one  hand  her  decision  to  kill 
Aegisthus  contradicts  her  previous  statement  at  817-22,  whereas  her 
forcefulness  is  mitigated  by  her  new  passivity  at  1165-70.140 
What  Is  more,  for  all  her  determination  to  act,  Electra  never 
envisages  taking  violent  action  against  her  mother.  she  proposes  the 
murder  of  Aegisthus,  not  of  Clytaemestra  (956-57;  cf.  1001),  thus 
avoiding  the  stain  of  matricide  and  managing  to  live  up  to  the  moral 
standards  that  have  been  so  typical  of  her  heroism.  141  True,  some  have 
137  Cf.  also  Woodard  (1965:  200). 
138  Cf.  Kells  (ad  983).  On  Electra's  ambivalence  towards  her  sex  see  Woodard 
(1964:  168). 
139  Woodard  (1964:  188-89)  correctly  remarks  that  "affirming  an  intention  to 
act,  [Electra]  highlights  her  limited  power". 
140  Cf.  Minadeo  (1967:  127).  Contra  Kirkwood  (1942:  88). 
141  Cf.  Jebb  (ad  957):  "Sophocles  [at  this  stage,  we  may  add]  avoids  everything 
that  could  qualify  our  sympathy  with  Electra";  also  Adams  (1957:  73):  "she 
means  Aegisthus,  and  Aegisthus  only".  See  also  Sheppard  (1918:  86-87),  (1927a: 42 
thought  that  Electra  in  fact  has  in  mind  to  kill  her  mother  too,  but  such 
a  contention  rests  on  flimsy  arguments.  Thus,  pace  e.  g.  Frils  Johansen 
(1964:  22)  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  957),  142  TOtaLV  EX6potc  (979)  is  too 
generic  to  prove  that  Electra  has  in  mind  to  kill  Clytaemestra  as  well;  143 
and  at  582-83  and  603-605  Electra  presents  the  possibility  of  killing  her 
mother  as  a  merely  hypothetical  one:  CYKfWJLV  o'K  oüaav  (584)  clearly 
dismisses  the  premises  upon  which  such  action  would  be  founded;  144  cf. 
also  the  conditional  clause  at  604-605.  Finally,  1080  8L81  Lav  EAova' 
'  EpLVÜV  Is  the  only  passage  that  could  possibly  imply  an  intention  of 
matricide;  but  here  there  are  good  reasons  for  emendation  (see 
Appendix).  145 
Furthermore,  the  references  to  the  revenge  theme  (whose  disturbing 
implications  have  been  made  clear  in  the  debate  scene  between  Electra 
and  her  mother)  are  remarkably  minimized  (953,955),  while  Electra's 
decision  is  `idealized'  by  her  persistence  in  the  moral  rewards  of  this 
action:  a  repute  for  reverence  towards  the  dead  (968-69),  146  a  worthy 
marriage  (961-66,970-72),  and  most  of  all  a  renown  for  bravery  (973- 
85).  Here,  the  more  or  less  clear  reminiscences  of  the  Attic  skolia  in 
7),  Machin  (1981:  228),  Gardiner  (1987:  165),  Huys  (1993:  340-1).  Contra  Segal 
(1981:  284),  quite  unconvincingly;  Linforth's  (1963:  103)  explanations  are 
inadequate  too,  whereas  Kirkwood's  (1942:  88-90)  interpretation  (-  Electra 
subconsciously  suppresses  the  fact  that  Clytaemestra  must  be  killed  too,  because 
presumably  she  feels  uneasy  about  it)  is  too  psychological  (later  Kirkwood 
[1958:  169  n.  56]  changed  his  mind).  Doxography:  Gellie  (1972:  119  with  nn.  16- 
19),  Juffras  (1991:  106  with  n.  20). 
142  Similarly,  if  more  subtly,  also  Owen  (1927:  51). 
143  So  rightly  Waldock  (1951:  185)  and  Gardiner  (1987:  165). 
144  Cf.  Erbse  (1978:  290-1). 
145  For  discussion  of  this  passage  see  Burton  (1980:  211-12),  although  I  am  not 
convinced  by  his  arguments.  Sheppard's  (1918:  87)  solution  ("[unlike  Electra] 
the  Chorus,  who  are  not  daughters  of  Clytaemestra,  include  her  in  the 
vengeance")  is  unconvincing. 
146  This  is  the  most  plausible  explanation  of  ea  3eLav  at  968;  see  Kamerbeek  (ad 
968,9).  On  the  daIPCta-theme  see  Long  (1968:  151-2). 43 
honour  of  Harmodios  and  Aristogeiton'47  finish  off  the  idealized  heroic 
image,  and  blur  any  grim  aspects  of  the  proposed  deed:  '-'Is  thus,  X6yuw 
... 
EV"KÄELav  (973)  and  Cw'aaLV  OavoÜQaiv  0'  (ilQTE  µiß  'Kü7TE1V  KaEOS  (985) 
are  comparable  with  PMG  896.1-2  Page  (aLEL  M4)OV  KAEOS  EUaETQL  KQT' 
QLQV,  14LATaO"  Apµ68LE  Kai  '  ApLUTÖ'yELTOV);  and  the  emphatically 
repeated  duals  at  977-85,  in  a  context  of  public  praise  for  the  regicidal 
pair  of  sisters,  must  have  conjured  up  for  an  Athenian  audience  the 
famous  pair  of  the  tyrannicides,  similarly  referred  to  in  the  dual  in  Attic 
skolia  e.  g.  PMG  893.3-4  Page  STE  Töv  TÜpavvov  KTaVETr1V  I  IGOv6µous 
T''AOr  vas-  4TroL'gcra7v  (cf.  also  PMG  896.3-4  Page).  Finally,  the  whole  of 
the  third  stasimon  (1058-97)  is  committed  to  the  praise  of  Electra's 
heroism  and  filial  devotion,  by  lyrically  elaborating  upon  the  previous 
episode's  antithesis  between  her  and  her  sister.  Electra  complies  with  the 
divinely  established  cosmic  order  (1058-65;  notice  the  mention  of  Zeus 
and  Themisl49)  and  is  prepared  to  bear  alone  the  burden  of  double 
revenge  (1074  zrp68oTos  ...  µ6va;  1080  6LS  Lav 
... 
'  Eplvüv  1so).  She  Is 
EÜtraTpLS,  "noble  child  of  noble  sire"151  (1081;  cf.  968,986  etc.  ),  she  is  one 
of  the  6Lya0ol  (1082),  she  seeks  E  V'KAE  La  (1083),  and  respects  the  laws  of 
147  Masaracchia  (1978:  1037  with  n.  27)  and  Knox  (1983:  8)  also  comment,  if  en 
passant,  on  the  allusion  to  the  skolia.  Juffras  (1991:  esp.  103-104),  without 
mentioning  the  similarities  with  the  skolia,  holds  that  what  Electra  refers  to  is 
a  public  statue  commemorating  herself  and  her  sister,  on  a  parallel  with  the 
paired  statues  of  Harmodlos  and  Aristogeiton  in  the  Athenian  Agora.  Whitman 
(1951:  167-8)  sees  an  echo  of  Tyrtaeus'  exhortatory  poems.  Cf.  also  Mantziou 
(1995:  83  n.  1). 
148  Kirkwood  (1942:  89)  remarks  on  the  difference  between  Electra's  concern 
about  heroism  in  this  scene,  and  her  acknowledgement  of  her  unseemly 
behaviour  in  the  debate  with  her  mother. 
139  OnThemis  cf.  Jebb  (ad  1064)  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  1064).  On  Electra's  being  in 
harmony  with  the  natural  and  moral  order  see  Woodard  (1965:  214). 
150  With  my  emendation  ?  Xoua'  for  Ao0a'  (see  Appendix)  the  meaning  of  1080 
is  that  Electra  embodies  the  avenging  spirits  of  both  her  father  and  her 
brother. 
151  Jebb's  (147)  translation. 44 
Zeus  (1096-97152);  thus,  she  deserves  eternal  glory  (1082-89;  cf.  Electra's 
arguments  at  973-85).  153  It  is  to  the  credit  of  Electra's  heroic  image  that 
the  ominous  theme  of  revenge  is  again,  as  before,  carefully  suppressed, 
whereas  the  noble  aspect  of  the  deed  is  given  excellent  prominence.  154 
This  encomium  of  Electra's  heroism  and  true  piety  is  cast  in  the  highest 
relief  by  means  of  its  opposition  to  Chrysothemis'  unfilial  behaviour 
which,  as  the  Chorus  remark,  is  disgraceful  news  for  the  dead  Atreidae 
(1066-73);  she  will  certainly  inflict  upon  herself  the  punishment  of  Zeus 
(1063-65)  because  she  runs  counter  to  natural  order  (1058-62).  155 
Significantly,  Electra's  behaviour  is  commended,  among  other  things,  for 
its  E  üaE  ßE  La  (1097;  the  last  word  of  this  stasimon).  This  word,  used  by 
the  Chorus  at  464  of  conventional  piety,  is  now  radically  modified:  in  the 
present  context,  the  heroic  language  and  the  references  to  the  supreme 
cosmic  order  place  the  word  in  a  wider  framework,  rubbing  off  the 
utilitarian  connotations  of  its  commonplace  counterpart  at  464.156 
152  Sheppard  (1927a:  7)  misleads. 
153  The  nightingale-motif,  characteristic  of  Electra's  desperate  heroism,  recurs 
in  this  stasimon  (1075-7);  cf.  Sheppard  (1918:  87).  On  the  heroic  language  of  this 
stasimon  and  of  Electra's  speech  (947-89)  see  Schein  (1982:  76-77). 
154  Cf.  Gellie  (1972:  120-21). 
155  Kells  (pp.  179-81)  has  proposed  that  the  Chorus,  far  from  castigating 
Chrysothemis  whose  good  sense  they  had  previously  praised  (1015-6;  for  the 
dramatic  point  of  this  inconsistency  cf.  below  p.  47f.  ),  in  fact  align  with  her 
attitude,  and  implicitly  complain  against  Agamemnon's  failure  to  help  his 
children.  However,  if  the  purpose  of  this  song  were  "to  stir  the  lethargic  soul 
of  Agamemnon  to  rise  up  and  take  vengeance  upon  his  enemies"  (Kells,  p.  181), 
one  should  expect  this  to  be  more  prominently  indicated,  as  it  is  in  A.  Cho.  315ff. 
Instead,  the  song  is  conspicuously  committed  to  the  unreserved  praise  of 
Electra  (cf.  esp.  1082-97)  and  the  (implicit  but  clear)  castigation  of 
Chrysothemis  -a  fact  which  Kells  prefers  staggeringly  to  ignore  rather  than 
explain.  For  criticism  see  Stinton  (1990:  478  n.  80).  Errandonea's  (1955:  385-96) 
view  (the  Chorus  chastises  both  Chrysothemis  and  Electra  for  their  failure  to 
take  revenge)  is  preposterous. 
156  Cf.  Lesky's  (1972:  234)  wise  remarks:  "Es  beleuchtet  die  Dialektik  der 
Zentralen  Gestalt,  wenn  an  derselben  Elektra,  die  (308)  klagt,  daß  ihr  das 
E1QEßEty  (fromm  sein)  versagt  sei,  nun  mit  dem  letzten  Worte  des  Liedes  ihre 
E1QEßeLa  (Frömmigkeit)  hoch  gepriesen  wird.  " 45 
Nevertheless,  now  more  than  ever  Electra  is  failing  to  comply  (though 
unknowingly)  with  Apollo's  will  -  i.  e.  is  distancing  herself  from  an 
important  aspect  of  what  the  Greeks  would  normally  call  E  üaj  ßE  La! 
1.3.3  Electra's  ignorance 
It  is  a  striking  feature  of  this  play  that  Electra  displays  the  most 
admirable  heroism  only  when  she  is  in  a  state  of  deplorable  ignorance. 
This  was  the  case  in  the  parodos  (as  well  as  in  the  first  part  of  the  first 
episode),  when  her  knowledge  was  all  but  non-existent  (she  had  only 
tidings,  i.  e.  aurally  imparted  information,  which  were  eventually  belied, 
169-70);  and  this  is  the  case  now,  when  Electra  keeps  relying  on  her  ears 
(cf.  883-84)  and  defends  the  (false)  aural  experience  she  has  acquired 
from  the  Paedagogus  (920ff.;  esp.  926  TOO  T68'  TjKOVQac).  Her  persistence 
is  all  the  more  strange,  since  now  Chrysothemis  sees  (885-86,.  892,.  894, 
897,899,900,902-903,904)157  indisputable  evidence  of  Orestes'  presence, 
namely  his  offerings  at  Agamemnon's  tomb,  and  we  know  that  what  she 
sees  is  the  truth.  She  naturally  defends  the  reliability  of  her  new 
knowledge  (907-15,923),  but  Electra  scornfully  rejects  the  news  (cf.  her 
quashing  of  Chrysothemis'  visual  experience  at  925  irSEv  E9  KETVÖV  y' 
opa158)  and  taunts  her  sister  for  her  supposed  foolishness  (879,920, 
922159)1  Electra's  disbelief  in  her  sister's  news  must  have  been  a  great 
surprise  to  a  Greek  audience,  and  not  only  because  visual  perception  was 
thought  to  be  much  more  reliable  than  aural  one:  160  the  audience,  famil- 
iar  with  the  Aeschylean  (Cho.  164ff.  )  version,  in  which  Orestes'  funeral 
offerings  had  an  important  role  in  the  Recognition,  must  have  surely 
157  On  the  emphasis  on  Chrysothemis'  seeing  cf.  Easterling  (1973:  27),  Seale 
(1982:  67-8). 
158  Cf.  Kamerbeek  (ad  924,5). 
159  As  commentators  remark,  this  line  may  echo  the  proverb  lroü  yfs 
Oa\dT  Tjs  ÜTTTjpxES;  ETTL  T(3V  ävoT  T(iv  (Apostol.  14.57  [CPG  II,  619  Leutsch]). 
160  See  again  n.  50.  On  the  paradox  of  hearsay  prevailing  over  visual  evidence 
in  this  scene  see  Solmsen  (1967:  21-22). 46 
expected  Chrysothemis'  news  to  be  believed  and  to  lead  to  the 
Recognition.  Sophocles  however,  consciously  deviating  from  the 
Aeschylean  precedent,  throws  his  Electra  into  the  deepest  ignorance  by 
making  a  false  narrative  take  precedence,  in  her  mind,  over  concrete 
visual  experience;  thus,  the  paradoxical  association  between  her  lack  of 
knowledge  and  the  bravery  which  she  displays  immediately  afterwards 
becomes  all  the  more  prominent.  161  We  cannot  help  recalling  another 
significant  paradox:  Electra  indulged  her  first  act  of  guile,  namely  the 
suppression  of  Clytaemestra's  offerings,  only  when  her  knowledge  had 
been  enhanced  by  the  dream  that  she  believed  to  be  sent  by  Agamemnon. 
It  seems  that  in  this  play  knowledge  and  heroism  are  mutually  exclusive. 
This  paradox  also  clarifies  another  of  the  dramaturgical  raisons  d' 
titre  of  the  Paedagogus  scene:  had  that  scene  not  been  there,  Orestes 
would  have  brought  the  news  of  his  death  himself,  which  would  have  in- 
stantly  led  to  the  Recognition.  Now,  however,  the  Recognition  is 
postponed,  and  there  is  enough  dramatic  time  for  the  second 
Chrysothemis  scene  where  a)  Electra's  heroism  is  put  against  her  sister's 
unheroic  care  for  expediency,  and  b)  Electra's  ignorance  is  contrasted  with 
her  sister's  knowledge,  thus  building  up  the  aforementioned  paradox: 
only  the  one  who  is  ignorant  laudably  takes  the  decision  to  risk  her  life, 
whereas  the  one  who  knows  prefers  submissive  inaction.  162 
However,  there  is  yet  another  paradox  associated  with  Electra's 
ignorance.  As  I  have  already  suggested  (above,  p.  20),  Electra  never 
accepts  that  she  lacks  good  sense.  Thus,  she  now  defends  her  reckless 
behaviour  not  on  moral  grounds  but  by  maintaining  that  she  is  the  one 
161  Thus,  we  must  dismiss  such  views  as  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz's  (1917:  191-3) 
and  Webster's  (1969:  118),  who  think  that  the  audience,  having  identified 
themselves  with  Electra,  share  her  belief  in  the  Paedagogus'  story  and  her 
disbelief  in  her  sister's  tokens.  The  audience  have  to  be  constantly  aware  of 
Electra's  delusion.  We  may  add  that  this  delusion  is  rendered  unmistakable  by  a 
unique  formal  feature:  "dies  ist  das  einzige  Mal,  daß  ein  Trug  sich  in  der 
sophokleischen  Tragödie  `verzweigt',  indem  er  zwei  gegensätzlich  auf  die 
Trugbotschaft  reagierende  Menschen  [i.  e.  Electra  and  Clytaemestra]  trifft": 
Parlavantza-Friedrich  (1969:  34). 47 
who  is  being  really  wise  (1023,163  1027  [the  irony  only  emphasizes,  I 
think,  Electra's  strong  confidence  in  her  own  voüs],  1039,164  1047, 
1054165).  It  is  surprising,  but  very  significant,  that,  despite  Chrysothemis' 
admonitions  about  her  sister's  lack  of  good  sense  (992-93,1013,1021- 
22,166  1024,1032,1038,1046,1055-56),  the  Chorus  find  themselves 
compelled  to  call  Electra  ao4ä  (1089);  cf.  also  1058  where  obviously 
Electra  is  thought  of  as  following  the  example  of  (ýpovLu16MTOL  o'LWvoL; 
the  Chorus  implicitly  pick  up  and  refute  Chrysothemis'  4povE  tv  (1056). 
They  indicatively  attribute  to  Electra  the  very  quality  the  Chorus-leader 
denied  her  at  1016,  but  now  (as  in  the  case  of  Ev6E3El,  v:  see  above,  p.  44) 
they  no  longer  use  ao4ä  in  the  conventional  sense  of  self-seeking 
common  sense  as  they  did  at  1016  (cf.  also  their  use  of  o'u4povi1aEis  at 
465).  167  This  seems  an  inexplicable  paradox,  given  Electra's  most 
162  On  the  dramaturgic  purpose  of  the  second  Chrysothemis  scene  cf.  Reinhardt 
(1979:  154)  and  Gellie  (1972:  118). 
163  See  Kamerbeek  (ad  1023),  Coray  (1993:  267). 
164  See  Jebb  (ad  1039). 
165  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990a)  delete  this  line,  along  with  1050-3,  as 
interpolated. 
166  Cf.  Jebb  (ad  1021f.  ),  Coray  (1993:  267-8). 
167  Pace  Burton  (1980:  208).  Kells  (ad  1066),  (1986:  158-60)  fails  to  see  how  the 
Chorus  could  now  praise  Electra  whom  they  had  previously  blamed  for  her 
attitude.  So,  he  emends  1087  into  Ta  µi1  K6X'  oü  KaBorrXicaaa,  thus  making  the 
Chorus  say  "Electra  has  not  chosen  to  have  two  prizes  at  once,  so  as  to  be  called 
once  for  all  a  daughter  both  wise  and  very  good"  (i.  e.  she  has  chosen  to  be  only 
&ptßTa).  With  my  interpretation  this  emendation  is  needless,  as  is  Stokes'  (1979: 
141-2)  very  strained  view  that  for  the  Chorus  Electra,  in  avenging  a  father,  is  a 
wise  and  very  good  child  (rrats)  but,  in  inciting  murder,  she  is  a  bad  woman; 
there  is  nothing  in  the  text  to  suggest  such  an  antithesis.  TO'  µil  KaX6v  (1087) 
should  either  be  taken  to  be  an  ironical  `quotation',  by  the  Chorus,  of  the 
conventional  (i.  e.  Chrysothemis')  judgement  of  Electra's  planned  actions  (thus 
Stinton  [1990:  478]),  or  alternatively  be  emended  into  earns  Ka)6V  as  Lloyd-Jones 
(1954:  95)  has  proposed.  Errandonea's  (1955:  393-4)  solution  (dissociate  TO  L1 
from  Kalov  and  associate  it  with  4EpELV)  is  impossible.  In  general  see 
Winnington-Ingram's  (1980:  242  n.  82;  cf.  241  with  n.  77)  excellent  remarks;  also 48 
deplorable  ignorance;  however,  as  I  shall  point  out,  it  acquires  its  full 
importance  later,  after  the  Recognition,  when  everyone's  knowledge  (but 
the  usurpers')  is  supposed  to  have  been  restored  (see  section  1.4.3).  For 
the  moment,  it  suffices  to  bear  in  mind  that  Electra's  and  the  Chorus' 
asseverations  about  her  cognitive  competence  must  be  taken  at  face 
value:  the  fact  that  they  are  in  so  stark  a  contrast  with  the  castigation  of 
her  foolishness  only  a  short  while  ago  (e.  g.  1016)  presumably  means  that 
they  are  intended  to  attract  our  attention  and,  thus,  make  us  take  them 
seriously  into  account. 
1.4.1  The  second  reversal:  Recognition 
When  Orestes  reappears  on  stage  at  1098,  the  audience  are  immediately 
presented  with  a  most  striking  paradox:  Orestes'  purpose  is  to  complete 
the  Paedagogus'  false  story  by  providing  visible  `proof  of  his  supposed 
death,  i.  e.  by  coming  forward  with  an  urn  supposed  to  contain  his  ashes 
(the  Paedagogus  has  already  prepared  Orestes'  entrance,  757-60).  The  urn 
achieves  its  deceitful  purpose  because  it  is  supposed  to  be  a  token  of 
Orestes'  heroic  death  in  the  Pythian  games;  in  other  words,  two  opposites 
(heroic  force  and  guile)  are  comprised  in  one  and  the  same  object,  and 
indeed  the  latter  is  a  corollary  of  the  former.  This  paradoxical  coexistence 
marks  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  Electra's  heroism.  She  witnessed, 
through  the  Paedagogus'  story,  the  heroic  end  of  her  brother,  and  fake 
though  this  may  have  been,  she  took  over  his  supposed  heroism  and  went 
as  far  as  to  plan  Aegisthus'  murder.  Now,  however,  she  will  soon  find  out 
that  the  alleged  token  of  her  brother's  heroism,  i.  e.  the  urn,  is  in  fact  only 
the  symbol  of  his  unheroic  guile;  what  is  more,  she  will  happily  embrace 
her  brother's  attitude  and  will  be  converted  into  his  ruthless  accomplice, 
instantly  abandoning  her  former  care  for  heroic  decency  and  abstention 
from  bloodshed. 
The  paradoxical  situation  becomes  all  the  more  manifest  when  one 
Burton  (1980:  208-14),  Coray  (1993:  123-4).  On  the  Chorus'  change  of  attitude  in 
1087-89cf.  also  Gellie  (1972:  120),  who  fails  however  to  explain  vo4a. 49 
considers  that  a  means  of  knowledge  considered  to  be  reliable  by 
definition,  i.  e.  visual  experience  (above,  n.  50),  is  now  used  to  consolidate 
a  state  of  ignorance  and  illusion  (that  the  urn  is  a  visual  token  is  more 
than  once  mentioned;  cf.  1109  E  µ4avfi  TE  K1Ii  p  La,  1114  ci)S  bpäs,  1116 
BE  pKo  IaL)  . 
168  However,  by  a  further  paradox,  the  urn  is  soon  (and  in  spite 
of  Orestes'  intentions)  converted  from  an  instrument  of  deceit  into  a 
means  of  true  knowledge:  when  Electra  holds  it  and  laments  her  brother 
(1119-20,1123)  she  is  obviously  a  victim  of  his  guile,  but  at  the  same 
time  she  unawares  discloses  to  him  who  she  is.  The  plan  that  was 
intended  to  withhold  knowledge  (or  to  enforce  ignorance)  leads  in  fact, 
despite  Orestes'  calculations,  to  true  knowledge,  both  for  him  and  for  his 
sister.  Knowledge  and  ignorance  are  amalgamated  into  an 
undifferentiated  blend,  eluding  human  control,  undermining  Orestes' 
carefully  planned  machinations,  and  proving  his  confidence  in  his 
guileful  intelligence  to  be  misguided.  Orestes  asks  for  the  urn  to  be  re- 
turned  to  him  (1205-17)  in  an  attempt  to  regain  control  of  the  situation, 
to  resume  his  role  as  a  dispenser  of  knowledge  and  ignorance:  thus,  he 
first  reveals  to  Electra  who  he  really  is,  and  then  he  gets  ready  to  use  the 
urn  again  as  an  instrument  of  guile  against  Clytaemestra  (cf.  1400- 
1401).  169  Still,  a  typically  Sophoclean  coup  de  theatre  lies  ahead:  much 
as  we  have  been  looking  forward  to  the  full  restoration  of  Electra's 
knowledge  in  this  scene,  the  situation  turns  out  not  to  be  so 
168  We  remember  the  paradox  of  the  second  Chrysothemis  scene  where 
Chrysothemis'  true  (i.  e.  visually  acquired)  knowledge  was  outweighed  by  her 
sister's  false  (i.  e.  aurally  acquired)  knowledge.  The  limits  between  knowledge 
and  ignorance  are  confusingly  blurred  in  this  play:  eyes,  which  are  reliable 
by  definition,  are  won  over  by  ears  (second  Chrysothemis  scene)  or,  as  in  the 
recognition  scene,  are  used  to  deceive,  i.  e.  to  be  an  extension  of  the  false  aural 
information  imparted  by  the  Paedagogus.  On  the  other  hand,  Orestes' 
recognition  by  Electra  (i.  e.  a  visual  experience)  is  phrased  in  terms  of  aural 
perception:  1225  464yµ',  1225  nnOq,  cf.  1220  &  1223  )'yw!  Cf.  Solmsen's  (1967:  25) 
discussion  Of  TEKtI.  1ipLa. 
169  On  the  various  functions  of  the  urn  see  Segal's  (1981:  277-79,287-88)  views  - 
rather  far-fetched  though  some  of  them  may  be.  Reinhardt  (1979:  156)  has 
excellently  epitomized  the  ambiguity  of  this  scene:  "[Electra's  lament]  misses  its 
target,  and  in  missing  it  comes  to  find  it.  " 50 
unproblematic.  For,  contrary  to  our  expectations,  the  new  knowledge  is 
first  imparted  not  to  Electra,  but  to  Orestes  who  finds  himself  entirely 
ignorant  of  his  woes  (1185  Tc3V  E  µciSV  ...  KaK(ZV  )!  170  It  is  significant  that 
verbs  denoting  vision  and  /  or  knowledge  are  used  almost  exclusively 
with  reference  to  him:  1184  ETrLQKOTr(3V,  1185  ij8rj,  1186  8LEyvws,  1187 
öpC3v  -  EµTrpETTOVaaV,  1188  opäs,  1189  ßXETrELV,  1191  EýEa1  IIT  Vas,  1199 
op6  v.  Thus,  the  anticipation  that  Orestes  would  only  have  to 
communicate  his  knowledge  to  Electra  for  things  to  be  sorted  out  is 
sensationally  belied.  171  On  the  other  hand,  when  at  last  we  are  presented 
with  the  recognition  stricto  sensu  (i.  e.  with  Electra's  realization  that  it  is 
her  brother  who  stands  before  her),  we  are  surprised  to  find  out  that  it  is 
reduced  to  a  few  lines  (1220-26)  and  almost  hastily  passed  over.  Whereas 
Aeschylus  and  Euripides  spend  many  lines  and  lay  much  emphasis  on 
providing  sufficient  recognition  tokens,  Sophocles  adroitly  belles  his 
audience's  expectations:  he  first  postpones  the  recognition,  thus  making 
the  whole  drama  lead  up  to  it,  but  then  swiftly  disposes  of  it,  by  simply 
providing  a  conventional  token  (1223  $pay7  a  TraTpös)  which  passes 
almost  unnoticed.  172  By  that  point,  the  audience  must  have  begun  to 
suspect  that  Sophocles'  purpose  is  not  to  celebrate  the  prevalence  of  true 
knowledge  over  long-lived  delusion,  but  on  the  contrary  to  undermine  a 
traditional  element  of  the  myth  and  to  point  out  that  here  we  have  not, 
170  Cf.  Woodard  (1964:  190-91)  and,  above  all,  Solmsen  (1967:  28-30).  Said  (1993: 
325)  sees  this  interjection  in  a  different  way.  For  another  approach  see 
Kirkwood  (1958:  143n.  33). 
1711  cannot  understand  such  views  as  e.  g.  Kaibel's  (p.  242)  and  Jebb's  (ad  1106) 
who  maintain  that  Orestes  is  from  the  beginning  fully  aware  of  Electra's 
identity.  Cf.  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz's  (1917:  204-6),  Reinhardt's  (1979:  263  n.  24), 
Solmsen's  (1967:  26-28),  and  Kamerbeek's  (ad  1105,1117,8)  right  objections. 
172  See  Jebb  (ad  1222f.  ):  "It  is  remarkable  how  swiftly  Sophocles  glides  over  the 
incident,  as  if  conscious  that  the  ai  iE  iov  was  little  more  than  conventional.  "  I 
cannot  agree  with  Said  (1993:  326)  who  puts  too  much  emphasis  on  the  Q4payis 
as  a  symbol  of  the  link  between  the  siblings.  I  also  disagree  with  Tycho  von 
Wilamowitz  (1917:  210),  Reinhardt  (1979:  160  with  n.  26)  and  Solmsen  (1967:  32- 
33)  who  think  that  the  psychic  reunion  of  sister  and  brother  makes  any  formal 
tokens  superfluous. 
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after  all,  the  unproblematic  restoration  of  knowledge  we  might  have  been 
tempted  to  expect. 
1.4.2  Unheroic  Electra 
That  the  Recognition  is  far  from  being  a  happy  restoration  of  impaired 
knowledge  is  more  clearly  shown  in  the  last  part  of  the  play.  First  of  all, 
the  joy  of  this  scene  is  grievously  spoiled  by  the  fact  that  the  moral 
standards  of  the  two  siblings  disappointingly  fail  to  coincide.  Thus,  in  the 
Recognition  duet  (1232ff.  )  we  see,  at  first,  Electra  happily  thinking  that 
the  time  at  last  has  come  when  her  heroism  can  be  displayed.  She 
bravely  declares  that  she  will  never  deem  it  worthy  of  herself  to  fear  the 
female  good-for-nothings  that  live  inside  the  house  (1240-42):  the 
contemptuous  yvvMKwv  (1242)  shows  that  Electra's  virile  aspect  is  now 
r,  ýs 
at  its  zenith.  However,  her  heroism  is  rendered  ineffective  by  her  brotheWJ 
deceitful  practices.  No  matter  how  much  she  dwells  on  her  well  known 
(cf.  e.  g.  213ff.,  328ff.  )  heroic  carelessness  and  fearless  expression  of  her 
true  feelings  (1239-42,1253-56,1260-63,1281-87173),  Orestes  remarks 
(1243-4)  that  "Ares  inheres  in  women  too"  (thus  throwing  in  a  sharper 
focus  the  antithesis  between  the  heroic  female  and  the  unheroic  male174) 
and  insists  on  the  need  for  silence  (1236,1238,1259),  an  important 
173  The  text  here  is  badly  mutilated,  but  it  seems  possible  that  the  general 
meaning  can  be  retrieved  (esp.  with  Dawe's  [1996:  in  app.  crit.  ]  tentative 
supplement  QrpLV  REV  oZV  EmEßXov):  what  Electra  seems  to  say  is  that  all  this 
time  she  has  been  forcing  (1282  <TEZr:  EaXov)  herself  not  to  voice  her  feelings 
(1282-83  o'pyäv  ävav8ov  I  ov'8E  avv  ßoä),  although  she  has  been  receiving 
tidings  about  Orestes'  coming  (1284  KX  )Ovv'  a  T&Mva).  Differently  Kaibel  (ad 
1281).  Discussion  in  Kamerbeek  (ad  1281-1287). 
174  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  254).  The  invocation  of  the  virile  Artemis  (1239)  is  also 
significant  in  relation  to  Electra's  masculinity.  Although  Seaford  (1985:  321-22) 
prefers  to  associate  it  with  the  anomalous  extension  of  Electra's  virginity,  the 
antithesis  is  here  not  between  marriage  and  celibacy,  but  between  female 
idleness  (1241-2  Ev6ov 
... 
öv  aLE'L  ro  vaiEL  Viketos])  and  the  heroic,  manly 
Electra. 
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prerequisite  of  any  guileful  action,  but  totally  alien  to  the  heroic  Electra 
we  have  known  and  admired. 
Nonetheless,  the  gap  between  the  siblings  is  not  only  moral;  it  is 
also  sentimental.  Electra's  happy  song  after  the  Recognition  (1232ff.  ) 
seems  to  be  an  auspicious  prelude:  the  two  siblings,  having  met  again 
after  all  this  time,  will  at  last  join  each  other  in  a  cheerful  celebration. 
However,  this  is  far  from  being  the  case.  Electra's  emotional  outburst  on 
the  one  hand  and  Orestes'  rational  restraint  on  the  other  are  reflected  on 
the  form  of  their  duet:  while  Electra  sings  in  a  variety  of  lyric  metres 
(mainly  dochmiacs  [a  markedly  emotional  metre]  and  iambics),  Orestes 
only  speaks  in  conventional  iambic  trimeters.  175  It  is  true,  of  course,  that 
in  1276-80  Orestes  seems  to  make  concessions  to  his  sister's  frantic  joy; 
and  as  we  have  already  seen  him  once  showing  signs  of  emotional 
sensitivity  (80-81),  176  one  might  suppose  that  after  all  Orestes  is  not  the 
business-like  avenger  we  thought,  but  can  also  be  an  affectionate  brother. 
Nevertheless,  this  is  not  true;  it  is  only  Sophocles  being  tricky:  the 
audience,  having  witnessed  Orestes'  strenuous  efforts  to  make  his  sister 
hush,  must  by  now  be  craving  to  see  at  last  some  genuine  fraternal  love, 
which  could  possibly  mitigate  the  horror  of  the  act  that  is  about  to  be 
performed.  These  lines,  along  with  the  couplet  from  the  prologue,  seem  to 
provide  this  excuse;  but  Orestes  instantly  resumes  his  original  behaviour 
(1288ff.;  cf.  also  the  curt  1353)  and  frigidly  asks  his  sister  to  stifle  her 
feelings  and  concentrate  on  the  execution  of  the  plan.  The  violent 
antithesis  of  the  latter  passages  with  Orestes'  would-be  fraternal  affection 
make  his  callousness  appear  even  more  distasteful.  177 
175  See  Woodard  (1964:  192-93  with  n.  78),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  229  with 
n.  43),  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  189);  contra  Gardiner  (1987:  155-56).  The  sole 
exceptions  are  1276  (Ti  µij  iror!  vw;  )  and  1280  (Ti  [01v  oü;  ).  Dale's  view  (1969: 
225)  that  Orestes  (and  the  Paedagogus!  )  eventually  "glow  with  the  inner 
warmth  of  [Electra's]  inner  fires"  is  unacceptable. 
176  Sandbach  (1977:  721-73),  however,  attributed  78-81to  the  Paedagogus  and  82- 
85  to  Orestes. 
177  See  also  Schein  (1982:  77-78),  Blundell  (1989:  174),  and  cf.  Gellie  (1972:  122-23 
with  n.  21).  The  opposite  view  has  been  held  by  Segal  (1966:  513-16)  and  most 
powerfully  by  Woodard  (1964:  169-70  and  passim),  who  thinks  that  Orestes  and 53 
Orestes'  unsavoury  practices  will  soon  be  shared  by  his  sister.  In 
this  latter  part  of  the  play,  Electra  undergoes  a  radical  change:  she  gives 
up  the  remarkable  heroism  she  had  displayed  during  the  first  part  of  the 
play  (i.  e.  before  the  Recognition),  and  is  suddenly  transformed  into  an 
unfeeling  and  unheroic  executor  of  a  murderous  plan.  178  It  is  significant 
as  well  as  surprisingly  disappointing  that  the  themes  of  utter  grief  and 
despair  that  had  dominated  the  first  part  of  the  play  are  now  used  to 
serve  the  treacherous  action.  First  of  all,  Electra's  incessant  lament,  so  far 
a  symbol  of  her  unflinching  heroism,  is  now  converted  into  an  in- 
strument  of  86Aos:  at  1309-13  she  declares  that  from  now  on  she  will  be 
using  her  tears  in  order  deceitfully  to  persuade  her  mother  that  she  is 
lamenting  her  brother's  death  (1298-99  cis  En'  &rO  111  w.  my 
AEAE'YýtE'V7I  I  QTEvc1i  ').  Furthermore,  Electra's  words  are  no  longer  tokens 
of  her  fearlessness,  nor  are  they  equivalent  to  heroic  deeds  as  before;  they 
are  simply  instruments  of  deceit  (cf.  esp.  her  misleading  use  of  words  in 
her  conversation  with  Aegisthus,  1442ff.  ),  and  are  to  give  way  to 
murderous  deeds  (1483-84,1487);  179  now  X6yoL  have  become  undesirable 
Electra,  previously  standing  for  cosmic  antitheses,  eventually  unite  and  create 
"a  double  image  of  excellence".  Minadeo  (1967:  129-30)  thinks  that  Orestes 
yields  to  Electra's  emotionalism  in  the  same  way  as  the  play  proceeds  from  the 
Apollonian  rationalism  of  the  beginning  to  the  irrational  passion  of  the  end; 
on  this  supposed  transformation  of  Orestes  see  also  Adams  (1933:  209-10),  (1957: 
74-76),  Webster  (1969:  73)  -the  latter  regards  Orestes  as  another  Neoptolemus 
recovering  his  heroic  identity  (!  ).  For  an  essentially  emotional  Orestes  cf.  also 
Letters  (1953:  251);  for  his  supposed  qualms  see  Adams  (1957:  64). 
178  Electra's  giving  up  her  heroism  and  embracing  Orestes'  practices  is 
appositely  condensed  in  1319-21:  had  she  been  alone,  she  would  have  either 
died  heroically  or  won  heroically  (cf.  the  repetition  of  Kakis  and  see  above  p. 
43f.  );  but  now  she  leaves  all  initiative  to  the  unheroic  Orestes.  On  Electra's 
transformation  cf.  Sheppard  (1918:  87),  Minadeo  (1967:  119-20),  Schein  (1982: 
78).  Kirkwood  (1958:  167-68)  fails  to  explain  this  change  of  heart.  Segal  (1966: 
522-3),  on  the  evidence  of  1485-86,  tries  to  show  that  Electra  retains  something 
of  her  initial  emotionality;  however,  these  lines  (athetized  by  Dindorf,  omitted 
in  Lac)  are  now  generally  accepted  to  be  spurious:  see  e.  g.  Dawe  (1996:  in  textu) 
and  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990a:  in  textu). 
179  Cf.  Woodard  (1964:  197),  Minadeo  (1967:  132),  Segal  (1981:  285). 54 
as  they  may  inhibit  timely  action  (cf.  1292),  whereas  Epya  are  called 
T18LQTa  (1360).  As  Woodard  (1964:  198)  has  put  it,  "with  her  use  of  verbal 
dolos,  Electra  reaches,  in  the  last  scene,  the  farthest  remove  from  her 
attempt  in  the  Prologue  to  make  logoi  replace  erga"  (cf.  also  Kitzinger 
[1991:  325]).  It  is  only  too  significant  that  she  also  gives  up  the  virility 
she  had  previously  displayed  (983)  :  now  it  is  (the  unheroic!  )  Orestes  and 
Pylades  that  are  called  `men'  (1398).  180  Moreover,  she  even  abandons 
what  has  been  perhaps  the  most  typical  feature  of  her  personality, 
namely  her  love  and  devotion  for  her  father  and  her  deep  respect  for  his 
memory.  At  1316-17  she  states  that,  now  that  her  brother  has  come  back, 
she  is  prepared  to  accept  even  the  possibility  of  her  father  rising  from  the 
dead;  given  Orestes'  associations  (as  a  revenant)  with  Hades  we  can  easily 
understand  this  equation  of  Orestes'  homecoming  with  the  resurrection  of 
Agamemnon.  181  Thus,  we  might  reasonably  think  that  Electra  does  at  last 
believe  in  help  from  the  dead  and  that  her  former  despair  (we  remember 
how  strongly  she  has  been  denying  any  possibility  of  assistance  from  the 
dead:  pp.  16  &  39)  is  over.  Nevertheless,  exactly  at  the  moment  when  her 
devotion  to  her  father  seems  to  be  reaching  a  new  peak,  as  she 
confidently  states  that  she  is  almost  waiting  for  him  to  appear,  Sophocles 
gives  a  fatal  blow  to  Electra's  heroic  image  he  has  been  building  up;  for 
her  father  indeed  appears  but  instead  of  the  heroic  Agamemnon  (see 
section  1.0.2)  it  is  the  treacherous,  unheroic  Paedagogus  who  is  given  the 
honour  of  that  name  (1361  TraTE  pa  yap  E  LQOpdv  8oK(S)!  182  Electra's 
distancing  from  her  previous  devotion  to  her  father  is  so  great  that  she 
180  Reinhardt  (1979:  161)  is  certainly  justified  in  thinking  that  "[Electra  is] 
happy  to  be  once  more  within  the  bounds  of  her  femininity",  but  I  doubt 
whether  we  are  meant  to  understand  as  a  happy  outcome  her  display  of 
attitudes  that  she  formerly  held  to  be  despicable  (e.  g.  1240-2). 
181  Cf.  above  section  1.0.1.  On  the  reversal  of  living  and  dead  cf.  Blundell  (1989: 
153  with  n.  15). 
182  As  Jebb  (ad  1361)  remarks,  "this  is  the  only  tragic  trimeter  in  which  the 
third  foot  is  formed  by  a  single  word  of  three  short  syllables".  Thus,  the  crucial 
word  naTcpa  is  extremely  emphasized,  as  "the  movement  of  the  verse  begins 
afresh  at  TraTE  pa".  Kells'  (ad  1315)  bizzare  view  that  Electra  has  gone  mad  is  a 
perverse  invention  of  his;  see  Stevens  (1978:  116). 55 
does  not  even  mention  him  in  her  final  prayer  (1376-83)183  -  contrast 
however  her  prayer  at  453-54!  The  Paedagogus'  hasty  eagerness  for  swift 
action  completely  discloses  the  unheroic  nature  of  the  deed  that  is  about 
to  happen:  Clytaemestra  must  be  caught  and  killed  alone,  before  the  men 
arrive  (1368-69);  however,  the  man  of  whom  the  Paedagogus  is  afraid  is 
the  effeminate  (300-302)  Aegisthus!  So,  two  men  must  hurry  to  kill  a  lone 
woman,  because  they  are  afraid  of  confronting  a  womanish  man!  184  What 
is  more,  the  Paedagogus  at  1326ff.  significantly  uses  the  same  key-words 
as  the  unheroic  Chrysothemis  in  the  two  Chrysothemis  scenes:  1326 
4pEV(3V  TfTChµEVOL  -  992-93  4pEVCiv  I 
...  KaK(iV;  1327  Trap'  oü8Ev  TOÜ 
ILOV  K1  8Eae'  E  TL  ^-  392  3LOV  8E  TOD  TrapöVTO9  OÜ  µvE  Lav  E  XE  Ls;  1329- 
30  KaKOts  I  TOLaLV  I.  tE'YLaTOLc  -  335  Ev  KaKOLs  /  374  KaKO'V  I.  I.  E'YLCTTOV  / 
1003  KaK(09  TTpQaaOVTE  ;  1334  E  ÜAä3E  Lav  -  994  E  ÜAä3E  LaV  . 
It  is  exactly 
her  sister's  `reasonable'  advice  that  Electra  had  scornfully  -  and 
admirably  -  rejected;  now,  however,  far  from  pouring  scorn  on  the  man 
who  offers  her  the  same  advice,  she  sees  in  him  her.  dead  father! 
Furthermore,  Electra's  behaviour  now  appears  incongruous  with  the 
advice  she  herself  had  offered  her  sister.  She  had  admonished  her  for 
being  forgetful  of  her  father  and  for  caring  only  about  her  mother  (341- 
42),  but  now  it  Is  a  stranger,  not  even  her  mother,  that  takes  her  father's 
part  in  her  heart!  She  had  formerly  asseverated  (145-46)  that  vnTrLOs  5s 
TCZV  OLKTp(ss  I  OLXOIIEV(t)V  'YOVEWV  ETTLAäOETa1;  but  if  so,  she  is  now  being 
as  v1ITrLOs  as  anyone,  since  she  is  the  one  who  T(.  V  OLKTp(  oLXoµEVWv 
'yovE  uw  E  TrlAä6E  Tat;  so,  despite  her  newly  acquired  knowledge,.  she  is  not 
really  ao  ä  (1089). 
Electra  is  being  rapidly  transformed  into  a  bloodthirsty  creature, 
irretrievably  incapable  of  regaining  her  humane  heroism.  She  all  but 
183  See  Kamerbeek  (ad  453,4). 
184  See  Kells  (ad  1368f),  and  Blundell  (1989:  175)  who  nicely  contradistinguishes 
Orestes'  attitude  from  Electra's  bravery  towards  both  her  mother  and  Aegisthus. 
At  the  crucial  moment  of  the  murder  Clytaemestra  calls  for  Aegisthus  (1409), 
thus  reminding  the  audience  of  her  female  impotence  (she  needs  her 
effeminate  husband  to  protect  herl),  and  stressing  the  unmanly  deed  of  her 
son. 56 
physically  delivers  the  fatal  blows  against  her  mother,  as  she  exhorts  her 
brother  with  the  terrifying  cry  (1415)  TrataOV,  EL  QOE  VE  Ls,  6LTrXTjv.  185 
Sophocles  anything  but  dissociates  Electra  from  the  matricide:  that  she, 
firstly,  enters  the  palace  along  with  Orestes  and  Pylades  (cf.  1386-88) 
serves  to  associate  her,  on  the  visual-theatrical  level,  with  the  murderers. 
As  Easterling  (1987:  19-21)  points  out,  the  interior  of  the  palace  is  fraught 
with  disturbing  connotations  (cf.  e.  g.  10,820-1,  etc.  ):  `those  within'  are 
evil,  sinister,  murderous,  but  now  Electra  associates  herself  with  them  in 
spatial  terms.  It  is  while  she  is  still  inside  with  them  that  we  hear  the 
Chorus  sing  of  guile  (1392  8oXLölrous,  1396  80Xov)  and  bloodshed  (1385, 
1394  M  ia)186  -  and  if  `bloodshed  caused  by  unholy  strife'  Is  what 
8uaEpLQTOV  a`Lµa  (1385)  means,  187  then  the  abominable  nature  of  the 
action  is  all  the  more  underscored.  That  Electra  reappears  on  stage 
immediately  afterwards  (cf.  the  Chorus'  surprised  question  at  1402:  Qv  8' 
E  KT  0%!  9  as  Trpös  T';  ),  so  far  from  implying  her  non-participation  in  the 
deed  as  some  have  thought,  188  serves  to  underscore  her  active  assistance 
to  the  murderers:  for  as  Machin  (1981:  425)  has  seen,  Electra  re-enters 
"non  pas  pour  eviter  le  cruel  spectacle  qui  s'  y  prepare  [i.  e.  in  the 
palace],  mais  pour  prevenir  de  1'  arrivee  d'  Egisthe",  i.  e.  in  order  to  back 
185  See  Gellie  (1972:  127  with  n.  24).  Machin  (1981:  425)  emphasizes  that  Electra, 
with  her  verbal  interventions  during  the  matricide  (1411-16),  "accomplit  sa 
vengeance,  ä  cela  pres  qu'  elle  ne  manie  pas  1'  arme";  cf.  Taplin  and 
Seidensticker  apud  Winnington-Ingram  (1983:  257).  Musurillo  (1967:  105-106) 
and  Huys  (1993:  339)  unacceptably  deny  that  the  phrase  indicates  the 
degeneration  of  the  heroine.  Linforth's  (1963:  109  n.  5)  interpretation  of  the 
phrase  as  a  derisive  exhortation  to  Clytaemestra  to  return  the  blow  is  not  to  be 
accepted:  see  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  230  n.  45). 
186  For  a  convincing  defence  of  the  traditional  reading  at  1394  see  Jebb  (ad 
1394),  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  73). 
187  This  meaning,  already  proposed  by  the  scholiast  (p.  156  Papageorgius),  has 
been  accepted  by,  among  others,  LSJ  s.  v.  and  L.  Campbell  (ad  1384,5),  (1907: 
152),  but  rejected  by  Jebb  (ad  1385)  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  1385). 
188  E.  g.  Letters  (1953:  259),  Gellie  (1972:  126),  Gardiner  (1987:  157). 57 
up  the  murder  as  a  lookout  and  thus  further  the  deceitful  plan.  189  What 
is  more,  her  gruesome  demand,,  later,  to  throw  Aegisthus'  corpse  to  dogs 
and  vultures  (1487-89)190  -  one  might  compare  Od.  3.256-61  -  seals 
her  transformation  into  a  female  counterpart  of  her  ruthless  brother. 
Denial  of  burial  was  deemed  by  Plato  (Leg.  873b-c)  a  worthy  punishment 
for  (among  others)  kin-killers.  The  irony  is  obvious:  Electra  demands  for 
Aegisthus  a  death  that  she  herself,  qua  matricide,  deserves! 
1.4.3  Curtain:  ignorant  Electra  and  ignorant  Orestes 
We  have  witnessed  a  similar  change  in  Electra's  behaviour  at  the  first 
Chrysothemis  scene,  when  after  the  announcement  of  Clytaemestra's 
dream  Electra  gave  up  her  heroic  attitude  and  set  a  treacherous  plan  into 
practice  (above,  p.  21ff.  ).  We  can  now  gain  a  broader  perspective  on  that 
change.  Clytaemestra's  dream,  like  Apollo's  oracle,  was  a  supernatural 
source  of  knowledge.  However,  that  knowledge  was  far  from  certain: 
Chrysothemis  significantly  dwelt  on  the  fact  that  she  knew  only  a  few  de- 
tails  about  the  dream:  410,414,426.  She  made  it  clear  that  she  had 
heard  about  it  from  someone  else  who  happened  to  be  present  at  the 
moment  when  Clytaemestra  related  it  to  the  Sun  (417  Xöyos  TLS  ... 
EQTLV;  424-425  ToLaOTä  TOU  1rapöVTOs  ... 
ýKXUOV  Eý71'YOViI.  EVOU).  191 
What  is  more,  Clytaemestra  herself,  i.  e.  the  only  person  who  had  full 
189  See  Woodard's  (1964:  195-96)  excellent  remarks  on  the  matter;  cf.  Lesky 
(1972:  236).  Linforth  (1963:  108),  having  adopted  an  optimistic  interpretation  of 
the  play,  finds  himself  unable  to  explain  why  Electra  goes  in  only  to  come  out 
again  almost  immediately. 
190  This  is  the  interpretation  of  Ta4E-Daw  (1488)  favoured  by,  among  others,  L. 
Campbell  (ad  1488),  Jebb  (ad  1488f.  ),  Kaibel  (pp.  298-9),  Linforth  (1963:  110), 
Gellie  (1972:  128  with  n.  25),  Erbse  (1978:  297),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  230 
n.  45),  Segal  (1981:  465  n.  63).  Contra  Bowra  (1944:  255),  Letters  (1953:  260),  Segal 
(1966:  520-2lwith  n.  60),  Friis-Johansen  (1964:  28  n.  34),  Gardiner  (1987:  167). 
191  Van  Lieshout's  (1980:  171-72)  suggestion  that  Eti  yovµEvov  refers  to  an 
official  interpreter  of  the  dream  (Eti  yi  n  c)  is  unconvincing. 
iý 58 
knowledge  of  the  dream,  called  it  "ambiguous"  (645  8Laa(3v  övEtpwv192); 
that  is  to  say,  even  if  Electra  knew  the  full  content  of  the  dream,  she 
would  still  be  unable  to  deduce  safe  conclusions  from  it.  193  Thus,  some 
uncertain  shreds  of  information  were  enough  to  make  Electra  give  up 
only  too  easily  her  heroic  values  and  indulge  in  deceitful  revenge.  The 
Chorus  had  applaused  her  good  sense  and  piety  (464-65),  significantly 
applying  to  her  the  standards  of  their  self-serving  morality.  Like  the 
Chorus  in  the  third  stasimon  (1086ff.  )  of  the  OT,  the  Electra  Chorus  relied 
on  their  ability  in  µavTLK1  (cf.  472-74)19.1  and  purported  to  know  the 
meaning  of  the  dream.  Still,  too  much  confidence  in  one's  intellect  is 
never  commendable  in  Sophoclean  drama:  in  the  OT  the  Chorus'  self- 
assuredness  very  soon  turned  out  to  be  woefully  wrong.  It  will  soon 
appear  that  this  is  the  case  with  the  Electra  Chorus  as  well. 
There  is  an  analogy  between  the  practical  impact  that  access  to 
privileged  knowledge  has  on  the  world  of  Electra  and  on  that  of  Orestes. 
He  also  thinks  that  his  knowledge  suffices  to  bring  deceit  and  revenge 
against  his  mother  to  completion.  However,  his  knowledge  (as  well  as 
Electra's)  turns  out  to  be  terribly  deficient:  we  find  out  that  Orestes  too 
ignores  a  lot.  First  of  all,  as  we  saw  (p.  50),  his  deceitful  plan  goes  amiss, 
192  For  this  meaning  of  8iaaös  see  Jebb  (ad  644f.  ),  L.  Campbell  (1907:  137).  For 
reasons  why  the  dream  is  ambiguous  see  Bowra  (1944:  224-25);  cf.  Devereux 
(1976:  229);  at  this  point  Letters  (1953:  250)  is  wrong.  For  detailed  analyses  of 
the  dream  see  Letters  (1953:  248-50),  Musurillo  (1967:  101-102);  especially 
Devereux  (1976:  220-55). 
193  Linforth  (1963:  96)  rightly  observes  that  Electra  does  not  explain  why  she  is 
hopeful;  however,  instead  of  seeing  that  this  undermines  Electra's  over- 
confidence,  he  (all  too  lightheartedly)  explains  away  the  difficulty  by  making 
arbitrary  assumptions.  That  Clytaemestra  is  afraid  of  the  dream  cannot  be  used 
as  an  e  con  trario  explanation  of  Electra's  extreme  confidence  in  supernatural 
assistance:  412-13  suggest  that  the  evidence  provided  by  Clytaemestra's  fear  per 
se  is  inconclusive. 
194  On  the  µavTLK  j-theme  see  Burton  (1980:  197-98);  on  its  ominous  similarities 
with  Or  1086ff.  see  Friis  Johansen  (1964:  15  with  n.  16).  I  argue  in  the 
Introduction  (section  0.4.2)  that  the  Chorus'  use  of  the  conditional  mode  (e.  g. 
472f.,  501)  is  a  mere  formality,  and  that  practically  their  confidence  in  their 
ability  to  interpret  the  dream  is  absolute. 59 
as  he  actually  reveals  (albeit  unwittingly)  his  identity  to  Electra; 
moreover,  his  first  reaction  after  the  Recognition  is  one  of  surprise  at  the 
realization  of  his  own  woes  of  which  he  has  been  totally  ignorant.  Orestes' 
and  Electra's  deficient  knowledge  becomes  all  the  more  prominent  in  Elec- 
tra's  prayer  to  Apollo  (1376-83).  We  remember  that  there  is  only  one 
other  prayer  to  Apollo  in  this  play,  namely  Clytaemestra's  (637-59).  195 
Now,  that  prayer  had  come  at  a  very  crucial  moment.  Immediately  after 
it,  the  Paedagogus  came  forth  with  a  narrative  that  seemed  to  be  Apollo's 
answer  to  Clytaemestra's  prayers  (the  fact  that  Orestes  was  supposedly 
killed  in  the  Pythian  games,  which  were  sacred  to  Apollo,  perhaps 
reinforces  this  feeling);  the  old  man's  tale  sounded  to  her  like 
"trustworthy  evidence"  (TrLQT[ä] 
...  TEKµ1jPLa,  774)  of  Orestes'  death. 
Reasonably  enough,  therefore,  Clytaemestra  thought  that  it  was  Nemesis 
that  ordained  her  son's  catastrophe  (792-93),  thus  (presumably) 
inflicting  just  punishment  upon  him  for  his  unfilial  behaviour  (cf.  775- 
82)196  -  cf.  Aegisthus'  words  at  1466-67:  Orestes'  death  was  due  to 
4eovos,  divine  resentment.  197  The  audience,  of  course,  knew  that  what 
Clytaemestra  considered  to  be  her  triumph  marked  in  fact  the  beginning 
of  her  doom  (similarly  Aegisthus'  exultation  over  the  supposed  corpse  of 
Orestes  throws  him  into  the  avengers'  trap).  The  analogy  between  her 
prayer  and  Electra's  own  has  very  sinister  implications:  the  two  siblings 
also  think,  like  their  mother,  that  justice  and  E  üaE  ßE  La  are  on  their  side 
(cf.  1382-83);  besides,  the  successful  outcome  of  their  enterprise  will 
appear  as  their  ultimate  triumph  over  their  enemies,  exactly  as 
195  Cf.  Kamerbeek  (ad  1376-1383):  "Electra's  addressing  Apollo  before  the  deed  is 
a  dramatic  `rhyme'  of  Clytaemestra's  praying  to  the  same  god  before  the 
messenger's  report  . 
[...  ]".  Cf.  Sheppard  (1927a:  8),  (1927b:  164);  Kitto  (1958:  33); 
Segal  (1981:  273).  Cf.  below,  n.  198. 
196  For  Nemesis  as  goddess  of  retribution  see  Jebb  (ad  792,793);  cf.  Kamerbeek 
(ad  792):  "the  genitive  [sc.  TOO  BavöVTOc]  brings  NE  i¬o  is  very  close  to  Erinys  or 
AL"".  Cf.  Kells  (ad  793),  and  below  n.  229. 
197  Jebb  (ad  1466f.  )  rightly  remarks  that  "the  invocation,  w  ZEV,  at  once 
indicates  the  sense  of  460vou  as  =  the  divine  jealousy",  and  compares  Ph.  776 
TÖv  4OOVOV  8E  zrpöaKUVOV.  Moreover,  the  ominous  connotations  of  the  word 
4  da  is  at  1466  have  been  very  wisely  explored  by  Kamerbeek  (ad  1466). 60 
Clytaemestra  thought  that  the  Paedagogus'  story  was  the  answer  to  her 
prayer.  However,  Clytaemestra  did  not  know,  and  her  ignorance  resulted 
in  her  catastrophe.  Her  children  think  they  know:  they  have  Apollo's 
oracle  to  guide  them.  198  And  as  the  Chorus  had  backed  up  the  8öXos  in 
464-65,  so  do  they  now  see  the  gods  helping  the  guileful  doers  (1384-97) 
and  rejoice  in  the  happy  ending  of  the  enterprise  (1413-14,199  1422- 
23200). 
But  are  things  really  so  unproblematic?  The  Chorus,  for  all  their 
gaiety,  had  ominously  sung  just  a  few  lines  before  (1417):  TEXoüß'  äpaL.  201 
This  must  be  for  the  audience  a  sign  of  increasing  uncertainty:  it  may 
refer  to  Electra's  invocation  of  '  Apä,  `Curse'  at  111;  but  "those  long  dead 
retrieving  the  killers'  blood"  fits  not  only  the  dead  Agamemnon  exacting 
revenge  through  Orestes,  but  also  (on  a  much  more  sinister  level)  Myrtilus 
exacting  revenge  from  his  killer  Pelops  by  cursing  his  whole  race.  In  other 
words,  the  Chorus  at  a  crucial  moment  of  the  play  remind  us  (unawares 
or  not)  that  the  ancestral  curse  is,  still  at  work,  which  means  that  not 
everything  has  ended  yet.  Indeed,  in  a  few  lines  Aegisthus,  will  grimly 
predict  that  there  is  still  evil  to  come  for  the  Pelopids:  Tä  T'  O'VTa  Kal 
198  Winning  ton-Ingram  (1980:  234  n.  60)  has  underlined  the  importance  of  the 
corresponding  prayers  to  Apollo,  especially  in  relation  to  the  significant 
repetitions  of  Kak:  after  the  Paedagogus'  news  (790,791,793,816)  on  the  one 
hand,  and  after  the  matricide  (1425)  on  the  other  (cf.  Sheppard  [1927a:  7]  and 
Kirkwood  [1958:  241  n.  22]).  See  also  Segal's  (1966:  525)  and  Blundell's  (1989:  175, 
176  with  n.  102)  important  remarks  (contra  Mantziou  [1994:  269:  n.  8]).  Waldock 
(1951:  188)  completely  misses  the  point.  As  to  Minadeo's  (1967:  131-32  with  n.  11) 
view  that  Electra  has  no  idea  of  Apollo's  involvement  before  1425,  one  can  only 
stress  the  importance  of  1264-70,  sadly  misinterpreted  by  Minadeo. 
199  Accepting  Hermann's  aoL  for  the  MSS.  aE;  cf.  Jebb(ad  1413f.,  and  pp.  222-23). 
Note  however  Segal's  (1966:  524)  remarks  on  the  sinister  implications  of  46'LvELv 
in  this  passage.  On  the  apparent  incongruity  with  1407  see  Dawe  (1976:  233-34), 
Stevens  (1978:  113),  Machin  (1981:  234  with  n.  443).  On  the  Chorus'  approval  of 
the  matricide  see  especially  Gardiner  (1987:  158)  and  Juffras  (1991:  107). 
200  With  Erfurdt's  JEyELV  for  the  MSS.  ?  yELV;  cf.  Jebb  (ad  1422f.  ),  L.  Campbell 
(1907:  153). 
201  On  the  suggestive  rhythm  of  this  passage  see  Webster  (1969:  131). 61 
L.  1E\XOVTa  IIEkOlTL8G  V  Kath  (1498)  -a  line  that  throws  a  "tiefe  Schatten 
von  Ungewissheit  über  die  wahre  Bedeutung  and  rechte  Beurteilung  der 
Rachetat",  as  Friis  Johansen  (1964:  29)  has  remarked.  202  This  is  the  same 
Aegisthus  who,  a  few  lines  before,  realized  -  only  too  late  -  the  snare  in 
which  he  has  been  caught  (1476,1479-80);  Orestes,  sure  of  his  knowledge 
as  he  was,  fully  displayed  his  intellectual  arrogance  in  the  gruesome  (as 
well  as  horribly  prolonged)  play  with  Clytaemestra's  body  which 
Aegisthus  thought  was  Orestes'  (1454-75).  203  However,  Aegisthus  is  very 
soon  at  a  cognitive  state  superior  to  Orestes';  now  he  is  the  one  who  plays 
with  Orestes'  ignorance,  taunting  him  for  his  limited  understanding 
(1497-98,1500),  whereas  his  opponent,  not  being  able  to  take  his  hints, 
202  Cf.  Jebb  (ad  1497f.  ),  Kells  (ad  1497f).  On  the  import  of  these  words  see 
Winning  ton-Ingram  (1980:  226-28),  although  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that 
it  is  the  persecution  by  the  Erinyes  that  is  implied.  Contra  Bowra  (1944:  258), 
Alexanderson  (1966:  95-97),  Erbse  (1978:  297-8),  Gardiner  (1987:  159  n.  32).  Could 
it  not  also  be,  as  Friis-Johansen  (1964:  26-7)  argues,  that  Clytaemestra's  cries 
(1415  W  '110L  ntnXiyyµaL,  1416  JOµoL  püX'  av6Ls)  are  meant  to  recall  A.  Ag.  1343, 
1345,  thus  highlighting  the  ominous  analogies  between  the  two  events?  See 
also  Bowra  (1944:  252),  and  Segal  (1966:  501),  (1981:  262);  Minadeo  (1967:  134-39) 
provides  a  very  detailed  thematic  analysis  of  the  analogies  between  the 
matricide  and  the  murder  of  Agamemnon  as  described  succinctly  at  193-200. 
Contra  -wrongly,  I  think  -Woodard  (1965:  225-26),  Alexanderson  (1966:  92), 
Erbse  (1978:  295-6),  Stinton  (1990:  474). 
203  On  the  tragic  irony  of  this  section  see  esp.  Salmon  (1961:  250-62).  One  reason 
why  Sophocles  inverted  the  order  of  the  murders  (whereas  both  in  A.  Cho.  and 
in  E.  El.  Aegisthus  is  the  one  who  is  killed  first)  was,  I  think,  to  gain  this 
abhorrent  play  with  the  corpse:  had  he  wished  to  divert  our  attention  from  the 
horror  of  matricide,  he  could  just  as  well  have  used  again  the  urn,  as  he  did 
with  Clytaemestra,  to  ensnare  Aegisthus  (for  the  reversal  of  the  murders'  order 
cf.  further  below  p.  63  with  n.  210).  The  urn  has  been  of  central  importance  as 
a  means  of  deceit  already  from  the  outset;  thus,  its  unexpected  replacement  by 
Clytaemestra's  corpse  can  only  be  explained  if  we  recognize  that  the  dramatist 
wished  to  place  special  emphasis  upon  the  grim  act  of  matricide  (Segal's  [1981: 
289]  explanation  is  unsatisfactory).  Reinhardt  (1979:  161)  is  certainly  wrong  in 
writing  -  off  this  scene  as  "theatrical  rather  than  poetic  tragedy":  the 
theatrical/visual  spectacle  furthers  the  poetic  purpose. 62 
does  not  heed  his  warnings  (1499).  204  Nevertheless,  it  is  not  only 
Aegisthus'  predictions  that  suggest  that  the  action  does  not  end  here. 
Electra  has  strongly  wished  Aegisthus'  death  (1416)  and  has  emphasized 
that  only  Aegisthus'  death  would  deliver  her  from  her  misfortunes  of  old 
(1489-90),  but  we  find  out  that  the  play  ends  with  Aegisthus  still  alive.  205 
So,  the  KaK(3V  I  µövov  Tcilv  TrdXaL  XuTrjpLOV  (1489-90)  never  comes,  206 
although  it  is  Aegisthus  that  has  been  proclaimed  by  Electra  as  the  guilty 
one  par  excellence  of  Agamemnon's  murder  (561-62).  Nor  are  we 
encouraged  to  hope  that  Orestes'  promise  at  1299-1300  or  the 
Paedagogus'  at  1365-6  will  be  ever  fulfilled  -  the  less  so  since  their 
rejoicing  is  vaguely  postponed  to  a  future  that  strangely  recalls  Electra's 
endless  misfortunes  before  the  matricide  (1365  TroXal  KUKAOÜVTQL 
VÜKTES  71µEpaL  T'  (a(IL  sounds  like  a  sinister  reminiscence  of  86-93  and 
103-106,  where  the  endless  succession  of  night  and  day  meant  only  the 
perpetuation  of  old  woes207).  The  Chorus'  last  word  -  1510  TEXEw0Ev  - 
comes  as  a  sinister  irony,  since  no  T009  seems  to  be  forthcoming.  208 
204  See  Sheppard  (1927b:  164-65),  rightly  refuting  Owen's  (1927:  50-51)  baseless 
remarks;  also  Linforth  (1963:  124);  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  238);  Blundell 
(1989:  176-77).  Perhaps  Kells  (ad  1481)  is  not  entirely  wrong  in  suggesting  that 
1481  "implies  that  Aegisthus  had  some  special  qualifications  in  µavTLIct  "  -these 
being  part  of  the  background  story  which  appears  to  have  been  lost  (cf.  E.  El. 
826f.,  where  Aegisthus  inspects  the  entrails  of  the  sacrificial  victims).  If  this  is 
the  case,  then  Aegisthus'  prophecy  about  the  Pelopids'  future  evils  carries 
great  weight. 
205  Pace  Gellie  (1972:  129),  the  fact  that  theatrical  convention  did  not  permit  a 
murder  to  be  shown  on  stage  does  not  explain  anything:  Aegisthus'  death  could 
have  been  signalled  to  the  audience  by  off-stage  screams,  just  as  Clytaemestra's 
has  been. 
206  Segal  (1981:  276)  aptly  remarks  on  the  ominous  similarity  of  XuTijpLov  with 
Clytaemestra's  frustrated  XvT1p1OL  Eu'Xa'L  (635-36).  See  also  Seaford  (1985:  321). 
207  See  further  Segal  (1966:  519),  (1981:  263-64).  Contra  Waldock  (1951:  190). 
208  See  Sheppard  (1927a:  9),  (1927b:  165);  Kamerbeek  (ad  1498);  Friis  Johansen 
(1964:  29);  Segal  (1981:  264).  Kells  (231)  sees  another  kind  of  irony  in  this 
passage:  TEXEWOEv  according  to  him  is  meant  to  recall  TEAELos  used  of  beasts  ripe 
for  sacrifice  (cf.  A.  Ag.  972f.  ).  For  the  ironic  use  of  words  implying  finality  in 
the  closing  scenes  of  the  play  see  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  226  with  n.  30);  for 63 
What  is  more.  the  mention  of  Atreus  (1508  aTrEpµ"  ATpEo)s)  seems  to  me 
to  recapitulate  the  allusions  to  the  hereditary  curse  of  the  House  made 
earlier  in  the  play  (504-15,1417).  209  We  can  now  identify  a  further 
reason  why  Sophocles  inverted  the  order  of  the  murders:  not  only  has  he 
gained  the  opportunity  to  present  the  gruesome  play  with  Clytaemestra's 
corpse  (1458ff.  ),  thus  making  sure  that  the  horror  of  the  matricide  is 
indelibly  impressed  on  the  audience's  minds  (cf.  above  n.  203);  he  has 
also  avoided  including  Aegisthus'  death  in  the  play,  thus  insinuating  that 
not  everything  is  over  yet,  and  that  the  sequence  of  woes  that  has  been 
dogging  the  Pelopids  may  go  on  for  much  longer.  210 
1.5.1  Conclusions:  divine  unknowability 
So,  the  play  is  rounded  off  with  a  sinister  ring-composition:  it  begins  with 
an  oracle  and  it  ends  with  a  prophecy,  both  of  which  Orestes  does  not 
fully  understand.  For  the  grim  uncertainty  about  the  motivation  of  the 
whole  action,  namely  Apollo's  oracle,  is  avowed  by  Orestes  himself, 
a  similar  irony  in  Euripides  see  Myrick  (1994:  141-8).  Above  all,  see  Blundell's 
(1989:  178)  most  important  remarks,  and  cf.  Kirkwood  (1942:  94-95).  Contra 
Letters  (1953:  260);  Woodard  (1965:  203-204);  Alexanderson  (1966:  97);  Erbse 
(1978:  300);  Burton  (1980:  220). 
209  Calder  (1963:  215-16)  thinks  that  it  is  only  Electra  that  is  meant  by  vtrE  pµ' 
'  ATpEcog,  but  this  is  implausible;  cf.  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  77-78). 
210  The  dramaturgical  purpose  usually  ascribed  to  this  reversal  is  that 
Sophocles  wished  to  mitigate  the  appallng  effect  of  the  matricide;  see  e.  g.  Owen 
(1927:  51);  Waldock  (1951:  177-79);  Linforth  (1963:  125);  Lesky  (1972:  235-36); 
Vickers  (1973:  571);  Stevens  (1978:  117);  Machin  (1981:  231);  for  a  far  more 
plausible,  though  not  totally  satisfactory,  account  see  Kirkwood  (1942:  91-94).  Of 
course,  people  who  content  themselves  with  Schlegel-like  views  about  `happy 
matricide'  (cf.  the  just  criticism  by  Sheppard  [1927a:  2])  would  resort  to  such 
solutions  as  Owen's  (1927:  50):  "Is  it  natural  for  a  writer,  who  intended  each 
play  to  be  complete  in  itself,  to  close  with  so  indefinite  a  hint?  ".  A  similar  view 
about  a  "self-contained  play"  is  also  held  by  Gellie  (1972:  129).  However,  for  a 
play  concerned  to  point  out  the  endlessly  self-reproductive  nature  of  talio,  such 
an  ending  is  the  only  conceivable  one. 
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immediately  after  the  matricide  (1425):  '  ATrö  v  EL  Kakos 
EeEQ1TLQEV.  211  We  are  never  told  whether  the  oracle  was  KaXCLG  or  not: 
Sophocles,  in  keeping  with  his  `apophatic'  approach,  neither  justifies  (like 
Aeschylus)  nor  condemns  (like  Euripides)  the  god;  he  simply  does  not 
scrutinize  this  issue.  212  What  he  is  concerned  with  is  the  illusory  quality 
of  human  knowledge.  Both  Clytaemestra  and  her  children  were  sure  of 
their  knowledge  of  divine  will.  Clytaemestra  thought  that  her  prayers 
were  heard  and  that  Nemesis  punished  her  evil  son;  on  the  other  hand, 
Electra  (both  after  the  announcement  of  her  mother's  dream  and  after 
the  Recognition)  and,  of  course,  Orestes  believed  that  they  knew:  they 
thought  that  the  gods  favoured  them  (e.  g.  70,411,213  1264,1372-83)  and 
that  justice  (34,70,466)  and  E  vaE  ßE  La  (1383)  have  been  restored  by  their 
murderous  act.  However,  they  eventually  find  themselves  totally  ignorant 
about  their  own  fortunes;  and,  although  their  actions  were  undoubtedly 
in  keeping  with  the  oracle  and  punished  their  enemies'  8uaaE  ßE  La 
(1383),  they  are  unable  to  reconcile  their  own  EüQEßELa  (obedience  to  the 
god)  with  the  meanness  (cf.  1493-94214)  of  the  deed  he  ordained.  Nor  is 
such  a  reconciliation  possible  in  the  Sophoclean  dramatic  universe: 
211  Bowra  (1944:  252-53),  Linforth  (1963:  124)  and  Friis  Johansen  (1964:  27)  see 
in  these  lines  obscurity  and  uncertainty  (cf.  Kamerbeek  [ad  1424,5]).  However, 
Jebb  (ad  1425)  sees  here  "the  calm  confidence  of  Orestes";  cf.  also  Letters  (1953: 
247),  Kitto  (1958:  34),  Musurillo  (1967:  105),  Stevens  (1978:  113),  Di  Benedetto 
(1983:  180).  It  is  true  that  El,  +indic.  can  be  used  as  a  causal  clause  with  assertive 
force;  cf.  Moorhouse  (1982:  279-80),  Erbse  (1978:  287-8),  and  Diggle  apud 
Mantziou  (1994:  270n.  3).  There  are,  however,  cases  in  which  this  syntagm  may 
express  an  open  condition  or  even  a  negation  of  the  content  of  the  protasis:  see 
further  Introduction,  section  0.4.2.  Thus,  the  conditional  clause  at  1425  may 
well  be  expressing  at  least  an  ambiguity  in  Orestes'  state  of  knowledge:  if  Et 
Ka)G.  )$  EOEVTTLQEV  may  be  an  assertion,  it  is  equally  possible  that  it  is  meant  to  be 
understood  as  a  doubt. 
212  If  Sophocles  does  nothing  to  question  the  justice  of  the  matricide,  as  Vickers 
(1973:  567,571)  insists,  he  does  nothing  to  affirm  it  either. 
213  See  Jebb  (ad  411).  For  the  idea  that  the  dream  is  a  sign  of  the  gods'  interest 
and  that  "[it]  is  equated  with  oracles  and  prophecies,  and  they  in  turn  with  Dike 
and  justice"  see  Kitto  (1958:  30-31),  (1961:  133);  cf.  Kamerbeek  (ad  410). 65 
obeying  the  god  does  not  necessarily  coincide  with  what,  by  human 
standards,  is  considered  KaX6v  or  ¬(J  E  ßE  La.  In  this  play,  indeed,  Orestes' 
and  Electra's  obedience  to  the  god  strongly  contradicts  human  morality, 
and  -  far  from  ensuring  for  them  an  undisturbed  happiness  -  leads 
them  to  an  impasse,  to  a  state  in  which  they  (and  the  audience)  cannot 
tell  whether  '  Arr  XXüV  Ka)L,  S  EOEQnLQEV.  215  We  perceived  a  similarly 
unsettling  uncertainty  about  true  knowledge  and  true  E  üaE  ßE  La  when 
Electra,  encouraged  by  the  report  about  Clytaemestra's  dream,  was 
involved  in  a  guileful  deed  of  retaliation:  however,  the  fact  is  that  neither 
had  she  full  knowledge  of  the  dream  nor  did  she  preserve  her  E  Oa  ßE  La 
(cf.  307-3081216);  and-  this  was  only  too  ironically  indicated  by  the 
doubtful  reward  for  `good  sense'  and  `piety'  (i.  e.  for  the  sad  compromise 
of  her  heroism)  that  the  Chorus  granted  her  (464-65). 
Thus,  as  Kirkwood  (1958:  259,262-63)  has  perceived,  we  are 
presented  with  an  irreconcilable  contradiction:  Electra  knows,  and  we 
know,  that  it  is  EvQE1ELa  to.  avenge  a  father  (245-50);  at  the  same  time, 
however,  the  heroine  herself  admits  that  revenge  (paying  back  evils  for 
evils)  excludes  EüaE1ELa  and  aw4poalvTl  (cf.  307-309).  217  This  inherent 
antithesis,  found  in  germ  at  the  outset,  is  dominant  throughout  the  play: 
214  Cf.  Kamerbeek  (ad  1493). 
215  Machin  (1981:  432-33)  is  inexplicably  certain  about  the  divine  approval  of 
the  matricide. 
216  Cf.  Kells  (ad  307ff).  See  further  the  following  paragraph. 
217  On  this  contradiction  cf.  also  Adams  (1957:  67);  Friis  Johansen  (1964:  13); 
Lesky  (1972:  231);  De  Wet  (1977:  28-36);  Burton  (1980:  195);  Schein  (1982:  74)and, 
most  importantly,  Cairns  (1993:  248-9).  Long  (1968:  151),  if  I  understand  him 
correctly,  and  McDevitt  (1983b)  try  to  reconcile  the  contradiction.  This 
ambivalence  is,  I  think,  also  substantiated  in  Clytaemestra's  character:  the 
Sophoclean  Clytaemestra  is  neither  utterly  cruel  (cf.  above,  p.  37f.  )  nor,  of 
course,  does  she  resemble  her  sympathetic  Euripidean  counterpart.  She  is 
undoubtedly  a  criminal,  but  also  able  to  show  her  affection  when  she  hears 
about  her  son's  supposed  death.  It  follows  that  the  killing  of  such  a  mother  is 
on  one  hand  just  (cf.  e.  g.  1154,1194,1426-27)  and  on  the  other  an  act  of  moral 
debasement,  an  act  that  both  distorts  Electra's  heroic  nature  and,  what  is  more, 
reveals  that  being  the  god's  instrument  does  not  necessarily  coincide  with 
human  morality. 66 
Electra,  when  adopting  86Xos  and  vengeful  action  (suppression  of 
Clytaemestra's  offerings,  matricide,  ensnaring  of  Aegisthus),  conspicuously 
lacks  E  vaE  ßE  La,  as  she  herself  admits,  but  at  the  same  time  paradoxically 
acts  in  accordance  with  the  god's  decree.  On  the  other  hand,  when  she 
avenges  her  father  by  mere  lamentation  and  words  (that  is,  before  she 
learns  about  Clytaemestra's  dream,  as  well  as  after  the  Paedagogus'  story 
and  before  the  Recognition),  she  respects  divine  law  (1095)  and  Zrvds 
E  vaE  ßE  La  (1097),  218  but  at  the  same  time  fails  to  comply  with  what 
Apollo  demanded. 
Therefore,  it  seems  that  EJQE  ßE  La  towards  the  gods  is  impossible  - 
and  so  is  the  knowledge  of  their  will.  We  have  seen  that,  when  Electra's 
knowledge  seemed  to  have  been  restored  with  the  Recognition,  there  came 
Aegisthus'  sinister  prophecies  to  darken  the  bright  picture;  whereas  only 
when  Electra  was  in  a  state  of  utter  ignorance  was,  she  truly  (and 
paradoxically)  oroýä  (1089).  This  paradox  is  what,  I  think,  constitutes  a 
major  aspect  of  the  tragic  issue  in  this  play:  Electra  complies  with  the 
god's  will,  but  finds  herself  lacking  her  previous  heroic  E  iuaE  ßE  La;  she 
thinks  that  eventually  she  comes  to  know  her  true  condition,  but  we  soon 
realize  how  defective  this  new  knowledge  is  and  how  genuine  the  ao4(a  of 
her  ignorance  was.  What  is  more,  in  either  case  Electra  is  miserable:  when 
she  is  ignorant  and  heroic  she  simply  perpetuates  her  misery,  for  even  her 
decision  to  deliver  herself  from  her  woes  by  killing  Aegisthus  is  simply 
suicidal;  on  the  other  hand,  when  she  is  imparted  her  brother's 
knowledge  about  the  will  of  the  god  (1264-70)  and  indulges  in  unheroic 
guile,  we  are  reminded  that  there  are  still  woes  for  the  Pelopids  to  come  - 
woes  of  which  the  siblings  are  still  unaware.  This  is  a  most  desperate 
deadlock:  Electra's  living  up  to  her  moral  status  is  on  a  par  with  being 
sadly  ignorant,  living  in  misery  and  disobeying  (though  involuntarily) 
the  god;  whereas  knowledge  of  the  oracle  and  compliance  with  it  means 
not  only  descending  to  guileful  practices  but  also  realizing  that  there  is 
still  too  much  ignorance  of  her  own  condition  as  well  as  of  the  gods'  will. 
It  is  no  use  trying  to  justify  the  gods  by  resorting,  like  Sheppard  (1927a: 
218  See  Woodard's  (1964:  198-99)  brilliant  remarks. 67 
3-4)  for  instance,  to  simplistic  excuses  about  Orestes'  supposedly,  wrong 
question  to  the  oracle:  as  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  236)  has  put  it,  "if 
Orestes  asked  about  means  and  not  ends,  we  are  given  no  reason  to 
suppose  that  the  god  did  not  approve  the  end  or,  for  that  matter,  that 
the  gods  of  Sophocles  are  not  behind  the  lex  talionis".  219  Thus,  divine  will 
is  not  only  inscrutable  but  also  can  hardly  be  called  beneficent  -  at  least 
by  human  measures.  220  The  gods  are  neither  benevolent  nor  malevolent: 
such  categories  are  only  conventions  of  the  human  mind  which  struggles 
to  create  taxonomies,  a  mental  framework,  that  is,  wherein  divinity  could 
be  accommodated  and  explained.  The  gods  are  not  comprehensible:  they 
are  just  there.  One  cannot  rely  on  one's  intellectual  capacity  in  order  to 
understand  them,  nor  could  it  ever  be  possible  to  be  sure  that  obedience 
to  divine  orders  means  tranquillity  and  insouciance.  221  To  quote 
Ehrenberg  (1954:  26),  "the  power  and  the  amorality  of  the  gods  are  the 
cause  of  human  tragedy.  Sophocles'  gods  are  neither  just  nor  evil  -  both 
would  comply  with  human  moral  standards;  they  are  the  one  thing  that 
219  See  also  the  correct  remarks  of  Bowra  (1944:  215-18),  Waldock  (1951:  172-73), 
Letters  (1953:  246),  Kitto  (1961:  132  ff.  ),  Alexanderson  (1966:  81),  Gellie  (1972: 
107),  Erbse  (1978:  285-6),  and  Blundell  (1989:  182  n.  124).  Stevens  (1978:.  112-13) 
rightly  asserts  that  Apollo's  sanctioning  of  the  matricide  is  undeniable,  but 
falls  victim  to  what  might  be  called  `moralistic  fallacy':  if  the  god  ordered  the 
deed,  then  it  must  be  unquestionably  just.  Hester  (1981)  too,  albeit  succesfully 
refuting  Sheppard,  takes  too  uncomplicated  a  view  of  the  matricide. 
220I  have  more  sympathy  for  such  views  as  Segal's  (1966:  539),  and  especially 
Minadeo's  (1967:  139-42),  which  pinpoint  the  inscrutability  of  dike  and  cosmic 
order  rather  than  Woodard's  (1965:  216-17)  or  Kirkwood's  (1958:  279),  which 
imply  the  existence  of  a  higher  law  and  of  an  objective  universal  order  which 
Sophocles  reveals  to  us. 
221  Cf.  Winning  ton-Ingram  (1980:  246):  "...  in  the  tragic  circumstances  there  is 
no  mode  of  conduct  which  can  be  truly  salutary  and  truly  laudable  ... 
[Electra] 
operates  -within  a  world  of  Sophoclean  gods:  an  Apollo  who  recommends  a 
vengeance  of  Aeschylean  craft,  and  a  Zeus  who  demands  a  vengeance  which,  as 
in  Aeschylus,  is  itself  a  crime  against  the  law  it  follows 
...  ".  Sophocles  does  not 
provide  any  way  out  of  this  deadlock;  cf.  again  Winnington-Ingram  (1954-55: 
26):  "[Sophocles]  is  dealing  with  a  situation  in  which  [...  ]  only  deplorable 
alternatives  are  open.  It  is  a  grim  play.  "  Schein's  (1982:  79-80)  remarks  are  also 
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human  '  beings  are  not:  divine.  The  order  of  the  world  is  their  order,  and 
thus  again  neither  good  nor  evil,  but  created-  and  directed  by  divine 
power  and  greatness.  "  The  human  race  is  prey  to  its  limited  understand- 
ing,  without  hope  ever  to  be  able  "to  justify  the  ways  of  God  to  man"  - 
the  ways  with  which,  however,  it  must  comply.  222 
APPENDIX 
S.  El.  1080  emended 
The  explanation  commonly  proposed  for  8i81)µav  ýXoOa''EpLvvv  (1080) 
is  "could  she  but  quell  the  two  Furies  of  her  house"  (Jebb),  with  8i8iuµav 
'  EpLvüv  taken  to  refer  to  Aegisthus  and  Clytaemestra.  A  first  objection 
against  the  communis  opinio  would  be  that  in  this  play  the  term'  EpLvüs 
is  never  applied  to  anyone  but  the  punishers  -  either  human  or 
superhuman  -  of  Aegisthus'  and  Clytaemestra's  crimes  (see  112-20,275- 
76,489-94,  and  cf.  1386-88);  thus,  the  use  of  the  same.  word  to  designate 
the  murderers  themselves  would  be  inconsistent.  Granted,  Winnington- 
Ingram  (1980:  244)  and  Burton  (1980:  211-12)  have  put  forward 
(independently,  it  seems)  an  interpretation  that  might  seem  to  meet  this 
objection:  Aegisthus  and  Clytaemestra  have  themselves  been  instruments 
of  divine  punishment  against  Agamemnon,  as  Orestes  and  Electra  are  to 
avenge  their  father  by  punishing  the  murderous  couple.  223  Nonetheless,  it 
would  be.  awkward,  in  the  first  place,  for  the  Chorus  to  remind  us,  at  a 
moment  when  their  song  is  committed  to  the  praise  of  Electra's  heroism, 
222  See  again  Ehrenberg  (1954:  26):  "[Man]  will  never  be  able  to  determine  his 
own  fate,  and  yet  he  has  to  shape  his  life,  his  community,  his  actions  and 
thoughts  in  accordance  with  the  eternal  laws  of  the  gods.  [...  ]  It  is  the  tragic 
irony  of  man's  fate  that  just  in  trying  to  do  this  he  meets  his  doom.  " 
223  Indeed,  the  term  `Erinys'  may  be  used  of  persons  functioning  as  agents  of 
the  Erinyes  in  such  passages  as  as  A.  Ag.  749  or  E.  Med.  1260;  contra,  however, 
Kaibel  (ad  1078),  and  J.  D.  Denniston  &  D.  L  Page  on  A.  Ag.  744ff. G9 
that  Clytaemestra  and  Aegisthus  have  functioned  as  agents  of  divine 
revenge  (Erinyes)  no  less  than  Orestes  and  Electra  will  soon  do.  Moreover, 
8L8Ü  1av  would  create  an  unintelligible  and  unnecessary  incongruity  with 
Electra's  conspicuous  reticence  as  to  the  lot  that  lies  in  store  for 
Clytaemestra  (957). 
Kaibel  (ad  1078)  thought  that  8L8vµav'  Epu  v  refers  to  the  Erinyes 
that  Electra  would  `win',  `obtain'  as  as  result  of  her  double  killing  of 
Aegisthus  and  Clytaemestra:  "[Elektra]  ist  bereit  zu  sterben  für  die  That 
die  sie  plant,  wenn  sie  nur  zuvor  die  doppelte  Erinys  der  von  ihr  zu 
erschlagenden  Unholde  gewonnen  hat".  The  objection  that  Electra  has 
not  mentioned  Clytaemestra  as  a  prospective  victim  Kaibel  tries  to  meet 
by  assuming  that  the  Chorus  here  indulge  in  (baseless  and 
dramaturgically  unwarranted)  speculations:  "der  Chor  wol  richtig 
empfand,  dass  der  Tod  des  Herren  den  Tod  der  Herrin  im  Gefolge  gehabt 
hätte'.  "  But,  as  Errandonea  (1955:  390)  points  out,  "le  choeur  ne  parle  pas 
de  ce  qui  en  soi  et  obj  ectivement  pourrait  s'  ensuivre,  mais  de  ce  qu' 
Electre  s'  etait  propose.  "  Kaibel's  interpretation  must  be  dismissed  also  on 
linguistic  grounds:  as  Kamerbeek  (ad  1078-80)  suggests,  EXEty  would  be 
unsuitable  in  this  context;  for  both  the  meaning  `win',  `gain'  (in  a  positive 
sense!  )  and  the  alternative  meaning  `overpower',  `kill'  are  obviously 
impossible:  the  Erinyes  can  neither  be  envisaged  as  `gain'  nor  be 
overpowered  or  killed.  Kaibel's  interpretation  would  be  much  better 
served  by  the  middle  EAoµEVII  which  would  give  the  desired  neutral 
meaning  `obtain'. 
Errandonea's  alternative  interpretation  (ibid.,  389-92)  is  even  more 
unsatisfactory:  he  takes  EXoüCT'  to  be  governed  by  To'  µil  ßMrrELV  (1079), 
the  meaning  being  'elle  ne  considere  pas  qu'  elle  dtpE  t  [...  ]  une  double 
Erinnye'224  (with  c  LpEty  having  the  sense  'gewinnen'  posited  by  Kaibel)  - 
i.  e.  Electra,  by  failing  to  avenge  her  father  and  her  brother,  will  attract  a 
double  Erinys  from  them.  The  problem  with  this  interpretation  is,  again, 
the  unnatural  use  of  äLpEty  in  this  context  (cf.  above),  and  also  the  fact 
224  For  this  syntax  cf.  e.  g.  Thuc.  1.32.5:  ij  1ELc  a6ÜVaTOL  öpwµEV  ÖVTES 
... 
TrEpLyEVEvOaL  and  see  further  Errandonea  (1955:  389n.  18). 70 
that  PX91TELV  is  the  wrong  verb:  its  essential  meaning  `have  the  power  of 
sight',  `look',  `fix  one's  eyes  on'  makes  it  highly  unsuitable  for  the  idea 
"eile  ne  considere  pas",  which  would  require  TO'  µiß  6pdv  (='she  does  not 
perceive',  `she  does  not  pay  heed  to',  `she  is  not  aware  of).  Moreover,  the 
`synoptic'  or  `instant'  verbal  aspect  expressed  by  the  aorist  participle 
EXoOQ'225  does  not  sit  very  well  with  the  notion  of  permanent  persecution 
by  the  Erinyes  -a  notion  that  would  be  better  expressed  by  the  present 
participle  (NB  that  Errandonea  [ibid.,  p.  389]  paraphrases  µiß  3XETrELv 
EXoOQ'  by  µi  ß?  nELV  ÖTL  aLpEt!  ).  More  importantly  perhaps,  making  T6 
TE  µiß  f3X  TrE  Lv  etc.  continue  into  the  following  phrase  destroys  the 
syntactic  `self-containedness'  of  the  nicely  symmetrical  QXfj  1a  KaTä 
OEQLV  Kai  QpaLV  (Cf.  OV'TE  TOÜ  OaVEI,  V  ...  T6  TE  ý11ý  3AE1TELV). 
Thus,  both  the  communis  opinio  and  the  alternative 
interpretations  proposed  by  Kaibel  and  Errandonea  are  inadmissible.  We 
must  therefore  accept  that  the  text  in  1080  is  corrupt.  I  would  suggest 
that  only  a  minimal  emendation  is  needed:  read  E  Xova'  instead  of 
EXoOQ'  -  mistaking  X  for  X  is  a  fairly  common  error.  This  simple 
alteration  yields  the  meaning  required:  Electra  is  viewed  as  bearing 
(EXouaa),  i.  e.  embodying,  being  possessed  by,  the  avenging  spirits  of  both 
her  father  and  her  brother,  for  8L8üµav  '  EpLvivv  will  now  be  taken  to  refer 
not  to  Aegisthus  and  Clytaemestra,  but,  as  it  should,  to  the  avenging 
spirits  of  Agamemnon  and  (the  supposedly  dead)  Orestes.  The  use  of  E  Xa) 
in  this  sense  is  paralleled  by,  most  notably,  Hippocr.  Morb.  Sacr.  1  (VI. 
362.9  LittrE):  KaOalpOVGL  yap  TOÜS  EX%1EVOV9  TT  V0110(  älµaTL  TE 
Kai  a?  XoiaL  TOLOUTOLQLV  WQTrEp  !  daCrj.  La  TL  EyOVTas  f  aXaaTopas 
... 
226  Such  cases,  in  which  the  human  personality  is  lost  and  submerged 
225  Cf.  Goodwin  §  148;  Smyth,  Gr.  Gr.  §  2112  a.  N. 
226  I  disagree  here  with  Parker  (1983:  224  n.  92):  "The  run  of  the  sentence 
makes  äMrropas  object  of  KaOaipovaL  rather  than  EXovTaS,  and  thus  human  not 
demonic.  It  indicates  that  being  an  alastor  is  a  condition  an  individual  might 
acknowledge  in  himself.  "  Parker  bases  his  interpretation  entirely  on  personal, 
subjective  Stilgefühl,  and  ignores  instances  like  A.  Ag.  1497ff.  (on  which  see 
immediately  below  in  the  text). 71 
in  that  of  the  supernatural  power  whose  agent  and  instrument  the 
individual  is,  are  far  from  unparalleled  in  Greek  literature:  apart  from 
the  famous  A.  Ag.  1497ff.,  where  Clytaemestra  sees  herself  as  a 
superhuman,  demonic  ä  MQTwp,  cf.  also  A.  Pers.  353ff.  and  see  on  the 
whole  the  excellent  discussion  by  Dodds  (1951:  40). 
A  further  improvement  gained  with  the  emendation  proposed  here 
is  that  the  Chorus'  vagueness  as  to  the  person(s)  against  whom  the 
8L8üµa  '  Epw  c  is  directed  is  absolutely  congruent  with  the  fact  that 
Electra  has  mentioned  only  Aegisthus  as  the  person  to  be  punished, 
whereas  she  has  been  reticent  as  to  whether  Clytaemestra  is  to  be  killed 
too. 
True,  Aegisthus  and  Clytaemestra  are  often  referred  to  as  a  dyad 
(e.  g.  97-8,206  8t8i  iaLv  XELpOty,  272-4,299-300,358,492-3  etc.  ),  so 
&8vµav  '  EpLvüv  would  most  naturally  refer  to  them.  227  However,  the 
supposedly  dead  Orestes  and  Agamemnon  are  also  referred  to  as  a  dyad 
(813-4,968-9,986-7)  that  must  be  avenged.  At  1384ff.  Orestes  _  who  is 
about  to  accomplish  the  act  of  revenge  that  Electra  would  have  carried 
out  had  her  brother  not  appeared  (cf.  1318-21)  -  is  thought  of  as 
embodying  the  Erinys  (cf.  1388  ä4UKTOL  KüvE3)228  that  will  finally  avenge 
Agamemnon. 
One  point  remains  to  be  clarified:  why  should  Orestes'  death  be 
avenged  at  all,  since  he  was  not  murdered  but  (supposedly)  killed  in  an 
accident?  The  Erinyes  were  thought  to  avenge  only  victims  of  murder  or 
of  unjust  death  in  general  (as  in  Od.  11.280  they  avenge  Epicaste's 
suicide).  Nonetheless,  there  are  a  number  of  passages  in  our  play  in  which 
a  feeling  that  vengeance  should  be  exacted  for  Orestes'  death  too  is  clearly 
conveyed.  At  792  Electra  invokes  the  "Nemesis  of  him  who  hath  lately 
died"  (Jebb),  NE  iEQL  TOO  OavövTO9  äpTtüS,  i.  e.  the  avenging  spirit  of 
Orestes;  229  while  at  986-87  she  views  the  killing  of  Aegisthus,  properly  an 
227  This  has  been  pointed  out  to  me  by  Professor  P.  E.  Easterling  in  private 
correspondence. 
228  Erinyes  in  canine  form:  A.  Cho.  1054  (cf.  Eum.  111-3,131-2);  E.  El.  1252  with 
Denniston  (1939:  ad  loc). 
229  It  is  universally  -and  rightly  -accepted  that  Nemesis  is  here  practically 72 
act  of  revenge  for  Agamemnon,  as  a  service  towards  her  supposedly  dead 
brother  as  well  (QUµTrövEL  naTpL,  QüyKaµv'  68EA4(il).  It  follows  that, 
even  though  Orestes  was  not  literally  a  victim  of  murder,  it  is  felt  that  his 
death  should  be  avenged  all  the  same.  The  reason  might  well  be,  as 
Herter  (art.  cit.  [n.  229]  2366-67)  has  pointed  out,  that  "jegliche 
Überhebung  gegenüber  Menschen  ist  sie  [sc.  Nemesis]  zu  strafen  berufen 
[...  ].  Klytaimestra  glaubt,  daß  Orestes  wegen  solcher  Gesinnung  von 
N.  [emesis]  bestraft  sei  [...  ],  während  Elektra  vorher  die  N.  [emesis]  ihres 
Bruders  angerufen  hatte,  die  haßerfüllten  Worte  der  über  seinen 
vermeintlichen  Tod  triumphierenden  Mutter  zu  hören.  "230 
equivalent  to  Erinys:  the  similarity  of  the  syntax  NEµEVL  TOO  OavövTOs  with 
OLKT  Tlvös,  '  Epwvüs  TLVOs  speaks  for  itself.  See  H.  Herter,  "Nemesis",  RE  16.2 
(1935)  2339,2365,2366-67;  Jebb  (ad  792);  Kamerbeek  (ad  792). 
230  Cf.  Kaibel's  (ad  792  &  793)  similar  remarks,  on  which  Herter  has  drawn. CHAPTER  TWO 
HOTMO1  AAIMONQN  TARE: 
HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE  AND  DIVINE  WILL 
IN  THE  PHILOCTETES 
In  the  sea  caves 
there's  a  thirst  there's  a  love 
there's  an  ecstasy 
all  hard  (ilc  shells 
you  can  hold  them  in  your  palm 
In  the  sea  caves 
for  whole  days  Igazed  into  your  eyes 
and  I  didn't  know  you  nor  dd  you  know  me. 
Cý.  Seferis  (trans(.  E-  Keety  &  P.  Sherrard) 
2.1.1  A  working  hypothesis:  Odysseus  as  an  instrument  of 
divine  will 
I  begin  with  a  working  hypothesis:  Odysseus,  despite  his  cruel  and 
unethical  practices,  fully  knows  and  fully  complies  with  the  divine  will  as 
expressed  in  the  prophecy  of  Helenus.  1  He  neither  blasphemously  uses  the 
gods  as  a  mere  pretext  to  achieve  his  own  base  purposes,  nor  does  he 
deliberately  distort  the  prophecy  to  match  it  to  his  own  interests,  as 
many  critics  have  assumed.  2  Such  assumptions,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  3 
I  This  is  far  from  novel:  on  Odysseus'  full  knowledge  of  the  prophecy  see  Knox 
(1964:  126);  on  his  adhering  to  its  terms  and  being  on  the  gods'  side  see  Poe 
(1974:  25-26,  cf.  47),  my  indebtedness  to  whose  article  I  readily  acknowledge.  Cf. 
also  e.  g.  Kirkwood  (1958:  149,260);  Masaracchia  (1964:  80  n.  3);  Hinds  (1967:  178- 
79);  Lesky  (1972:  247);  Buxton  (1982:  130). 
2  E.  g.  Bowra  (1944:  265-27letc.  );  Diller  (1950:  20-21,  cf.  25);  Alt  (1961:  143);  Knox 
(1964:  127);  Erbse  (1966:  183-5);  Segal  (1977:  140-41);  Pucci  (1994:  39).  Further 
literature  in  Steidle  (1968:  169n.  1). 
3  Cf.  the  list  of  critics  cited  in  n.  1. 74 
totally  lack  support  from  the  text,  and  are  rather  to  be  seen  as  a  product 
of  their  authors'  religious  or  moral  sensibilities.  My  working  hypothesis 
will  attempt  to  take  seriously  such  textual  evidence  as  e.  g.  lines  603ff., 
989-90,1324-47,  where  it  is  explicitly  said  that  the  plan  Odysseus  has 
undertaken  to  carry  out  is  divinely  ordained  and  sanctioned.  In  the 
present  section  I  shall  also  argue  that  this  working  hypothesis  is  never 
contradicted  and  may  actually  be  seen  to  underlie  a  number  of  earlier 
passages,  which  can  thus  function  as  reminders,  to  the  audience,  of 
Odysseus'  role  as  a  divine  agent.  -  In  the  following  sections  I  shall  attempt 
to  show  how  this  hypothesis  can  be  used  as  a  tool  for  the  overall 
interpretation  of  the  play,  and  how  it  coheres  with  the  Sophoclean 
`apophatism'. 
The  first  confirmation  of  our  hypothesis  seems  to  be  provided  as 
early  as  191-200:  not  only  was  the  accident  on  Chryse's  isle  ordered  by 
the  gods  (191-194),  but  also  Philoctetes'  present  misery  forms  part  of  a 
divine  plan  to  ensure  that  Troy  is  taken  at  the  right  time  (195-200). 
Neoptolemus  seems  to  have  no  doubt  that  the  Greek  mission  to  fetch 
Philoctetes  to  Troy  is  part  of  a  wider  divine  scheme.  5  It  is  consistent  with 
4  Some  scholars  -e.  g.  Musurillo  (1967:  127),  Segal  (1977:  141),  (1981:  331  with 
n.  8)  -hold  what  seems  to  me  a  compromise  view,  namely  that  Odysseus  is  "a 
twisted  instrument  of  the  divine  will".  Twisted  or  not,  he  is  a  divine  agent;  this 
is  why  he  "is  felt  as  a  presence  all  through  the  play"  (Kirkwood  [1958:  58]), 
although  at  the  end  Sophodes  allows  him  "to  fade  from  the  picture"  (Musurillo 
[1967:  114];  cf.  Taplin  [1978:  154]  and,  from  a  narratological  point  of  view, 
Roberts  [1989:  173])  -and  although  Odysseus  may  even  be  seen  to  display  comic 
features:  Taplin  (1971:  36-37),  Craik  (1979:  26-27),  Kirkwood  (1994:  29-3  1).  This 
"fading",  as  well  as  the  possible  comic  traits,  have  a  specific  dramatic  purpose, 
since,  as  we  shall  see,  the  dramatist  wants  the  divine  will  to  be  (until  1408) 
flouted. 
5  Neoptolemus  repeats  much  more  confidently  these  assumptions  at  1324-47:  see 
below,  p.  102f.;  on  the  `illogicality'  of  his  knowledge  see  below  p.  119f.  However, 
I  should  not  go  as  far  as  Pucci  (1994:  31-32)  who  sees  191-200  as  the  first  cryptic 
revelation  of  the  prophecy  itself,  all  they  indicate  is  Neoptolemus'  belief  in  the 
divine  sanctioning  of  their  mission.  The  importance  of  these  lines  has  been  all 
too  often  downplayed:  see  e.  g.  Kitto  (1956:  112),  (1961:  301);  Harsh  (1960:  413); 
Masaracchia  (1964:  86);  Rose  (1976:  65  with  n.  39).  Minadeo  (1993:  91-92with  n.  6) 75 
Neoptolemus'  confidence  in  the  divine  sanctioning  of  their  expedition 
that  he  should  bring  in  the  gods  at  a  point  at  which  his  deceitful  plan 
seems  to  have  been  successfully  concluded:  I  mean  the  notoriously 
ambiguous  528-29,  "Only  may  the  gods  convey  us  safely  out  of  this  land, 
and  hence  to  our  haven,  wheresoever  it  be!  ".  6  The  gods  are  also  brought 
in  by  the  Chorus  who  assist  Neoptolemus  in  carrying  out  the  deceitful 
plan:  at  391-402  (in  a  song  with  strong  cultic  resonances)  they  use  no  less 
than  the  name  of  the  mother  of  Zeus  himself,  the  goddess  Ge,  in  order  to 
support  a  blatant  lie,  namely  that  they  witnessed  the  Greeks  offend 
Neoptolemus  by  denying  him  his  father's  arms.  What  would  be  otherwise 
a  grave  blasphemy7  is  now  justified  because  deceit  furthers  the  plans  of 
the  gods.  It  is  no  use  pretending,  like  Gardiner  (1987:  24  with  n.  23),  that 
the  Chorus  avoids  blasphemy  by  invoking  a  foreign  goddess,  the  Phrygian 
Cybele;  as  Haldane  (1963:  56)  has  pointed  out,  "Sophocles  [...  ]  attempts 
perhaps  voices  an  assumption  implicitly  made  by  all  these  critics  when  he 
argues  (  in  the  belief  that  gods  must  be  fair  and  just)  that  "Neoptolemus' 
machinations  of  entrapment  and  deceit  disavow  any  real  faith  in  divine 
providence"  and  that  191-200  are  a  mere  excuse  that  Neoptolemus  makes  to 
himself,  in  order  to  justify  Philoctetes'  misfortunes;  so  also  Linforth  (1956: 
107).  Kirkwood  (1958:  80-81,144)  offers  a  similar  but  substantially  modified 
view.  -Lines  191-200are  no  doubt  inconsistent.  However,  Machin  (1981:  68-69) 
thinks  that  the  inconsistency  is  moderated  by  the  fact  that  Neoptolemus' 
assertions  about  the  divine  plan  are  presented  as  mere  hypotheses.  Hinds  (1967: 
176)  denies  that  there  is  any  inconsistency  at  all:  already  in  112  Neoptolemus 
knows  that  Philoctetes  must  come  to  Troy.  But  112  does  not  explain  Neoptolemus' 
assumption  that  Philoctetes'  plight  was  ordered  by  the  gods.  This  inconsistency 
has  a  point  and  should  not  be  explained  away:  see  below  p.  119f. 
6  Jebb's  translation.  On  the  ambiguity  see  further  S.  K.  Johnson  (1928b:  210).  On 
the  function  of  verbal  ambiguity  in  general  see  again  S.  K.  Johnson  (1928b:  210- 
11). 
7  See  e.  g.  Machin  (1981:  80),  Minadeo  (1993:  93).  Contra  Calder  (1971:  159  with 
n.  27)  on  the  assumption  that  the  Chorus  consists  of  Achilles'  Myrmidons  who, 
of  course,  had  witnessed  the  award  of  their  late  king's  arms  to  Odysseus.  But 
why  are  they  never  identified  as  such?  Stokes  (1988:  158-9)  is  at  pains  to  prove 
that  the  Chorus  do  not  literally  commit  perjury,  true,  but  they  call  on  the 
goddess  as  a  means  of  making  Neoptolemus'  lie  sound  more  credible. 76 
to  draw  the  foreign  goddess  more  closely  into  the  sphere  of  orthodox 
Greek  religion  by  identifying  her  [...  ]  with  the  Greek  Mother  of  the  Gods 
[...  ]  and  for  the  first  time  with  both  Ge  -  appositely  since  Ge  was  an 
oath  goddess  (I1.19.259,  cf.  3.278)  -  and  Rhea,  who  is  significantly 
referred  to  as  the  mother  of  Zeus".  8  The  blasphemy  is  avoided  only 
because  the  Chorus  with  their  lies  back  Neoptolemus'  efforts  to  carry  out 
the  divine  plan.  9  The  Chorus  continue  the  "same  misuse  of  religious 
matters"  10  in  the  antistrophe  (507-518)  too.  11  Their  advice  to 
Neoptolemus  to  take  Philoctetes  aboard  in  order  to  avoid  TaV  OEC3v 
VEýLEQLV  (517-8)  is  ambiguous:  it  can  refer  not  only  to  the  wrath  of  the 
. 
gods  for  offending  a  suppliant  (a  reference  to  Philoctetes'  invocation  of 
Zeus  Hikesios  at  484)  but  also  to  the  wrath  of  the  gods  if  Neoptolemus 
should  defy  their  plan  to  take  Philoctetes  to  Troy.  12  In  the  light  of  these 
considerations,  we  are  also  perhaps  allowed  to  conclude,  retrospectively, 
that  Odysseus'  invocation  of  Hermes  `the  trickster'  (8oxLos)13  and  of 
Athena  Nike  at  the  end  of  the  prologue  (133-34)  is  not  to  be  taken  as 
hypocritical  or  impious:  Odysseus  is  launching  a  deceitful  plan  In  order 
to  promote  what  he  knows  to  be  the  will  of  the  gods;.  so  he  quite  legiti- 
8  For  other  attempts  to  exculpate  the  Chorus  see  Adams  (1957:  143-44),  and  more 
recently  Webster  (pp.  95-96passim),  well  refuted  by  Bers  (1981:  502-503).  Segal 
(1981:  324)  adds  an  interesting  remark:  "the  rather  jarring  intrusion  of 
Odysseus'  patronymic,  `son  of  Laertes',  into  the  attributes  of  Earth  in  "  the  last 
line  (402)  is  a  reminder  of  Odyssean  guile  and  of  the  practice  of  that  guile  in 
the  very  lie  which  this  ode  attempts  to  support.  " 
9  As  to  whether  the  divine  will,  as  expressed  in  Helenus'  prophecy,  allows 
deceit,  see  below  pp.  83-85. 
10  Reinhardt  (1979:  267  n.  9). 
11  The  correspondence  in  content  between  strophe  and  antistrophe  is  probably 
underlined  by  the  correspondence  in  form,  as  Gardiner  (1987:  29-30)  has 
convincingly  shown.  Cook  (1968:  91)  is,  I  think,  wrong  when  he  states  that  in 
507-18  "the  same  heavy  dochmiacs  and  bacchiacs  express  a  pity  this  time 
unfeigned!  " 
12  On  the  Chorus'  ruse  here  cf.  Bowra  (1944:  273);  Linforth  (1956:  114);  Adams 
(1957:  145  );  Rose  (1976:  68-69);  Segal  (1977:  138). 77 
mately  invokes  their  assistance.  No  doubt,  such  an  invocation  may,  seem 
irreligious  to  some  modern  readers,  14  but  presumably  it  was  -  not  con- 
sidered  as  such  by  Sophocles  himself:  to  take  only  one  example,  at  S.  E1. 
1395-9715  Hermes  is  supposed  to  assist  Orestes'  deceitful  plan  which  has 
been  sanctioned  expressis  verbis  by  Apollo  himself  (35-7). 
As  I  mentioned  above  (p.  73),  that  Odysseus  knows  and  tries  to 
carry  out  the  divine  plan  is  explicitly  stated  in  (or  can  be  inferred  from) 
such  passages  as  605-619,1324-1347  and,  most  strikingly,  989-990,  where 
Odysseus  declares  in  the  strongest  possible  terms  that  the  whole  plan  of 
capturing  Philoctetes  was  a  decision  made  by  Zeus  himself  (990  Zeig,  w" 
6E8oKTat.  Taü6'),  and  that  he  is  merely  his  servant.  Philoctetes'  resentful 
objections  (991-2)  he  counters  with  the  flat  and  straightforward  answer 
that  with  his  actions  he  shows  the  gods  to  be  truthful  (993)  -  which 
indeed  will  turn  out  to  be  the  case  when  Heracles  will  demand 
Philoctetes'  presence  at  Troy.  16  What  is  more,  Odysseus'  claims  are  never 
doubted  either  by  Neoptolemus  or  by  the  Chorus.  Indeed,  the  Chorus 
(1116-17),  in  reply  to  Philoctetes'  complaints  about  Odysseus'  deceitful 
plan  which  deprived  him  of  his  bow,  state:  "this  [i.  e.  Philoctetes'  present 
13  On  Hermes  86XLos  see  e.  g.  Garvie  (1986:  ad  726-7). 
14  Fraenkel  (1977:  47),  for  instance,  thought  that  especially  the  invocation  of 
Athena  would  be  a  "mostruositä"  for  the  pious  Sophocles;  so,  he  wished  to  delete 
133-34!  (see  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  [1990b:  181]  for  an  answer).  Similarly  Calder 
(1971:  169n.  94)  and  Kitto  (1961:  300).  Contra  rightly  Schucard  (1973/74:  137). 
is  A  parallel  adduced  also  by  Webster  (ad  133).  Cf.  A.  Cho.  726-9. 
16  Bowra  (1944:  284):  "He  [sc.  Odysseus]  believes  that  he  is  carrying  out  the  gods' 
will,  and  he  is  not  to  be  suspected  of  hypocrisy  [...  ]"  (my  italics);  cf.  Linforth 
(1956:  134);  Alt  (1961:  164);  Reinhardt  (1979:  185);  Minadeo  (1993:  99).  Contra 
Harsh  (1960:  409-410);  Musurillo  (1967:  113).  Gellie  (1972:  151)  rightly  sees  that 
"when  Odysseus  replies  `No,  I  make  them  truthful'  (993),  we  are  forced  to  give 
at  least  intellectual  assent.  "  Segal  (1977:  141-42),  albeit  doubting  the  sincerity  of 
Odysseus'  claiming  to  be  the  servant  of  Zeus,  sees  a  deep  irony  in  that  Odysseus 
is  the  one  who  will  eventually  turn  out  to  be  in  harmony  with  the  gods'  will.  As 
Kirkwood  (1958:  260)  remarks,  Heracles  "substantiates  Odysseus'  claim,  making 
clear  beyond  all  doubt  that  it  is  the  will  of  Zeus  that  Philoctetes  go  to  Troy".  See 
below,  p.  110f. 78 
state]  is  your  destiny  ordained  by  the  gods  (76Tµo9  ... 
8aLµ6vuw  Tä8'), 
and  not  a  deceit  contrived  by  me"117  True,  the  Chorus  may  be  mainly 
concerned  to  maintain  good  relations  with  Philoctetes  (cf.  1121):  they 
indicatively  urge  him  to  direct  his  curses  not  against  them,  but  against 
those  responsible  (1120)  -  presumably  Odysseus,  or  even  perhaps 
Neoptolemus.  But  it  is  significant  that  they  should  mention,  in  the  same 
breath,  both  the  gods  and  Odysseus  as  responsible  for  what  Philoctetes 
has  suffered.  The  deceitful  plan  against  Philoctetes  is  to  be  seen  in  the 
context  of  divinely  ordained  destiny.  To  restate  my  working  hypothesis  in 
the  light  of  the  corroborative  evidence  adduced  above:  Odysseus',  actions, 
albeit  morally  objectionable,  are  to  be  seen  as  promoting  the  divine  will; 
and  his  assertion  (989-90)  that  he  is  the  carrier-out  of  plans  decreed  by 
Zeus  himself  is  to  be  taken  seriously. 
I  have  repeatedly  used  the  phrase  "the  will  of  the  gods"  or  "the 
divine  plan"  with  reference  to  Philoctetes'  coming  to  Troy.  It  may  be 
objected  that  this  misrepresents  the  facts:  a  great  number  of  scholars18 
have  argued  that  the  prophecy,  because  negatively  /  conditionally 
phrased  ("Troy  will  not  be  taken,  unless  Philoctetes'  bow  is  used":  68-69, 
611-13,  cf.  also  1329-1335),  implies  that  Philoctetes'  coming  to  Troy  is 
not  demanded  by  the  gods,  but  is  left  at  the  Greeks'  discretion.  This  I 
cannot  accept:  early  in  the  play  Neoptolemus  views  the  sack  of  Troy  by 
Philoctetes'  shafts  as  a  divinely  ordained  necessity  (195-200;  NB  200 
ypi  vai);  this  is  confirmed  by  Odysseus  at  998  (TpoLav  (Y'  E  Env  8¬t...  ), 
17  Cf.  Beye  (1970:  73):  "As  the  chorus  proceeds  to  make  clear  (1083  ff.  ),  [sic,  read: 
1118ff.  ]  the  action  is  destined,  Odysseus  is  acting  as  destiny's  agent  as 
Philoctetes  is  its  victim.  "  See  also  Poe  (1974:  25).  On  the  sincerity  of  the  Chorus 
see  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  294n.  44).  They  must  be  regarded  as  much  more 
knowledgeable  about  the  gods'  plans  than  Segal  (1977:  137-38)  thinks. 
18  E.  g.  Jebb  (xxvi);  Kitto  (1956:  136);  Linforth  (1956:  153);  D.  B.  Robinson  (1969: 
52)  with  strong  argumentation;  Gellie  (1972:  155-56);  Schmidt  (1973:  43-4); 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  300  n.  62).  For  criticism  see  Vidal-Naquet  (1972:  167 
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and  by  Neoptolemus  at  1339  (c's  FED  yEVEQeaL  TaüTa)1`9  and  at  1340-41 
((s  EQT'  aVa'yKr1  TOD  1TapEQT6T09  eEpouc  I  Tpo(av  ä)  3vaL  Trdaav).  20 
The  above  passages,  in  combination  with  the  prophecy  as  reported 
(conditionally)  at  611-13  and  1329-35,  form  a  simple  syllogism  which 
leads  to  the  conclusion  that  Philoctetes'  coming  to  Troy  is  obligatory: 
a)  if  Philoctetes  does  not  come,  Troy  will  not  fall  (611-13,1329-35) 
b)  Troy  must  fall  during  the  summer  (1340-41;  cf.,  for  the  idea  of 
necessity,  200,998,1339) 
CONCLUSION:  Philoctetes  must  come  to  Troy. 
The  audience's  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  Troy  did  eventually  fall  to  the 
Greeks  must  have,  no  doubt,  reinforced  their  sense  of  the  necessity  of 
Philoctetes'  coming  to  Troy.  21 
Before  bringing  this  section  to  a  close,  I  shall  endeavour  further  to 
corroborate  the  view  propounded  here  by  anticipating  two  objections 
that  might  be  raised  against  it.  First,  at  the  problematic  and  much 
discussed  lines  839-842  Neoptolemus  seems  to  realize  suddenly  that  his 
obedience  to  Odysseus  and,  consequently,  his  whole  course  of  action  up 
to  this  point  has  been  in  stark  opposition  to  the  divine  will  (cf.  esp.  841 
eE  ös)  :  it  is  not  the  bow  alone  that  is  required;  it  Is  Philoctetes  and  the 
bow.  However,  Odysseus  never  really  said  that  only  the  bow,  and  not 
Philoctetes,  was  to  be  fetched  to  Troy;  his  instructions  in  the  prologue 
19  The  importance  of  this  line  D.  B.  Robinson  (1969:  52)  tries  to  belittle;  Segal 
(1977:  140n.  19)  sets  things  straight. 
20  Cf.  already  921-2  'rroXXý  KPcTEL  I  To)TCJV  äväyKti.  On  the  importance  of 
`Shicksal'  in  the  play  cf.  Alt  (1961:  144,161,164,167-8  and  passim). 
21  Cf.  Hoppin  (1981:  29  n.  56),  although  she  exaggerates  the  point.  Jebb  (p.  xxvi) 
labours  to  reconcile  the  allegedly  conditional  character  of  the  prophecy  with 
its  obligatory  quality  as  revealed  in  such  passages  as  1340-1:  "The  Greeks  would 
understand  this  [i.  e.  the  prophecy]  only  in  a  conditional  sense,  since  he  [i.  e. 
Helenus]  had  told  them  that  their  victory  depended  on  the  return  of  Philoctetes 
(611ff.  ).  But  the  absolute  statement  in  v.  1340  is  intelligible,  if  the  seer  be 
conceived  as  having  a  prevision  of  the  event,  and  therefore  a  conviction  that, 
by  some  means,  Philoctetes  would  be  brought".  This,  as  well  as  being 
speculative,  amounts  to  having  one's  cake  and  eating  it. 80 
have  been  deliberately  vague,  with  the  result  that  it  has  remained 
unclear  whether  it  is  Philoctetes  or  only  his  weapons  that  are  needed. 
Whereas  at  68-9  and  77-8  the  emphasis  is  on  the  bow,  at  14,90,101-3, 
107  (Xaf36VTa  [XnO6VTa  Blaydes],  where  EKEI.  VOV  [SC.  (DLXOKT1jTgV]  is  to  be 
supplied  from  106)  we  hear  that  it  is  Philoctetes  who  must  come  to  Troy. 
The  ambiguity  is  further  complicated  by  the  use  of  such  verbs  as  a'LpEty 
and  Xa.  tpaVE  LV  at  14  and  101;  for,  as  Knox  (1964:  187  n.  20)  remarks,  "to 
`take'  or  `capture'  Philoctetes  might  be  necessary  to  get  the  bow,  but  the 
words  used  by  Odysseus  do  not  necessarily  imply  taking  him  to  Troy  as 
Neoptolemos'  a'yELV  [90,102]  does.  "22  This  ambiguity  is  set  out  with 
particular  force  in  the  contrast  between  112  (TOÜTOV  [sc.  (DLX0KT>1Tr  v]  Es 
Tpo'Lav  µoAEty)  and  113  (a.  'LpE  t  Tä  T6ýa  TaOTa  Tip  Tpo(aV  µdva).  23 
And  although  the  matter  seems  for  the  moment  to  be  settled  with  lines 
115-16  (which  imply  that  it  is  the  bow  that  Neoptolemus  will  have  to  get 
hold  of),  there  come  a  little  later  lines  197-200  which  contain,  in 
22  Or,  as  Gill  (1980:  145  n.  20)  has  put  it,  "this  [i.  e.  86X  y  >aßEiv  etc.  ]  may  simply 
mean  `tricking'  Philoctetes  to  make  him  give  up  his  bow".  NB,  however,  that,  as 
Hoppin  (1981:  11  n.  20)  points  out,  AäßoLc  at  103  can  only  mean  "to  capture  (not 
`trick')  Philoctetes"  (because  of  irpöc  Aav  and  because  it  answers  Neoptolemus' 
dyewv  at  102);  this  probably  holds  for  107  too  (because  of  the  precedence  of  the 
unambiguous  103).  That  Odysseus  generally  stresses  the  bow  rather  than 
Philoctetes  does  not  mean  that  he  is  after  the  bow  only  (thus  misunderstanding 
the  oracle):  if  Philoctetes  is  to  be  captured,  his  unerring  bow  must  first  be 
taken  from  him;  see  Linforth  (1956:  103);  Hinds  (1967:  171-2);  Steidle  (1968:  172- 
3);  D.  B.  Robinson  (1969:  49);  Hoppin  (1981:  10,12-3);  Seale  (1982:  30).  Cf.  also 
below  n.  27. 
23  On  the  ambiguities  of  these  passages  (pace  e.  g.  Linforth  [1956:  101-4], 
Masaracchia  [1964:  84],  Musurillo  [1967:  112  n.  1],  Steidle  [1968:  172]  and,  most 
forcefully,  Hoppin  [1981:  10-15])  see  primarily  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz  (1917: 
273-7,302-6);  also:  Waldock  (1951:  199);  Hinds  (1967:  176-77);  D.  B.  Robinson  (1969: 
49);  Gellie  (1972:  133-34,  cf.  145);  Seale  (1972:  95-96),  (1982:  30);  Easterling  (1978a: 
27,30).  I  am  not  convinced  by  Craik  (1979:  19-21,22)  who  sees  melodramatic 
qualities  in  these  ambiguities.  J.  A.  Johnson  (1988)  has  recently  argued  that  the 
bow  is  both  necessary  and  sufficient  for  the  sack  of  Troy;  but  this  is 
unacceptable. 81 
Neoptolemus'  mouth,  a  significant  ambiguity.  Their  obvious  meaning  is 
that,  as  e.  g.  Webster  (p.  84)  writes,  "in  spite  of  Odysseus,  Neoptolemus  has 
no  doubt  that  Philoctetes  must  himself  use  the  bow".  Nonetheless,  the 
pronoun  Töv8E  (197)  creates  an  ambiguity,  which,  to  my  knowledge,  has 
gone  unnoticed:  it  may  well  refer  to  Philoctetes,  although  he  Is  not  pre- 
sent;  24  on  the  other  hand,  88E  (or  ME  6  avTlp  and  sim.  )  is  common 
tragic  idiom  for  "I".  Thus,  Neoptolemus'  words  may  be  taken  to  mean  a) 
that  the  gods  want  Philoctetes  to  use  the  bow  on  time  (such  an 
interpretation  of  his  words  might  be  retrospectively  supported  by  e.  g.  the 
"false  departures"25  at  533ff.,  645ff.,  730ff.,  which  suggest  that  the  youth 
has  in  mind  to  take  Philoctetes  with  him)  or  b)  that  the  gods  want  him 
to  use  the  bow  on  time;  26  it  would  be  only  natural  for  the  ambitious 
young  man  to  think  that  he  is  after  all  the  one  who  will  use  the  bow, 
especially  in  view  of  114-1527  (retrospective  support  for  such  an 
Interpretation  might  be  provided  by  such  lines  as  654-67,774-75,  which 
evince  Neoptolemus'  desire  for  the  bow  itself).  This  is  a  very  instructive 
example  of  Sophocles'  ability  to  make  dramatic  capital  of  his  use  of 
verbal  ambiguity.  To  conclude,  the  notorious  839-842  are  by  no  means  a 
non  sequitur,  nor  do  they  imply  that  Odysseus  has  misinterpreted  the 
prophecy:  for,  up  to  this  point,  its  terms  have  been  left  deliberately  vague 
and  ambiguous. 
24  On  ö&  referring  "to  someone  not  present  on  the  stage  but  clearly  implied  by 
the  context  and  visible  to  the  speaker's  imagination"  see  Garvie  (1986:  ad  893). 
25  Onwhich  see  Hinds  (1967:  172-73);  Seale  (1972:  98-100);  Taplin  (1978:  67-9). 
26  "On  time"  in  Neoptolemus'  case  might  seem  somewhat  dissonant,  but  it  is  not: 
the  young  man  had  also  to  wait  for  ten  years,  in  order  to  take  over  his  father's 
position  in  the  Greek  army.  Cf.  Kieffer  (1942:  48):  "Neoptolemus  [...  ]  is  still 
thinking  of  the  time  fated  for  the  capture  of  Troy  as  determined  by  his  own 
coming  of  fighting  age". 
27  Kirkwood  (1958:  80)  and  Hinds  (1967:  172),  after  the  scholiast  on  68  (p.  352 
Papageorgius),  rightly  suggest  that  Odysseus  in  115  puts  emphasis  on  the  bow 
and  not  on  Philoctetes,  in  order  not  to  undercut  Neoptolemus'  ambitious 
enthusiasm  (cf.  also  above,  n.  22).  The  young  man  himself  seems,  in  352-53,  to 
admit  this  trait  of  his  personality,  on  which  see  e.  g.  Segal  (1977:  145), 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  283). 82 
A  second  possible  objection  to  my  interpretation  would  be  that  in 
1054ff.  Odysseus,  bow  in  hand,  professes  himself  determined  to  depart  to 
Troy,  leaving  Philoctetes  behind.  Nonetheless,  there  is  evidence  to  suggest 
that  Odysseus  is  bluffing  in  order  to  lure  the  obdurate  exile  into  fighting 
for  the  Greek  cause  (this  is  in  accordance  with  the  prophecy's 
requirement  for  TTE  L6c',  on  which  see  below  p.  84f.,  as  it  can  be  regarded  as 
a  combination  of  crafty  TrEL6ch  with  what  Dio  Chrysostom  [52.2]  has 
called  TTELOt  ävayKaLa,  i.  e.  blackmail).  28  For  otherwise  his  attempt 
verbally  to  persuade  Philoctetes  to  come  to  Troy  (997-8)  would  be 
pointless;  nor  would  he  have  reasons  to  prevent  him  from  committing 
suicide  (1003).  29  The  Chorus  seem  to  further  Odysseus'  bluff:  in  a  lengthy 
epirrhematic  scene  (1081-1216),  in  which  Philoctetes  "swallows  Odysseus' 
bait"  (Calder  [1971:  162]),  30  the  Chorus  try  to  convince  him  that  he  must 
grasp  the  opportunity  and  come  to  Troy  where  he  will  be  healed;  indeed, 
taking  up  Odysseus'  bluffing  techniques,  they  even  pretend  to  be 
determined  to  leave  the  island  (1178-80),  thereby  causing  a  desperate 
response  on  Philoctetes'  part  (1181-5).  What  is  more,  Neoptolemus  seems 
to  grasp  his  superior's  true  intentions  when  he  expresses  the  hope  that, 
while  they  are  at  the  seashore  making  ready  their  departure,  Philoctetes 
28 
... 
&4aipo6pEv  c  yE  T(Sv  61Tkwv  fV  I>L?  oKT1  TTS  61T6  TOÜ  '  08UQQE  WS  KaL  6T6!; 
ELS  TTýV  TPOLQV  ävayöµEVOs,  TO'  µEV  1TJýEOV  EKÜ  V,  TO'  6E  TL  KQL  1TELOOt  ävayKaLa, 
EITEL8h  T(V  0'1TÄuJV  ECTTEP70 
.... 
Cf.  primarily  Hoppin  (1981:  5-6  with  n.  14,24-5); 
Schlesinger  (1968:  118,123-4).  On  Odysseus'  bluff  see  also:  Kitto  (1956:  98,124); 
Linforth  (1956:  135-6);  Erbse  (1966:  184);  Hinds  (1967:  177-78);  Calder  (1971:  160- 
62);  Gellie  (1972:  151-2);  Reinhardt  (1979:  186);  and,  hesitantly,  Waldock  (1951: 
213),  Webster  (ad  1055),  and  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  293).  Further 
bibliography  in  Steidle  (1968:  171  n.  10).  Contra  e.  g.  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz 
(1917:  302-7);  Knox  (1964:  134);  Steidle  (1968:  171);  D.  B.  Robinson  (1969:  45-51); 
Taplin  (1971:  35-36  with  n.  24),  (1978:  49  with  n.  17);  Garvie  (1972:  220);  Rose 
(1976:  93  with  n.  90);  Blundell  (1989:  208  n.  89).  Seale  (1972:  99-100)  and  Poe  (1974: 
11,20-21)  remain  agnostic. 
29  Knox  (1964:  192  n.  38)  tries  unsuccessfully  to  answer  these  objections. 
30  Garvie  (1972:  222)  seems  to  regard  this  scene  as  an  attempt  at  honest 
persuasion.  For  the  Chorus  as  an  active  dramatis  persona  see  Jebb  (p.  xxix), 
Kirkwood  (1958:  184ff.  ). 83 
may  "make  a  more  profitable  decision"  for  them  (1078-9).  31  Finally,  even 
when  Neoptolemus  reacts  against  Odysseus'  practices  (1222ff.  ),  he  never 
as  much  as  mentions  Odysseus'  supposed  intention  cruelly  to  make  off 
with  the  bow  leaving  Philoctetes  behind;  it  is  only  to  the  dishonesty  of  the 
means  used  by  him  that  he  objects  (1228  äzräTaLQLv 
... 
SöXois,  1234, 
1246,1251a)  -  which  is  conspicuously  less  than  what  one  should  expect, 
if  Odysseus'  professed  intention  to  abandon  Philoctetes  was  more  than  a 
bluff.  32  That  Odysseus  meticulously  adheres  to  the  prophecy's 
requirement  for  TrE  LOW'  is  further  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that,  despite 
his  threats  (983,985,1297-98),  he  never  uses  force  (except,  of  course,  in 
order  to  prevent  Philoctetes  from  killing  himself:  1003).  33  Thus,  in  1054ff. 
he  avoids  having  Philoctetes  led  handcuffed  to  Troy,  although  he 
certainly  has  the  power  to  do  so  -a  behaviour  that  is  inexplicable  unless 
we  assume  that  Odysseus  strictly  obeys  that  clause  of  the  prophecy  which 
explicitly  precludes  violence.  I  regard  as  insubstantial  (nay,  erroneous) 
the  objection,  raised  by  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz  (1917:  306-7)  and  D.  B. 
Robinson  (1969:  45),  34  that,  if  the  audience  are  meant  to  perceive 
Odysseus'  threatened  abandonment  of  Philoctetes  as  a  mere  bluff,  then 
the  emotional  power  of  the  kommos  at  1081ff.  is  severely  diminished.  For 
one  thing,  such  an  argument  would  collapse  in  the  face  of  a  Sophoclean 
parallel  that  has  strangely  been  missed  so  far,  namely  S.  Ei.  1126ff.:  there, 
the  audience  know  full  well  that  Orestes  is  alive  and,  indeed,  standing 
before  Electra;  still,  this  hardly  detracts  from  the  emotionality  of  her 
lament.  35  More  importantly,  the  scene  acquires  much  greater  dramatic 
31  Cf.  further  Hoppin  (1981:  25  n.  50).  Contra  Stokes  (1988:  164). 
32  Cf.  also  Hoppin  (1981:  27). 
33  Cf.  Hinds  (1967:  179),  Beye  (1970:  73),  Hoppin  (1981:  19  n.  37,25-6),  pace  e.  g. 
Garvie  (1972:  219-22  with  nn.  21,26),  Gellie  (1972:  151),  Minadeo  (1993:  94  with 
n.  8).  On  the  contrary,  it  Is  Odysseus  himself  who  later  (1299)  becomes  the  target 
of  Philoctetes'  bow! 
34  And  endorsed  by  Garvie  (1972:  220). 
35  Vickers  (1973:  570)  thought  that  it  is  "impossible  for  us  to  be  really  moved  by 
[Electra's]  sorrow  at  the  news  of  Orestes  death,  for  the  news  is  false  and  her 
sorrow  comes  to  seem  false,  worked  up.  "  This  I  find  unacceptable. 84 
tension  and  pathos  if  we  do  assume  a  bluff  on  Odysseus'  part:  for  only  on 
such  an  assumption  can  an  audience  be  faced  with  the  distressing 
possibility  that  Philoctetes'  heroic  resistance  might  actually  break  down 
under  the  pressure  of  what  we  know  to  be  no  more  than  a  (divinely 
ordained!  )  sham.  Could  anything  strike  us  as  more  demeaning  for  a  hero 
of  Philoctetes'  calibre?  36  An  audience  consisting  of  Wilamowitzes  and 
Robinsons  would  completely  miss  the  dramatic  potential  of  this  scene:  for 
them,  all  Philoctetes  is  now  left  with  is  the  prospect  of  certain  death; 
there  are  no  choices  to  be  made.  37  For  such  an  audience  the  Chorus' 
persistence  at  1095ff.  would  be,  at  best,  driven  by  humanitarian  concerns, 
and,  at  worst,  dramatically  pointless;  and  the  drama  should  be  soon 
drawn  to  an  end. 
We  can  now  attempt  to  reach  a  final  conclusion,  as  far  as  Odysseus' 
dramatic  function  in  the  play  is  concerned.  The  gods,  we  hear,  want 
Philoctetes  to  come  to  Troy  by  means  of  TrELed)  (cf.  612  7rELQavTEc  X67(9, 
which  admittedly  forms  part  of  the  Emporos'38  ambiguous  story  but  is 
never  doubted  by  anyone).  Now,  1TEL6w  has  a  socially  desirable  aspect  and 
a  socially  undesirable  one.  Buxton  (1982:  64-66)  gives  a  good  account  of 
the  existing  evidence  about  this  fundamental  ambiguity:  e.  g.  In  A.  Cho. 
726  HE  L66  is  qualified  by  the  epithet  6oXia;  besides,  "the  Hesiodic  femme 
fatale  in  the  adorning  of  whom  Peitho  was  said  to  have  participated  is 
described  elsewhere  by  Hesiod  as  a  dolos  (Th.  589,  W.  D.  83)"  (Buxton,  op. 
cit  p.  65);  and  Hera's  "deception  of  Zeus"  in  Iliad  14  "is  perfectly 
summed  up  in  the  phrase  pei  tho  dolia,  `tricky  persuasion"'  (Buxton  l.  c.  ). 
36  The  importance  of  this  point  has  been  made  clearer  to  me  by  Hoppin's  (1981: 
26)  lucid  treatment. 
37  Contra  Taplin  (1971:  35):  "the  desertion  and  helplessness  of  Philoctetes  must 
be  taken  seriously.  We,  the  audience,  must  believe  that  he  is  faced  with  the 
choice  of  going  to  Troy,  or  of  starving  to  death;  for  we  know  of  no  alternative.  " 
But  surely  if  we  take  the  desertion  seriously,  then  Philoctetes  is  faced  with  no 
choice  whatsoever:  Odysseus  has  made  off  with  the  bow,  which  he  or  Teucer 
will  use  to  capture  Troy,  with  Philoctetes  being  left  on  Lemnos  forever. 
381  use  Emporos  (='traveller')  throughout,  as  the  usual  `Merchant'  or  `Trader' 
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Of  the  greatest  interest  to  us  are  Buxton's  (pp.  65-66)  conclusions:  "In 
some  contexts,  then,  peitho  is  characterized  by  frankness,  and  is  opposed 
to  dolos  and  indeed  to  any  subversion  of  the  normal  values  of  the  polls. 
This  is  the  socially  desirable  peitho  [...  ].  But  other  contexts  emphasize 
that  peitho  can  have  another  face,  which  retains  the  seductiveness  of  its 
twin,  but  uses  that  seductiveness  to  put  the  values  of  the  polls  in 
jeopardy.  So,  far  from  being  opposed  to  dolos,  this  peitho  may  become 
virtually  indistinguishable  from  it.  [emphasis  mine]  ...  This  ambiguity  Is 
one  of  peitho's  fundamental  qualities.  "39  Thus,  Odysseus,  in  advocating 
deceit  instead  of  honest  persuasion,  is  anything  but  disobeying  the  divine 
requirement  for  TTE  Lew:  verbal  trickery  is  still  TrE  LM,  albeit  with  its  'anti- 
social'  aspect  prevailing.  This  is  confirmed  by  Philoctetes  when  he 
protests  to  Neoptolemus  (1268-69):  KäL  Ta  TrpLv  Tap  EK  Xöywv  I  Kalov 
KQKGJS  ETrpaýa  QOtS  TTELQOELc  AÖyoLc.  `° 
39  Cf.  also  Blundell  (1989:  190),  who  aptly  defines  persuasion  as  "the  honest 
counterpart  of  deception  (since  both  employ  words  rather  than  deeds)",  and 
Hoppin  (1981:  18-19with  n.  34),  with  excellent  argumentation.  Cf.  also  Linforth 
(1956:  115);  Garvie  (1972:  218  n.  16);  Gellie  (1972:  144);  Poe  (1974:  26); 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  292).  -  Buxton,  however,  fails  to  apply  his 
conclusions  on  the  duality  of  TCEL@w  to  the  specific  case  of  the  Philoctetes. 
Schlesinger  (1968:  122-4),  albeit  fully  aware  of  the  ambiguity  of  TTELOth,  insists 
that  it  is  honest  persuasion  that  is  meant  by  rrEtoavTE9  X6yw  (612). 
40  Cf.  Hinds  (1967:  179).  On  the  association  between  TrELOth,  Myos  and  äTräTTI  cf. 
Gorgias  (82  B  11.8  D.  -K.  ):  XÖyog  6  nEivas  Kal  TiIV  uXTIv  änaTnvac;  also  ibid. 
11.11:  8UOL  8E  &UOUc  ITEPL  ÖQCAV  K(IL  ETrELQaV  Kai,  TTEteOVaL  8E  ttiiEuS  Xiyov 
Trk.  aavTEc;  cf.  Rose  (1977:  83),  Blundell  (1987:  327).  Admittedly,  at  102 
Neoptolemus  does  make  a  distinction  between  8oXos  and  TIE  LAh;  but  this  is  simply 
the  only  possible  way  of  distinguishing,  in  Greek,  tricky  persuasion  from 
honest  persuasion,  and  does  not  imply  that  TrELOt  cannot  be  8oXia  as  well. 
Neoptolemus'  typical  preference  for  straightforward  means  (force  or  honest 
persuasion)  has  to  be  established  as  early  as  that,  as  it  will  prove  to  be 
dramatically  crucial  in  the  Emporos  scene:  see  below,  pp.  92-99. 86 
2.2.1  Increasing  understanding  of.  and  increasing  deviation 
from,  the  prophecy 
In  the  parodos,  the  Chorus  ask  their  commander  about  the  course  of 
action  that  is  to  be  followed  (135-143),  only  to  realize  that  Neoptolemus 
is  not  quite  certain  either:  his  answer  (144-9)  is  a  rather  self-evident 
statement,  and  this  is  the  point  of  the  Chorus'  remark  (150):  Ii  Aov 
Trä\aL  tEXflµä  µoL  XyELc,  ävaý 
... 
1  The  young  man,  being  at  a  loss, 
often  can  do  no  more  than  repeat  verbatim  Odysseus'  words:  42  159-60 
OLKOV  [...  ]  ä14LBvpov  11TETpLVTIc  KOLTTIS  -  16  8LQTOI  Oc  TTETpa,  32 
OLKOTTOLÖS  [...  ]  Tp0ft  162-63  87ýXov  EµoLy'  (iJs  ýOpßýs  XPELCL 
I  QTLßOV 
07ýLEVE1  TýFE  TTEXag  Trou  -  40-41  avgp  KaTOLKEt  TOÜQSE  TOU9  TOTrOUs 
as  63s  I  K&QT'  oÜX'  EKCIc  TTOU  &  43  ä)J\'  1F  'TTL  4Opf3ijs  VOCYTOV43 
E  ýE  Xi  Xu6E  V  ... 
(the  Chorus  too  sometimes  echo  Odysseus,  e.  g.  156  µiß 
1rpOQTTEQGJV  µE  Xä&I  TTOeEV  46  µiß  KC  LL  µE  TTpOQTTEQGJV).  -'4  These 
verbal  echoes,  as  well  as  showing  Neoptolemus'  ignorance,  pinpoint  his 
complete  compliance  with  his  commander's  orders.  Significantly,  when 
the  Chorus  (169-90)  express  their  sympathy  for  the  man  who  has  had  to 
go  through  unimaginable  hardship  in  order  to  survive,  45  Neoptolemus 
asseverates,  in  a  matter-of-fact  tone,  that  this  misery,  as  well  as  their 
mission,  are  part  of  a  divine  plan  (191-200,  on  which  see  above,  p. 
74f.  ).  46  Despite  his  ignorance  (or,  perhaps,  because  of  it),  his  commitment 
41  I  cannot  see  how  Masaracchia  (1964:  85)  concludes  that  Neoptolemus  knows 
exactly  what  Odysseus  wants  him  to  do.  See  Minadeo  (1993:  91). 
42  Cf.  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  284  n.  14).  I  cannot  agree  with  Inoue  (1979:  223 
n.  19)  that  Neoptolemus'  echoing  of  Odysseus  indicates  a  dissonance  between 
them. 
43  For  various  attempts  to  emend  vöoTOV  (of  which  Toup's  ý  µaaTÜV  seems  the 
best)  see  I1oyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  180). 
44  Cf.  Gardiner  (1987:  20  with  n.  11).  For  further  echoes  see  Schmidt  (1973:  50). 
45  Contra  Gardiner  (1987:  18)  who  thinks  that  the  Chorus'  "statement  is  hardly 
an  emotional  commitment". 
46  Cf.  Kott  (1974:  168). 87 
to  the  cause  is  absolute. 
Nonetheless,  this  absolute  commitment  will  be  eventually  shaken 
by  the  gradual  revelation  of  Philoctetes'  pitiable  state.  Even  before 
Philoctetes  appears,  Neoptolemus  becomes  increasingly  acquainted  with 
the  miserable  conditions  of  his  life.  In  the  prologue  Neoptolemus  gains  a 
preliminary  knowledge  of  Philoctetes'  miserable  manner  of  life  from  the 
observation  of  inanimate  objects  (33,35-6,38-9).  47  The  discovery  in 
progress  is  repeatedly  marked  by  a  remarkable  accumulation  of  words 
denoting  visual  or  mental  perception:  27  daopdv,  30  Spa,  31  Opci),  37 
rnqµaLvECS,  40  a#wc.  A  similar  accumulation  of  such  verba  perciplendi 
is  also  to  be  noted  in  135ff.,  where  Neoptolemus  invites  the  Chorus  to  join 
him  in  the  observation  of  inanimate  objects  (Philoctetes'  cave):  145 
Trpooi8Ety,  146  BEpKOV,  155  µa6Ety,  159  öpäs,  162  &fiXov.  Soon  however 
they  are  to  have  direct  experience  of  the  man  himself:  it  Is  noteworthy 
that  the  theme  of  visual  preception  is  now  abruptly  abandoned,  and  we 
are  presented  with  a  concentration  of  words  denoting  aural  perception 
instead:  201  TrpoucßävrJ  KTOTTOS  205-209  ßcJA  c,  ßcß  c  µ'  ... 
I  ý6oyyä 
[...  ]  oü8E  µE  Xd-  16EC  [...  ]  av8ä  [...  ]  8cämlµa  yap  6privEt.  49  Philoctetes, 
trying  to  establish  contact  with  the  Greeks,  stresses  the  verbal  /  aural 
aspect  of  their  communication:  225  4wvrjs,  äKOÜQac,  229  4wmlcraT',  230 
ävTaµEt  Jaa6',  234  4wvrl  ia,  235  Trpoaý6Eyµa,  238  yEywvE.  50  The 
emphasis  on  aural  experience  serves  to  play  down,  on  the  verbal  level,  the 
new  visual  experience  offered  on  the  theatrical  level,  now  that 
Neoptolemus  actually  sees  the  man  he  has  only  heard  of  -  an  experience 
47  See  on  this  point  Rose  (1976:  58-59),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  290),  and 
especially  Inoue  (1979:  218-220). 
48  On  the  `synaesthesia'  (blending  of  different  senses  [hearing  and  sight]  into 
the  same  image)  here  cf.  also  189,216,  and  see  C.  P.  Segal,  ICIS  2  (1977)  92. 
49  Op1vE  i  Dindorf  :  Opo¬  t  MSS.  See  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  183-84). 
50  Cf.  Podlecki  (1966b:  235-6);  Buxton  (1982:  121). 88 
which  is  undoubtedly  much  more  crude  and  direct.  51  For  the  time  being, 
the  effect  of  Philoctetes'  pitiable  sight  on  Neoptolemus  must  be 
suspended,  and  so  it  is  never  referred  to  in  this  part  of  the  play.  When 
words  denoting  knowledge  and  /  or  sight52  are  used,  it  is  always  in  a 
context  of  lies  and  trickery,  with  the  purpose  of  furthering  the  deceitful 
plan.  In  other  words,  Neoptolemus,  far  from  being  affected  by  the  new 
visual  experience,  manipulates  the  theme  of  sight  /  knowledge  in  order  to 
obscure  his  victim's  vision.  Thus,  241  ota6',  250  KaTOL8'  ...  E18ov  (taking 
up  249  otaOa,  EIQOpäs),  253  µi&v  Ed80T'  L,  aeL,  319  µäpTus,  320  o18a 
signal  the  imparting  of  information  that  we  know  to  be  deliberately  false, 
in  keeping  with  Neoptolemus'  role  as  a  trickster.  Nonetheless,  this  same 
Neoptolemus  who  now  manipulates  his  knowledge  with  such  certainty 
and  self-confidence,  will  soon  find  out  that  there  are  many  things  that  he 
does  not  yet  know  -  most  importantly,  the  horror  of  Philoctetes'  disease. 
Neoptolemus'  attempt  to  conceal  knowledge  from  Philoctetes  will  (in  a 
sort  of  dramatic  con  trapp  un  to)  develop  along  with  his  own  progressive 
acquisition  of  new  and  crucial  knowledge.  The  gradual  realization  of 
Philoctetes'  misery,  of  the  callousness  of  men  and  gods  toward  him,  of  the 
immorality  or  injustice  of  their  means,  will  lead  Neoptolemus  to  gradual 
deviation  from,  and  eventual  defiance  of,  the  prophecy. 
Much  new  knowledge  is  revealed  in  Philoctetes'  account  of  his  life 
(254-316)  which,  quite  naturally,  is  in  the  sharpest  contrast  with  the 
distinctly  cavalier  tone  of  Odysseus'  version  thereof  in  the  prologue.  Thus, 
his  description  of  his  agonizing  pain  is  substantially  more  elaborate  (265- 
268,311-313;  NB  the  significant  ring-composition)  and  far  more  powerful 
than  Odysseus'  one-line,  neutral  statement  at  7.  The  gloomy  description 
of  the  cave  (272-274,286)  is  worlds  apart  from  the  almost  idyllic 
description  of  it  by  Odysseus  (16-19),  and  his  reference  to  his  possessions 
51  Kitto  (1956:  113)  rightly  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  visual  experience 
for  the  whole  design  of  the  play.  On  the  antithesis  between  sound  and  sight  in 
this  scene  see  Inoue  (1979:  226-27). 
52  On  the  affinity  between  words  denoting  knowledge  and  words  denoting  sight 
see  Jebb  (ad  846f.  )  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  250),  and  especially  Snell  (1924:  26-7)  and 
Coray  (1993:  11-18). 89 
by  the  qualification  ETrcO4EXriµa53  QµLKpöv  (275)  neatly  counterbalances 
Odysseus'  glib  09aaüpLQµa  (37).  All  in  all,  Philoctetes'  crude  presentation 
of  the  excruciating  hardship  he  has  had  to  face  on  Lemnos  (276-313)54  is 
meant  to  be  set,  as  a  whole,  against  the  rather  embellished  picture  offered 
by  Odysseus  in  the  prologue.  55  Neoptolemus,  whose  knowledge  of 
Philoctetes'  situation  depended  entirely  on  Odysseus'  account,  is  now 
faced  with  unsettling  `first-hand'  Information.  What  is  more,  the  gods' 
role  in  Philoctetes'  misery  is  now  seen  in  a  much  more  sinister  light:  the 
religious  considerations  which  Odysseus  put  forth  in  the  prologue  (8-11) 
as  a  justification  of  the  Greek  leaders'  decision  to  abandon  Philoctetes,  56 
have  been,  it  appears,  fully  accepted  by  Neoptolemus,  who  cocksurely 
pronounced  Philoctetes'  plight  to  be  but  a  means  to  an  ulterior,  and 
divinely  sanctioned,  purpose  (191-200;  cf.  above,  p.  74f.  ).  Now,  however, 
his  complacency  is  bound  to  be  shaken:  Philoctetes  declares  his 
abandonment  to  have  been  ävoot  uc  (257),  57  thus  refusing  to  acquiesce  in 
the  consoling  assumption  that  his  woes  are  part  of  a  divinely  sanctioned 
order.  All  he  can  offer  as  an  explanation  of  his  plight  is  divine  hatred:  his 
exclamation  i  Tr6Kp0's  OEotc  (254)  must  surely  be  a  complaint  against 
what  he  perceives  as  divine  injustice,  58  as  is  his  vehement  protest,  a  little 
53  This  is  a  unique  coinage  (Long  [1968:  98],  Rose  [1976:  61  n.  33])  and  thus 
perhaps  designed  to  attract  attention. 
54  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  195-98,200)  has  offered  a  helpful  analysis  of  the  novel 
(and  therefore  all  the  more  impressive)  "vocabulary  of  suffering"  used  by 
Sophocles  in  the  description  of  Philoctetes'  sufferings. 
55  On  the  differences  between  Odysseus'  and  Philoctetes'  accounts  see  Blundell 
(1989:  194),  Rose  (1976:  63).  Inoue  (1979:  220-24)  sets  Odysseus'  rhetoric  against 
Neoptolemus'  own  visual  experience. 
56  Cf.  Segal  (1977:  136-37;  but  contr.  138).  Kitto  (1956:  102,130;  cf.  109)  would 
rather  emphasize  the  political  aspect  of  Philoctetes'  exposure;  cf.  Pratt  (1949: 
277  n.  21). 
57  Cf.  Kitto  (1956:  114-15),  Webster  (ad  257),  Segal  (1977:  150).  Cf.  1031-34where 
Philoctetes  sarcastically  dismisses  these  religious  excuses:  see  Machin  (1981: 
96),  Segal  (1981:  300). 
58  Thus  Poe  (1974:  34). 90 
later,  that  the  gods  care  only  about  the  base  (446-7),  and  indeed  that 
they  are  base  themselves  (452).  59  Such  a  reprobation  against  divine 
justice  cannot  leave  the  young  man  untouched:  lines  601-2  may 
suggest60  (although  not  unequivocally,  as  they  fit  the  plotter's  role  just  as 
well)61  that  Neoptolemus  starts  suspecting  that  divine  justice  may  not, 
after  all,  be  on  the  Greeks'  side.  That  Neoptolemus'  erstwhile  absolute 
confidence  has  been  dealt  some  severe  blows  by  his  direct  acquaintance 
with  Philoctetes  may  also  be  inferred  from  such  passages  as  431-32  and 
441,  which  (as  many  have  remarked)  seem  to  indicate  his  growing 
disapproval  of  Odysseus'  practices  -  and  therefore  of  what  he  knows  to 
be  the  gods'  plan.  Of  course,  in  both  these  instances  his  qualms  are,  at 
best,  only  implicit;  at  the  moment  nothing  seems  to  disturb  the  status 
quo:  at  461-7  he  resumes  his  role  as  a  trickster,  pretending  to  be  in  a 
hurry  to  leave,  with  the  obvious  purpose  of  exciting  Philoctetes'  desire  to 
follow  them  wherever  they  take  him.  The  trick  works  admirably  well,  and 
in  a  long  speech  (468-506)  Philoctetes  entreats  Neoptolemus  to  carry  him 
back  to  Greece.  Still,  successful  as  he  is  in  his  role  as  a  crafty  manipulator 
of  his  victim's  ignorance,  Neoptolemus  is  soon  to  face  the  possibility  that 
(as  I  have  already  implied)  his  own  knowledge  may  also  be  shown  to  be 
deficient.  For  Philoctetes  invites  him  to  a  new  visual  experience,  to  a 
further  enhancement  of  his  knowledge,  with  regard  to  his  miserable  life.  A 
concentration  of  verba  videndi  again  marks  the  new  knowledge  about  to 
59  Cf.  esp.  Gellie  (1972:  292  n.  7),  Poe  (1974:  32-7)  and  Segal  (1977:  135  with  n.  7, 
148)  against  the  pietistic  view  (held  by  Kitto  [1956:  116-17];  cf.  D.  B.  Robinson 
[1969:  55-56])  that  Sophocles  avoids  raising  the  issue  of  Divine  Providence.  - 
Linforth  (1956:  111  n.  9)  takes  Ta  O¬ta  to  mean  `religious  faith  and  practice'  (to 
which  Philoctetes  professes  loyalty:  ErTaw(Zv)  as  opposed  to  the  gods  themselves 
(Toüs  O¬ovs,  whom  he  fords  base);  I  would  rather  take  both  to  mean  basically 
the  same  thing  ('divinity'),  with  Erraivc3v  having  a  conative  force:  `I  try  to 
praise  all  things  divine,  but  I  find  the  gods  to  be  base'  (thus  in  essence  L. 
Campbell  and  Jebb).  I  am  not  convinced  by  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  189) 
who  change  EnaLVCJV  into  ErraOpwv  (Postgate). 
60  Cf.  e.  g.  Adams  (1957:  145),  Machin  (1981:  92). 
61  Gellie  (1972:  143). 91 
be  acquired:  534  µä6rls,  536-37  öµµao  iv  ... 
O  av  I 
... 
Aaß6vTa.  62  The 
extreme  conditions  in  which  Philoctetes  has  had  to  live,  so  far  known  to 
Neoptolemus  only  by  the  ou 
fist's 
narrative  (cf.  472  &  Kouaas),  will  be 
now  visually  evidenced,  thus  acquiring  the  status  of  certain  and 
undeniable  knowledge.  63 
2.2.2  The  Emnoros  scene:  de  facto  confirmation  of  guile  as  the 
only  feasible  means  of  action 
However,  this  visual  /  cognitive  experience  has  to  be  briefly  postponed,  64 
for  a  new  character  is  announced  by  the  Chorus;  he  has  clearly  new 
information  to  deliver:  539  µäOu  i¬v,  65  541  µaOovTEs.  This  information, 
in  spite  of  what  some  scholars  have  thought,  66  is  not  to  be  dismissed  as  a 
complete  lie  from  start  to  end;  it  has  been  made  clear  in  the  prologue 
that  the  Emporos  will  speak  not  entirely  falsely,  but  `in  a  craftily 
iridescent  fashion'  (130  TroLKtAL  a'&  i  vou)  . 
67  The  purportedly  genuine 
information  communicated  by  the  Emporos'  speech  is  tripartite:  firstly, 
there  is  a  prophecy  spoken  through  Helenus  (604ff.  );  secondly,  according 
62  An  emphatic  periphrasis  for  i&tv.  On  the  theme  of  forthcoming  new 
knowledge  here  cf.  Rose  (1976:  97). 
63  On  the  Greek  idea  that  visual  experience  is  more  trustworthy  than  aural  one 
see  Chapter  One,  p.  16  n.  50. 
64  For  the  dramatic  function  of  this  postponement  as  a  preparation  for  what  is 
going  to  follow  see  Webster  (1933:  120-21). 
65  Both  Fraenkel  (1977:  59)  and  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  192)  suspect 
LdOwµEv  to  be  corrupt  in  view  of  538  zrpoüµaOov  and  541  µa60VTES.  Nonetheless, 
this  repetition  is  not  pointless,  because  it  emphasizes  the  new  knowledge  that  is 
forthcoming.  The  same  cannot  be  said  of  Hense's  QTaAcý1EV  (favoured  by  Lloyd- 
Jones  &  Wilson  [1.  c.  ])  which  creates  an  idle  pleonasm  after  539  ETr(OXETOV  (see 
Fraenkel's  [1.  c.  ]  misgivings  about  this  emendation). 
66  E.  g.  Kitto  (1956:  97f.  );  Steidle  (1968:  171). 
67  See  Machin  (1981:  70):  "Ulysse  lui-meme  a  promis  des  discours  non  pas  faux, 
mais  `ambigus'  (130)";  cf.  Minadeo  (1993:  88  n.  3). 92 
to  this  prophecy  Troy  will  not  fall  unless  Philoctetes  himself  decides,  by 
means  of  verbal  1EL&w,  to  come  there  (611-13);  thirdly,  Odysseus  has 
pledged  to  bring  Philoctetes  to  Troy,  even  by  violence  if  need  be  (594, 
617-19).  68 
The  mention  of  a  prophecy  specifying  that  Philoctetes  is 
indispensable  if  Troy  is  to  be  taken  has  to  be  accepted  as  genuine,  even 
though  it  is  given  in  the  context  of  an  ambiguous  speech.  There  are  two 
reasons  for  this:  on  the  one  hand,  the  reported  prophecy  is  consistent 
with  the  speculative  assumption  already  made  by  Neoptolemus  (191- 
200)  that  the  Greek  expedition  to  fetch  Philoctetes  forms  part  of  a  divine 
plan;  on  the  other  hand,  the  report  is  validated  a  little  later,  when 
Neoptolemus  (who  has  been  advised  to  accept  such  parts  of  the  Emporos' 
speech  as  he  sees  useful:  130-1)  explicitly  acknowledges  (839-42)  that  it 
was  the  god  himself  who  ordered  that  Philoctetes  should  be  brought  to 
Troy.  69  As  for  the  mention  of  the  `1TELcravTES  X6ycp'  clause  (612),  far  from 
contradicting  Odysseus'  preference  for  guile  (TrE  LOW'  can  be  both  honest 
and  tricky:  see  above,  pp.  83-85),  it  shows  this  preference  to  have  been 
justified;  for  Philoctetes  vehemently  denies  that  he  might  be  persuaded  to 
fight  on  the  side  of  those  who  have  cast  him  out:  7°  the  sarcastic  tone  of 
622-25  (NB  the  dismissive  use  of  words  related  to  persuasion:  623  TrE  LQac, 
624  1TELaO1  aoµaL)  and  the  indignant  determination  of  628-634  (NB  esp. 
629  X6yOLQL  µaX6aKOt9,632  KX1OLµ',  633  TräVTa  AEKTä:  verbal  persuasion 
is  out  of  the  question)  leave  no  doubt  that  Odysseus  was  after  all  right: 
68  For  a  similar  (though  slightly  different  in  details)  tripartite  segmentation  of 
the  new  information  see  Machin  (1981:  69-70). 
69  Knox  (1964:  126).  So,  D.  B.  Robinson's  (1969:  49)  argument  -accepted  by  Garvie 
(1972:  213-4)  and  Seale  (1972:  96),  (1982:  35  with  n.  23)  -that  "Sophocles  at  no 
point  allows  any  of  his  characters  to  purport  to  quote  the  exact  words  of  the 
oracle  of  Helenus  verbatim  and  in  full  [...  ]"  must  be  seriously  qualified. 
70  Alt  (1961:  155-6);  Steidle  (1968:  170);  Garvie  (1972:  217-18);  Blundell  (1989: 
203).  Older  doxography  on  the  Emporos  scene:  Masaracchia  (1964:  92-95). 93 
Oü  µlj  TrLeljTaL  (103).  71  Thus,  one  of  the  more  acceptable  alternatives  to 
guile  that  Neoptolemus  proposed  in  the  prologue  (102  TrE  taavT')  no 
longer  counts. 
However,  honest  persuasion  was  for  Neoptolemus  only  a  second- 
best  alternative;  by  far  his  preferred  course  of  action  would  have  been 
force  (90  Trpös  ßLav).  Indeed,  the  Emporos  reports  that  Odysseus  has 
indeed  threatened  to  use  force  against  Philoctetes,  should  he  not  come  of 
his  own  volition  -a  threat  which,  despite  glaringly  violating  the 
`1TE  IaaVTES  X6-IQ'  clause,  is  not  meant  to  suggest  that  Odysseus  disobeys 
the  requirements  of  the  prophecy  (we  have  seen  that  he  never  actually 
uses  force  against  Philoctetes:  above,  p.  83),  but  to  remind  us  that 
violence  is  the  means  that,  due  to  its  inherent  straightforwardness,  would 
be  most  conformable  with  Neptolemus'  heroic  code.  And  even  though 
Neoptolemus  knows  that  violence  is  precluded  by  the  `TrELQavTES  AÖyw' 
clause,  he  also  knows  that  the  Messenger  speaks  TrOLKIXÜ  s,  and  so  (only 
for  the  time  being)  he  can  not  be  sure  whether  Odysseus'  reported 
readiness  to  use  violence  is  or  is  not  to  be  taken  seriously  -  the  Messenger 
twice  stresses  the  possibility  of  using  forcible  means:  Trpös  LQXüos 
KpäTOS  (594),  EI.  µ1j  6EAOL  8',  a'KOVTa  (618).  As  a  true  son  of  Achilles, 
Neoptolemus  (and  also,  conceivably,  a  sympathetic  audience  that  would 
be  loath  to  see  Philoctetes  deceived)  might  be  tempted  seriously  to 
consider  using  force,  especially  after  it  becomes  clear  (622ff.  )  that 
persuasion  will  not  do.  However,  it  will  soon  appear  that  violence  will  not 
do  either,  not  only  because  it  is  precluded  by  the  reported  prophecy,  but 
also  because  of  a  forthcoming  upsurge  of  pity  on  Neoptolemus'  part:  as  in 
the  case  of  honest  persuasion,  the  exclusion  of  the  possibility  of  violence 
by  Odysseus  in  the  prologue  is  validated  de  facto  through  the  young 
71  Many  have  tried  to  explain  away  the  failure  of  Neoptolemus'  final  attempt  to 
persuade  Philoctetes  (1314ff.  )  as  a  result  of  his  failure  to  use  honest  persuasion: 
thus  e.  g.  Bowra  (1944:  267,282-83,299);  Kitto  (1961:  304);  Knox  (1964:  119-20, 
137);  Podlecki  (1966b:  244,245);  Schlesinger  (1968:  102-3);  Buxton  (1982:  124). 
The  passages  cited  above  in  the  text  show  that  this  would  have  been  impossible: 
cf.  rightly  Steidle  (1968:  170),  Garvie  (1972:  218  n.  15). 94 
man's  direct  experience.  An  unexpected  attack  of  Philoctetes'  disease 
(730ff.  )  will  exclude  this  possibility  once  and  for  all:  Neoptolemus  cannot 
harm  a  man  whose  sufferings,  made  for  the  first  time  visually  evident  to 
him,  move  him  to  deep  pity72  -a  man  who  is,  indeed,  as  good  as  dead 
(cf.  882-5,946).  To  Philoctetes'  repeated  entreaties  for  extreme  violence 
(747-9,799-803),  Neoptolemus  responds,  for  the  first  time,  73  with  his 
genuine  expression  of  sympathy:  'LW'  .d  Büa7vE  aü  (759);  74  notable  is 
also  the  most  explicit  c  Xyw  TräAQL  811...  vTE  VUV...  (806)  as  well  as 
Neoptolemus'  tell-tale  silence  (805),  which  reveal  how  shattering  an  effect 
the  sight  of  the  suffering  Philoctetes  has  had  upon  him.  75  For  it  is  the 
72  Blundell,  (1989:  206-207  with  n.  86).  In  fact,  as  many  have  argued,  one  might 
discern  hints  of  Neoptolemus'  growing  qualms  even  earlier,  namely  in  his 
excuses  about  the  adverse  wind  (639-40,  contrast  466-67):  see  e.  g.  Kirkwood 
(1958:  59-60);  Alt  (1961:  156);  Beye  (1970:  72-73);  Garvie  (1972:  215-16&  n.  9)-with 
bibliography;  Poe  (1974:  40).  Still,  it  is  only  now  (i.  e.  at  759,806  etc.  )  that 
Neoptolemus  will  find  himself  compelled  explicitly  to  show  his  genuine  pity. 
73  See  Rose  (1976:  71-72with  n.  52),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  284,286). 
74  Cf.  Minadeo  (1993:  96).  Probably  the  next  line  also  (760)  is  spoken  by 
Neoptolemus:  see  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  199).  For  further  analysis  of  759- 
60  (from  a  predominantly  stylistic  point  of  view)  see  Segal  (1981:  303);  cf.  Inoue 
(1979:  224  with  n.  24).  On  Neoptolemus'  cries  of  internal  distress  (esp.  895  rrarrat) 
as  echoing  Philoctetes'  cries  of  physical  pain  (e.  g.  746,754,785ff.,  792f.  )  -a 
fact  which  underlines  the  effect  the  latter  has  had  upon  the  former  -see  e.  g. 
Taplin  (1978:  133),  Buxton  (1982:  122,124  with  n.  24),  Cairns  (1993:  257  with 
n.  153).  Incidentally,  895-909,  along  with  the  heated  altercation  between 
Odysseus  and  Neoptolemus  in  the  prologue,  suffice  to  refute  Calder's  (1971:  163- 
69)  preposterous  opinion  (accepted  in  general  also  by  Kiso  [1984:  93-97;  cf.  150 
n.  27]  and  advanced  independently,  on  a  much  smaller  scale,  by  Raubitschek 
[1986])  that  Neoptolemus  is,  from  first  to  last,  an  unrepentant  deceiver,  (there 
are  of  course  many  more  weaknesses  in  this  view  [e.  g.  the  pointlessness  of 
confessing  the  deceit  at  895ff.  ];  some  of  them  are  well  summarized  by  Segal 
[1981:  476  n.  32]).  Fuqua  (1976:  49-62)  shows  how,  the  Neoptolemus  of  the 
Philoctetes  deviates  from  his  basically  negative  image  in  the  mythic  tradition. 
75  I  cannot  understand  how  Craik  (1979:  25,27-29)  can  detect  burlesque 
elements  in  the  representation  of  Philoctetes'  sufferings  (similarly,  though 95 
visual  experience  of  sufferings  only  heard  of  previously  (an  experience 
which  has  been  anticipated  at  533ff.  [cf.  above,  p.  91])  that  causes 
Neoptolemus  to  swerve  from  his  role  as  a  cold-blooded  trickster.  This  new 
visual  experience  is  marked  again  by  a  concentration  of  related  words: 
753  o.  aO'  (twice),  754  OU'K  oi8a  -  Tr(ýS  o1K  o  aOa;  755  8fX6v  yE  (Dawe: 
8ELVOV  yE  codd.  ).  76  And  if  we  are  to  see  in  671  (o1K  ä  0o  ai  a'  i86v...  ) 
Neoptolemus'  attempt  to  disguise,  by  an  antiphrasis  of  sorts,  his  growing 
unease  at  the  sight  of  such  misery,  as  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  286)  has 
proposed,  then  we  have  an  early  subtle  hint  of  the  association  between 
sight  and  pity  that  is  soon  to  be  of  central  importance.  77 
This  association  between  visual  experience  and  pity  is 
foreshadowed  in  the  single  proper  stasimon78  of  this  play.  Such  passages 
as  676  (Aöy(p  µhv  Eý7JKOUQ',  O'TrwTra  8'  ob  µäAa)  imply  that,  whereas  the 
Chorus  have  heard  of  sufferings  as  great  as  Philoctetes'  (namely  Ixion's), 
they  have  never  witnessed  such  misery  with  their  own  eyes  (this  is  also,  in 
effect,  the  meaning  of  682  cDAAov  8'  oüTLv'...  ol8a  KXUwv  oü8'  Eai8w'V)  79 
The  mythological  paradigm  of  Ixion  takes  up,  if  only  implicitly,  a 
more  reservedly,  Greengard  [1987:  54-5]);  she  herself  (ibid.  p.  28  n.  35  &  n.  36) 
provides  decisive  arguments  against  this  view. 
76  Cf.  Pratt  (1949:  281),  Adams  (1957:  149).  For  the  emendation  see  Dawe  (1978: 
128-29);  contra  11oyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  198). 
77  On  the  importance  of  sight  cf.  Beye  (1970:  73),  Garvie  (1972:  216),  Gellie  (1972: 
148)  and,  most  helpfully,  Inoue  (1979:  esp.  224-26).  On  Neoptolemus'  first  signs 
of  pity  here  see  S.  K.  Johnson  (1928b:  210),  Gellie  (1972:  136-42,  cf.  149),  Machin 
(1981:  89);  see  however  Erbse  (1966:  189-93),  Rose  (1976:  71  n.  52)  and  Strohm 
(1986:  117-8)  for  a  warning  against  the  tendency  (a  prime  example  of  which  is 
Steidle  [1968:  179-80];  cf.  Schmidt  [1973:  62ff.  ])  to  discover  hints  of  Neoptolemus' 
pity  too  early  in  the  play. 
78  Cf.  Jebb  (p.  111).  This  formal  feature  is  by  no  means  insignificant;  in 
Sophocles'  late  plays  the  tendency  is  to  decrease  autonomous  stasima,  and  to 
increase  the  kommoi  (Kirkwood  [1958:  192]).  Therefore,  the  presence  of  a 
complete  stasimon  in  a  play  of  409  BC  must  have  a  special  dramatic 
significance.  Contra  Kitto  (1956:  103;  cf.  118),  excellently  answered  by  Segal 
(1977:  151). 
79  Cf.  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  286n.  21)  and  esp.  Tarrant  (1986:  129). 96 
suggestion  made  by  Philoctetes  as  early  as  446-52  (cf.  above,  p.  89):  how 
can  one  accept  that  the  gods  care  for  justice  when  the  punishment  they 
inflict  on  a  man  as  guilty  as  Ixion  is  no  more  horrendous  than  the  fate  a 
man  as  innocent  as  Philoctetes  (676-686;  NB  685  ävaýics)  has  to 
endure?  80  Perhaps  the  expression  of  the  Chorus'  genuine  sympathy 
continues  until  the  end  of  the  stasimon,  including  the  enigmatic  lines 
719-29:  instead  of  assuming  that  in  these  lines  the  Chorus,  in  view  of 
Philoctetes'  reappearing  from  his  cave  with  Neoptolemus,  resume  their 
role  as  assistant  tricksters81  (a  role  they  had  naturally  abandoned  in  676- 
718),  we  should  perhaps  see  here  a  foreshadowing  of  what  will  eventually 
happen  in  1402ff.:  Neoptolemus,  after  a  long  emotional  and  moral 
struggle,  will  make  up,  his  mind  to  take  Philoctetes  home,  thus 
diametrically  opposing  himself  to  the  divine  plan.  82 
Thus,  to  return  to  the  point  made  on  pp.  92-93,  the  two 
alternatives  approved  by  Neoptolemus  in  the  prologue,  namely  violence 
and  honest  persuasion,  are  now  out  of  the  question.  83  Deceit  is  the  only 
viable  option,  just  as  Odysseus  pointed  out  in  the  prologue;  Neoptolemus 
has  come  to  realize  this  through  his  own  direct  experience.  Thus,  the 
dramatic  purpose  of  the  Emporos'  scene  is  evidently  neither  to  speed 
things  up  by  frightening  or  enraging  Philoctetes  on  to  Neoptolemus'  ship84 
80  On  the  implicit  questioning  of  the  gods'  justice  cf.  Segal  (1977:  138,150-51). 
81  Thus  e.  g.  Jebb  (ad  718);  Linforth  (1956:  120-3);  Adams  (1957:  148);  Knox  (1964: 
130);  Minadeo  (1993:  96  with  n.  11).  Contra  Taplin  (1971:  33  n.  18),  Tarrant  (1986: 
125-7).  For  doxography  on  the  staging  of  this  part  see  Gardiner  (1987:  30-36); 
refutation  of  earlier  views  in  Linforth  (1956:  121). 
82  I  was  happy  to  see  that  Tarrant  (1986:  129-30)  takes  a  similar  view  of  these 
lines  (although  I  disagree  with  him  in  matters  of  detail).  Knox  (1964:  130), 
although  he  thinks  that  at  719-29  the  Chorus  are  lying,  remarks  that  their 
heartfelt  sympathy  as  expressed  in  the  rest  of  this  ode  provides  us  with  a 
measure  by  which  to  gauge  the  inner  turmoil  that  must  be  torturing 
Neoptolemus;  for  criticism  of  this  view  see  Tarrant  (1986:  124). 
83  I  do  not  understand  how  Seale  (1972:  96-97)  can  maintain  that  the  options  of 
force  and  persuasion  remain  open  even  after  the  Emporos'  speech. 
84  Thus  e.  g.  (with  minor  differences  in  emphasis)  Linforth  (1956:  116);  Steidle 
(1968:  171);  D.  B.  Robinson  (1969:  49);  Strohm  (1986:  117). 97 
(Philoctetes  has  been  all  too  willing  to  follow  Neoptolemus:  468ff.  )  nor,  as 
Buxton  (1982:  121-2)  has  more  thoughtfully  proposed,  to  misdirect 
Philoctetes'  attention  towards  the  prospect  of  persuasion  or  violence,  so 
that  deception  can  proceed  unhindered  (for  deception  has  proceeded 
unhindered  anyway)  :  85  its  purpose  is  rather  to  show  Neoptolemus  (and 
the  audience)  that  there  is,  de  facto,  no  other  choice  than  deception.  This 
narrowing-down  of  possibilities  is,  however,  well  calculated  to  lead  to  an 
impasse.  In  839-42  Neoptolemus,  in  response  to  the  Chorus'  veiled 
suggestion  (827ff.  )  to  make  off  with  the  bow,  86  voices  his  sudden 
realization  (cf.  839  op(Z)87  of  the  true  meaning  of  the  prophecy  (a 
realization  that  occurs  in  a  µEa;  6  s  conspicuously  inserted  between 
strophe  and  antistrophe,  88  and  spoken  in  hexameters  intended,  perhaps, 
to  convey  something  of  the  oracular  style89):  it  is  Philoctetes  himself,  not 
merely  the  bow90  that  they  must  fetch  to  Troy.  Neoptolemus  is  the  kind 
of  man  who  would  prefer  to  fail  honestly  than  to  win  dishonestly  (94-95); 
but  now  he  has  both  indulged  in  dishonesty  and  failed  to  carry  out  his 
mission!  In  Winnington-Ingram's  (1969:  49)  words,  "to  boast  over  the 
capture  and  conveyance  of  the  bow  alone  is  to  boast  of  an  uncompleted 
85  For  analytical  doxography  on  the  Emporos  scene  see  Osterud  (1973:  16-9). 
86  Cf.  e.  g.  Jebb  (p.  134),  Dain  &  Mazon  (1960:  42  n.  1),  Webster  (p.  119);  contra 
Hinds  (1967:  175-6).  D.  M.  Jones,  CR  63  (1949)  83-85  has  argued  that  esp.  828-38, 
with  the  summoning  of  Hypnos,  allude  to  the  `Deception  of  Zeus'  in  Il.  14.230- 
91,  thus  suggesting  that  the  Chorus  too  have  treachery  in  mind. 
87  On6pw  cf.  Easterling  (1978a:  34),  Seale  (1982:  39). 
88  Jebb  (p.  134).  That  the  Chorus  do  not  seem  particularly  to  heed  Neoptolemus' 
new  realization  is,  pace  D.  B.  Robinson  (1969:  46),  no  argument  against  its 
validity:  Neoptolemus'  sudden  insight  becomes  all  the  more  prominent  by 
breaking  through  in  the  midst  of  the  Chorus'  misguided  views  (cf.  Segal  [1977: 
146]). 
89  Thus  Bowra  (1944:  281),  Knox  (1964:  131);  differently  Webster  (1936:  136-37), 
Winnington-Ingram  (1969:  49). 
90  Lines  942-5  are  perfectly  consistent  with  this  new  realization  if  we  punctuate 
lightly,  or  not  at  all,  at  the  end  of  944:  "he  wishes  it  to  appear  to  the  Argives 
that  he  has  captured...  ".  See  Webster's  (ad  944)  excellent  remarks,  who  disposes 
of  the  notion  that  4AvaaOaL  (944)  can  have  Tä  Tö  a  as  its  object. 98 
task  (6  EXf)  and  so  shameful  (daXpöv  övELbos).  But  aiiv  OEÜ8EQLv 
echoes  the  prologue  and  betrays  the  misgivings  of  Neoptolemus.  To  take 
Philoctetes  by  fraud  is  bad  enough,  but  (Neoptolemus  has  been 
persuaded)  might  be  justified  by  success:  to  seize  the  bow  alone  would  be 
futile  as  well  as  dishonest.  "91  The  dramatist  fully  exploits  here  the 
ambiguity  he  has  carefully  created  as  to  whether  it  is  Philoctetes  or 
merely  the  bow  that  is  required  (114-15,191-200;  92  cf.  345-793)  :  thanks 
to  this  ambiguity  he  can  now  become  more  specific  as  to  the 
requirements  of  the  prophecy,  without  offending  dramatic  plausibility. 
And  the  dramatic  point  of  his  giving  out  more  specific  information  about 
the  content  of  the  prophecy  is,  paradoxically,  to  make  Neoptolemus  move 
a  step  further  from  its  requirements,  namely  to  reveal  to  Philoctetes  the 
true  purpose  of  his  mission  (915ff.  ).  Neoptolemus  proceeds  from  wrong 
premises:  the  newly  realized  prophecy  simply  states  that  Philoctetes  must 
come  to  Troy  himself,  it  does  not  demand  honest  persuasion;  94  so, 
Neoptolemus  could  have  perfectly  well  kept  using  tricky  persuasion 
(guile),  having  now  as  his  object  Philoctetes  himself,  not  merely  the  bow. 
In  a  sense,  Neoptolemus  `overinterprets'  the  prophecy  in  an  attempt  to 
combine  the  divinely  sanctioned  plan  to  capture  Troy  with  the  demands 
of  his  code  of  ethics  and  of  his  noble  ýVaLs  (902)95  -  honest  persuasion 
91  Cf.  Gellie  (1972:  149),  Cairns  (1993:  256).  Hinds  (1967:  172-73)  holds  that 
Neoptolemus  knew  from  the  beginning  that  his  object  was  Philoctetes  himself; 
so  also  Steidle  (1968:  173,175)  and  Hoppin  (1981:  20-3  &  passim).  But  why  should 
839-42  be  so  emphatically  phrased  if  they  do  not  contain  some  important  new 
point? 
92  See  above,  p.  78. 
93  Cf.  Adams  (1957:  142).  Also  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz  (1917:  304-5). 
94  Cf.  Hinds  (1967:  175). 
95  This  is  quite  different  from  maintaining  -with  e.  g.  Linforth  (1956:  127,130), 
Masaracchia  (1964:  97),  and  esp.  D.  B.  Robinson  (1969:  46-48)  and  Garvie  (1972: 
216,217  n.  13);  cf.  Poe  (1974:  29-30)-that  Neoptolemus,  so  far  from  realizing  the 
true  meaning  of  the  prophecy  at  839-42,  merely  uses  `the  god's  will'  as  a  pretext 
that  thinly  veils  his  growing  pity  (895ff.  )  and  /  or  his  moral  considerations.  If 
Neoptolemus  felt  his  change  of  heart  to  have  originated  only  in  his  morals  or 
pity,  then  surely  he  could  have  explicitly  said  so  (as  he  does  e.  g.  at  895ff.  ), 99 
is  after  all  the  course  of  action  he  would  rather  have  taken  in  the  first 
place  if  force  were  impossible  (102).  '  However,  such  a  combination, 
laudable  as  it  is  per  se,  proves  impracticable.  In  his  attempt  to  reconcile 
human  notions  of  justice  and  morality  with  obedience  to  divine  will  (two 
things  that  all  too  often  prove  irreconcilable),  Neoptolemus  will 
eventually  jeopardize  the  whole  divine  plan:  it  has  been  established  that 
deceit  is  the  only  means  of  achieving  the  divinely-sanctioned  purpose, 
since  Philoctetes  is  entirely  unwilling  to  give  in  to  any  kind  of  persuasion 
(622-25,628-32).  The  impasse  created  by  Neoptolemus'  inner  conflict  has 
been  well  formulated  (with  its  religious  aspects  appropriately  stressed)  by 
Pratt  (1949:  280):  "...  the  evil  of  Philoctetes'  suffering  exists  under  an  order 
of  things  in  which  the  gods  rule.  Thus  the  moral  issue  of  justice  is 
ultimately  a  religious  issue.  And  yet,  over  against  this  greater 
understanding  in  Neoptolemus  stands  the  fact  that  the  gods  will  that 
Troy  now  fall.  Neoptolemus  will  soon  cry  (908):  J)  ZEÜ,  TL  Bpäaw;  " 
Paradoxically,  the  new  realization  of  the  prophecy  leads,  it  seems,  not  to 
its  fulfilment,  but  to  its  frustration.  Knowledge  of  the  divine  will  and 
adherence  to  it  appear  to  be  in  inverse  proportion. 
2.2.3  Further  deviation  from  the  prophecy.  Failure  of  rrE= 
Neoptolemus  does  not  give  in  to  his  scruples  all  at  once.  His  distancing 
from  what  he  knows  to  be  an  order  of  his  superior  and,  what  is  more,  the 
will  of  the  gods,  takes  place  progressively,  96  and  his  eventual  concession 
to  honest  persuasion  comes  only  after  a  long  and  painful  inner  struggle.  97 
At  a  first  stage  he  reveals  to  Philoctetes  the  truth  about  his  mission  (915- 
6),  but  he  still  insists  on  keeping  the  bow,  of  which  he  has  managed  to  get 
hold  (762ff.  )  by  having  first  carefully  smoothed  the  way  into  obtaining 
instead  of  focusing  exclusively  on  what  the  god  has  said  (841).  Cf.  rightly 
Cairns  (1993:  256-7). 
96  Cf.  Rose  (1976:  88-89),  Segal  (1977:  146-47). 
97  Kirkwood  (1958:  148  n.  38). 100 
Philoctetes'  permission  to  do  so  (654-675).  98  Neoptolemus  has  moved 
from  deceit  to  blackmail  -a  more  `straightforward'  means,  but  hardly  a 
more  ethical  one  99  After  Odysseus'  intervention,  he  complies  with  his 
superior  (1074-80),  in  the  hope  that  Philoctetes  might  submit  to  the 
blackmail  and  "make  a  more  profitable  decision"  for  them  (1078-79).  1°° 
Still,  pity  and  ethical  considerations  do  eventually  overwhelm  the  young 
man.  His  hundred-line  silence  in  974-1073  (as  well  as  his  much  shorter 
silence  at  934-5,  misunderstood  by  Philoctetes  as  a  sign  of  inexorability) 
is  undoubtedly  a  sign  of  inner  turmoil  between  his  sense  of  duty  and  his 
growing  pity  and  shame:  101  ob  vüv  TrpZZTOV  xX).  x  KQL  Tr&  aL  (966) 
indicates  exactly  this  long  and  painful  upsurge  of  OAKTOS  8ELVO3  (965)  he 
is  experiencing.  102  His  emotional  distress,  apparent  from  such  passages  as 
970,1011-12,1068-69,1074  (otKTOU  1TMÜ)S  ),  will  cause  Neoptolemus  to 
crack  up  (1222  ff.  ).  103  This  outbreak  of  pity  has  moral  dimensions  as 
98  See  e.  g.  Bowra  (1944:  273),  Kirkwood  (1958:  59).  Of  course,  Neoptolemus' 
hypocrisy  is  not  restricted  to  these  lines:  for  a  detailed  analysis  of  his  well- 
crafted  deceit  see  Calder  (1971:  passim),  notwithstanding  his  conclusion  that 
Neoptolemus  is  the  "arch-deceiver"  throughout  the  play  (cf.  above,  n.  74). 
99  Bowra  (1944:  296);  Gellie  (1972:  150);  Gill  (1980:  142);  Machin  (1981:  412). 
100  Reinhardt  (1979:  186);  Calder  (1971:  161-62);  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  289). 
Neoptolemus  is  complying  with  Odysseus'  bluff:  see  above,  p.  82. 
101  On  Neoptolemus'  silences  cf.  e.  g.  Podlecki  (1966b:  240-1);  Taplin  (1971:  33); 
Garvie  (1972:  216);  Schmidt  (1973:  176);  Segal  (1981:  336,341);  and  esp.  Steidle 
(1968:  181-4passim).  . 
102  Kirkwood  (1958:  159-60);  Taplin  (1978:  114);  Strohm  (1986:  118-9);  Cairns 
(1993:  257). 
103  On  1222ff.  as  mirroring  974ff.  see  Taplin  (1978:  132-3).  Tycho  von 
Wilamowitz  (1917:  307-9;  cf.  294-8)  was,  predictably,  hostile  to  the  idea  of  an 
inner  development  in  Neoptolemus,  and  thought  that  his  cracking  up  is  totally 
unprepared  and  comes  as  a  complete  surprise;  see  however  Steidle  (1968:  175- 
81),  who  shows  that  "Mitleid  and  Trug  schließen  sich  [...  ]  nicht  von  vornherein 
aus"  (p.  177)  -although  he  does  tend  to  detect  hints  of  Neoptolemus'  pity  too 
early  in  the  play  (cf.  n.  77).  On  Neoptolemus'  pity  as  gradually  undermining 
the  intrigue  cf.  also  Parlavantza-Friedrich  (1969:  50-65passim). 101 
well:  '  Philoctetes  himself  has'  closely  connected  the  notions  of  pity  and 
justice  in  1040-42,105  and  Neoptolemus  explicitly  describes  his  previous 
conduct  as  unethical,  as  appears  from  such  passages  as  1224  (Eý1  LapTOV) 
in  conjunction  with  1248-9  (TTJv  äpapT'Lav  I  aiaXpäv  äµapTC6v),  106  1228 
(äTrGLTaLQLV  a'ia  pats  ... 
SöXoLs),  1234  (daXpCýs 
...  KO  8(K1  ),  1246, 
1251a.  He  has  to  act  in  accordance  with  his  4üaLs  (cf.  902)107  and  his 
heroic  code  of  honour.  Thus,  he  returns  the  bow  (1287ff.  ).  At  the  same 
time,  however,  he  deviates  even  further  from  the  terms  of  the 
prophecy.  108  As  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  299)  remarks,  "the  pious 
Sophocles  constantly  surprises  us;  the  ironist  operates  at  the  divine  level 
also.  It  is  ironical  that  Neoptolemus,  by  behaving  well  [i.  e.  by  complying 
with  his  moral  principles  and  his  feelings],  should  endanger  the  designs 
of  the  gods".  This  second  deviation  from  the  requirements  of  the 
prophecy  is  also  preceded,  paradoxically,  by  a  refreshed  awareness  thereof 
(cf.  also  above,  p.  98f.  ):  at  989-90  Odysseus  proclaims  himself  to  be  the 
104  Machin  (1981:  411);  cf.  Adams  (1957:  150).  Gill  (1980:  142)  puts  it  well:  "This 
combination  of  moral  unease  and  `terrible  compassion'  (965-6)  leads 
Neoptolemus  to  abandon  the  policy  of  deceit  and  to  deal  openly  with  Philoctetes 
for  the  first  time.  " 
105  The  point  is  excellently  made  by  Blundell  (1989:  200). 
106  on  the  moral  sense  of  the  root  ap  apT-at  1224  and  1248  see  Bremer  (1969:  34); 
Cairns  (1993:  260). 
107  Cf.  esp.  902-903,950,971,1007-15.  See  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  209-10).  I  refrain 
from  giving  a  more  detailed  account  of  Neoptolemus'  course  towards  the 
reassertion  of  his  innate  nobility  through  his  contact  with  Philoctetes,  as 
Blundell  (1988)  has  recently  offered  a  thorough  analysis  thereof.  See  also 
Bowra  (1944:  274,276,279-80etc.  );  Kitto  (1956:  114,116);  Alt  (1961:  passim);  Knox 
(1964:  220-21);  Torrance  (1965:  316-7);  Beye  (1970:  70-73);  Rose  (1976:  66ff., 
cf.  85ff.,  97  with  n.  97).  For  older  bibliography  on  the  subject  see  Fuqua  (1976:  36 
n.  14). 
108  Cf.  Pratt  (1949:  282-83).  Bowra  (1944:  298)  and  Kitto  (1956:  126)  think  that 
Neoptolemus  acts  in  accordance  with  the  gods'  will,  but  this  is  what  we  might 
call  `moralistic  fallacy':  one  accepts  a  priori  that  the  gods  must  be  (by  human 
measures)  just  and  good,  and  therefore  an  honest  act  like  the  return  of  the  bow 
mustbe  in  accordance  with  divine  will. 102 
agent  of  divine  will  in  the  strongest  terms  possible  (NB  the  threefold 
repetition  of  the  name  of  Zeus  in  the  former  passage),  and  at  997-8  he 
stresses  the  (divinely  ordained,  we  may  infer)  necessity  of  Philoctetes' 
coming  to  Troy;  109  he  thus  confirms  the  content  of  the  prophecy  as 
reported  by  the  Emporos  (603-19)  and  as  realized  by  Neoptolemus  (839- 
42).  110  Nevertheless,  no  sooner  has  Neoptolemus'  knowledge  of  the 
prophecy  been  consolidated,  than  he  proceeds  one  step  farther  from  it. 
Even  at  the  very  moment  when  the  bow  is  returned  to  its  owner  (1291-2), 
Odysseus  inserts  a  last  desperate  reminder  of  the  gods  (1293  Ws  O¬ot 
ýuv(QTOpEs)  whose  designs  he  feels  unable  to  prevent  from  being  foiled. 
A  paramount  role  in  this  further  deviation  is  played,  no  doubt,  by 
Philoctetes'  counter-claims  that  the  time  has  come  for  the  injustice 
against  him  to  be  rectified:  Odysseus'  claim  to  have  Zeus  on  his  side 
(989-90)  cannot  be  true  (991-2),  he  claims,  because  it  is  the  gods'  concern 
for  8'L",  i.  e.  for  Philoctetes'  restitution,  that  has  spurred  on  the  Greek 
mission  (1035-39);  the  gods  will  hearken  to  Philoctetes'  curses  and 
destroy  the  loathsome  Greeks  (1040-44).  This  is,  of  course,  only  wishful 
thinking"'  (as  is  apparent  from  his  bitter  complaint  at  1020),  but,  as  it 
emphatically  involves  the  gods,  it  is  bound  to  shake  Neoptolemus' 
confidence  in  the  divine  sanction  of  the  Greek  plan  (on  pp.  89-90  I  argue 
for  a  similar  effect  of  446-52  on  Neoptolemus).  Nonetheless,  the  young 
man  is  still  fully  aware  of  the  main  object  of  his  mission,  namely  to  bring 
Philoctetes  to  Troy;  thus,  in  accordance  with  his  principles,  he  makes  a 
last  attempt  honestly  to  persuade  Philoctetes  to  comply  with  the  divine 
decrees.  Now  the  young  man  seems  to  possess  full  and  complete 
knowledge  of  the  prophecy,  which  he  wishes  to  communicate  to 
109  Cf.  above,  p.  77. 
110  See  e.  g.  Lesky  (1972:  243). 
111  Pace  Rose  (1977:  100).  What  is  more,  Philoctetes'  certainty  about  the  plans  of 
the  gods  is  misguided:  the  KEVTpov  that  initiated  the  Greek  mission  was  indeed 
O¬tov  (1039),  but  we  know  that  the  divine  plan  is  primarily  concerned  not  with 
Philoctetes'  restitution  but  with  the  promotion  of  the  Greek  cause.  Cf.  Intro. 
section  0.4.2. 103 
Philoctetes;  this  is  indicated  by  yet  another  accumulation  of  words 
denoting  sensory  or  mental  perception:  1316  äKOUQOV,  1325  ETrLQTW, 
ypd4  OV  4pEVC3V  Ecru,  1329  LQOL,  1336  ot8a,  1343  KäTOLaOa;  cf.  also  1381 
opc6,1387  8L86LaKOU,  1389  µavOäv¬Lv,  1391  o'pa.  Neoptolemus'  account 
(which  we  must  accept  as  fully  accurate,  since  it  is  entirely  consistent 
with  Heracles'  undoubtedly  authentic  version  at  1421ff.  112)  recapitulates 
and  confirms  previous  references  to  divine  involvement  in  Philoctetes' 
fate,  thus  creating  a  coherent  picture  of  the  prophecy  and  the  divine  will 
expressed  through  it:  his  disease  was  a  god-sent  misfortune  (1326  EK 
OEMs  TuXTjs)  related  to  his  trespassing  upon  Chryse's  shrine  (cf. 
Neoptolemus'  speculative  assumption  at  191-4).  113  His  disease  will  never 
be  cured  unless  he  comes  to  Troy  of  his  own  free  will  (1329-32)  -a 
reiteration,  basically,  of  the  Emporos'  account  at  610-13,114  except  that 
his  TrELQQVTE9  X6yc;  w  (612)  is  now  replaced  by  EKW'  V  atTÖS  (1332),  which, 
in  keeping  with  Neoptolemus'  ethical  approach,  clearly  precludes  guile. 
He  will  be  healed  by  the  sons  of  Asclepius  and  gain  supreme  glory  by 
sacking  Troy  (a_  fact  already  alluded  to  at  919-20).  Finally,  we  hear  again 
(cf.  the.  Emporos'  speech,  604ff.  )  that  all  the  above  have  the  seal  of  divine 
authority,  as  they  have  been  pronounced  by  the  seer  Helenus.  115 
112  See  e.  g.  Easterling  (1978a:  32-33).  I  am  unable  to  comprehend  how  D.  B. 
Robinson  (1969:  50)  can  maintain  that  "what  Heracles  says  [...  ]  is  not  evidence 
for  what  the  oracle  [he  means:  the  prophecy]  said;  Heracles  has  his  own  divine 
foreknowledge.  "  In  other  words,  we  either  have  to  dismiss  whatever  is  said  in 
the  play  about  the  prophecy  as  an  irrelevance,  or  to  accept  that  the  divine  will 
as  expressed  through  the  prophecy  and  the  divine  will  as  expressed  through 
Heracles  are  two  different  things! 
113  Pucci  (1994:  40)  aptly  points  out  that  Neoptolemus  no  longer  speaks  of  OEwv 
REMTII  (as  he  did  at  196)  but  uses  the  phrase  OEla  '-Xil  instead  (1326):  "after  all 
the  excruciating  experience  of  assisting  and  persuading  Philoctetes, 
Neoptolemus  is  no  longer  sure  that  his  friend's  sufferings  are  really  caused  by 
a  divine  care  [i.  e.  a  REXTTI],  and  prefers  a  less  committed  expression";  cf.  Poe 
(1974:  44),  Rose  (1976:  74  n.  57),  Segal  (1981:  356). 
114  Cf.  Gellie  (1972:  154-55). 
115  Cf.  Podlecki  (1966b:  239  n.  15). 104 
According  to  the  pattern  we  have  identified,  however,  Neoptolemus' 
being  in  a  position  to  give  a  full  and  accurate'  account  of  the  prophecy  is 
combined,  paradoxically,  with  his  ultimate  deviation  from  It.  Well  may 
Neoptolemus  attempt  honestly  to  persuade  Philoctetes  to  comply  with 
the  divine  plan  (NB  the  concentration  of  Xöyos-words:  1267,1278-9, 
1322,1324,1374,1385,1393-95),  but  Philoctetes  remains  intractable,  and 
words  are  precisely  what  he  finds  most  distasteful:  ""  1268-69,1271-72, 
1275-76,1280,1288  (Ejnac--8oXol  1E6a:  a  meaningful  juxtaposition), 
1290,1306-7,1380,1382,1388,  and  1401  ä4s 
...  TEOPÜXTITQL  X6yos117 
(ruling  out  every  possibility  of  continuing  the  debate).  118  Philoctetes,  far 
from  being  persuaded,  is  on  the  contrary  the  one  who  will  eventually 
persuade  Neoptolemus  -  with  A  yoL,  of  course!  -  to  give  up  entirely  the 
divine  plan  he  has  been  trying  to  carry  out,  and  to  bring  him  back  to 
Greece  instead.  Being  no  longer  at  the  receiving  end  of  1TELet  (either 
honest  or  tricky),  Philoctetes  is  now  able  to  make  effective  use  of  nE  Let  to 
achieve  his  own  ends. 
Ironically,  this  successful  attempt  At  persuasion  is  based  on  the 
false  premises  that  Neoptolemus'  use  of  tricky  nE  L8w  has  established: 
First,  Philoctetes  reprimands  the  young  man  for  encouraging  him  to  help 
the  same  men  who  have  deprived  him  of  his  father's  arms  (1362-6).  119 
Although  Neoptolemus  knows  this  to  be  untrue  (it  is  one  of  the  lies  he 
was  instructed  by  Odysseus  to  tell:  60-64,  cf.  362-84),  he  cannot  use  this 
116  Cf.  Podlecki  (1966b:  242-43with  n.  19);  Easterling  (1973:  29);  Pucci  (1994:  39). 
117  TEep'XrTCLL  Hermann'  :  TEep1ýýTaL`or  TEep1»XrT  LL  or  TEepiv11TCLL  MSS.  Aöyos 
KAUY  :  XöyoLc  rell.:  yöoLc  yp  in  LSGUYT.  See  Lloyd  Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  211). 
118  On  the  repetition  of  Xiyos-words  see  Podlecki  (1966b:  242):  "it  is  clearly  not 
accidental  that  the  Aöyos-theme  recurs  in  this  climactic  scene  with  almost 
embarrassing  frequency".  Cf.  Hoppin  (1981:  28).  Segal's  (1981:  337)  view  that  at 
the  end  of  the  play  Neoptolemus  and  Philoctetes  overcome  false  speech  and 
establish  true  communication  is  belied  by  the  passages  I  have  just  cited.  Until 
the  end  of  the  play  Philoctetes  remains  impervious  to  human  TrELOt. 
119  Bers'  (1981:  501-2)  textual  objections  do  not  affect  the  essence  of  my 
argument. 105 
as  an  argument  against  Philoctetes'  demands,  as  this  would  further 
expose  his  treacherous  behaviour  and  thus  ruin  even  his  last  chance  to 
win  over  Philoctetes.  120  The  only  reply  he  can  give  is  M  yE  LS  µE  V 
E  LKÖT[a]  (1373),  thus  giving  Philoctetes  the  opportunity  to  score  off  him 
on  false  grounds.  121 
Second,  the  main  argument  on  which  Philoctetes'  case  rests  is  that 
Neoptolemus  has  sworn  (1367-8  ýuvchµoaas;  cf.  already  941  6µmaas)  to 
bring  him  back  home  (1397-9);  but  this  relies  on  false  grounds  too. 
Neoptolemus  never  swore  such  an  oath  -  in  fact,  swear  an  oath  was 
exactly  what  he  did  not  do  (cf.  811  oü  p.  i  v  a"  EvopKÖV  'y'  äi6O  (TOai). 
What  he  actually  did  was  to  pledge  not  to  abandon  Philoctetes  during  the 
attack  of  his  disease  (809-13),  whereas  his  earlier  promise  to  bring  him  to 
Greece  (524-29;  cf.  779-81),  to  which  Philoctetes  is  evidently  referring,  was 
clearly  part  of  his  attempt  to  trick  him  into  embarking  with  them  to 
Troy.  Some  scholars122  have.  tried.  to  explain  away  the  inconsistency  by 
psychologizing  or  rationalizing  considerations.  However,  I  believe  that  the 
inconsistency  is  meant  to  .  be  perceived,  not  glossed  over.  Sophocles 
deliberately  makes  Philoctetes  use,  and  Neoptolemus  succumb  to,  a  kind 
120  Cf.  Lesky  (1972:  245);  Schmidt  (1973:  234-5);  Easterling  (1978a:  33); 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  296).  There  is  no  point  in  the  much-repeated 
speculation  (e.  g.  by  Adams  [1957:  142,  but  cf.  n.  7!  ],  Podlecki  [1966b:  236-37;  but 
contrast  239  &  n.  14!  ],  Machin  [1981:  74-81])  that  Neoptolemus  has  really  been 
refused  his  father's  weapons.  See  Bers  (1981:  501-502)  for  discussion. 
121  Cf.  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  296):  "The  fact  remains  that  this  evidence 
for  the  villainy  of  the  Atridae  is  spurious  and  Philoctetes  is  trying  to  turn  his 
friend  against  his  enemies  on  non-existent  grounds.  "  Cf.  also  Taplin  (1987:  70). 
See  further  Hamilton  (1975). 
122  Taplin  (1971:  38-39)-but  contr.  Taplin  (1987:  71-2)!  -,  Machin  (1981:  81-83), 
Winnington-Ingram  (1981:  297  n.  53).  Recently  Stokes  (1988:  155-66)  has 
interestingly  argued  that,  although  Neoptolemus  never  formally  swore  an  oath, 
he  nonetheless  led  Philoctetes  to  believe  that  he  did  so  in  essence.  To  my  mind, 
this  only  underlines  the  (non-deliberate)  falsity  of  Philoctetes'  TrELOW,  and  thus 
heightens  the  irony  of  the  situation:  Philoctetes'  rrELOW  imposes  itself  on 
Neoptolemus  because  it  is  a  corollary  of  his  own  deceitful  practices.  See 
immediately  below  in  the  text. 106 
of  TrELBt  which  (regardless  of  the  intention  of  the  person  who  uses  it)  rests 
on  blatantly  false  premises123  -  indeed  they  are  a  side-effect  of  his  own 
deceitful  practices,  of  his  own  tricky  TrE  16th.  For  it  is  Neoptolemus'  lies 
about  his  having  been  deprived  of  his  father's  arms  that  Philoctetes  now 
holds  against  the  young  man's  willingness  to  have  him  fight  for  the 
Greeks  in  Troy.  And  it  is  Neoptolemus'  false  promise  to  carry  him  back  to 
Greece  that  Philoctetes  now  uses  in  order  to  achieve  his  own  purposes. 
Neoptolemus'  use  of  guile  (or  rather,  ironically,  his  failure  properly  to 
carry  out  the  deceitful  plan)  now  backfires,  with  the  result  that  the  young 
man  finds  himself  compelled  to  do  exactly  the  opposite  of  what  he  knows 
to  be  a  divinely  sanctioned  plan  -a  plan  of  which  he  gave  a  full  account 
a  few  moments  before:  1324-47.  Knowledge  of  the  divine  will  is  again 
combined  with  deviation  from  it;  indeed,  this  ultimate  deviation  comes 
as  a  result  of  Neoptolemus'  erstwhile  commitment  to  the  promotion  of 
the  divine  plan  by  means  of  guile. 
2.3.1  Heracles'  epiphany:  the  divine  plan  salvaged 
The  divine  plan  has  been  jeopardized  because  of  the  failure  of  TrE  Lbw: 
Neoptolemus  has  used  both  tricky  and  honest  TrE  Loch,  but  to  little  avail; 
whereas  Philoctetes  has  successfully  used  a  perverse  kind  of  honest  1TE  LOW' 
that  rested  on  false  premises  established  by  (Neoptolemus')  guile.  In  the 
former  case  the  divine  plan  was  not  promoted  at  all,  while  in  the  latter  it 
is  in  danger  of  being  foiled.  Heracles  comes  to  reroute  the  plan  by  means 
of  proper  and  effective  TrE  LOW',  and  thus  to  impose,  at  last,  the  divine  will: 
his  speech  begins  with  a  strong  n  Trw  (1409),  reinforced  by  a  prohibitive 
KaTE  p11TÜQwv  (1416),  and  continues  in  either  the  imperative  (1417,1421, 
123  That  is  why  I  cannot  accept  Segal's  (1981:  335)  suggestion  that  Philoctetes' 
(allegedly)  natural  language,  unlike  Odysseus'  smooth  rhetoric,  "can  touch  a 
chord  of  instinctive  communication  lost  in  a  world  of  ruthless  cleverness  and 
pitiless  artifice".  Buxton  (1982:  124)  also  regards  Philoctetes'  persuasion  as 
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1433,1436,1440)  or  the  future  indicative  mood  (1424,1427,1428,1438). 
Linforth  (1956:  115,150)  and  D.  B.  Robinson  (1969:  53)  thought  that 
Heracles  does  not,  properly  speaking,  persuade  Philoctetes,  but  as 
Easterling  (1978a:  33-34)  has  pointed  out,  the  question  whether 
Philoctetes  is  `persuaded'  by  Heracles  or  not  "can  easily  turn  into  a  rather 
pointless  debate  if  we  allow  ourselves  to  be  mesmerised  by  English 
terminology  and  make  a  rigid  distinction  between  obedience  to  a 
command  and  compliance  in  response  to  argument:  the  Greeks  after  all 
used  peithomai  for  both  ideas.  "  124  This  is  fully  consistent  with 
Philoctetes'  reply:  o1K  Q1TLO1  cm)  TOLS  Qots  µiOoLs  (1447). 
That  Heracles  uses  1TE  LOW  to  bring  Philoctetes  to  Troy  does  not  mean 
that  he  speaks  as  an  old  and  beloved  friend,  as  some  critics  have 
thought.  125  He  has  come  rather  as  a  god  who  is  concerned  to  bring  an 
errant  mortal  to  reason.  126  His  imperatives  and  future  indicatives  show 
that  the  god  does  not  leave  room  for  choice:  he  either  gives  orders  or 
124  See  also  Buxton  (1982:  129),  Blundell  (1989:  221).  C.  Campbell  (1972:  83)  is 
therefore  wrong  in  preferring  `I  am  persuaded'  to  `I  obey'  as  a  translation  of 
OÜK  aTrL9rjvw  (1447),  in  order  to  make  the  oracle  take  "care  of  human  free  will.  " 
125  E.  g.  Bowra  (1944:  301-303);  Linforth  (1956:  155);  Easterling  (1978a:  35);  Pucci 
(1994:  35-36).  Pratt  (1949:  285-89)  holds  a  more  moderate  view,  according  to 
which  Heracles'  epiphany  presents  us  with  a  combination  of  kindliness  and 
authority.  For  Whitman  (1951:  186-89)  the  epiphany  is  merely  the  projection  of 
Philoctetes'  inner  greatness.  Others  think  that  the  epiphany  is  simply  a 
continuation  and  ratification  of  the  newly-forged  friendship  between 
Philoctetes  and  Neoptolemus:  see  e.  g.  (with  differences  in  emphasis)  Kirkwood 
(1958:  39,40,58,84,155),  (1994:  424,432-6);  Musurillo  (1967:  112);  Segal  (1976: 
81,86);  C.  Campbell  (1972:  82-3);  Matthiesen  (1981:  22);  Seale  (1982:  45-6);  cf. 
Webster  (1969:  66,67  but  contr.  69!  );  further  references  in  Garvie  (1972:  224  n. 
30)  who  rightly  rejects  this  view,  as  Pratt  (1949:  276)  and  Linforth  (1956:  151-2) 
also  do.  -  Doxography  on  Heracles'  epiphany:  Hamilton  (1975:  135  n.  17); 
Easterling  (1978a:  35-6). 
126  See  e.  g.  Beye  (1970:  74-75),  Gellie  (1972:  157),  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  214).  It  goes 
without  saying  that  I  cannot  agree  with  Craik  (1979:  21-22,25-26)  who  sees 
Heracles  as  a  burlesque  figure;  Craik  herself  (1979:  26  n.  30)  shows  the 
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predicts  what  is  bound  to  happen.  127  As  Blundell  (1989:  223)  has  put  it, 
"the  gods,  it  seems,  are  more  concerned  with  what  will  be  than  with  what 
ought  to  be".  Heracles'  discourse  is  entirely  devoid  of  emotion  or  personal 
feeling;  it  may  even  sound  peremptory  or  business-like.  128  Even  the 
reference  to  Philoctetes'  future  glory  (1422;  cf.  1425,1429)  is  hardly  to  be 
construed  as  a  recompense  for  his  toils,  i.  e.  as  an  unambiguous  sign  of 
divine  benevolence:  as  Garvie  (1972:  225-26)  has  pointed  out,  1422  is 
ambiguous,  for  EK  Tc3v  Trövc)v  Twv8'  can  mean  not  only  "as  a  result  of 
these  toils"  (in  which  case  a  kind  of  theodicy  may  be  Implied  -  although 
EK  is  not  quite  8Lä  =  `because  of)  but  also,  simply,  "after  these  toils"  (cf. 
for  this  use  271,720),  in  which  case,  as  Linforth  (1956:  154  n.  32) 
remarks,  "the  sentiment  expressed  [...  ]  is  the  familiar  one  of  the 
inevitable  alternation  in  human  fortunes,  from  good  to  bad  and  from 
bad  to  good;  In  itself  It  is  not  an  idea  of  moral  or  religious  import.  "129 
Significantly,  Philoctetes  never  utters  as  much  as  a  word  of  joy  or  relief, 
never  does  he  console  himself  with  the  thought  of  future  glory:  he  merely 
accepts  his  destiny  (1466-68).  130  Despite  the  view  of  some  critics,  131  I 
127  Cf.  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  300),  Blundell  (1989:  223).  Contra  Schmidt 
(1973:  246-47),  followed  by  Pucci  (1994:  41  n.  49). 
128  It  may,  or  may  not,  be  significant  that,  as  Podlecki  (1966b:  244-45  with  n.  24) 
has  remarked,  Heracles'  utterances  are  designated  not  as  ki&yoL  but  as  µ060L 
(1410,1417,1447):  this  lexical  feature  may  perhaps  be  seen  (in  this  particular 
context)  as  investing  Heracles'  commands  with  the  special  status  of 
superhuman  discourse,  thus  rendering  them  all  the  more  authoritative.  Cf.  also 
Segal  (1981:  334,337-39,348,351-52and  passim);  Buxton  (1982:  128);  Pucci  (1994: 
36-37);  Rabel  (1997:  301-3). 
129  This  ambiguity  of  EK  is  missed  by  Harrison  (1989:  175)  who  treats  it  as  a 
synonym  for  äVTI  and  uses  it  to  support  his  idea  that  Philoctetes'  prospective 
cult  (intimations  of  which  Harrison  thinks  he  can  detect  in  the  play  [ibid.,  173- 
5])  will  be  a  compensation  for  his  sufferings.  For  a  comparable  ambiguity  -in 
relation  to  Heracles'  own  fate  -cf.  1419:  the  participles  can  be  either  causal  or 
temporal  (suggestion  of  Mr  Garvie). 
130  Cf.  Garvie  (1972:  225-6),  Pucci  (1994:  43).  On  the  absence  of  theodicy  in  the 
play  see  D.  B.  Robinson  (1969:  54),  Poe  (1974:  7,9-10  with  n.  25,48-51),  Reinhardt 
(1979:  191).  Segal  (1977:  158),  although  he  labours  to  trace  optimistic  per- 109 
cannot  agree  that  Philoctetes  leaves  Lemnos  in  a  mood  of  joyful 
acceptance.  His  moving  farewell  to  the  island,  with  its  `humanization'  of 
the  landscape  that  Segal  (1981:  323-24,353-55,359-60)  has  so  well 
described,  does  not  indicate  a  sense  of  calm  and  reconciliation  between 
human  and  divine;  132  if  anything,  it  suggests  a  feeling  of  nostalgia133  for 
the  place  that,  despite  its  harsh  conditions,  has  preserved  Philoctetes' 
heroic  decency  -a  decency  that  he  will  now  have  to  abandon  (cf.  1352- 
61),  submitting  as  he  does  to  the  divine  will.  134 
But  if  Heracles  does  not  come  as  an  old  friend  bringing  to  his 
protege  the  good  news  of  his  future  rehabilitation,  then  for  what  specific 
reason  has  the  dramatist  chosen  him  in  particular  to  enforce  the  will  of 
the  gods?  Why  Heracles  and  not  just  any  god?  I  think,  the  answer  is  not 
hard  to  find.  Only  three  lines  before  Heracles'  appearance  (1406) 
Philoctetes  had  mentioned  his  name  in  connection  with  the  prospective 
spectives  in  the  ending  of  the  play  (like  e.  g.  Bowra  [1944:  305-6],  Taplin  [1971: 
39],  Gill  [1980:  144]),  finds  himself  obliged  to  admit  that  "what  Philoctetes  most 
passionately  wants,  justice  in  this  life,  he  is  denied";  cf.  also  Segal  (1976:  71-2, 
81,87),  (1981:  347-48).  Pucci  (1994:  37-38)  seems  to  bring  in  theodicy  by  the 
back  door  when  he  maintains  that  Heracles'  "epic  epiphany  signals  the  switch 
from  tragedy  to  epic,  from  a  bitter  view  of  the  business  of  life  to  its  trusting 
acceptance  [...  ]".  Even  Matthiesen,  who  argues  for  Philoctetes' 
'Resozialisierung'  at  the  end  of  the  play  (but  see  Kirkwood's  criticism  [1994:  425 
with  n.  2])  admits  that,  even  after  the  supposedly  beneficiary  intervention  of 
the  gods,  "am  Schluß  viele  Fragen  offen  bleiben". 
131  E.  g.  Easterling  (1978a:  34),  Buxton  (1982:  129),  Kirkwood  (1994:  428). 
132  As  e.  g.  Vidal-Naquet  (1972:  179-80),  Rose  (1976:  103),  Segal  (l.  c.  )  and  (1977: 
154-6)  have  argued. 
133  Cf.  Knox  (1964:  141),  (1983:  21);  Torrance  (1965:  318).  Linforth  (1956:  156) 
points  out  that  in  Philoctetes'  last  words  "there  is  no  trace  of  the  eagerness  to 
leave  the  island  which  he  had  shown  when  he  pleaded  with  Neoptolemos  to  take 
him  home,  no  trace  of  the  joy  he  hadfelt  when  Neoptolemos  consented.  " 
134  Cf.  Linforth  (1956:  154).  Greengard  (1987:  21)  remarks  that  the  tragic  effect 
of  the  shattering  of  Philoctetes'  heroic  nature  is  brought  about,  paradoxically, 
by  the  apparently  `comic'  (='happy')  ending  (although  she  then  [e.  g.  62-3,105 
etc.  ]  proceeds  to  qualify  her  argument,  to  the  effect  that  the  epiphany,  with  its 
fusion  of  the  tragic  and  the  comic  genres,  does  provide  full  resolution). 110 
use  of  his  bow  to  resist  even  further  the  divine  plan  -  i.  e.  to  fight  off  the 
Greeks  should,  they  attempt  to  invade  Neoptolemus'  land  by  way  of 
reprisal  for  his  apostasy  (1404ff.;  note  the  emphatic  position  of  the 
phrase  i3EAEQL  Tots  `HpaxMous135  [1406]  in  a  sequence  of  antilabai). 
Heracles,  jealously  defending  his  prerogatives  as  any  Greek  deity  would 
do,  is  concerned  to  rectify  this  impending  misuse  of  his  bow  -a  misuse 
which  would,  moreover,  seal  definitely  the  failure  of  the  divine  plan:  136  in 
other  words,  Heracles'  intervention  is  motivated  both  by  personal  and  by 
broader  (communal,  cosmic)  considerations.  Heracles'  ownership  of  the 
bow  has  been  referred  to  in  numerous  passages  (e.  g.  801-3,942-3,1131- 
3),  while  Heracles  himself  twice  indicates  how  his  bow  is  to  be  used:  it  will 
be  the  instrument  of  Paris'  death  (1426-27;  NB  1427  TÖýOLQL  Tots 
E  uoLQL  )137  and  it  -will  capture  Troy  for  the  second  time  (1439-40;  NB, 
again,  Tots  Euots 
...  TÖýOLS).  Instead  of  explicitly  disapproving  of 
Odysseus'  practices  (which  is  what  one  should  expect  if  Odysseus  had 
really  been  ungodly),  Heracles  -  in  what  is  undoubtedly  a  tour  de  force 
of  Sophoclean  irony  -  echoes  Odysseus'  discourse  In  announcing  to 
Philoctetes  that  he  must  comply  with  the  divine  will:  138  cf.  e.  g.  1409 
135'HpaKMovs  Brunck  (prob.  Dawe  [1996]):  -  ECOLS  codd.:  -EOLs  Wackernagel 
(prob.  Lloyd  Jones  &  Wilson  [1990a]). 
136  The  point  is  brilliantly  made  by  Harsh  (1960:  412,  cf.  414);  cf.  Segal  (1976:  76- 
7,79).  Contra  Poe  (1974:  22),  Rose  (1976:  79  n.  69)  and  most  recently  R.  J. 
Newman,  Cl  86  (1991)  307  with  n.  8,  who  argues  that  Heracles  actually  ratifies 
Philoctetes'  willingness  to  defend  his  newly-formed  heroic  friendship  with 
Neoptolemus;  cf.  Rabel  (1997:  303).  On  the  bow's  role  see  also  Knox  (1964:  139- 
40);  Musurillo  (1967:  121-22);  Beye  (1970:  67);  Gellie  (1972:  156);  Segal  (1977:  152- 
53),  (1981:  298-99,320-22);  DiBenedetto  (1983:  193). 
137  Is  the  indication  of  Paris  as  target  of  the  bow  an  implicit  disapproval  of 
Philoctetes'  attempt  to  shoot  Odysseus  (1299ff.  )? 
138  See  Blundell  (1989:  224  n.  136).  Cf.  Beye  (1970:  74):  "Heracles  stops  every 
forward  thrust  of  the  story,  save  the  will  of  Odysseus".  Kirkwood  (1965:  66)  has 
also  rightly  pointed  out  the  essential  similarity  between  Odysseus  and  Heracles 
as  carriers-out  of  the  divine  will.  Contra  Schmidt  (1973:  246),  who  thinks  that, 
because  Odysseus  himself  fails  to  achieve  his  purpose,  he  cannot  have  been  an 
instrument  of  the  divine  will.  Knox  (1964:  221)  incomprehensibly  argues  that 111 
µnjTrW  'YE  -  1293  Eyw  8'  (11MV8G  yE  (both  in  a  context  of  preventing  the 
foiling  of  the  divine  plan);  1415  Ta  ALÖs  TE  #äaWV  ßouXEÜµaTa 
ý  990 
ZEÜs,  c)  8E8OKTaL  TaOe';  1425  äpETrj  TE  1TP6TOS  EKKpLOEl 
QTpaTE1*aT0c  -  997  %10LOUs  TOts  apLQTEOaLV;  139  1428  Tr4pQEL9  TE 
TpO'LaV  &  1440-41  ÖTav  I  TrOp0rjTE  yatav  N  998  TpoLav  U'  EXEtV  8Et  KaL 
KaTaCTK#aL  3La;  1434-35  013TE  yap  ab  TOOS'  aTEp  QeEVEL9  I  EAEI,  V  T6 
TpoLas  TrESLOV  oÜe'  OÜTOs  QEeEV  -  115  oÜT'  äV  Ub  KELVWV  XWPL9  OÜT' 
E  KEtva  aoO.  140  It  is  not,  then,  Odysseus  who  must  be  chastised  -  after  all 
he  is  the  only  one  who  fully  and  unswervingly  adhered,  to  the 
requirements  of  the  prophecy.  It  is  rather  Philoctetes  and  Neoptolemus.  141 
This  is,  I  suggest,  the  point  of  the  final  exhortation  to  E1  aE  ßE  La  (1440- 
44):  142  both  Philoctetes  and  Neoptolemus  have  failed  to  be  EÜQEIEts. 
Neoptolemus'  progressive  acquaintance  with  Philoctetes'  misery,  along 
with  the  latter's  complaints  against  divine  injustice  (e.  g.  446-52,1020), 
have  given  rise  to  preoccupations  with  fairness  and  to  feelings  of 
compassion,  which  have  led  to  a  gradual  deviation  from  the  divine  plan. 
Philoctetes,  even  when  briefed  on  the  details  of  this  plan  (1324-47), 
remained  intransigently  preoccupied  with  retributive  justice  (e.  g.  1035- 
44,1113-6,1369)  and  heroic  pride  (e.  g.  995-6,1352-61),  and  chose  to 
ignore  the  will  of  the  gods  (cf.  esp.  his  provocative  defiance  of  Zeus 
himself  at  1197-9,  a  passage  with  distinctly  `Promethean'  echoes:  cf.  ?  A. 
Odysseus  is  ignominiously  ignored  by  Heracles,  who  reserves  his  blessing  (!  ) 
for  Neoptolemus  and  Philoctetes. 
139  &pLUTEÜULV  Nauck  :  -uL  G:  äpLQTEÜQaQL  R:  äpiOTOLUL  rell. 
140  Line  115  must  be  read  in  the  light  of  the  ambiguity  (permeating  the 
prologue)  as  to  whether  Philoctetes  or  only  the  bow  is  needed.  See  above,  p.  79. 
For  further  Odyssean  echoes  in  Heracles'  speech  see  Schucard  (1973/74:  135 
with  n.  17). 
141  D.  B.  Robinson  (1969:  54)  fails  to  see  this. 
142  Lines  1443-44  are  undoubtedly  genuine;  see  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b: 
212).  1  cannot  see  how  Kieffer  (1942:  49)  concludes  that  the  exhortation  to 
EüaEßELa  is  actually  addressed  to  Odysseus. 112 
W  992-6).  143  I  see  no  other  point  in  this  strong  admonition  to  EÜQ4  PC  La 
-  apart,  perhaps,  from  that  proposed  by  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  302- 
303),  according  to  whom  at  this  point  the  ironist  Sophocles  Is  merely 
opening  "a  window  upon  a  tragic  future".  144  True,  in  Its  immediate 
context,  the  exhortation  to  E  ia4  ßE  La  evidently  refers  to  what  should  be 
the  heroes'  conduct  while  sacking  Troy  (cf.  1440-41),  and  may  perfectly 
well  allude  to  Neoptolemus'  atrocities  against  Priam,  Polyxena  and 
Astyanax  (cf.  e.  g.  Webster  [ad  1441]).  145  Still,  an  allusion  to  this  tragic  fu- 
ture  would  apply  only  to  Neoptolemus,  not  (as  far  as  I  can  see)  to 
Philoctetes.  It  seems  completely  improbable  that  Heracles,  who  has 
abandoned  his  heavenly  abode  for  Philoctetes'  sake  (1413-14),  should 
spend  the  final  lines  of  his  speech  (and  the  last  iambic  lines  of  the 
play)  146  sermonizing  about  Neoptolemus'  future,  which  is  definitely  not  a 
central  issue  of  the  play.  The  undeniable  fact  that  the  admonition  to 
EÜQý  ßE  La  is  closely  connected  with  the  sack  of  Troy  Is  perfectly  explicable 
along  the  lines  of  my  interpretation:  it  is  exactly  on  the  battlefield  that 
these  two  ferocious  lions  (see  n.  147)  are  most  likely  to  reiterate  such 
deeds  of  äaE  ßE  La  as  their  flouting  of  the  divine  will  in  this  play.  147 
143  For  further  possible  associations  between  Philoctetes  and  Prometheus  see 
Greengard  (1987:  84  n.  47)  and  especially  Stokes  (1988:  166-73).  On  Philoctetes' 
lack  of  EvlE(3ELa  see  e.  g.  Bowra  (1944:  304),  Diller  (1950:  21),  Kirkwood  (1958: 
265).  Cf.  Segal  (1977:  137,157),  who  sees  however  a  basically  optimistic  tone  in 
Heracles'  final  words  about  piety.  Kitto  (1961:  308)  preposterously  thinks  that 
the  admonition  to  EüvE13ELa  is  irrelevant,  while  Pucci  (1994:  36,38-39)  offers  a 
completely  different  interpretation  thereof. 
144  Cf.  Rose  (1976:  102-3);  Taplin  (1983:  166). 
145  For  the  relevant  ancient  sources  see  Gantz  (1993:  650,658).  On  Neoptolemus' 
sinister  persona  in  the  mythic  tradition,  and  in  Sophocles'  lost  plays,  see  Fuqua 
(1976:  34-49). 
146  Cf.  Segal  (1977:  134). 
147  Pace  e.  g.  Bowra  (1944:  304-305),  Steidle  (1968:  187),  Gill  (1980:  139)  and 
Machin  (1981:  414),  the  lion-simile  is  not  unequivocally  flattering.  Wolff 
(1979),  who  offers  a  detailed  examination  of  lion-similes  in  Homer  and  tragedy, 
concludes  that  in  the  present  passage  the  associations  of  lions  with  savagery 
and  impiety  are  unmistakable  -especially  in  view  of  A.  Cho.  937  (cf.  Garvie 113 
It  is  obvious,  then,  that  Heracles'  epiphany  forms  an  integral  part 
of  the  play.  148  To  deny  this  is  to  assume  an  artistic  failure  on  Sophocles' 
part  (a  failure  of  the  kind  castigated  by  Aristotle  in  Fb.  1454a37- 
1454b2149);  such  an  assumption  however  should  be  resorted  to  only  when 
all  other  arguments  in  defence  of  the  artistic  unity  of  the  play  have 
failed.  Such  an  artistic  failure  is  assumed  by  those  critics  who  suggest 
that  Sophocles  used  the  deus  (according  to  some  of  them,  under  the 
influence  of  Euripides)  in  order  to  reconcile  the  ending  of  the  play  with 
the  mythological  data;  as  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz  (1917:  311)  amusingly 
remarked,  Heracles  comes  "um  im  Namen  des  Zeus,  wir  könnten 
ebensogut  sagen  im  Namen  Homers,  Philoktet  die  Fahrt  nach  Troja  zu 
befehlen".  150  Some  of  the  critics  that  fall  into  this  category  (see  n.  150) 
feel  that  the  first  (`false')  ending  -  departure  to  Greece  -  is  necessary, 
because  we  must  see  Philoctetes'  heroic  obduracy  duly  celebrated.  In 
other  words,  those  critics  want  to  have  It  both  ways  (even  at  the  price  of 
artistic  disunity):  on  the  one  hand  their  moral  and  /  or  emotional 
preoccupations  are  satisfied  because  Philoctetes  does  not  give  In  to  mortal 
pressurizing,  while  on  the  other  hand  they  may  rest  assured  that  Troy 
[1986:  ad  935-8])  and  E.  Q.  1401-2,1554-5  (cf.  Willink  [1986:  ad  1400-1]).  Fuqua 
(1976:  93)  inconsistently  sees  the  lions  as  symbols  of  degrading  ferocity  in  the 
Orestes  passages,  and  as  images  of  heroic  friendship  in  the  Philoctetes  passage. 
148  For  a  most  forceful  support  of  this  view  see  esp.  Reinhardt  (1979:  190-91), 
Segal  (1977:  135  and  passim).  Cf.  also  the  theatrical  arguments  of  Seale  (1982: 
46). 
149  ýaVEp0  'V  01)"V 
vvµßaLvELV,  KaL  µý  CMTEp  Ev  Tri  Mr6El¢  äirö  µTjXavTis.  Indeed,  D.  W.  Lucas 
(Aristotle.  Poetics  [Oxford  1968]  ad  loc.  )  thought  that  the  Philoctetes  falls  into 
this  category.  -  For  other  pieces  of  ancient  criticism  against  the 
inconsequential  use  of  the  deus  see  Spira  (1960:  149-52). 
150  Other  critics  sharing  this  view  are,  e.  g.,  Adams  (1957:  159);  Linforth  (1956: 
151-52);  D.  B.  Robinson  (1969:  51-56);  Garvie  (1971:  224-25);  Gellie  (1972:  156-58); 
Taplin  (1983:  164-6).  Pucci  (1994:  37-3  8,42-  44)  is  a  special  case:  his  view  of  the 
epiphany  as  something  external  is  based  on  the  substantial  differences  of 
language  and  context  discerning  the  epic  genre  (whose  traces  he  identifies  in 
the  epiphany)  from  the  tragic  genre. 114 
was  after  all  taken.  Others  felt  that  their  religious  or  moral  sensibilities 
were  offended  by  the  god's  peremptoriness:  Kitto  (1956:  103-105,134, 
136-37),  (1961:  306-308),  for  instance,  striving  to  discover  a  theodicy  in 
the  play,  demurred  at  the  fact  that  Heracles  does  not  restore  moral  order, 
so,  he  issued  the  verdict  that  the  epiphany  is  not  a  culmination  of  any 
kind,  it  is  only  a  conventional  "cutting  of  the  knot".  My  interpretation 
has  the  advantage  of  preserving  the  unity  of  the  play  without  having  to 
resort  to  such  desperate  measures  as  hypothesizing,  contrary  to  the 
evidence  of  the  text  (cf.  above,  p.  107ff.  with  n.  125),  that  the  reason  why 
Heracles'  epiphany  is  an  integral  part  of  the  play  is  because  it  supposedly 
ratifies  and  rewards  the  newly-forged  heroic  friendship  between 
Neoptolemus  and  Philoctetes.  I  should  rather  insist  that  the  epiphany  Is 
the  natural  ending  to  the  play  because  it  duly  imposes  the  will  of  the 
gods  that  has  been  increasingly  resisted  and  all  but  frustrated.  This  was 
seen  most  clearly  by  Spira  (1960:  29)  who  interpreted  Heracles' 
appearance  as  part  and  parcel  of  the  play's  dramatic  structure:  "Von  der 
dramatischen  Struktur  her  gesehen  bedeutet  also  der  D.  [eus]  e.  [x] 
m.  [achina]  die  Einführung  eines  neuen  Motivs,  nachdem  die  In  der 
Exposition  angelegten  Motive  erschöpft  sind  and  das  Ziel  der  Handlung 
nicht  hatten  erreichen  können"  (his  emphasis).  151 
2.4.1  Summary  and  conclusions 
A  prerequisite  of  my  interpretation  has  been  that  Odysseus,  far  from 
misunderstanding  or  distorting  the  prophecy  to  match  it  to  his  own 
interests,  is  the  person  who  knows  it  best  and  adheres  to  it  most.  Of 
151  My  main  disagreement  with  Spira  is  his  insistence  (1960:  25,27)  that 
Heracles'  epiphany  is  essentially  beneficent,  because  it  stops  Philoctetes' 
"Starrsinn"  and  reveals  to  him  the  will  of  Zeus  which  Philoctetes  has  (not 
refused  but)  failed  to  see,  and  which  involves  healing  and  glory.  I  have  argued 
on  p.  111  that  Philoctetes  knowingly  defies  the  will  of  Zeus;  and  on  pp.  107-109 
that  there  is  no  reason  to  perceive  Heracles'  intervention  as  necessarily 
beneficent. 115 
course,  this  does  not  mean  that  we  have  to  see  Odysseus  as  a  good 
character;  he  is  beyond  doubt  a  villain  who  will  not  hesitate  to  achieve 
his  purpose  by  hook  or  by  crook.  And  although  he  fights  for  a  common 
cause  (cf.  1143-45),  152  he  is  not  free  from  egotism  and  ambition  (cf.  e.  g. 
1052).  But  this  is  precisely  one  of  the  main  points  of  this  play:  the  gods 
are  above  and  beyond  human  morality;  if  Odysseus  is  the  best  person  to 
carry  out  their  plan,  they  will  choose  Odysseus.  153  One  of  the  most  fasci- 
nating  aspects  of  this  play  is  that  the  divine  will  is  not  revealed  through 
an  irreproachable  human  agent  (e.  g.  an  oracle,  as  it  happens  in  the 
Electra)  but  through  a  person  whose  trustworthiness  is,  to  say  the  least, 
doubtful:  we  first  hear  about  the  prophecy  from  the  Emporos,  Odysseus' 
agent,  who  uses  an  ambiguous  discourse  (130  TrOLK(s  )s).  154  And  although, 
as  we  saw,  Neoptolemus  does  take  seriously  the  prophecy  and  the  divine 
plan  revealed  by  it,  Odysseus'  despicable  character  and  practices  are 
hardly  creditable  to  the  divine  plan  he  earnestly  tries  to  carry  out.  As 
152  These  lines  seem  to  me  to  refer  to  Odysseus:  see  e.  g.  Jebb  (ad  1140,1143ff.  ), 
Webster  (ad  1140ff,  1143),  Rose  (1976:  91).  However  Kamerbeek  (p.  157)  and 
11oyd  Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  207)  take  them  to  allude  to  Neoptolemus.  Dain  & 
Mazon  evasively  translate:  "L'  homme  dont  tu  parles". 
153  Many  scholars  have  tried  to  demonstrate  `positive'  aspects  of  Odysseus' 
persona;  see  e.  g.  Beye  (1970:  68-69),  a  very  sober  and  helpful  analysis;  Gellie 
(1972:  132-33);  Poe  (1974:  23);  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  282);  Kiso  (1984:  105- 
106);  Strohm  (1986:  112-14).  I  feel  however  that  such  attempts  may  stem  from  an 
implicit  pietistic  assumption  that  the  agent  of  the  gods  must  be  (even  partly) 
justified  on  moral  grounds.  On  Odysseus'  amoral  pragmatism  in  the  Philoctetes 
see  esp.  Blundell's  (1987)  thorough  analysis,  as  against  M.  Nussbaum's  attempt 
at  moral  justification  (Phil.  &  Lit.  1  [1976-7]  25-53).  On  Odysseus'  image  as  an 
(often  malicious)  trickster  in  the  archaic  and  classical  eras  see  W.  B.  Stanford, 
The  Ulysses  Theme  (Oxford  1954),  90-117;  in  Sophocles'  lost  plays:  Kiso  (1984:  87- 
92). 
154  Cf.  Buxton  (1982:  130  with  n.  40);  Pucci  (1994:.  42  n.  52);  Gellie  (1972:  144-45); 
Greengard  (1987:  5-6,25-6);  Roberts  (1989:  171).  In  general,  see  Segal  (1977: 
138):  "in  this  play  [...  ]  the  divine  will  appears  embedded  in  falsehoods, 
ambiguous  statements,  oracles  which  are  partly  suppressed  or  of  uncertain 
reliability".  Pucci's  (1994:  33  n.  34)  relevant  remarks  put  the  matter  in  a 
broader  perspective. 116 
Bowra  (1944:  262)  remarked,  "those  who  resist  [the  divine  will]  are  more 
attractive  and  more  noble  than  those  who  claim  that  they  work  for  it", 
with  the  result,  I  believe,  that  the  divine  plan  itself  is  bound  to  appear 
(quite  justifiably)  less  attractive  and  less  noble.  155  We  have  seen  that 
Neoptolemus  views  the  designs  of  the  gods  in  an  increasingly 
unfavourable  light  as  he  becomes  more  and  more  acquainted  with 
Philoctetes'  plight  and  his  protests  against  divine  injustice.  It  is,  after  all, 
to  Philoctetes'  moral  considerations  concerning  this  plan  that 
Neoptolemus  gives  in,  thus  forsaking  the  plan  (1352ff.  ).  An  audience  is 
very  likely  to  be  carried  away  into  seeing  Odysseus  from  first  to  last  as  a 
hypocritical  villain  who  blasphemously  tries  to  forward  his  base  plans  in 
the  name  of  the  gods;  still,  such  an  audience  would  be  no  doubt  shocked 
at  the  end  of  the  play,  when  Heracles  has  nothing  to  blame  Odysseus  for 
(indeed,  he  often  echoes  Odysseus'  discourse!  ),  whereas  he  is  concerned  to 
correct  the  course  of  action  Philoctetes  and  Neoptolemus  have  been 
following  up  to  that  point.  This  does  not  mean  that  Sophoclean  gods  are 
immoral;  they  are  rather  "supramoral",  156  i.  e.  their  will  does  not 
necessarily  comply  with  human  notions  of  justice  or  morality,  and  their 
actions,  therefore,  are  not  to  be  judged  by  human  measures.  Actually, 
they  are  not  to  be  judged  at  all. 
However,  this  is  exactly  what  Philoctetes  does  -  and  leads 
Neoptolemus  gradually  to  do.  Philoctetes  directly  doubts  the  justice  of 
the  gods  (e.  g.  446-452)  and  attributes  his  misfortunes  to  their  hatred 
against  him  (254,1020  etc).  Neoptolemus,  albeit  never  explicitly 
questioning  the  gods,  tries  to  reconcile  the  terms  of  the  prophecy  with  his 
own  feelings  and  morals,  in  the  belief  (at  least  until  1402)  that  divine  will 
and  human  morality  and  compassion  can  perfectly  coincide.  His  conduct 
betrays  an  increasing  concern  with  ethics;  this  concern  leads  him,  first,  to 
an  attempt  to  adjust  the  divine  plan  to  his  own  moral  preoccupations  by 
using  honest  instead  of  tricky  ºTELeW'  (915ff.;  1287-92  &  1314-47)  - 
155  Bowra's  (1944:  263)  pietistic  prejudice  prevented  him  from  seeing  this:  "We 
can  hardly  believe  that  Sophodes  intended  our  moral  feelings  to  run  counter 
to  what  is  desired  by  the  gods". 117 
although  he  is  aware  that,  well  may  this  be  the  fairest  way,  it  is  bound  to 
be  ineffective,  and  that  by  doing  so  he  may  endanger  the  whole  plan.  At 
the  end,  however,  he  goes  so  far  as  to  frustrate  completely  the  divine 
scheme  by  taking  Philoctetes  together  with  himself  home,  evidently 
persuaded  by  him  that  going  to  Troy  will  be  humiliating  for  the  poor 
outcast  (cf.  1352-61);  thus,  pity  and  ethics  work  once  more  against  divine 
will.  As  we  have  seen,  Neoptolemus'  progressive  change  of  action  is 
effected  through  successive  stages  of  gradually  increasing  awareness  of 
Philoctetes'  misery;  this  awareness,  along  with  his  growing  pity,  are  the 
main  inner  workings  which  will  lead  the  young  man  to  his  final  action  of 
utter  irreverence  and,  at  the  same  time,  of  utmost  heroism.  He  has  in- 
deed  grown  to  be  a  man  through  his  effort  to  understand  and  to  judge 
the  ends  and  means  imposed  by  the  gods;  now  he  has  also  to  learn  to 
respect  their  will  without  scrutinizing  it,  just  like  his  former  master, 
Odysseus.  Finite  human  understanding  is  too  restricted  to  know  -  let 
alone  judge  -  divine  will;  ob  yap  äv  Tä  6Eia  KpUTrTOVTÜ  V  OECD  VI 
päOoLs  QV,  0U'8'  EL  TraVT'  ElTEýEXOOLs  QKOTrCOV  (S.  ir.  919  Radt).  157  As 
E.  R.  Dodds  has  demonstrated  long  ago,  ä  propos  of  the  Oedipus  Rem  a) 
Sophocles  "did  not  believe  (or  did  not  always  believe)  that  the  gods  are  in 
any  human  sense  `just"'  and  b)  "he  did  believe  that  the  gods  exist  and 
that  man  should  revere  them".  158  As  the  same  scholar  has  put  it  (op.  cit. 
47),  "for  him  [i.  e.  Sophocles],  as  for  Heraclitus,  there  is  an  objective 
world-order  which  man  must  respect,  but  which  he  cannot  hope  fully  to 
understand".  159  A  similar  point  has  also  been  made  by  Diller  (1950:  24): 
156  Whitman's  (1951:  245)  terminology. 
157  Cf.  Lesky  (1972:  269). 
158  Both  quotations  from  Dodds  (1966:  46;  cf.  47).  Cf.  Segal's  (1981:  355-56)  similar, 
though  more  moderate,  view:  "there  is  something  Intransigent  about  the 
demands  of  the  gods,  something  not  entirely  congruent  with  human  justice" 
(quotation  from  p.  355). 
159  Bowra  (1944:  295-96)  maintains  that  men  should  not  criticize  the  gods  but 
acquiesce  in  their  will;  if  this  were  not  hollow  pietism,  but  implied  that  gods 
are  unknowable  (and  therefore  cannot  be  criticized),  I  would  endorse  it. 
However,  Bowra  insists  that  the  gods  are  just  and  benevolent  (Bowra  [ibid.  263, 118 
"[...  ]  Sophokles  nichts  daran  liegt,  das  Geschehen  in  seinen  Tragödien  mit 
menschlichen  Vorstellungen  von  Gerechtichkeit  oder  Moral,  sei  es  positiv 
oder  negativ,  zu  konfrontieren.  Wohl  aber  liegt  ihm  daran,  die  eindeutige 
Klarheit  der  göttlichen  Aussage  gegenüber  allem  menschlichen  Fehlwissen 
darzutun.  " 
Neoptolemus'  gradual  deviation  from  the  divine  will  (as  expressed 
in  the  prophecy)  parallels  the  progressive  revelation  of  the  prophecy:  at 
191-200  the  young  man  infers  -  apparently  without  having  been 
informed  by  anyone,  and  certainly  not  by  Odysseus  (Cf.  E'(TrEp  Käyt  TL 
4pov6  192)  -  that  his  mission  forms  part  of  a  divine  plan.  Significantly, 
as  well  as  paradoxically,  his  utter  ignorance  of  the  divine  will  is  combined 
with  his  complete  devotion  to  it;  whereas,  the  more  familiar  he  becomes 
with  the  details  of  the  prophecy  the  more  he  flouts  it.  Thus,  when  the 
Emporos  introduces  specific  information  about  the  prophecy, 
Neoptolemus  ('overinterpreting'  the  information:  83  9-42;  cf.  above,  p.  98) 
gradually  begins  to  oppose  what  he  knows  to  be  the  designs  of  the  gods. 
His  first  step  is  to  reveal  the  plan  to  Philoctetes  (915ff.  ).  A  little  later, 
after  his  knowledge  of  Odysseus'  divine  agency  has  been  confirmed  (989- 
90),  he  takes  a  second  step  away  from  the  prophecy  by  giving  the  bow 
back  to  its  owner  (1222  ff.  ).  Finally,  when  at  1314ff.  he  appears  capable 
(no  matter  how)  of  giving  a  detailed  account  of  the  prophecy,  he  gives 
the  coup  de  grace  to  the  divine  plan:  Philoctetes,  far  from  being 
persuaded  (despite  the  young  man's  frankness)  to  come  to  Troy,  will 
instead  persuade  Neoptolemus  to  carry  him  back  to  Greece. 
It  is  for  the  sake  of  the  pattern  we  identified  above  (i.  e.  the  more 
fully  Neoptolemus  knows  the  prophecy,  the  more  he  deviates  from  it) 
290,294,296  etc.  ),  whereas  to  my  view  Sophoclean  gods  do  not  conform  with 
human  ethics.  I  agree  with  Kirkwood's  remarks  (1958:  265-66)  that  "man  must 
obey  and  trust  [i.  e.  the  gods]  but  cannot  hope  to  comprehend",  notwithstanding 
his  view  that  Sophoclean  gods  do  care  for  justice,  although  this  is  not  always 
obvious  to  men  (op.  cit.  273,279,287).  For  the  gulf  between  human  doxa  and 
divine  aletheia  see  again  Kirkwood  (1958:  286-87).  Cf.  also  Reinhardt  (1979:  191), 
Segal  (1981:  356-57). 119 
that  Sophocles  allows  himself  such  `illogicalities'  as  that  of  191-200:  160 
Neoptolemus'  speculations  about  the  plans  of  the  gods  must  be 
unjustified,  they  must  constitute  a  coup  de  theatre;  in  other  words,  they 
must  not  stem  from  what  he  has  heard  from  Odysseus  in  the  prologue,  so 
that  the  arising  inconsistency  highlights  all  the  more  emphatically  that 
Neoptolemus,  albeit  in  a  state  of  sheer  ignorance,  puts  complete  faith  in 
what  he  thinks  is  some  inscrutable  divine  plan.  On  the  other  hand,  his 
progressive  knowledge  of  the  terms  of  the  prophecy  -  which  parallels  his 
progressive  acquaintance  with  Philoctetes'  plight  (depicted  by  the 
dramatist  in  full  detail)  and  with  the  divine  injustice  that  seems  to  have 
caused  it  -  will  lead  him  finally  to  flout  (1402ff.  )  this  same  divine  plan 
that  he  (in  his  ignorance)  respected  so  much  at  191-200.161  The  same 
explanation  can  be  applied  to  the  similarly  `illogical'  lines  1324ff.,  where 
Neoptolemus'  inexplicable  knowledge  of  the  full  version  of  the  prophecy  is 
intended  to  be  contrasted  with  his  complete  defiance  thereof  in  1402ff.  162 
The  more  glaring  the  inexplicability  of  Neoptolemus'  Insight  into  the 
plans  of  the  gods,  the  more  blatant  his  defiance  of  these  plans. 
Sophocles  deliberately  presents  Philoctetes  and  Neoptolemus,  two 
undeniably  attractive  characters,  as  resisting  the  divine  will,  but 
eventually  complying  with  it.  The  audience,  sympathizing  with  the 
heroes'  moral  struggle,  identify  with  them,  163  until  they  realize,  at  the 
end,  that  they  have  their  own  share  in  the  tragedy  of  Philoctetes:  while 
160  The  most  noteworthy  (albeit,  as  I  argue  in  the  text,  quite  needless)  attempts 
to  explain  away  these  illogicalities  are  those  by  Kitto  (1956:  87ff.  ),  Knox  (1964: 
187  n.  21)  and,  more  recently,  by  Machin  (1981:  61-103). 
161  Adams  (1957:  140)  and  Gellie  (1972:  135-36)  seem  to  be  the  only  critics  who 
hint  (but  only  hint)  at  the  important  point  that  Neoptolemus'  firm  belief  in  a 
divine  plan  is  meant  to  be  contrasted  with  the  eventual  frustration  thereof. 
162  The  importance  of  Neoptolemus'  gradual  comprehension  of  the  prophecy  is 
perceived  by  Gill  (1980:  141-42)  as  well,  but  interpreted  in  a  quite  different  way. 
Cf.  also  Kieffer  (1942:  47-48),  Segal  (1977:  140n.  19). 
163  Cf.  the  quotation  from  Bowra  on  p.  116.  Kitto  (1956:  121-22,123,125-26,130); 
(1961:  304-307)  rightly  remarks  -  pace  Strohm  (1986:  120)  -  that  Sophocles 
presents  Philoctetes  as  reasonably  resisting  every  attempt  at  persuasion,  so 
that  the  audience  are  not  irritated  against  him;  cf.  Linforth  (1956:  118). 120 
watching  the  play,  they  have  been  involved  in  a  fruitless  struggle  to 
understand  the  divine  will  and  to  explain  it  by  human  moral  measures. 
In  the  end  however  they  realize  that  divinity  is  beyond  comprehension 
and  above  human  standards  of  morality;  it  does  not  necessarily  conform 
to  our  (intellectual,  moral  etc.  )  preconceptions,  and  it  cannot  be 
accommodated  within  the  categories  created  by  the  human  mind.  The 
most  that  can  be  known  about  the  gods  is  that,  regardless  of  our 
comprehension  and  /  or  compliance,  they  eventually  impose  their  will. 
Heracles'  epiphany  confirms  this  inexorable  teleology. CHAPTER  THREE 
OIKOS  AND  THE  WILD, 
CIVILIZATION  AND  SAVAGERY 
IN  THE  TRACHINIAE 
Set  me  as  a  seat  upon  thine  heart,  as  a  seal  upon  thine  arm: 
for  love  is  strong  as  death;  jealousy  is  cruel  as  thegrave: 
the  coals  thereof  are  coals  of  fire,  which  hath  a  most  vehement  flume. 
9v(any  waters  cannot  quench  love,  neither  can  the  floods  drown  it. 
Te  Song  ofSolomon,  8.6-  7 
Sin4  whoever  raises  thegreat  stones; 
I  've  raised  these  stones  as  long  as  I  was  able 
I  've  loved  these  stones  as  long  as  I  was  able 
these  stones,  my  fate. 
Wounded  by  my  own  soil 
tortured  by  my  own  shirt 
condemned  by  my  own  gods, 
these  stones. 
George  Seferis,  Gr1mnopaiä'ra,  II:  M  jcenae 
(trans.  by  Edmunrf  9ýgeley  er  Pkifip  Sherrard) 
3.0.1  Introduction 
Heracles  in  Greek  myth  is  the  embodiment  of  a  set  of  symmetrically 
arranged  contradictions  that  define  his  nature.  Kirk  (1977:  286)  has 
drawn  an  instructive  diagram  to  illustrate  them: 
humane  :  bestial 
serious  :  burlesque 
sane  :  mad 
salutary  :  destructive 
free  :  slave 
human:  divine 122 
Loraux  (1995:  116-39)  pointed  out  that  yet  another  contradiction, 
namely  "man  :  woman"  (or,  as  she  puts  it,  "virile  :  feminine"),  may  be  of 
equal  importance.  In  this  chapter  I  intend  to  explore  some  of  these  pairs 
of  contradictions,  predominantly  the  polarity  "Culture  :  Nature"  (or 
"Civilization  :  Savagery",  or  even,  to  put  it  in  more  concrete  terms, 
"humane  :  bestial"),  1  because  I  believe  that  they  constitute  an  important 
thematic  axis  of  the  Trachiniae  and  are,  therefore,  central  to  our 
understanding  of  it.  In  this  respect,  I  have  found  Segal's  method  of 
analysis  of  Sophoclean  tragedy  highly  applicable  to  this  play,  precisely 
because  it  acknowledges  the  capital  importance  of  the  basic  dichotomy 
"Civilization  :  Savagery".  2  This  general  polarity,  already  fully  formulated 
in  the  mythical  background,  may  reveal  an  underlying  pattern  which 
would  account  for  the  contradictions  between  the  humane  and  the 
bestial  aspects  and  actions  of  Heracles  both  in  myth  and  in  the 
Trachiniae.  Important  dichotomies  like  "masculine  :  feminine"  or 
"salutary  :  destructive"  will,  of  course,  be  brought  into  consideration,  In 
order  to  supplement  and  illustrate  the  basic  antinomy  "Civilization 
Savagery". 
1  On  the  importance  of  this  contrast  in  Heracles  see  Kirk  (1974:  206-209)  and 
(1977:  291);  cf.  Fuqua  (1980:  11  n.  29).  Burkert  (1979:  97),  in  a  masterly 
exploration  of  shaman  parallels  to  the  Heracles  myth,  has  shown  that  this 
contrast  may  be  intrinsic  to  Heracles'  nature:  "Heracles  `civilizes'  the  earth  by 
destruction.  "  Silk  (1985:  6-7,11),  however,  is  only  partly  in  agreement:  he 
recognizes  Heracles'  `interstitial'  nature,  but  views  him  as  being  betwixt  and 
between  not  Nature  and  Culture,  but  divine  and  human  status.  For  Heracles  as 
the  intersection  of  human  and  divine  attributes  -  an  embodiment  of 
contradictions  -see  also  Frils  Johansen  (1986:  57-61). 
2  See  in  particular  Segal  (1975a)  and  (1981).  His  important  article  "Sophocles' 
Trachiniae:  Myth,  Poetry,  and  Heroic  Values",  YCS  25  (1977)  99-158  has  been 
reproduced  in  Segal  (1995),  to  which  the  citations  refer. 3.1.1  Heracles  and  the  wild:  Heracles  and  the  oLicog 
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At  the  outset  of  the  play  we  are  presented  with  the  traditional  image  of 
the  heroic  Heracles,  fighter  of  monsters  and  preserver  of  civilized  order. 
We  first  hear  of  him  in  an  account  of  his  battle-like  fight  (20)  with  the 
fiendish  Achelous:  the  agonistic  vocabulary3  of  this  and  other  passages 
(e.  g.  19  KAELv63,4  20,5  26,6  36  etc.  )  is  a  reminder  of  Heracles'  wondrous 
exploits  and  an  affirmation  of  his  heroic  image,  so  well  established  in 
Panhellenic  legend.?  Interestingly,  the  mention  of  the  fight  against 
Achelous  reveals  Heracles'  civilizing  function  both  in  macrocosmic  and  in 
microcosmic  terms:  the  hero  is  not  only  the  performer  of  deeds  of  wider 
significance  (such  as  the  defeat  of  a  monster),  but  also  a  creator  of  a 
household,  i.  e.  of  what  is  the  elementary  constituent  of  society  and  the 
basic  form  of  civilized  life.  The  fight  against  the  river  is  essentially  an  act 
of  restoration  of  domestic  order:  thanks  to  Heracles,  Deianeira  has  been 
spared  a  horrible  perversion  of  a  wedding  (cf.  9,15,17)8  and  has  instead 
been  ensured  a  proper  and  distinguished  marriage  (27)  to  the  best  of  men 
(cf.  176-77). 
Very  soon,  however,  the  bright  image  of  the  glorious  Heracles  is 
3  On  this  vocabulary  see  Easterling  (ad  80). 
4  On  K)  LVÖc  in  association  with  Heracles  see  Davies  (ad.  19). 
5  Military-agonistic  connotations  are  to  be  seen  not  only  in  äyc,  Sva  RaXrs  (on 
which  see  Davies  [ad  20]),  but  also  in  6vµrrEQWV,  which  Kamerbeek  (ad  20) 
renders  as  `concurrens  pugnando'  and  appositely  compares  with  Aj.  467. 
6  on  äytVLos  as  an  epithet  applied  to  gods  who  preside  over  trials  of  strength 
see  commentators. 
7  On  the  `halo  of  epic  light'  in  which  Heracles  makes  his  first  appearance  see 
Schiassi  as  cited  by  Easterling  (ad  19).  On  Heracles'  aspect  as  "eroe 
acculturante"  see  Gentili  (1977)  and  cf.  Galinsky  (1972:  16,29-35);  contra  Kirk 
(1974:  204). 
8  On  Achelous  as  a  monstrous  parody  of  a  suitor  see  Sorum  (1978:  61);  contra 
Heiden  (1989:  26-7);  wrongly  Wender  (1974:  5). 124 
clouded  by  disturbing  hints.  Was  the  outcome  of  the  fight  between  him 
and  Achelous,  i.  e.  Heracles'  winning  of  Deianeira's  hand,  really  Kcth  3 
(27)?  As  Stinton  (1990:  413)  has  remarked,  "it  is  Deianeira's  particular 
fate  that  she  is  cheated  of  the  conjugal  bliss  which  a  bride  is  led  at  her 
wedding  to  expect.  "9  Deianeira's  nights,  far  from  being  devoted  to  the 
mutual  sexual  gratification  of  the  married  couple,  as  they  should  be,  are 
on  the  contrary  beset  by  an  endless  succession  of  TrövoL  (30;  cf.  149-50);  10 
her  bridal  bed  is  `husbandless'  (109-10)  and  witnesses  not  her  marital 
happiness  but  her  incessant  agony.  "  The  couple  may  have  had 
numerous  children  (31,54),  but,  as  appears  from  lines  31-33,  their 
importance  in  the  life  of  the  household  is  minimal;  ironically,  the.  word 
chStvES,  instead  of  referring  to  the  birth-pangs  which  are  normally 
accompanied  by  joy  for  the  new  life  that  comes  to  the  household,  is  used 
of  Deianeira's  anxiety  on  her  husband's  account  (41-42).  12  Her 
generalizations  about  the  troubles  of  married  life  at  144-52  as  opposed  to 
the  insouciance  of  youth  may  be,  seen  as  simply  reflecting  her  own 
individual  experience.  13  What  is  more,  with  Heracles'  having  to  leave 
9  For  documentation  about  the  Greek  ideal  of  a  happy  marriage  see  again 
Stinton  (1990:  413  n.  38). 
10  On  Deianeira's  TrövoL  cf.  Hoey's  (1972:  142,146)  remarks. 
11  Cf.  Easterling  (1968:  59)  who  also  points  out  that  the  use  of  TpE4cU  at  28 
underlines,  as  a  foil,  that  a  marriage's  normal  function  should  be  the 
nurturing  of  children,  not  of  fears;  see  also  Wender  (1974:  5)  and,  most 
exhaustively,  Segal  (1975a:  42-43),  (1975b:  613-17),  (1981:  75)  for  the  sinister 
tones  of  fertility  imagery  in  general. 
12  The  use  of  w8ic  here  is  of  course  metaphorical:  see  Easterling  (ad  42).  I  do  not 
believe,  however,  that  the  choice  of  this  particular  word  to  describe  Deianeira's 
mental  anguish  is  accidental;  cf.  Segal's  (1975b:  616)  and  Rehm's  (1994:  73) 
interesting  remarks.  OnA.  Cho.  211  see  Lebeck  as  cited  by  Garvie  (1986:  ad  211). 
13  Cf.  Adams  (1957:  115),  Easterling  (1968:  60).  As  Stinton  (1990:  411)  remarks, 
considerations  about  the  carefree  life  lost  by  marriage  are  a,  topos  of  the 
wedding-song;  this,  however,  does  not  alter  the  highly  individual  character  of 
Deianeira's  remarks.  Seaford  (1986:  55)  sees  Deianeira's  fears  as  an  abnormal 
extension  of  her  ritualized  premarital  anxiety.  On  the  theme  of  Deianeira's  fear 125 
home  almost  as  soon  as  he  comes  there  (34),  the  normal  distinction 
between  domestic  and  outdoors  space  has  collapsed:  for  the  Greek  mind 
the  oLKOs  is  a  locus  of  central  importance,  which  serves  as  the  par 
excellence  criterion  for  the  geographical  categorization  of  the  world;  it  is 
"the  node  and  starting  point  of  the  orientation  and  arrangement  of 
human  space"14  (cf.  such  distinctions  as  otKOL  :  evp<E  15);  yet,  in 
Heracles'  case  the  household  has  abnormally  become  an  outdoors-like 
place,  an  äpovpa  EKTO1TOS  (32).  16  Significantly,  Deianeira  uses,  in  order 
to  describe  her  and  her  children's  lives  as  members  of  Heracles' 
household,  a  word  signifying  the  exact  negation  of  the  oLKOs-concept, 
namely  äväaTaTOL  (39),  a  word  used  later  of  the  sacked  Oechalia  (240)!  17 
We  already  suspect  that  Heracles'  relation  to  that  nucleus  of  civilized 
social  life,  the  household,  is,  to  say  the  least,  ambiguous.  His  function  as 
creator  of  a  household  (warding  off  from  Deianeira  a  monstrous 
`marriage'  and  offering  her  a  legitimate  and  distinguished  marriage)  is 
alarmingly  counteracted  by  his  marginalization  of  this  household, 
whereby  he  has  been.  reduced  to  a  stranger  to  his  own  house  (65 
EýEVwµEVov),  18  a  man  whose  abode  is  unknown  to  his  own  kin  (68). 
In  the  parodos  this  essential  ambiguity  (the  gulf  between  husband 
and  wife,  on  the  one  hand,  as  opposed  to  the  potential  reunion  of  the 
couple  along  with  the  re-establishment  of  their  household  on  the  other) 
is  still  a  dominant  theme.  Firstly,  the  agonizing  TröeL  µOL  TröOL  yds  va'LE  1. 
in  general  cf.  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  75-8lpassim). 
14Vernant  (1983:  128). 
15  Cf.  e.  g.  Phil.  158  EvauXov  f  Oupatov;  also  Tr.  531-33  Kar'  OLKOV  ... 
Oupatoc,  1021 
OUT'  vsoeEV  OÜTE  8vpa6EV.  On  the  confusion  of  inner  and  outer  space  in  the 
Trachiniae  cf.  Segal  (1981:  67-68,83-84). 
16  Cf.  Heiden  (1989:  29). 
17  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  80),  (1995:  29). 
18  Explained  as  `foreigner'  or  `exile'  by  Jebb  (ad  65f.  )  and  Davies  (ad  65) 
respectively.  For  Heracles'  ambiguous  relation  to  his  OLKOs  Cf.  Sorum  (1978:  62). 126 
TrOT'  (98-99)19  reprises  the  theme  of  Heracles'  extreme  alienation  from  the 
domestic  environment  where  he  normally  belongs  -a  theme  already 
announced  at  68.  Of  his  whereabouts  there  is  utter  ignorance:  he  may  be 
at  the  extreme  points  of  earth,  "either  west  or  east"  (cf.  100-101).  20  This 
rudimentary  disjunction  is  the  closest  the  Chorus  can  get  to  an  attempt 
to  locate  Heracles'  `abode'  (99):  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Heracles  has  no  abode 
at  all;  he  is  thought  of  as  being  engaged  in  an  incessant  wandering  all 
over  the  four  ends  of  the  earth,  east  and  west  (100-101),  south  and  north 
(113).  The  simile  of  the  troubled  Cretan  sea  (116-19)  with  its  emphasis 
on  the  perpetual  sucession  of  waves  (112-15)  points  to  a  negation,  an 
exact  antithesis,  of  the  calm  fixity  that  normally  characterizes  the  o  zo  ; 
at  any  moment  Heracles  is  in  danger  of  becoming  one  of  the  `dwellers'  of 
the  `house'  of  Hades  (119-21),  21  i.  e.  of  a  place  that  is  not  a  house  at  all.  22 
19  yds  is  Schneidewin's  emendation  (printed  by  Dawe  [1996])  for  the  MSS  VOL 
Trail.  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990a)  prefer  a  different  alternative,  but  see  Davies 
(ad  97-8).  I  feel  that  yd!;  has  the  advantage  of  fitting  better  the  prominent 
theme  of-  Heracles'  geographical  alienation:  if  we  accept  it,  then  we  gain  a 
subtle  Fernverbindung  with  236,  where  the  persisting  question  Troü  yfs  is  at 
last  answered. 
20  This  is  Lloyd-Jones'  (1954:  91-2)  ingenious  interpretation  of  100-101  (reading 
TTovTias  for  Tr-),  based  on  the  ancient  scholiast  ad  101  (p.  285  Papageorgius):  icd 
Trpös  Ta  ¬4Sa  Kai,  6UTLKa);  cf.  also  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  152-53)  and  see 
Davies  (ad  100)  for  doxography  and  criticism  of  other,  less  plausible,  views. 
Davies  has  further  elaborated  on  this  view,  with  original  argumentation,  in 
Prometheus  18  (1992)  217-26.  Hoey  (1972:  144-46),  although  he  considers  this 
interpretation  too  restrictive,  shows  how  it  can  fit  into  the  solar  imagery  of  the 
parodos  -an  imagery  that  underscores  the  extreme  geographical  breadth  of 
Heracles'  wanderings. 
21  This  idea  is  more  clearly  brought  out  with  Triclinius'  EpüKOL  (121),  approved 
by  Davies  (ad  119ff).  Hooker's  (1977:  72)  view  that  TroXürrovov  ...  TrAayos  does 
not  mean  'sea  of  troubles',  but  refers  to  Heracles'  heroic  exploits  (Trövoi)  is 
perverse:  see  McDevitt  (1983a:  9  n.  12). 
22  Despite  its  being  called  a  66µ.  os  here  and  in  other  passages,  and  despite  the 
idiomatically  Sophoclean  use  of  oiKl1Twp  for  the  'dwellers'  of  Hades,  the 127 
Whereas  it  is  one's  OLKOS  (homeland  or  household)  that  is  normally 
considered  one's  TpO  EV9  (cf.  e.  g.  A.  Sept.  16-9,477;  Pl.  R  414e,  Menex 
237b-c;  Isocr.  6.108),  in  Heracles'  case,  ironically,  it  is  that  restless  sea  of 
troubles,  so  unlike  his  O  KOs,  that  `nurtures',  TpE4E  L,  him  (116-19),  23  as  if 
it  were  his  homeland. 
However,  in  the  second  antistrophe  and  in  the  epode  of  the 
parodos  it  is  implied  that  Heracles'  household  may  not  miss  him  for  very 
long.  The  regular  succession  of  joy  and  sorrow  in  the  cosmos  as  well  as  In 
human  affairs  (129-35)  suggests  that  there  is  a  predictable  order  in  this 
world  of  ours,  and  that,  since  Heracles  has  had  his  share  of  toils,  he  is 
now  entitled  to  some  peace  and  happiness.  The  darkness  of  Deianeira's 
husbandless  nights  (29-30)  should  now  give  way  to  the  light  of  joy  and 
salvation;  the  Chorus'  appeal  to  the  Sun,  with  its  pervading  light-imagery 
(95  4AoyLCöµEVOV,  99  Aaµ.  rrpä  c'TEpOnä  ýAEyEOuw),  24  already 
foreshadows  the  splendid  news  of  Heracles'  homecoming  that  is  soon  to 
be  heard  (203-204).  It  seems  that,  in  the  parodos,  the  otherwise 
important  idea  of  regular  alternation  (cf.  e.  g.  94-95,132-35),  which 
implies  a  predictable  succession  of  darkness  by  light  and  vice  versa,  is 
deceased,  I  argue  elsewhere  (see  Chapter  Four,  section  4.6.1;  Chapter  Five, 
section  5.3.1)  that  in  Greek  thought  Hades  is  nothing  like  an  abode.  Whereas 
one's  oLKOs  in  the  Upperworld  is  part  of  a  familiar  Ev668E,  the  `house'  of  Hades 
is  its  negation,  a  place  totally  alien  to  one's  usual  experience  of  an  otKOc;  this  is 
why  it  is  referred  to  with  a  vague  EKEL. 
23  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  154)  convincingly  defend  the  paradosis  TpE4EL 
(117)  against  Reiske's  aTpEýEL:  "the  sea  of  troubles  can  perfectly  well  be  said  to 
`feed'  Heracles,  in  the  sense  of  being  the  element  in  which  he  lives  and  gets 
his  daily  sustenance";  cf.  Macro  (1973:  3);  contra  McDevitt  (1983a).  However, 
they  do  not  explain  very  well  the  strong  contrast  implied  in  the  juxtaposition 
TpE)EL,  TO'  8'  a1CEL 
(=TO'  [LEV  TpE4)EL,  TO'  8'  aÜ%EL);  see  Stinton  (1990:  209-12), 
who  argued  that  perhaps  aütEL  is  the  corrupt  word  (being  originally  a  gloss  on 
TpE4)EL)  and  that  something  like  TpEcEL  T608'  ad  ILÖTou  TToX6Trovov  ...  7TE)1ayoc 
gives  the  sense  required;  cf.  Burton  (1980:  47).  I  fully  accept  the  point. 
24  For  possible  sinister  innuendos  see,  however,  Seale  (1982:  185  with  n.  10). 128 
eventually  superseded  by  the  notion  of  perpetual  light:  when  the  Chorus 
put  forth  the  äpKTOc-paradigm  (129-30)  to  reinforce  their  consolatory 
arguments,  this  may  well  be  seen  as  yet  another  illustration  of  the 
principle  of  cyclicity  (cf.  QTpO4  L8ES  KEXEUeOL,  and  ýTrl, 
...  KUKAoOQLV). 
Nonetheless,  the  Greeks  of  Sophocles'  time  knew  from  Homer  that,  unlike 
the  other  constellations,  the  Great  Bear  always  revolves  in  the  same  place 
(11.18.488  fj  T'  aüTOD  QTpE4ETaL)  and  therefore  never  sets  and  always 
shines  (11.18.489,  Od.  5.275:  otil  8'  ip4Iop0s  EQTL  XOETpdV'QKEaVOtO). 
To  quote  Jones'  (1962:  175)  formulation,  the  Great  Bear's  "enduring 
cyclical  movement  issu[es]  from  an  ultimate  fixity";  so  this  cosmic 
parallel  evokes  the  idea  of  permanent,  never-setting,  light,  even  in  dead 
of  night.  25  The  idea  of  darkness  yielding  to  light  is  also  negatively 
expressed  at  132-33:  `night  does  not  remain  fixed  for  mortals'  might  be 
an  expression  of  the  principle  of  perpetual  alternation,  if  it  were  followed 
by  something  like  `and  day  is  succeeded  by  night  too',  but  it  is  not:  the 
emphasis  is  laid  on  the  succession  of  night  by  day,  not  the  opposite.  26 
This  idea  is  emphatically  brought  out  by  the  last  sentence  of  the  parodos, 
the  climax  of  the  whole  structure,  as  Burton  (1980:  49)  has  seen:  "for  who 
has  ever  seen  Zeus  so  unmindful  of  his  own  children?  "  (139-40).  All  in  all, 
the  parodos  ends  not  as  a  lecture  on  the  law  of  eternal  change,  as  it 
began,  but  on  a  more  optimistic  note:  as  light  eventually  drives  darkness 
out,  so  the  light  of  Heracles'  homecoming  (203-204)  will  finally  scatter 
25  As  far  as  I  know,  Jones  (1962:  175)  and  Burton  (1980:  48-9)  are  the  only  critics 
to  concur  with  the  interpretation  of  the  Great  Bear  parallel  advanced  here. 
26  De  Romilly  (1968:  89-92),  Segal  (1995:  31  &  61)  and  Easterling  (1968:  59-60), 
(1982:  2  &  ad  132-40)  see  here  only  an  image  of  cyclicity.  Hoey  (1972:  140-41)  is 
closer  to  the  truth  when  he  remarks  that  the  principle  of  cyclicity  is  appealed 
to  here  as  a  proof  that  there  cannot  be  continuous  unhappiness  (contr.  e.  g.  IL 
24.525-33);  cf.  Krause  (1976:  186-8),  Lawrence  (1978:  288),  Holt  (1987:  206,208 
with  n.  9).  Curiously,  the  same  observation  leads  Winnington-Ingram  (1980: 
330-1)  to  exactly  the  opposite  conclusion!  Heiden's  (1989:  36-9)  treatment  of  the 
cyclicity  theme  in  the  parodos  goes  much  too  far. 129 
away  the  darkness  in  which  Deianeira  has  been  living  (29-30). 
The  movement  of  the  parodos  from  darkness  and  despair  to  light, 
joy  and  hope  is  taken  up  in  the  first  episode,  which  similarly  begins  with 
ominous  considerations  on  Deianeira's  part,  but  ends,  as  we  have  already 
remarked,  on  a  note  of  joyous  relief  (200-204)  thanks  to  `the  unexpected 
dawning  of  the  radiant  news'  of  Heracles'  homecoming  (203-204).  27  We 
remember  that  in  the  prologue  Heracles'  relation  to  his  household  was 
described  in,  to  say  the  least,  ambiguous  terms.  The  point  is  picked  up  at 
the  gloomy  beginning  of  this  episode  (161-63),  when  Heracles'  aspect  as 
potential  destroyer  of  his  own  household  is  presented  as  his  most 
prominent  feature.  Treating  his  household  as  an  äpoupa,  KTOTTOs  (32) 
was  bad  enough,  but  at  least  Heracles  has  been  `sowing  and  reaping' 
children  (31-33),  thus  fulfilling,  to  a  more-than-satisfactory  degree  (54), 
a  marriage's  main  purpose,  namely  procreation  (cf.  the  marriage  contract 
formula  ETr'  äpoTw  -Tra(8wv  yvTlaiwv)28  and  sustaining  in  this  way  his 
household.  All  the  same,  it  now  becomes  clear  that  there  can  be  no  talk 
of  procreation  and  preservation  of  the  house,  for  there  is,  virtually,  no 
marriage:  Deianeira,  far  from  being  merely  husbandless  (109-10),  has 
been  all  but  a  widow,  her  forebodings  of  Heracles'  death  are  presented 
almost  as  a  certainty  (175-77;  cf.  already  43,46).  29  The  feeling  that 
27  I  paraphrase  Easterling's  (ad  203-4)  translation;  for  the  imagery  see 
Kamerbeek  (ad  203,4)  and  Easterling  (l.  c.  ),  who  explain  that  6µµa  means  `bright 
thing',  suggesting  the  metaphorical  light  of  salvation,  and  that  avaaXbv  evokes 
the  image  of  a  heavenly  body  which  rises,  probably  the  sun,  as  is  suggested  by 
the  ancient  scholiast  ad  203  (p.  292  Papageorgius).  See  also  Lawrence  (1978: 
289),  Seale  (1982:  187). 
28  Cf.  Rehm  (1994:  73,181  n.  7).  For  the  formula  see  Men.  Dysc.  842,  Pk.  1010  with 
Gomme  &  Sandbach  (1973:  ad  locc.  ). 
29  Rehm  (1994:  73  with  n.  6)  notices  that  Deianeira's  longing  for  Heracles  is 
termed  n66os  (103,107),  a  word  that  often  refers  to  longing  for  a  marriage 
partner  or  for  the  deceased  (in  A.  Pers.  135  it  refers  to  both,  as  Mr  Garvie  has 
pointed  out  to  me);  cf.  Vermeule  (1979:  154).  On  the  accumulation  of  TEAog-words 
in  Deianeira's  narrative  and  its  implications  see  C.  S.  Kraus  (1991:  82-83).  Also  in 130 
Deianeira  is  practically  a  widow  is  intensified  when  we  learn  that  her 
husband,  before  embarking  on  his  last  errand,  gave  his  testamentary 
instructions,  `as  if  he  were  a  doomed  man'  (161),  30  telling  her  what  she 
should  take  as  her  marriage-property31  and  what  disposition  of  his 
patrimony  he  made  for  his  children  (161-63).  32  With  the  Messenger's 
arrival,  however,  all  those  fears  seem  to  be  over.  Deianeira's  state  of 
virtual  widowhood  has  reached  an  end,  and  Heracles'  homecoming  is, 
quite  naturally,  envisaged  as  a  wedding  (205-207)  -  "the  wedding  in  this 
case  being  the  reunion  in  wedlock  of  Deianeira  and  Heracles"33  or,  in 
other  words,  the  re-establishment  of  the  couple's  marriage,  which  has 
been  severely  impaired  by  their  excessively  prolonged  separation.  34  The 
choral  song  of  11.205-24  is  a  hymn  to  Apollo  and  Artemis  (209,214)  who, 
together  with  the  Nymphs  (215)  and  Dionysus  (219),  are  especially 
associated  with  wedlock,  -35  it  also  seems  that  the  choirs  of  boys  and  girls 
(207,211)  who  are  invited  to  raise  their  song  in  honour  of  Apollo  and 
Artemis  formed  the  customary  choirs  to  celebrate  a  wedding.  36  The 
imminent  re-establishment  of  the  household  by  means  of  the 
E.  HF  (e.  g.  295-7,426-29  etc.  )  Heracles,  who  has  descended  to  Hades  to  catch 
Cerberus,  is  thought  of  as  already  dead. 
30  Jebb's  translation;  cf.  Easterling  (ad  161). 
31  Kamerbeek  (ad  161,2)  interprets  slightly  differently. 
32  I  paraphrase  Easterling's  (ad  161-8)  rendering  of  the  passage. 
33  Quotation  from  Stinton  (1990:  419),  whose  reading  and  interpretation  of  the 
passage  (ibid.  417-21)  1  follow.  His  view  has  been  adopted  by  Lloyd-Jones  & 
Wilson  (1990a)  and  (1990b:  156-57).  See  also  Easterling's  (ad  205-7)  and  Seaford's 
(1986:  56),  (1987:  128)  excellent  remarks. 
34  The  obvious  parallel  to  this,  as  Mr  Garvie  points  out  to  me,  is  the  reunion  of 
Odysseus  and  Penelope  in  the  Odyssey  -a  reunion  presented  in  terms 
suggestive  of  a  wedding  (23.130-40);  for  a  detailed  analysis  see  Seaford  (1994a: 
31-8). 
35  See  Stinton  (1990:  409  n.  23)  and  Rehm  (1994:  74  with  n.  9)  for  full 
documentation.  On  the  possible  ominous  undertones  of  the  invocation  of 
Dionysus  see,  however,  Schlesier  (1993:  105-8). 
36  This  is  argued  by  Stinton  (1990:  419  with  n.  49;  cf.  409  n.  23). 131 
forthcoming  wedding  is  succinctly  expressed  in  the  phrase  E4EQTioLs 
ä)&ayaLs  (206):  Heracles'  homecoming  means  that  the  EQT'La,  the 
hearth,  will  acquire  again  its  central  importance  as  symbol  of  the  otKOS.  37 
Thus,  after  we  have  been  presented  with  what  seemed  Heracles'  almost 
certain  dissolution  of  his  household  (i.  e.  Deianeira's  virtual  widowhood), 
we  are  now  reassured  that  this  negative  trend  has  been  reversed:  the 
XTIpE  [a  will  be  succeeded  by  a  y%los,  the  household  that  was  verging  on 
dissolution  will  be  recreated,  and  fear  of  death  will  give  way  to  hope  for 
life. 
The  hope  for  the  restitution  of  the  family  hearth  seems  to  be 
confirmed  by  the  Messenger's  narrative:  almost  the  first  thing  we  learn 
about  Heracles  (237-38)  is  that  he  is  demarcating  the  sacred  ground  on 
which  new  altars  are  to  stand  -  an  act  that  is  practically  equivalent  to 
the  setting  up  of  altars,  as  Kamerbeek  (ad  237)  remarks.  38  Thus,  his 
function  as  creator  of  a  household,  which  has  already  been  substantiated 
in  his  marriage  to  Deianeira,  becomes  also  apparent  in  his  building  of 
altars  -  an  act  typical  of  the  civilizing  hero  who  transfigures.  the  wild 
into  domestic  space.  Altars  /  hearths  are  nuclei  and  symbols  of 
humanized  space  such  as  the  polis  and  the  household:  Protagoras  in 
Plato's  homonymous  dialogue  (322a)  states  that  the  setting  up  of  altars 
distinguishes  human  beings  from  animals  and  approximates  them  to  the 
gods.  39  Nonetheless,  Sophocles  the  ironist  presents  us  with  an  unexpected 
37  Cf.  Segal  (1995:  46).  On  the  hearth  as  the  core  of  the  household  and  a  symbol 
of  its  coherence  and  continuation  see  e.  g.  Vernant  (1983:  128,133-34,141), 
Burkert  (1985a:  255);  the  latter  remarks  that  Greek  has  no  special  word  for  the 
family:  "one  speaks  of  house  and  hearth,  thus  consciously  designating  the 
domestic  sacrificial  site".  He  also  notes  (ibid.:  170  with  n.  3):  "to  banish  or 
destroy  a  family  is  to  drive  out  a  hearth";  cf.  Hdt.  5.72.1,73.1. 
38  Cf.  Burkert  (1985b:  15). 
39  ETTELSTj  $E  6  QVepW1T0s  eEcas  RETEUXE  µo(pa19,1Tp(TOV  µEV 
&Q 
T1IV  TOD  eEOD 
oiryyEVELaV  CWWV  j16vov  eEOÜs 
V6fLQEV,  Kal.  EITEXEI,  pEL  ß(  LOÜs  TE  18p1EUeaL 
KaL  äyä?  LaTa  eEwv.  Cf.  also  Segal  (1975a:  32-33),  (1981:  61,65-74).  On  the  hearth 132 
dramatic  twist:  Lichas  informs  Delaneira  that  her  husband  is  offering 
thanksgiving  sacrifices  in  fulfilment  of  a  vow  he  made  when  he  was  about 
to  sack  Oechalia  (239-41;  cf.  287-88)  and  make  Eurytus'  family  `dwellers 
of  Hades'  (282),  i.  e.  of  an  `abode'  which,  as  I  have  argued,  forms  the  exact 
negation  of  our  familiar  dwellings  in  the  Upperworld.  40  So,  Heracles' 
setting  up  of  new  altars,  which  should  mark  the  establishment  of  a  new 
city  and  new  households,  is  in  fact  the  result  of  his  successful  destruction 
of  a  city  and  a  household!  The  `civilizing  hero'  is  setting  up  altars  at 
Cenaeum,  having  first  destroyed  the  hearths  of  Oechalia.  41 
Further  indications  in  the  text  seem  to  suggest  that  we  are 
witnessing  a  new,  alarming  upsurge  of  Heracles'  ambiguous  attitude 
towards  the  household,  the  polis,  and  towards  civilized  life  in  general. 
Lichas'  narrative  shows  that  Heracles,  paradoxically,  seems  to  be  able  to 
retain  his  heroic  status  only  in  his  encounters  with  the  beasts  of  which  he 
has  been  ridding  Greece;  when  in  domestic  contexts,  his  heroism  is 
challenged  and  his  valour,  otherwise  undisputable,  seems  to  be  seriously 
as  the  domestic  sacrificial  site,  and  on  the  duty  of  the  head  of  the  house  to 
sacrifice  at  it  see  Burkert  (1985a:  255).  For  the  hearth's  sacrificial  function,  on 
which  see  Burkert  (1985a:  61),  cf.  the  fact  that  &oria  and  ßwµös  can  be 
synonyms:  see  Diggle  (1981:  33-34)  for  copious  evidence  (as  Sophoclean 
examples  he  cites  Tr.  658,  CC  1495;  add  Tr.  607),  and  cf.  Segal  (1975a:  34).  On  the 
association  between  the  family  hearth  and  the  public  Hearth,  which  is  the 
centre  of  collective  sacrificial  activity,  see  Gernet  (1981:  323,325-27,333). 
"Hearth-houses",  early  forms  of  Greek  temples  (Burkert  [1983:  10  n.  43]  and 
[1985a:  61]),  were  apparently  connected  with  sacrificial  activity.  For 
archaeological  evidence  of  such  activity  in  rulers'  dwellings  (probably  the 
original  form  of  Greek  temples)  cf.  most  recently  Mazarakis  Ainian  (1988:  105- 
19  passim)  . 
40  Cf.  Segal  (1995:  237  n.  58). 
41  Segal  (1975a:  36-37)  makes  a  similar  point,  appropriately  emphasizing  the  use 
of  bptCELv  /  -¬a6aL  (237)  in  Sophocles  to  imply  "les  actes  constitutifs  de  la 
civilization";  this  usage  is  ironically  reversed  in  our  passage,  where  "cet  acte 
de  bp(CELv,  de  creer  un  espace  humain,  solennise  la  destruction  d'  une 
communautb  humaine.  "  Cf.  also  Segal  (1981:  65-6). 133 
doubted.  Thus,  it  is  at  the  house  of  Eurytus  (262;  the  pleonasm  Es 
8öµou9  E4EQTLOV,  along  with  marking  Eurytus'  violation  of  hospitality,  42 
emphasizes  the  domestic  setting  of  the  action)  that  Heracles'  qualities  as 
an  archer  are  questioned;  it  is  at  that  same  house  where  he,  the  liberator 
th 
of  Greece  (cf.  1010-12),  is  scorned  as  a  slave  (267-68).  43  It  is  4a 
domestic  setting  -  indeed,  at  Tiryns  (270-71),  Heracles'  own  home  before 
he  was  exiled  -  that  the  hero  indulges  in  his  sole  unheroic  deed,  the 
guileful  murder  of  Iphitus  (272-73,277-78)  who  was  hurled  from  the 
walls  of  the  city  (273).  44  One  is  perhaps  meant  to  recall  here  the'  Homeric 
description  of  Iphitus'  murder  (Od.  21.22-30),  45  where  it  is  emphasized 
that  the  foul  deed  was  done  in  Heracles'  own  house,  with  no  respect 
either  for  their  guest-friendship  or  for  their  having  dined  together 
(incidentally,  in  Sophocles'  account  [262-69]  it  is  precisely  Eurytus' 
violation  of  guest-friendship  that  accounts  for  Heracles'  grudge  against 
him  and  for  the  subsequent  murder  of  Iphitus!  ).  46  The  outrageousness  'Of 
42  So  Jebb  (ad  262),  Heiden  (1988a:  18). 
43  The  text  is  corrupt,  but  the  contrast  between  the  words  8oüoos  and  AEu6Epou 
at  267  seems  clear.  Stinton  (1990:  218)  proposed  to  read  Trovw  for  the  MSS  (WVEL 
(or  4wv¬t),  taking  the  resulting  phrase  `crushed  by  hard  labour,  as  befits  a  free 
man's  thrall'  to  refer  to  Heracles'  servitude  to  Eurystheus. 
44  I  adopt  Jebb's  (ad  272f.  )  and  Kamerbeek's  (ad  273)  interpretation  of 
Trupyth6ouc  Trkuc6g  as  `a  tower-like  building',  not  `a  flat  top  of  a  towering  cliff', 
for  it  is  in  accordance  with  the  current  version  of  the  myth  (already  attested  in 
Pherecydes,  FGrHist  3F82b  Jacoby);  cf.  now  Heiden  (1988a:  21-22).  What  is  more, 
as  Jebb  (1.  c.  )  remarks,  "the  word  Trüpyoc  oft.  =a  city  wall  with  its  towers  (QT.  56 
n.  )"  (he  might  have  addede.  g.  A.  Ag.  127  and  S.  CC  14);  and  as  Kamerbeek  (l.  c.  ) 
adds,  "-t6ric  indeed  so  often  becomes  merely  a  suffix  that  Trupyt&c  can  surely 
have  the  function  of  Trüpyou". 
45  On  which  see  generally  Galinsky  (1972:  11-12). 
46  The  oblique  reference  to  Homer  has  been  also  noted  by  Davies  (1984:  482), 
Halleran  (1986:  242)  and  Heiden  (1988a:  18),  (1989:  58);  cf.  also  Fuqua  (1980:  13 
n.  36).  The  verbal  parallels  between  the  Homeric  and  the  Sophoclean  accounts 
are  remarkable:  Q1.21.27  ös  (sc.  Heracles)  LLV  (sc.  Iphitus)  tEtvov  EOVTa 
KaTEKTaVEV  W  EV'L  OIKGJ  -S.  Tr.  262-630"s  (sc.  Eurytus)  aÜTO'V  (sc.  Heracles)  EXO6  vT' 
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such  an  act  angered  Zeus  (274-75)  and  led  to  further,  enforced, 
diminution  of  Heracles'  heroism:  for  the  supermale  hero  not  only  has 
suffered  loss  of  his  freedom  (276)  but  has  also  been  reduced  to  a  woman's 
(Omphale's)  thrall  (70,248-52)47  -a  fact  whose  abnormality  is 
commented  upon  by  Deianeira  (71).  To  conclude:  paradoxically,  Heracles 
remains  the  celebrated  civilizing  hero  only  in  the  wild,  amongst  the 
monsters  he  fights;  when  in  a  tamed,  humanized  context  (household, 
city),  his  destructive  potential  is  released  and  at  the  same  time  his 
heroism  (superiority,  manhood)  is  seriously  diminished.  48  This  raises  the 
question  whether  his  long-awaited  homecoming  will  be  as  unproblematic 
as  one  might  have  thought. 
3.1.2  Marriage  and  sacrifice 
An  unproblematic  homecoming  seems  indeed  to  be  the  hope  of  Heracles' 
ES  BOROUS  E4EOTLOV,  I  tEVOV 
TTaXaLÖV 
6vTa 
...;  also  (21.21.28-29  OÜ8E  TpQlreCav 
(SC.  d8EQaTO),  I  TijV  IJV  OL  1TapEErgKEV  - 
S.  Tr.  268-69  8ELnvoLS  8'  TIVtK'  11v 
WVW[LEVOS  I  EppLi  EV  EKTÖS  WÜTÖV. 
47  Scodel  (1984:  36)  reminds  us  that  craft  is  a  woman's  weapon,  so  Heracles' 
guile  results,  quite  appropriately,  in  subordination  to  a  woman.  What  is  more, 
guile  itself  is  considered  avEAEÜOEpov:  cf.  453-54.  So,  by  indulging  in  deceitful 
practices,  Heracles  himself  undermined  his  own  status  as  a  free  man, 
regardless  of  his  subsequent  servitude  to  Omphale.  Cf.  also  Heiden  (1988a:  22). 
In  both  my  Electra  and  my  Ajax  chapters  I  attempt  to  demonstrate  that  the  use 
of  unheroic  means  like  guile  is  never  unproblematical  for  the  Sophoclean  hero 
-even  when  it  is  commanded  by  a  god,  as  is  the  case  in  the  Electra. 
48  I  refer  the  reader  again  to  Kirk's  diagram  cited  in  section  3.0.1;  cf.  also 
Burkert  (1985a:  210)  on  Heracles  as  being,  potentially,  his  own  antithesis.  Segal 
(1971:  101)  rightly  remarks  that  "in  mold  punti  del  dramma  Sofocle  sottolinea  1' 
ironia  di  questo  rapporto  fra  1'  eroe  difensore  e  1'  eroe  distruttore.  "  That  Greek 
heroes  in  general  contain  the  very  sub-  or  superhuman  forces  against  which 
they  contend  has  been  demonstrated  by  Brelich  (1958:  233-48);  cf.  Fuqua  (1980: 
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friends  and  relatives:  he  has  now  been  delivered  from  his  enslavement  to 
a  woman  (72);  he  can  be  again  the  best  of  men  (177)  and  the  valiant 
warrior  (182-83,186)  he  used  to  be.  It  soon  turns  out,  however,  that  this 
is  far  from  being  the  case,  for  it  is  exactly  his  homecoming  that  will  put 
the  stability  (or  even  the  very  existence)  of  his  own  household  in 
jeopardy.  Deianeira  pities  the  Euboean  captives  for  being  a'OLKOL  (300) 
and  prays  to  Zeus  Tropaios  to  avert  such  a  fate  from  her  family  (303- 
305),  but  fears  lest  her  own  household  may  suffer  a  similar  blow  (306). 
Indeed,  as  soon  as  Lichas'  deceit  is  revealed,  it  becomes  clear  that  the 
household  which  was  about  to  celebrate  Heracles'  and  Deianeira's  reunion 
in  wedlock  (205-207)  will  shortly  witness  a  different,  disturbingly  sinister, 
wedding,  which  will  undermine  the  oLKOS's  coherence:  Heracles  has 
brought  into  his  home  a  new  `bride'  (cf.  894  vüµ4a)  who  may  be  formally 
a  concubine,  but  is  referred  to  in  language  pertaining  to  the  standard 
vocabulary  of  legitimate  wedlock.  She  has  been  sent  `not  in  careless 
fashion  [...  ]  nor  like  a  slave'  (366-67;  Jebb's  transl.  ),  a  phrase  which 
probably  suggests  that  her  state  is  not  that  of  a  ira)aKr  ;  49  on  the 
contrary,  she  is  Heracles'  wife-to-be,  his  8äµap  (428,429),  a  word 
normally  signifying  `lawfully  wedded  wife'  in  tragedy,  and  which  indeed 
is  used  of  Deianeira  herself  only  a  few  lines  before  (406);  as  Segal  (1981: 
75)  remarks,  86Lµap  "might  also  mean  `concubine',  but  Sophocles  exploits 
the  ambiguity  of  the  marital  terms  to  suggest  the  confusion  wrought 
upon  the  house  by  this  new  bride  and  new  marriage".  50  What  is  more, 
Heracles'  union  to  her  is  clearly  referred  to  as  y%tos  (cf.  546,843, 
49  Concubines  who  were  kept  not  `with  a  view  to  free  children'  were  normally, 
perhaps  always,  slaves;  see  MacDowell  (1978:  89).  Admittedly,  there  could  be 
free  concubines  as  well:  see  again  MacDowell  (1.  c.  ).  MacKinnon  (1971:  34), 
contrary  to  the  indications  of  the  text,  insists  that  Iole  is  a  slave. 
50  Cf.  also  Segal  (1975a:  49  n.  30),  de  Wet  (1983:  221-2),  Davies  (ad  429),  Rehm 
(1994:  74),  Loraux  (1995:  39  with  n.  144).  Contra  Easterling  (ad  428). 13G 
1139).  51  So,  Heracles'  household  is  again  on  the  verge  of  collapsing:  the 
new  `bride'  is  a  `bane  under  the  roof  (376  Tr  iovrj  Ü1TÖaTEyos;  Jebb's 
transl.  ).  The  prospective  wedding  that  the  Chorus  have  been  gaily 
celebrating  turns  out  to  be  a  perversion  of  a  wedding,  destroying  the 
harmonious  symmetry  that  should  normally  characterize  a  marriage:  two 
women  in  the  same  man's  bed  (539-40),  living  in  the  same  house  and 
sharing  the  same  marital  union  (545-46)  is  as  exorbitant  an  asymmetry 
as  a  married  woman's  being  practically  a  widow  (which,  one  recalls,  has 
been  the  case  with  Deianeira  so  far).  Paradoxically,  Heracles  is  destroying 
the  household  by  means  of  an  act  of  a  clearly  domestic  character,  namely 
a  marriage.  Once  again  the  domestic  context  becomes  the  setting  for  the 
undermining  of  Heracles'  heroism:  the  best  of  men,  the  most  valiant  of 
heroes,  has  become  again  a  complete  slave  to  a  woman,  namely  Iole  (488- 
89:  Toü  Tfjc6'  EPÜ)TOs  ELS  diTav6'  7jacWv  Eau).  This  takes  up  the  theme 
of  enslavement  to  a  female,  which  was  initiated  with  his  enforced  AaTPE  (a 
to  Omphale  and  is  continued  with  his  all  too  voluntary  submission  to 
Tole  -  both  taking  place  under  similar  circumstances:  the  servitude  to 
Omphale  was  the  result  of  an  unheroic,  deceitful  act  (Iphitus'  murder) 
that  caused  a  severe  damage  to  a  household  (Eurytus');  similarly,  the 
enslavement  to  lole  is  set  against  a  background  of  8oXoS  (she  was 
originally  meant  to  be  an  illegitimate  liaison,  a  KPüýLOV  XgXos,  360)  that 
led  to  the  total  devastation  of  Eurytus'  household.  52  Guile,  curtailing  of 
Heracles'  heroic  straightforwardedness,  reduction  to  female  status  -  all 
51  Easterling  (ad  546  &  842-3)  insists  that  yäµos  in  those  passages  need  not  refer 
to  formal  marriage;  but  see  again  Segal  (1981:  75-6).  Suffice  it  to  note,  with 
Stinton  (1990:  413),  that  the  yäµos  that  Deianeira  is  worried  about,  i.  e.  the  fact 
that  her  husband  is  actually  bringing  home  a  new  bride  (894  vüµýa),  should  be, 
and  indeed  is,  sharply  distinguished  from  the  occasional  and  trivial  `yäµoL' 
(=temporary  love  affairs)  Heracles  has  many  a  time  contracted  (460).  Cf.  also 
Biggs  (1966:  230),  Kitto  (1966:  168-69),  Hester  (1980a:  3),  Scodel  (1984:  38-9). 
52  For  Heracles  as  destroyer  of  the  family  cf.  Sorum  (1978:  64-65). 137 
take  place,  again,  in  a  domestic,  humanized  ground,  away  from  the  wild 
where  Heracles  performs  his  labours.  This  paradox  seems  Indeed  to  be 
thematic. 
The  first  stasimon  (497-530)  starts  off  as  a  hymn  to  the  power  of 
love,  apparently  inspired  by  the  news  of  Heracles'  lust  for  Iole  that  has 
been  disclosed  in  the  previous  episode.  Nonetheless,  the  Chorus,  Instead 
of  singing  about  this  new  love-affair,  relate  the  old  story  of  the  duel 
between  Heracles  and  Achelous  over  Delaneira's  hand  -a  story  with 
which  we  are  already  familiar,  since  it  was  with  this  that  the  play 
virtually  began.  53  The  correspondences  in  theme,  rhetorical  structure  and 
phraseology  between  this  choral  ode  and  the  prologue  are,  as  Davies  (pp. 
136-37)  has  pointed  out,  unmistakable,  despite  the  fact  that  the  two 
treatments  are  separated  by  a  large  number  of  lines.  A  further  similarity 
between  this  stasimon  and  the  prologue  is  again  the  abundance  of 
agonistic  vocabulary  in  the  description  of  the  fight  of  Heracles  and 
Achelous:  note,  inter  alia,  "the  agonistic  language  used  of  the  duel,  e.  g. 
KaTE  ßav  504  and  a'E  OX'  äycb'vwv  506,  which  suggest[s]  a  contest  of  athletes 
rather  than  a  fight  between  rival  suitors"  (Easterling  [p.  133]).  The 
"strong  flavour  of  the  epinician  ode"  (Easterling  1.  c)  and  the  Pindaric 
echoes  both  in  the  opening  generalization  (Davies  [ad  497])  and  in  the 
use  of  "the  technique  whereby  the  poet  answers  the  question  he  himself 
has  just  asked"  (503-506;  see  Davies  [ad  505-6])  strongly  add  to  this 
effect.  54  The  point  of  this  lyrical  reworking  of  themes  already  dealt  with 
in  the  prologue  is,  I  think,  to  create  a  highly  Ironic  contrast.  We 
remember  that  the  use  of  agonistic  language  at  the  outset  served  as  a 
reminder  of  Heracles'  glorious  aspects  in  heroic  legend;  his  struggle 
against  monsters  contributes  to  the  transformation  of  Greece  into  a 
civilized  place,  while,  on  a  smaller  scale,  his  saving  of  Deianeira  from  a 
53  "...  the  present,  Iole  and  Heracles'  passion  for  her,  is  indirectly  represented 
by  the  story  of  Deianeira  and  Heracles'  passion  for  her":  C.  S.  Kraus  (1991:  78). 
54  See  also  Fuqua  (1980:  42)  and  Heiden  (1989:  77). 138 
perverted  `wedding'  to  a  monster  effectuates  the  establishment  of  a 
legitimate  household  (cf.  above  p.  123).  In  other  words,  Heracles  in  the 
prologue  was  almost  unequivocally  on  the  side  of  civilization.  Although 
there  have  certainly  been  disturbing  hints  of  his  ambiguous  relation  to 
his  household,  his  imminent  homecoming  was  still  envisaged  as  the  only 
hope  for  the  restoration  of  his  O  KOS  to  its  appropriate  status.  Now, 
however,  we  realize  that  the  hero's  homecoming  definitely  signals  not  the 
re-establishment  of  his  marriage  to  Deianeira,  but  its  perversion  (cf.  536- 
37,539-40,545-46).  His  struggle  against  Achelous,  despite  the  heroic  light 
in  which  it  is  visualized,  has  been,  as  it  turns  out,  much  more  ambivalent 
than  one  may  have  initially  thought.  Significantly,  the  outcome  of  the 
fight  (Heracles'  defeat  of  Achelous)  is  not,  this  time,  quickly  and  clearly 
stated,  as  in  the  prologue  (26-27).  Now  we  are  presented  with  a  long 
description  of  the  fight,  that  takes  no  less  than  16  lines  (507-22),  ss 
whereas  such  a  detailed  account  was  artfully  avoided  in  the  prologue 
(21-25).  56  The  emphasis  falls  on  the  equal  strength  displayed  as  well  as 
the  equal  amount  of  labour  spent  by  both  opponents  (517-22),  which 
results  in  the  duel's  remaining  undecided  for  long;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
55  Zielinski's  emendation  OaTr  p  (a  rare  Doric  word,  and  therefore  liable  to 
corruption)  for  the  MSS  µärrip  at  526  would  appropriately  emphasize  that  the 
Chorus  describe  the  battle  as  if  they  were  a  spectator  -  which  would  be 
consistent  with  their  insistence  on  its  details;  so,  pace  van  der  Valk  (1967:  124- 
5),  it  does  not  offer  "une  interpretation  banale".  I  cannot  understand  Uoyd- 
Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  161)  who  think  that  the  Chorus  offer  no  such 
description;  see  W.  Kraus'  (1986:  98)  eloquent  approval  of  the  emendation;  cf. 
also  Easterling  (ad  526-8),  Davies  (ad  526)  and  C.  S.  Kraus  (1991:  87  n.  36)  who  note 
the  Fernverbindung  with  22-23.  For  discussion  see  Burton  (1980:  57-8). 
56  For  another  explanation  of  this  narrative  omission  see  C.  S.  Kraus  (1991:  81). 
She  rightly  points  out  (p.  87)  that  in  narrative  terms  the  importance  of  this 
stasimon  "lies  in  its  return  to  the  temporal  setting  of  the  prologue  to  tell  the 
one  detail  of  Deianeira's  youth  that  she  had  omitted  -  the  battle  between 
Heracles  and  Achelous.  " 139 
outcome  of  the  contest  is  never  stated!  57  The  civilizing  hero's  gloriously 
prevailing  over  his  bestial  enemies  is  no  longer  presented  as  an 
indisputable  certainty.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  implied  that,  whoever  the 
winner  and  Deianeira's  future  husband,  the  bride's  lot  would  be  piteous 
anyway  (528  EXELVÖV  äµµEVEL  ::  VXos>);  58  the  contrast  with  the 
prologue,  where  it  was  stated  that  Heracles'  victory  was,  at  least  in 
principle,  Kaaws  (26)  is  obvious.  Ironically,  whereas  TOLOVS'  Eyw 
µviarf  pa  zrpoa8E8EyµEV-q  (15)  clearly  referred  only  to  Achelous,  from 
whom  Heracles  saved  Deianeira,  now  the  similarly  constructed  phrase 
TöV  öV  npOQµEVOUQ'  cKo'LTav  (525)59  fits  Heracles  just  as  well,  and 
implies  that  Deianeira's  marriage  to  him  was  not,  after  all,  a  deliverance 
from  her  woes.  Her  prospective  marriage,  far  from  being  the  )X09  KpLTbv 
(27)  of  the  prologue,  marks  only  her  sudden  and  brutal  alienation  from 
her  familiar  domestic  environment  (she  is  likened  to  a  calf  weaned  from 
her  mother:  529-30)60  without  offering,  as  it  should,  the  consolatory 
alternative  of  her  incorporation  into  a  new  household.  The  equipoise 
characterizing  the  fight  is  eventually  discreditable  to  Heracles,  for  he  is 
57  The  ancient  scholion  on  the  corrupt  526  (Eyw  TrapEtaa  Ta  TroA1ä,  Tal  TEk) 
X  yw  T(ýv  TrpayµäTwv,  unaccountably  omitted  by  Papageorgius)  cannot  point  to 
a  text  in  which  the  outcome  of  the  fight  (Tä  TE)11  TCJV  TrpaypäTwv)  was  stated;  as 
I1oyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  161)  remark,  "this  is  made  to  look  out  of  place  by 
the  sentence  that  follows";  cf.  also  I1oyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990a:  in  app.  cri  t.  ): 
"exspectares  ut  de  pugna  adhuc  ancipiti  diceretur". 
58  It  seems  that  a  supplement  of  the  metrical  form  u-is  needed  after  äµµEVEL 
(although  Kamerbeek  [ad  528],  as  he  would,  refuses  to  alter  the  paradosis);  I 
prefer  Gildersleeves'  (1985:  155)  ?  EXos  to  Gleditsch's  TAos  or  X&Xos,  since  it 
makes  the  ironic  echo  of  27-28  all  the  more  prominent;  cf.  Stinton  (1990:  412 
n.  34),  Davies  (ad  528).  W.  Kraus  (1986:  98)  unfortunately  misses  the  point. 
59  The  similarity  is  noted  by  Davies  (p.  137). 
60  On  the  image  see  Seaford  (1986:  50-54,  esp.  53),  Rehm  (1994:  74-75).  On  the 
contrast  between  this  stasimon  and  the  prologue  cf.  Sorum  (1978:  63). 
"Thematically,  then,  the  stasimon  both  brings  Deianeira's  marriage  to  a  close 
and  assimilates  her  to  Iole  (and  vice-versa),  both  victims  of  a  bestial  love":  C.  S. 
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equated  with  one  of  the  monsters  he  was  supposed  to  be  extinguishing. 
Significantly,  as  well  as  ironically,  "the  contest  itself  is  described  In  terms 
which  bring  out  the  primitive  violence  of  the  scene,  and  there  Is  no 
attempt  to  distinguish  the  glorious  Heracles  from  his  monstrous 
opponent  Achelous  [...  ]",  to  quote  Easterling's  (p.  134)  excellent  remark.  61 
If  there  is  a  winner  in  this  fight,  it  is  neither  Heracles  nor  Achelous,  but 
Kypris  herself,  who  EK4)  pETaL  vLKas  äEL  (497);  62  at  the  same  time,  she  is 
also  the  `umpire'  of  the  contest  (516),  but  a  very  peculiar  umpire  Indeed: 
she  does  not  simply  regulate  the  contest,  but  also  exercises  absolute 
control  over  it  and,  in  fact,  determines  its  outcome,  63  despite  the  fact 
that  she  is  alone  (515)  whereas  the  contestants  are  described,  by  a  bold 
catachresis,  as  a  massed  group  (513  doXVts).  64  Nevertheless,  Aphrodite  is 
61  Anticipated  by  Wender  (1974:  10).  The  refined  formal  parallelism  (noted  by 
Kamerbeek  [ad  5121  and  Sorum  [1978:  63]),  with  which  the  two  opponents  are 
introduced,  may  add  to  the  impression  of  the  hero's  being  dangerously  close  to 
the  monster  (Fuqua  [1980:  42  with  n.  111]  however  is  more  sympathetic  to 
Heracles).  Kirk  (1977:  287)  also  comments  on  Heracles'  "power  to  wrestle  on 
equal  terms  with  monsters"  as  a'sign  of  his  uncanny  proximity  to  animality  - 
an  aspect  of  Heracles  that  is  particularly  stressed  by  G.  Murray  (1946:  113-26 
passim)  and  Galinsky  (1972:  46-52).  Cf.  also  Gellie's  (1972:  63-4)  remarks, 
wrongly  condemned  by  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  86),  and  see  generally  Kott 
(1974:  134).  Biggs  (1966:  228)  and  Silk  (1985:  8)  think  that  we  are  to  think  of 
Achelous  as  a  river-god,  so  that  Heracles'  parallelism  with  him  is  a  reminder  of 
his  (partly)  divine  nature  ("he  fights  gods  ... 
because  he  is  (in  part)  one  too", 
writes  Silk);  however  this  is  a  misemphasis,  for  Achelous  in  our  play  is  viewed 
as  a  monster,  not  as  a  god. 
62  We  remember  that  Eros  was  the  only  opponent  that  Heracles  has  not  been 
able  to  defeat  (488-89). 
63  1  owe  the  point  to  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  87).  Cf.  also  Kamerbeek  (ad 
5  15,6),  Heiden  (1989:  77-8).  Van  der  Valk  (1967:  118-20)  aptly  demonstrates  "1' 
aspect  ambivalent  del'  amour"  in  this  ode.  Gardiner  (1987:  130)  misunderstands 
Aphrodite's  role. 
64  The  catachresis  was  already  noted  by  the  scholiast  ad  513  (p.  307 
Papageorgius):  Ka.  TaXPTjQTLK(3c  E11TEV  ETTL  SVO  TO  aO))  tc  ETrL  TrX1Oous  'Yap 
)tyETaL;  see  Burton  (1980:  57),  Easterling  (ad  513)  and  Davies  (ad  513). 141 
not  present  here  as  the  cosmic  force  of  regeneration  and  procreation,  nor 
as  the  goddess  normally  presiding  over  weddings;  65  it  Is  rather  her 
destructive  aspect  that  is  prominent:  66  her  absolute  dominance  has 
occasioned  the  destruction  of  one  household  (Eurytus'),  by  means  of  a 
`marriage'  (Heracles'  to  lole)  and  is  about  to  generate  the  dissolution  of 
another  one  (Heracles'  own),  by  means  of  another  `marriage'  (Deianeira's 
to  Heracles).  67 
As  I  have  already  remarked  (p.  136),  the  household  of  Heracles 
seems  never  to  be  symmetrical:  either  there  is  no  husband  In  It,  with 
Deianeira  being  practically  a  `married  widow',  or  there  are  two  wives  in 
the  same  husband's  bed.  This  lack  of  symmetry  is  also  expressed  in  the 
'gifts'  that  Heracles  and  Deianeira  exchange  before  the  former's  return: 
Deianeira  has  been  keeping  the  house  during  his  long  absence,  but 
Heracles'  `reward'  to  his  wife  for  that  (542  oLKOÜpLa)  is,  preposterously,  a 
second  wife,  i.  e.  a  factor  that  impedes  the  normal  -function  of  the 
household  and  is  potentially  a  destructive  force,  `a  bane  under  the  roof 
(376).  Deianeira  will  respond  with  "such  gifts  as  it  is  right  to  give  in 
recompense  for  gifts"68  (494  ä  T'  aVTL  8tpu  v  8(.  i)pa  Xpgl  npoaapµöaaL) 
--  a  phrase  of  whose  full  implications  she  is  still  unaware.  She  certainly 
65  On  this  role  of  Aphrodite  see  Seaford  (1987:  116-17with  nn.  114-16). 
66  An  aspect  with  which  the  Greeks  were  familiar  from  lyric  poetry:  e.  g.  Sapph. 
47,130  L.  -P.;  Archil.  193  W.;  Ibyc.  286,287  P.  For  Sophoclean  examples  of  the 
ruinous  power  of  love  see  Ant.  781-800  and  fr.  941  R.  cited  by  Burton  (1980:  54 
n.  28). 
67  I  mean  that  Deianeira's  desire  to  win  Heracles  back,  and  thus  celebrate 
eventually  in  true  fashion  the  `wedding'  announced  at  205-20,  will  lead  her  to 
send  him  the  fatal  robe,  thus  contributing  her  share  to  the  destruction  of  their 
household.  Cf.  Segal  (1975a:  44),  Rehm  (1994:  82);  on  Deianeira's  sexuality  as  a 
motive  force  in  the  play  see  Winnington-Ingram  (1983:  240).  It  will  appear 
that,  pace  Segal  (1981:  86  and  passim),  I  view  Deianeira's  share  in  the 
destruction  of  the  OtKOs  as  much  smaller  than  Heracles'. 
68  I  quote  Easterling's  (ad  494-5)  rendering  of  the  passage.  Cf.  also  Jebb  (ad 
494ff.  ),  Kamerbeek  (ad  494). 142 
intends  the  robe  to  be  a  means  of  saving  her  household  from  dissolution 
and  of  preventing  the  intolerable  `wedding'  that  is  about  to  happen  by 
re-establishing  her  own  marriage;  however,  it  is  this  robe  that  will  seal  the 
fate  of  the  household  -a  suitable  gift  indeed  for  Heracles'  perverted 
OLKOÜpLa  to  her.  Thus,  the  `positive'  reciprocity  of  the  exchange  of  marital 
gifts  (a  common  practice  in  weddings)  is  replaced  (though  inadvertently 
on  Deianeira's  part)  by  the  `negative'  reciprocity  of  returning  destruction 
of  a  marriage  (death  of  Heracles  and  Deianeira)  for  perversion  of  a 
marriage  (Iole  as  a  second  wife).  69 
Thus,  it  appears  that  the  anointed  robe  is  both  a  potential  saviour 
and  a  potential  destroyer  of  the  household;  it  is  intended  to  save  the 
oLKOS,  but  it  eventually  destroys  it.  This  is  a  fundamental  ambiguity,  the 
first  of  a  whole  series  of  ambiguities  that  make  this  piece  of  garment  a 
symbol  of  Heracles  himself.  To  begin  with,  the  robe,  like  Heracles  himself, 
belongs  to  the  µETa'Xµ1OV  between  savagery  and  civilization.  The  poison 
(or  the  love-charm,  as  Deianeira  thinks)  came  from  a  beast  (556  6rjp6s), 
the  Centaur  Nessus,  who  is  clearly  described  as  belonging  entirely  to  the 
wild:  he  is  associated  with  the  elemental  force  of  ravaging  water,  the 
"deep-flowing  river  Euenus"  (559),  70  across  which  he  ferried  people,  not 
with  civilized  means  (560-61  OÜTE  trop.  rLµoLs  KcyrraLs  Ep4ouo  v  OÜTE 
69  On  the  capital  importance  of  reciprocity  (Xäp«)  in  Greek  marriage  see 
Vernant  (1983:  132):  "...  the  union  of  the  sexes  is  a  contract  [...  ]  In  this 
connection,  one  of  the  essential  aspects  of  Greek  charis  should  be  emphasized: 
charis  is  the  divine  power  that  is  manifest  in  all  aspects  of  gift-giving  and 
reciprocity  (the  round  of  generous  liberality,  the  cordial  exchange  of  gifts), 
which,  in  spite  of  all  divisions,  spins  a  web  of  reciprocal  obligations,  and  one  of 
the  oldest  of  all  of  the  functions  of  charis  is  the  giving  of  herself  by  a  woman 
to  a  man.  "  In  this  aspect,  Aj.  522  is  a  very  instructive  passage;  cf.  also  Redfield 
(1982:  196),  Scodel  (1984:  33-4)  with  very  important  remarks,  and  Segal  (1981: 
70),  (1995:  82). 
70  Euenus  is  "one  of  the  fiercest  and  most  treacherous  torrents  in  Greece":  see 
Tozer  as  cited  by  Jebb  (ad  559f.  ). Xa.  LýEOIV  'vEtS)  but  with  his  bare  hands  (5G0  XEpo(v).  71  The 
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poison  / 
love-charm  consists  not  only  of  the  beast's  blood  but  also  of  the  venom  of 
another  beast,  namely  the  Lernaean  Hydra  (574),  in  which  Heracles' 
arrows  were  dipped.  (Incidentally,  this  is  yet  another  indication  of 
Heracles'  veering  between  civilization  and  savagery:  the  arrows  with 
which  he  performs  his  feats  against  monsters  are  active  because  of  the 
power  of  a  monster!  ).  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  poison  /  love-charm 
has  strong  associations  with  civilization  and,  especially,  with  the 
household:  it  is  smeared  -  with  a  tuft  of  wool  (695  KhTayµa)72  taken 
from  a  ewe,  a  domestic  animal  (675,690  K  T110'[01)  3OTOÜ  Xd  vriv)  -  on  a 
robe  which  is  markedly  a  product  of  the  household:  it  is  woven  by 
Deianeira  herself  (603  Tljs  Eµ  is  XE  Lpog),  73  who  has  been  keeping  it  all 
these  years  in  the  deepest  recesses  of  the  house  (578-79  86µots  [...  ] 
EyKEKXTI  VOV  KQ)L3S,  686  Ev  µ)Xots),  inside  a  domestic  utensil  (556 
XEßryTL  XaXKEQ).  Before  it  is  given  to  Lachas,  a  herald  belonging  to  the 
household  (cf.  the  pleonasm  at  757  än'  O'  KWV  ...  OLKEtOS),  74  it  is  sealed 
71  Cf.  Segal  (1975a:  46):  "son  [i.  e.  Nessus']  metier,  comme  sa  forme  meme, 
constitue  une  espece  de  parodie  de  la  civilization  humaine.  "  Cf.  also  Segal  (1981: 
91-2),  (1995:  30). 
72  KäTayµa  has  markedly  domestic  associations,  as  it  is  properly  used  of  "the  ball 
of  wool  on  the  distaff,  from  which  the  thread  is  drawn  down  (KaTäyETaL, 
deducitur)  by  the  spinner"  (Jebb  [ad  695ff.  ]);  cf.  Kamerbeek  (ad  695)  and 
Easterling  (ad  695). 
73  See  Kamerbeek  (ad  603)  and  Easterling  (ad  603).  Hsch.  s.  v.  tvTLa  (L  1017  Latte): 
"f  t4aivouaa  yuv1j.  KaL  olKLa"  indicates,  in  a  very  convenient  (although 
etymologically  wrong)  manner,  the  Intrinsic  association  of  weaving  (as  a 
domestic  occupation  par  excellence)  with  the  household.  Cf.  Segal  (1975a:  36), 
(1981:  64),  (1995:  45)  and  above  all  Redfield  (1982:  194-5)  and  Seidensticker 
(1995:  159). 
74  See  Easterling's  (ad  757)  comment,  and  cf.  Davies  (ad  757).  Dawe  (1996)  has 
oiKEtoc  between  daggers,  whereas  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  166)  keep  the 
word,  but  think  it  means  no  more  than  `his  own'  (so  also  Jebb  [ad  757]  and 
Kamerbeek  [ad  757]).  I  believe  that  otKEtoc  has  its  full  force  ('from  the  house') 
and  that  the  pleonasm  is  deliberate;  Segal  (1981:  80)  seems  to  have  grasped  the 144 
with  Deianeira's  signet  (615  a4  payl8os  9p  KE  L  ),  by  which  Heracles  will 
undoubtedly  recognize  the  robe  as  coming  from  his  own  house  (cf.  614 
Eü  ia6Es).  The  phrasing  used  in  this  passage  is  interesting:  9pKOs 
certainly  refers  to  the  bezel,  i.  e.  the  part  of  the  ring  which  bears  the 
signet;  75  given  however  that  the  current  Greek  word  for  `bezel'  was 
o4Ev8ovij,  perhaps  we  should  see  in  the  (rather  elaborate) 
circumlocution  $payt8os  9p  KE  La  word-play  with  9  pKOs=`sacred 
enclosure  (that  may  contain  an  altar)'76  In  that  case,  the  robe  would  be 
all  the  more  closely  associated  with  the  tamed,  domesticated  space  of  the 
house  or  the  city  (cf.  above  p.  131  with  n.  39).  At  any  rate,  it  is  highly 
ironical,  as  well  as  of  paramount  importance  for  our  understanding  of 
the  play,  that  another  EpKOc  (607),  namely  the  altar  at  which  Heracles 
sacrifices  (604-13,  cf.  765-71,993-95),  will  activate  the  fatal  power  of  the 
poisoned  robe.  Thus,  the  robe,  so  closely  associated  with  the  safety  and 
certitude  of  domestic  environment  (cf.  again  614-15),  contains  a 
destructive  potential  that  leads  eventually  to  a  negation  of  the  ol,  KOs 
(the  robe's  fatal  clinging  on  Heracles'  body  is  ironically  referred  to  at  1055 
as  ýuvoLKOÜV177),  insofar  as  it  brings  about  a  negation  of  an  OIKOS's  very 
centre,  namely  the  hearth  (EQTI.  a),  the  domestic  sacrificial  site.  78  For 
Heracles'  thanksgiving  sacrifice  is  nothing  like  the  sacrifice  at  the  hearth 
point. 
75  See  Jebb  (ad  614f.  )  and  cf.  Davies  (ad  614-15). 
76  Cf.  Segal  (1975a:  34,38),  (1981:  68). 
77  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  175-76)  well  explain  the  meaning  of  ýuvOLKOÜv 
here:  "...  the  robe  [...  ]  is  thought  of  as  though  it  were  a  person,  a  secret  sharer 
of  Heracles'  life";  see  also  Davies  (ad  1055),  who  refutes  Dawe's  (1978:  95) 
unjustified  complaints  and  rightly  condemns  his  unfortunate  conjecture 
Cuvtrrovv.  On  the  theme  of  the  house's  destruction  from  within  cf.  Easterling 
(1987:  19). 
78  Deianeira  stressed  with  all  possible  emphasis  that  the  robe  should  not  come 
in  contact  with  light,  especially  altar-fire  (606-609,685-86  etc.  ).  On  the 
destructive  potential  of  the  hearth  /  altar  in  the  play  cf.  Segal  (1975a:  41), 
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which  it  was  the  duty  of  the  pater  familias  to  perform  by  way  of 
reaffirmation  of  the  household's  cohesion;  on  the  contrary,  this  sacrifice 
is,  by  means  (paradoxically)  of  a  domestic  product  (the  robe),  corrupted 
into  a  gruesome  distortion  of  the  ritual,  whereby  the  sacrificer  himself 
becomes  the  victim,  to  the  ultimate  detriment  of  the  household.  This  is 
succinctly  expressed  in  the  phrase  (613)  OUTTjpa  KaLvw  KaLvöv  Ev 
TrE1T)4LaTL:  as  Easterling  (ad  610-13)  perceptively  remarks,  "KaLvös  often 
has  a  sinister  meaning,  `strange'  rather  than  simply  `new'",  and  "[a] 
sacrificer  might  be  `strange'  if  he  turned  out  to  be  the  victim  instead".  79 
This  confusion  between  the  roles  of  sacrificer  and  victim  is  confirmed,  as 
Seaford  (1994a:  391)  has  remarked,  by  i)  the  parallelism  between 
Heracles'  flesh  being  devoured  by  the  flames  (cf.  840  EinCEQavTa)  and 
the  sacrificial  victim's  flesh  being  burned  by  the  altar  flame  (cf.  766  ski 
aL  to  qpä),  and  ii)  by  the  memorable  image  of  Heracles'  being  shrouded 
by  the  murky  altar-smoke:  1rpoaE8pov  Xiyvüos  (794)80  -a  phrase 
which,  as  Kamerbeek  (ad  794)  notes,  may  also  suggest  Heracles'  being 
shrouded  by  the  burning  garment  (cf.  schol.  ad  loc.  [p.  324 
Papageorgius]:  Tý  Tl  S'  1TCLPCLKE1  tEv11c  KCLL  trcpLKEXu  jEVTjT  CLÜTOV 
c  Xoyt6ovc  vöaou).  The  robe,  a  product  of  the  house,  in  association  with 
the  altar-flame,  a  symbol  of  the  house,  effects  a  grim  parody  of  an  act  so 
central  to  the  notion  of  &KOS  as  sacrifice. 
At  this  critical  moment  the  ambiguity  of  the  robe  (hovering  betwixt 
and  between  civilization  and  savagery)  is  appropriately  brought  up 
again:  we  hear  that  it  clung  to  Heracles'  body  like  a  sweaty  artisan's  cloak 
sticking  to  his  body  (768-69)  81  -a  familiar  image  of  a  civilized  (and 
79  Seaford  (1994a:  391  n.  101)  calls  613  "an  (unconsciously)  ironically 
appropriate  phrase".  Cf.  also  Segal  (1975a:  38),  (1981:  71),  (1995:  46-47,55-56). 
80  On  the  meaning  here  see  Jebb  (ad  794f.  and  his  transl.  )  and  Easterling  (ad 
794). 
81  This  interpretation  was  first  proposed,  as  far  as  I  am  aware,  by  West  (1980: 
366  n.  9).  Zijderveld  (1935-36:  175-76)  had  arrived  at  a  similar  solution,  but  went 
on  to  say  that  "fabri  [...  ]  et  opifices  vestimenta  arte  restricta  induere  solebant, 146 
civilizing)  activity.  At  the  same  time,  the  robe's  uncanny  nature  is 
revealed  when  it  is  said  to  have  devoured  Heracles'  flesh  like  the  deadly 
venom  of  a  hateful  viper  (770-71)  82  -  an  image  that  clearly  places  the 
robe  in  the  domain  of  savagery,  but  on  the  other  hand  ironically 
connects  it  again  with  the  household,  since,  as  Borthwick  reminds  us,  "the 
most  notorious  belief  about  the  echidna  in  antiquity  was  that  the  female 
bit  the  male  to  death  in  the  act'  of  mating".  83  Thus,  the  viper's  bite 
"becomes  `the  image  for  domestic  treachery'  (Jebb  on  Soph.  Ant.  531), 
and  it  Is  appropriate  that  Sophocles  likens  Deianeira's  love-gift  for 
Heracles  to  an  echidna's  poison  feeding  on  his  flesh".  84  Likewise,  the  piece 
of  sheep's  wool,  another  domestic  product  (cf.  above,  p.  143),  with  which 
Deianeira  has  anointed  the  robe,  crumbles  away  (678,85  697-98)  under 
the  effect  of  the  poison's  contact  with  sunlight,  thus  foreshadowing  the 
fate  of  the  entire  household.  Ironically,  however,  the  woollen  tuft's 
combustion  is  described  in  imagery  recalling  civilized  activity:  it  looks 
like  sawdust  (699-700:  the  elaborate  circumlocution  lends  emphasis  to 
ne  labore  assiduo  occupati  impedirentur  sinu  ampliore"  (ibid.:  p.  176).  Heracles' 
sweat,  however,  is  important,  for  it  is  thus  that  the  poison  seems  to  be  activated 
(767).  For  a  list  of  other  interpretations  see  commentators,  especially  Easterling 
(ad  768-9)  and  Davies  (ad  768).  They  both  reject  the  view  advocated  here  on  the 
grounds  that,  as  Davies  puts  it,  it  "supplies  a  merely  familiar  idea  instead  of  a 
characteristic  blend  of  the  sinister  and  the  mundane".  Nonetheless,  it  is 
precisely  this  "merely  familiar  idea"  that  we  need  here.  Dawe  (1978:  91-92), 
(1996)  obelizes  the  line,  but,  as  West  (1.  c.  )  shows,  he  has  misunderstood  the  text. 
82  At  770  read  ýOiVLos  (Pierson),  with  Dawe  (1996)  and  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson 
(1990a)  for  the  MSS  4oLv'Las;  see  Davies  (ad  770).  Dawe  (1978:  92)  did  not 
understand  the  blending  of  illustrans  and  illustrandum  in  this  passage,  well 
explained  by  Davies  (ad  770-71). 
83  E.  K.  Borthwick,  CR  n.  s.  17  (1967),  250,  with  ample  evidence  for  this 
widespread  belief  (pp.  250-51).  The  earliest  instances  are  Hdt.  3.109  and  A.  Cho. 
247-9. 
84  Borthwick,  art.  cit.,  251. 
85  If  the  text  is  sound:  see  I1oyd  Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  165)  and  commentators. 
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the  phrase,  which  thus  cannot  fail  to  contribute  to  the  imagery  of 
civilized  activity),  while  "from  the  earth,  where  it  was  strewn,  clots  of 
foam  seethed  up,  as  when  the  rich  juice  of  the  blue  fruit  from  the  vine  of 
Bacchus  is  poured  upon  the  ground"  (701-704;  Jebb's  transl.  ),  a 
description  recalling  the  ritual  o  rovöi  (another  ironic  link  with  images 
of  civilized  domestic  life).  86 
The  symbolism  of  this  blending  of  the  domestic  and  the  wild  in  the 
imagery  surrounding  the  robe  (and,  secondarily,  the  tuft  of  wool)  is  clear 
enough:  ironically,  it  is  on  domestic,  humanized  ground  that  the  world'of 
savagery  will  eventually  best  the  civilizing  hero;  Heracles  has  been 
fighting  monsters  all  his  life,  only  to  be  defeated  by  them,  in  an 
unexpected  intrusion  of  the  wild  into  his  own  household.  87  As  one  should 
expect,  the  voaos  that  attacks  Heracles  as  a  result  of  his  donning  of  the 
robe  is  (qua  manifestation  of  the  world  of  the  wild)  described  in  terms 
strongly  reminiscent  of  its  savage  nature:  it  is  äypLa  (975,1030)88  and 
äTroTißaTos  (1030),  89  and  is  envisaged  as  a  beast  that  can  spring  from  its 
lair  at  any  moment  (979-81),  90  while  civilization  has  no  means  of  curing 
86  See  Segal  (1975a:  46),  (1981:  89-91),  (1995:  52-53). 
87  On  the  ambiguity  of  the  robe  cf.  also  Segal  (1995:  32-33).  March  (1987:  52-56, 
62-65)  has  argued  with  great  plausibility  that  the  arrowshot  which  killed 
Nessos  and  produced  the  lovecharm  was  perhaps  an  innovation  introduced  by 
Sophocles  himself,  who  was  thus  the  first  to  connect  Nessos  with  Herakles' 
death.  If  so,  then  the  motif  of  the  defeated  monsters'  defeating  Heracles,  as  well 
as  the  wider  theme  of  the  tension  between  civilization  and  wilderness,  must 
have  been  a  central  preoccupation  in  Sophocles'  mind. 
88  On  the  image  of  the  voaoc  as  a  wild  animal  and  its  implications  see  Biggs 
(1966:  227-8),  Sorum  (1978:  59-60),  Segal  (1971:  101),  (1981:  93),  (1995:  36)  and 
Easterling  (1968:  67),  (1981:  59),  (1982:  ad974-5). 
89  The  word  is  a  hapax  Jebb  (ad  1027ff.  )  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  1030)  rightly 
compare  1093. 
90  The  point  is  excellently  made  by  Sorum  (1978:  60)  and  Easterling  (ad  979-81). 
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it:  neither  a  charmer  (aOL86c)91  nor  a  practitioner  of  medicine 
(XELpOTEXV71S  'LaTOpLaS)  could  successfully  cope  with  it  (1000-1002).  92 
Heracles'  fatal  sacrifice  (whose  perverted  character  was 
demonstrated  above,  p.  14Sf.  )  represents  yet  another  instance  of  this 
merging  of  civilization  and  wilderness  93-  It  may  well  be,  as  Plato  has  it 
(Prot.  322a;  cf.  above  p.  131  with  n.  39),  that  the  sacrificial  act 
distinguishes  humans  from  beasts  and  reveals  their  affinity  to  the  divine, 
but  in  Heracles'  case  it  only  signals,  on  the  one  hand,  his  defeat  by  the 
bestial  voaoS  (and,  ultimately,  by  the  untamed  wilderness),  while  on  the 
other  it  marks  the  impossibility  of  communication  with  divinity:  as  the 
hero  himself  complains  at  the  important  lines  993-95,  his  terrible 
predicament  is  far  from  what  one  should  normally  expect  from  the 
performance  of  a  pious  duty  such  as  sacrifice.  94  Furthermore,  this  fatal 
sacrifice  takes  place  at  Cape  Cenaeum,  a  `sea-girdled  shore'  (237,752-53 
äKT1t  TLS  äl1LKXUQTOS,  cf.  993),  i.  e.  an  area  that  is  dangerously  close  to 
the  sea:  one  recalls  that  Heracles'  perilous  wandering  in  the  wild  has  been 
compared,  in  the  parodos,  to  being  tossed  about  at  sea  (112-21),  so  it 
seems  possible  that  the  sea  is,  in  this  play  at  least,  a  symbol  of  the  hero's 
toils.  95  Moreover,  it  is  important  that  both  the  Hydra  and  Nessus  are 
91  The  catachrestic  use  of  &L56g  for  i  iq  8Ös  is  unique:  Kamerbeek  (ad  1000). 
92  In  Cä.  17.383-85,  the  hTr1p  KaKwv  and  the  cLOLSös  are  two  of  the  STiµLOEpyoL,  the 
people  who  are  at  the  service  of  the  organized  community  -an  infallible  sign 
of  a  civilized  society. 
93  Cf.  Segal  (1975a:  35),  (1981:  62). 
94  Cf.  Burkert  (1985b:  16). 
95  Cf.  the  words  of  the,  Chorus  in  E.  HF  697-700:  [Heracles]  µoxOi  as  TO'V  &KVU.  OV  I 
OKEV  3LOTOV  ßpOTO  gI  TTEpaas  8ELµaTa  OripLJV.  The  phrase  VaaL(ZTLV  iQTktV  (658) 
must  not  deceive  us  into  believing  that  Euboea  is  thought  of  as  having  a 
domestic  character  (&UTLa):  the  use  of  a  word  meaning  `hearth,  home'  here 
creates  a  pointed  irony,  for  Heracles'  sacrifice  is  a  thanksgiving  for  his  having 
destroyed  one  &TLa  (Eurytus'),  and  is  about  to  become  the  means  of  the 
destruction  of  yet  another  one  (Heracles'  own).  See  below  in  the  text  (section 
3.2.1).  On  the  sea  as  a  hostile,  untamed  element  in  this  play  cf.  Segal  (1981:  92). 149 
closely  associated  with  water:  Nessus  ferries  people  across  the  river 
Euenus,  96  while  Hydra,  the  `water-serpent'  as  her  name  signifies,  lives  at 
the  Lernaean  swamp;  one  also  recalls  that  Heracles  had  to  fight  with  the 
river  Achelous  in  order  to  win  Deianeira's  hand  and  create  a  new 
household  97  Victory  over  those  three  monsters  probably  signified  the 
victory  of  the  civilizing  hero  over  the  overwhelming  power  of  water,  one 
of  the  most  uncontrollable  elements  of  nature  -a  power,  however,  which 
eventually  defeats  him  98  Thus,  it  is  a  sinister  irony  that  the  sacrifice 
which  is  supposed  to  signal  the  end  of  Heracles'  labours  is  associated,  by 
means  of  locale  (sea),  with  the  raging  sea  of  Heracles'  tolls  -  of  his 
struggle  against  alien,  untamed,  undomesticated  elements.  Through  the 
corrupted  sacrifice  by  the  seashore,  the  beasts  Heracles  has  been  fighting, 
the  wilderness  he  has  been  trying  to  tame,  seem  now  to  re-appear,  in  the 
form  of  Nessus  and  the  Hydra99  whose  blood  and  venom  anointed  the 
fatal  robe,  and  to  invade  Heracles'  own  ol.  KOc,  in  order-to  deal  a  final 
deadly  blow  against  both  the  hero  himself  and  his  household.  100  This 
96  Jebb  (ad  557f.  )  plausibly  suggests  that  Nessus'  very  name  symbolizes  "the 
roar  of  the  angry  torrent"  and  adduces  comparative  linguistic  evidence  (Greek 
and  Sanskrit)  to  support  his  view.  It  is  interesting  that,  as  he  points  out,  N&TTOS 
(in  Thrace)  and  NE8a  (in  Arcadia)  are  river-names,  while  Ao6rrwv  and  "Oµa8oc 
(names  denoting  noise,  like  Ncaaoc)  are  names  of  Centaurs.  Fontenrose  (1959: 
354)  sees  Nessus  as  the  spirit  of  the  river  Euenus. 
97  On  the  structural  equivalence  of  Achelous  and  Nessus-Euenus  as  river-spirits 
see  Fontenrose  (1959:  355);  cf.  Segal  (1981:  79). 
98  On  the  role  of  water  in  Heracles'  legend  see  Fontenrose  (1959:  109,354)  and 
cf.  Kirk's  (1974:  201)  en  passantremark.  Water  in  the  Trachiniae:  Heiden  (1989: 
86-7,95-6,123-4).  The  bitter  irony  of  nautical  metaphors  such  as  468,815-16  and 
827  (on  which  see  Segal  [1995:  227  n.  88])  may  be  yet  another  allusion  to  the 
destructive  function  of  water  in  the  Heracles'  myth. 
99  Interestingly,  at  1090ff.  the  monsters  Heracles  has  fought  are  described  in 
terms  recalling  either  the  Nessus  or  the  Hydra:  see  Appendix. 
100  After  having  written  these  lines  I  found  that  Easterling  (1968:  65)  also 
reached  a  similar  conclusion  via  a  different  path,  namely  by  noting  the 
thematic  and  verbal  parallelisms  between  first  and  third  stasimon. 150 
startling  paradox  is  well  formulated  by  Heracles  himself  towards  the  end 
of  the  play  (1159-63):  the  Orjp  KEvTavpoc  (1162),  a  representative  of  the 
wild  and  a  `dweller'  of  as  inhabitable  a  place  as  Hades  (1161  "ALsov 
... 
oLici  m  p),  encroaches  on  the  world  of  the  living  (1163  C  5vTa)101  and 
turns  him  and  his  wife  into  `dwellers'  of  Hades,  by  devastating  their 
normal  abode,  namely  their  OLKOS. 
3.2.1  The  second  and  third  stasima:  Heracles'  homecoming  as 
wedding 
The  contrast  between  Heracles'  much  desired  return  from  the  wild,  with  a 
view  to  the  restoration  of  his  marriage  and  household,  and  the  ultimate 
devastation  of  this  household  becomes  all  the  more  conspicuous  through 
the  contrast  of  the  second  (633ff.  )  with  the'third  stasimon  (821ff.  ).  In  the 
former,  the  familiar  imagery  of  the  polls  and  the  household,  as  opposed 
to  the  wild  and  the  outdoors,  Is  a  prominent  feature.  To  begin  with,  "the 
opening  invocation  to  the  dwellers  around  Heracles'  home  [...  ]  serves  to 
give  a  feeling  of  local  background,  rather  as  the  Colonus  ode  does  in 
Oedipus  Coloneus"  (Stinton  [1990:  408-409]).  The  Chorus  address  places 
markedly  associated  with  the  inhabitants'  communal  life  or  with  their 
civilized  activities.  Thus,  in  contrast  with  the  stormy  sea-imagery  so 
conspicuously  used  in  the  parodos  (112-21),  it  is  the  calm  and  safe 
vaiXoXa  (633)102  that  gain  prominence  now,  along  with  the  security  of 
101  Segal  (1995:  30,38,42)  and  Easterling  (pp.  3-4)  have  some  fine  remarks  on 
the  important  theme  of  the  past's  threatening  and  influencing  the  present; 
Reinhardt  (1979:  47)  rather  missed  the  point.  The  theme  of  the  dead  killing  the 
living,  a  theme  common  especially  in  Sophocles  (cf.  e.  g.  Aj.  1026-7,  E1.1420-1), 
is  well  explored  by  Kitto  (1956:  193),  (1966:  180-8). 
102  Some  take  vaiXoya  to  be  an  adjective,  with  Aourrpa;  Davies  (ad  633),  however, 
gives  good  reasons  for  considering  it  a  substantive  ('haven,  harbour'). 151 
the  ia  ja  Mils  XLµva  (635-36).  103  Oeta,  which  is  generally  associated 
in  this  play  with  the  untamed  wilderness  (e.  g.  200,436-7,1191  [reading 
Ot  ao  TOV  with  the  MSS.  ]  104),  is  now  exceptionally  seen  as,  almost,  part  of 
the  domesticated  space  of  human  abodes:  634-5  Träyovs  I  OZTas 
TrapavaLETäovTEc.  Even  the  Amphictyonic  League  is,  somewhat 
unexpectedly,  brought  into  the  picture  (638-39),  in  order  to  make  all  the 
clearer  Trachis'  association  with  the  communal  activities  of  organized 
societies  -  an  unmistakable  sign  of  civilized  life,  implicitly  opposed  to 
Heracles'  being  äTröTrTOüs  (647)  for  such  a  long  time.  10s  Now  Heracles' 
prolonged  wandering  at  sea  (649  TrE?  «IyLos;  we  remember  again  the 
parodos'  sea  imagery),  and  his  relatives'  and  friends'  total  ignorance  of 
his  whereabouts  (649)  are  hopefully  over  (655ff.  ):  Heracles  is  at  last 
hurrying  back  home  (645).  Not  unexpectedly,  marital  imagery  is  used 
again,  as  in  the  choral  song  at  205ff.:  as  Stinton  (1990:  404)  has  pointed 
out,  OE'Las  ävTLAvpov  poüacis  (642-43)  does  not  simply  mean  `a  sound  of 
divine  music  equalling  the  lyre',  but  `a  sound  of  divine  music  answering 
to  the  lyre',  the  implication  being  that  the  aulos  (instrument  of 
Dionysus),  mentioned  at  641,  will  be  used  in  conjunction  with  the  lyre 
(instrument  of  Apollo);  so,  if  we  also  take  into  account  the  particular 
reference  to  Artemis  in  the  strophe  (637),  106  then  all  three  gods  who 
103  There  are  two  possible  meanings  for  µEV(Tav:  i)  "surrounded  by  the  lands  of 
Euboea,  Trachis,  and  Phthiotis"  (L.  Campbell  [ad  635]),  or  ii)  "the  part  of  the 
gulf  between  the  two  extremities,  i.  e.  the  innermost  part  of  the  deep  recess 
which  it  forms"  (Jebb  [ad  633-639]).  Jebb's  translation  of  i1.  ouav  as 
`landlocked'  fits  both  meanings  while  successfully  conveying  the  sense  of 
security  implicit  in  the  word.  The  meaning  remains  virtually  unchanged  with 
Heiden's  (1988b),  (1989:  94-5)  reasonable  explanation  of  ?  p.  va  as  `marsh'  .  (his 
own  interpretation  of  itaaa  is  unnecessarily  restrictive). 
104  Cf.  below  n.  157. 
105  The  above  considerations  should  perhaps  qualify  Knox's  (1983:  7)  remark 
about  the  complete  lack  of  political  background  in  the  Sophoclean  Trachis. 
106  All  commentators  agree  that  Xpucr6aKaTou  ...  Köpac  must  mean  Artemis. 152 
preside  over  marriage  in  205-20  are  again  invoked.  The  Chorus'  final  wish 
that  Heracles  should  come  `full  of  desire'  (660  Tray  LµE  pos  107),  along  with 
the  erotic  connotations  of  IIEL6oü9 
...  TrapcäaEL  (661-62),  108  rounds  off 
the  wedding-theme  by  expressing  a  hope  for  the  re-union  of  Heracles  and 
Deianeira,  for  a  restoration  of  the  disrupted  mutual  affection  and 
conjugal  harmony,  in  what  is  envisaged  as  a  re-enactment  of  the 
marriage  ritual.  Since  the  Greeks  often  thought  of  marriage  as  a  harbour 
(cf.  e.  g.  OT  422-23,1208-10),  109  the  contrast  between  Heracles'  imminent 
marriage  and  his  previous  wandering  over  the  seas  becomes  all  the 
sharper,  thus  conveying  a  feeling  of  relief. 
The  third  stasimon,  as  I  have  already  intimated,  is 
contradistinguished  from  the  joyful  second  stasimon  in  its  alarmed 
realization  of  the  advancing  destruction  of  Heracles'  household  (cf.  849- 
50).  La  racine  du  mal  is,  quite  naturally,  traced  back  to  Nessus' 
treacherous  `gift'  (837-40).  110  That  `gift'  had  followed  a  fatal  `intercourse' 
107  Mudge:  Traväµ-  cold.  Jebb  (ad  660),  Easterling  (ad  660)  and,  most  eloquently, 
Stinton  (1990:  405  &  424-26)  accept  the  emendation,  whereas  I1oyd-Jones  & 
Wilson  (1990b:  165)  and  Davies  (ad  660)  seem  undecided,  and  Kamerbeek  (ad 
660)  is  entirely  averse  to  it. 
108  Trap4äcfL  is  the  word  most  likely  to  have  been  ousted  by  the  MSS's  impossible 
Trpo«  «TEL:  see  Stinton  (1990:  426-28).  He  also  provides  copious  evidence  (ibid., 
428)  for  the  use  of  TräpýavLS,  `beguilement',  in  erotic  or  marital  contexts;  he 
shows  that  persuasion  and  beguilement  are  needed  not  only  by  a  bridegroom  in 
his  wooing  but  also  by  a  wife  using  her  seductive  charm  on  her  husband  to 
restore  0La00povvv1  and  3µ60pwv  Evvý'.  Cf.  on  this  point  Redfield  (1982:  196-98). 
109  See  Kamerbeek  (1967:  ad  422,423);  also  DA  Campbell  in  Cropp,  Fantham  & 
Scully  (1986:  118).  On  nautical  imagery  in  marital  contexts  see  the  important 
remarks  of  Seaford  (1987:  124);  on  nautical  metaphors  suggesting  sexual 
congress  in  Attic  comedy  see  J.  Henderson,  The  Maculate  Muse  (New  York  & 
Oxford  21991),  142,161-66. 
110  On  the  supposed  love-charm  as  Nessus'  8wpov  to  Deianeira  see  555. 153 
(845  O'X  Op(aLQL  auva)AayaLs;  111  cf.  also  565)  between  Deianeira  and 
Nessus,  which  threatened  Heracles'  and  Deianeira's  new  marriage  (562- 
63)112  and  ended  with  the  death  of  the  offender-donor.  Needless  to  say, 
Nessus'  `gift'  constitutes  a  violation  of  reciprocity.  As  Deianeira  realizes 
only  too  late  (707-11),  Nessus'  EüVOLa  (708)  cannot  but  have  been  false: 
what  he  presented  as  a  sign  of  `positive'  reciprocity,  i.  e.  a  gift,  could  not, 
in  fact,  be  called  properly  so,  for  it  was  actually  given  in  return  for  death; 
it  could  only  have  been  an  implementation  of  `negative'  reciprocity 
(revenge).  In  these  considerations  a  pattern  of  intertwined  themes  can 
already  be  identified:  Nessus'  lawless  lust  for  Deianeira  threatens  Heracles' 
legitimate  marriage  as  well  as  his  household;  before  his  death  from  the 
poisonous  shafts  of  Heracles,  the  Centaur  presents  Deianeira  with  a  `gift 
(seemingly  a  token  of  `positive'  reciprocity),  which  is  supposed  to  ensure 
the  stability  of  Deianeira's  and  Heracles'  household,  but  turns  out  to  be  a 
means  of  `tit-for-tat'  vengeance  (death  for  death),  thus  perverting  what 
seemed  to  be  `positive'  reciprocity  into  its  opposite.  This  pattern,  in  its 
general  outlines,  seems  to  hold  good  in  Heracles'  case  too.  Heracles'  lust 
for  Iole  (like  Nessus'  lust  for  Delaneira)  is  a  threat  to  his  marriage  to 
Deianeira  and  a  serious  danger  for  his  household.  He  may  have  once 
averted  the  collapse  of  his  oLKOs  by  warding  the  libidinous  Nessus  off 
Deianeira,  but  now  it  Is  his  own  lechery,  his  lawless  lust  for  Iole,  that 
constitutes  a  danger  for  his  own  Oi  KOs.  113  Furthermore,  the  `positive' 
reciprocity  (exchange  of  gifts  and  counter-gifts)  that  should  be  the 
symbol  of  the  balanced  life  of  a  household  is  superseded  by  a  perverted 
111  For  the  erotic  connotations  of  auva)XzaacaOaL  cf.  Aj.  493  e  vrjs  ... 
auvijXäXOT  Elio(;  E.  Hipp.  652?  KTPWV  äeiKTWV  l)&s  ES  UUVaNXa-ydc. 
112  Rehm  (1994:  75-76)  has  some  interesting  observations  about  Nessus'  attempt 
at  rape  as  a  threat  to  marital  ritual;  cf.  Segal  (1975a:  45),  Sorum  (1978:  61-62)  and 
esp.  Armstrong's  original  remarks  in  Armstrong  &  Ellis  Hanson  (1986:  101-2). 
113  Cf.  Segal  (1995:  88-89). 154 
form  of  reciprocity.  114  Heracles'  oLKOÜpLa  (542),  namely  the  new 
`marriage'  conceived  by  the  Chorus  as  µEyä)av  [...  ]  8opoLQL  G3  3av 
vEcuv  [...  ]  y%twv  (842-43),  far  from  rewarding  his  wife's  care  for  the 
household,  result,  on  the  contrary,  in  the  dissolution  of  the  household, 
for  they  pervert  his  expected  wedding  (=re-establishment  of  his  marriage) 
to  Deianeira  into  a  `wedding'  to  another  woman  -a  most  undeserved 
`reward'  for  Delaneira's  keeping  of  the  house,  to  be  sure.  115  Thus,  Heracles' 
`gift'  to  Deianeira  is  in  fact  a  blatant  violation  of  `positive'  reciprocity,  as 
Nessus'  purported  `gift'  to  her  was  a  perversion  of  `positive'  reciprocity  in 
that  it  presented  as  a  gift  what  was  in  fact  a  means  of  destruction,  i.  e.  the 
exact  negation  ofýa  gift.  Ironically,  Deianeira's  sending  of  (Nessus')  `gift' 
(603,668,692,758,776,872)  is  envisaged  as  an  attempt  to  redress  the 
balance  of  `positive'  reciprocity  that  has  been  destroyed  by  Heracles. 
Nonetheless,  its  having  originated  in  a  perversion  (by  Nessus)  of  `positive' 
reciprocity  makes  such  a  positive  function  impossible;  this  `gift'  has  been 
from  the  first  a  means  of  revenge  and  such  it  remains  until  the  end:  In 
spite  of  Delaneira's  good  Intentions,  116  the  `gift'  turns  out,  to  be,  as  it 
114  On  the  importance  of  reciprocity  in  Greek  marriage  see  n.  69. 
115  Cf.  above,  p.  141. 
116  It  is  pointless  to  involve  oneself  in  the  idle  debate  over  Deianeira's  moral 
innocence;  Hyllus'  defence  of  her  (1113-42)  is  eloquent  enough;  cf.  e.  g. 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  77  with  n.  16);  for  an  answer  to  Bowra's  (1944:  126-8) 
objections  as  to  the  use  of  philtres  (repeated  recently  by  Gasti  [1993:  25-6])  see 
Waldock  (1951:  98-100),  Whitman  (1951:  114),  Gellie  (1972:  65).  Such  passages  as 
Arist.  MM  1188b29-38  (cf.  MacDowell  [1963:  45-7;  58-69,147])  indicate  beyond 
doubt  that  to  a  Greek  mind  Deianeira  must  have  been  held  innocent;  this  is 
something  even  Bowra  (1944:  147-8)  concedes.  Her  so-called  `deception  speech' 
(436-69)  has  been  thought  sometimes  to  reveal  her  malice;  many  scholars, 
however,  from  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz  (1917:  145-9)  to  Fuqua  (1980:  40  n.  108), 
have  objected  to  this,  and  Hester  (1980a:  7-8)  definitely  settled  the  matter  by 
proving  beyond  doubt  that  Deianeira  meant  well  and  that  her  supposed 
`deception  speech'  has  a  far  more  poignant  dramatic  point;  see  also  Reinhardt's 
(1979:  45-7  with  n.  11),  Gellie's  (1972:  61-2)  and  Lesky's  (1972:  216-7)  sensitive 
remarks.  On  Deianeira  as  a  timorous,  passive  being,  incapable  of  taking  any 155 
would,  an  implementation  of  `negative'  reciprocity  (Heracles  receives  a 
deserved  reward  [494  aVTL  8tpwv  &  Spa]  for  his  perverted  oLKOVpLa  to  his 
wife),  which  brings  only  great  woes  (871-72).  117 
Let  it  be  repeated  once  more:  Heracles  is  assimilated  to  one  of  the 
beasts  he  fought,  i.  e.  Nessus,  in  his  uncontrolled  lawless  lust  and  his 
destructive  perversion  of  reciprocity.  118  In  this  respect,  Deianeira's 
(Nessus')  `gift'  marks  yet  another  intrusion  of  the  wilderness  Into  Heracles' 
own  household.  Significantly,  at  the  end  of  the  third  stasimon  the  hero  is 
ominously  associated  with  the  `dark'  world  of  his  monstrous  opponents: 
the  spear  by  which  Heracles  won  his  new  `bride'  (894  vüµ4a)  -  the 
immediate  cause  of  all  this  evil  -  is  appropriately  called  KEXa.  uVä 
(856),  119  like  the  pEAayXa'Tac  Nessus  (837),  the  p.  EX  yXoXos  poison 
(573-74)  of  the  Hydra120  and  the  Lös  dLµaTos  µEkxs  (717),  the  supposed 
love-charm  consisting  in  Hydra's  black  gall  and  in  the  Centaur's  blood. 
This  point  has  been  excellently  made  by  Segal  (1995:  81),  who  adds:  "The 
spear  that  might  defend  a  marriage  and  household  (cf.  promachos,  `in 
the  front  of  the  battle',  856)  here  destroys  both;  and  it  Is  evoked  at  just 
the  point  where  Aphrodite's  damage  to  this  house  has  become  manifest 
(863).  "121  Indeed,  Kypris,  apparently  an  `attendant'  (860  äµ4tTroXos)122 
initiative  whatsoever  see  McCall  (1972:  143-55),  Gardiner  (1987:  128-9);  cf. 
already  Kirkwood  (1941:  205-7),  Bowra  (1944:  120-1,124-5). 
117  On  the  ambiguity  of  the  gift  cf.  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  86)  and,  most 
eloquently,  Parry  (1986:  105). 
118  On  Heracles'  overall  similarity  with  the  Centaurs  as  evidence  for  his 
animality  see  Kirk  (1974:  207-9)  and  (1977:  287).  Cf.  also  Winning  ton-Ingram 
(1980:  89)  and  Segal  (1995:  58,87,233  n.  14),  and  see  above  p.  140  with  n.  61. 
119  Easterling  (ad  856)  cites  Dodds  (1960:  ad  628),  who  suggests  that  KEkuvc  here 
may  carry  the  sinister  associations  of  Lat.  `ater',  Engl.  `dark'. 
120  On  OpE  µµa  as  referring  to  Hydra's  venom  see  Long  (1967:  275-7)  and  Davies 
(ad  572ff.  );  I  follow  the  latter's  reading  of  the  passage.  Cf.  also  Lloyd-Jones  & 
Wilson  (1990b:  163). 
121  He  probably  means  860-2. 
122  The  possible  marital  connotations  of  äµ4hTroXoT  here  have  been  noted  by 156 
to  the  several  `marriages'  of  this  play  (cf.  the  first  stasimon,  where 
Aphrodite  was  thought  of  as  having  excited  Heracles'  passion  for  both 
Deianeira  and,  implicitly,  Iole123),  has  finally  revealed  herself  as  plainly 
the  TrpaKTWp  (861)  of  these  deeds.  The  word  TrpaKTWp  is  ironically 
ambivalent:  it  does  not  simply  mean  `doer'  here  (nor  at  251),  as 
Easterling  (ad  251;  cf.  ad  860-1)  suggests;  for,  as  she  herself  remarks, 
"more  often  it  derives  its  meaning  from  npaUGELv  =  `exact'  and  has  the 
sense  of  `avenger'  or  (as  a  technical  term)  `bailiff'  or  `tax-collector'".  124 
Precisely:  at  251  Zeus  may  be  seen  in  his  retaliatory  function  as  restorer  of 
balance:  Heracles  has  exceptionally  indulged  in  guile,  a  markedly 
unheroic  practice,  and  therefore  must  pay  for  that  by  a  diminution  of  his 
heroism  and  masculinity,  i.  e.  by  his  becoming  a  slave  to  a  woman.  I 
suggest  that  at  861  Kypris  should  be  similarly  viewed  in  her  retributive 
function:  she  punishes  Heracles'  illegitimate  lust  for  Iole  by  seeing  to  It 
that  he  is  poisoned  with  what  has  been  the  result  of  Nessus'  illegitimate 
lust  for  Deianeira.  To  paraphrase  Segal's  (1995:  30)  formulation,  the 
violent,  primitive  past,  in  the  form  of  the  apparently  defeated  beasts  but 
also  of  primitive,  uncontrollable  lust,  encroaches  upon  and  destroys  a 
civilized  house.  Ironically,  this  intrusion  is  effected  by  way  of  two  women 
(Deianeira  and  Iole)  who  act  as  Its  instruments.  The  paradox  here  lies  In 
that  those  all  too  fearful  and  weak  creatures  (Deianeira:  24,28,37,150, 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  88)  and  Segal  (1995:  80-1).  Jebb  (ad  860ff.  )  thinks 
that  Aphrodite  is  `ministering  in  silence'  to  the  purposes  of  the  gods,  not  to  the 
desire  of  Heracles;  contra  Kamerbeek  (ad  860-62)  who,  following  Linforth 
(1952:  260  n.  6),  takes  exactly  the  opposite  view.  Easterling's  (ad  860-1) 
intermediate  position  is  probably  preferable:  "Cypris  works  by  stimulating  and 
gratifying  her  victims'  passions,  but  [is]  also  `attendant'  of  the  gods,  fulfilling 
their  purposes.  "  At  any  rate,  a  meaning  `attendant  at  a  marriage'  for  %t4uroAoc 
cannot,  I  think,  be  preluded. 
123  Cf.  above,  p.  137  with  n.  53. 
124  See  ISJ  s.  v.,  II.  1-3  for  instances.  Heiden  (1988a:  14),  (1989:  54)  fully  develops 
the  point. 157 
175-76,181;  Iole:  322-28)  become  fearsome  fiends,  destructive  viragos, 
who  overpower  the  most  valiant  of  men  (Iole:  488-89;  Deianeira:  1062- 
63)  exactly  by  adhering  to  their  female  nature.  Iole's  status  can  be 
defined  in  terms  of  a  woman's  procreative  power  (cf.  Deianeira's 
exploratory  question  at  308:  ävav8pos  i  TEKVoOaaCt  );  as  we  shall 
presently  see  in  more  detail,  she  will  indeed  be  TE  KVOOaO  a  very  soon,  but 
her  scion  will  be  a  pernicious  Erinys  (895).  Deianeira,  on  the  other  hand, 
remains  tied  to  her  household  throughout  the  play  (cf.  her  farewell  to  her 
opyava  at  905-906),  but  it  is  exactly  this  adherence  to  her  femininity 
that  proves  fatal:  she  has  kept  the  Centaur's  poison  in  a  domestic  utensil 
(556),  safeguarded  in  the  dark  recesses  of  the  house  (578-79,686),  and 
has  used  her  loom  to  weave  the  robe  that  will  prove  an  '  EpLvv(,  )v 
V4aVT6'V  äµ41ßXTjQTpOV  (1051-52).  125 
Thus,  these  two  women,  despite  remaining  typically  female  and 
keeping  themselves  strictly  within  the  boundaries  of  the  household,  cross 
the  limits  of  their  femininity  and  acquire  male  traits.  126  This  has  an 
exact  counterpart  in  Heracles'  becoming  a  woman  in  domestic  contexts. 
His  complaint,  in  his  final  monologue,  that  he,  the  defeater  of  monsters, 
125  Cf.  above,  p.  143  and  see,  most  recently,  Conacher  (1997:  passim,  esp.  30-1). 
On  Deianeira's  bondage  to  the  house  cf.  Segal  (1971:  100,106),  (1995:  43,83), 
Seidensticker  (1995:  161-2)  and,  above  all,  Winnington-Ingram  (1983:  239-40). 
126  Probably  Deianeira's  rather  un-feminine  mode  of  suicide  (sword,  a  weapon 
of  male  combat)  indicates  an  unexpected  proximity  to  masculinity  (the  Chorus' 
reaction  at  898  may  be  significant).  It  could  be  indicative  that  in  the  other 
versions  of  the  myth  (Apollod.  2.7.7,  D.  S.  4.38.3)  Deianeira  hangs  herself  -the 
noose  being  by  far  the  females'  preferred  means  of  suicide  in  tragedy  (cf. 
Frazer  [1921:  269  n.  3]).  Thus,  the  contrast  with  Heracles'  undignified  death  `in 
the  hands  of  a  woman'  (1058-63)  would  become  all  the  more  pointed.  "The 
instrument  of  his  death  is  a  robe,  and  of  hers  a  sword",  writes  Hoey  (1970b:  16) 
-  for  the  implications  of  the  1rElrl)s  as  a  female  garment  worn  by  the 
supermale  Heracles  see  Loraux  (1995:  125-3  1).  See  in  general  Rehm  (1994:  78), 
Segal  (1995:  74  with  n.  19),  Loraux  (1987:  14-17,55)  and  especially  (1995:  41-2). 
Differently  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  81n.  28). 
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has  been  defeated  by  a  woman,  i.  e.  Deianeira  (1048-52,1058-63),  thus 
having  been  reduced  to  a  female  (1071  GJQTE  napOEVOs,  1075  Of  Xvs),  is 
quite  significant:  it  reminds  us  of  two  earlier  occasions  on  which  Heracles 
became  feminine,  namely  of  his  servitude  to  Omphale  as  well  as  of  his 
defeat  by  Iole  (or,  more  precisely,  by  his  lust  for  her:  488-89).  127  Those 
occasions  were  disturbing  warnings  of  a  paradoxical  tendency  of  Heracles, 
on  which  we  have  already  commented  (p.  132ff.  ):  he  displays  admirable 
heroism  while  being  in  the  wild,  but  his  heroism  is  severely  diminished, 
or  even  totally  obliterated,  in  domestic  contexts.  The  civilizing  hero  par 
excellence  fails  to  remain  unequivocally  on  the  side  of  civilization, 
because  he  is  overcome  by  bestiality;  the  supermale  fails  to  be  a  model 
KÜpLOS  of  his  OI.  KOS  (as,  would  be  only  natural  in  a  patriarchal  society  like 
fe)1An,  ise4 
the  Greek128),  because  he  becomes  and,  what  is  more, 
destroys  his  own  household  by  means,  quite  paradoxically,  of  a 
perversion  of  a  markedly  domestic  function,  namely  marriage.  129 
,  127 
Fern  IK,  sat-(*  gorum  (1978:  65-6).  Enslavement  to  women:  Winnington- 
ngram  (1980:  85-6),  Segal  (1981:  79-80).  Silk's  (1985:  9)  reading  of  Heracles' 
femý  nds  is  perhaps  too  fanciful.  eff4wAnvden 
128  on  headship  of  a  family  (Kup'LELa)  as  a  male  preserve  see  Lacey  (1968:  21). 
129  Hoey  (1970b:  10-20)  has  shown,  on  the  evidence  of  mainly  formal  features, 
that  the  Trachiniae  is  about  the  failure  of  Heracles  and  Deianeira  to  achieve 
union,  therefore  to  construct  an  otKOS.  The  paradox  of  the  civilizing  hero  who 
destroys  the  household  seems  to  have  been  inherent  in  the  Heracles  myth:  as  G. 
Dumezil,  Marriages  indo-europeens  (Paris  1979),  60-3  (teste  Loraux  [1995:  120 
n.  20])  points  out,  Heracles,  on  the  one  hand,  has  a  strong  bond  with  marriage, 
and  the  recurrence  of  marriage  in  his  career  is  structural;  on  the  other  hand, 
however,  violation  of  marriage  (Iole)  and  destruction  of  the  oiKOc  (killing  of 
his  first  wife,  Megara,  and  his  children  -  the  subject-matter  of  Euripides' 
Heracles)  are  also  central  incidents  and  substantial  features  of  the  Heracles 
legend. 
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3.3.1  The  collapse  of  the  o%Kos  (1):  a  monstrous  `marriages' 
Aphrodite  and  Erinyes 
The  Nurse's  narrative  is  a  kind  of  recapitulation  of  the  themes  that 
are  associated  with  the  collapse  of  Heracles'  household.  The  symbols  of 
the  conjugal  bed  and  of  the  altar  /  hearth  are,  as  one  should  expect, 
prominent  in  this  narrative,  since  they  represent  the  very  essence  of  a 
household:  the  former  stands  for  the  marital  union  that  constitutes  an 
oLKOs,  while  the  latter  symbolizes  the  actual  locus,  in  which  the  oLKOS 
consists,  since  the  hearth  is  the  household's  navel,  the  centre  at  which  its 
coherence  and  unity  are  regularly  reconfirmed  by  means  of  the  sacrificial 
act.  Deianeira's  farewell  to  the  household  begins  with  the  altars,  which 
would  henceforth  be  doomed  to  desolation  (904-905).  130  She  laments 
over  familiar  household  objects  (905-906)  and  weeps  at  the  sight  of  her 
household  slaves  (908  OIKETwv).  These  actions  doubtless  symbolize  the 
impending  disintegration  and  collapse  of  the  domestic  locus  as  a 
physical  entity;  indeed,  they  are  paralleled  by  a  similar,  but  much 
stronger,  feeling  of  disintegration  of  the  OLKOS's  physical,  local  dimension 
which  is  conveyed  towards  the  end  of  the  play.  When  Heracles,  trying  to 
collect  his  scattered  family,  asks  for  his  mother  and  all  his  children  (1147 
TÖ  Trdv  [...  ]  aTrEpµa)  to  be  present  (1146-50),  Hyllus  replies  that  none  of 
130  At  905  1  read  yEVOLVT'  EprjµoL  (Nauck)  for  the  MSS  yEVOLT'  Eprjµrl:  see  Jebb  (ad 
904ff.  )  and  Easterling  (ad  905-6);  the  reason  for  the  corruption  might  well  be 
that  the  subject  of  all  preceding  clauses  (from  900  onwards)  is  Deianeira. 
Admittedly,  Seaford  (1986:  58)  offers  a  most  eloquent  defence  of  the  MSS 
reading.  Davies  (ad  905)  objects  that,  whereas  prodelision  ('K?,  atE)  after  -il 
(Epf)  Lrl)  is  perfectly  normal,  such  a  phenomenon  after  -OL  (EP%LOL)  is  a  good  deal 
less  certain.  I  do  not  think,  however,  that  one  should  exclude,  as  Davies  does, 
the  alternative  of  K%aLE  being  an  unaugmented  form:  true,  as  Dodds  (1960:  ad 
1133-6)  remarks,  "the  augment  is  ordinarily  omitted  only  at  the  beginning  of 
the  line",  but  he  also  provides  a  list  of  possible  exceptions  (ibid.  ).  For  a  detailed 
treatment  of  the  subject  see  Davies  (ad  560,767,905). 160 
his  siblings  is  nearby:  some  of  them  are  in  Tiryns  with  their  grandmother 
(1151-53),  while  the  rest  are  in  Thebes  (1154),  and  only  Hyllus  is  in 
Trachis  (1155).  Here,  the  dismemberment  of  Heracles'  oLKOS  is  effectively 
put  again  in  terms  of  locality:  Heracles'  offspring  (the  potential 
continuation  of  his  oLKOs)  have  been  scattered  to  three  cities;  so,  the 
household  has,  as  it  were,  three  hearths,  three  seats,  namely  Tiryns, 
Thebes  and  Trachis.  Significantly,  these  are  the  three  places  which  have 
been  only  temporarily  Heracles'  abodes,  thus  symbolizing  his  inherent 
inability  to  dwell  permanently  at  one  place,  his  inherent  incompatibility 
with  any  sense  of  locality-131  Ironically,  ritual  reception  at  the  family 
hearth  was,  for  the  Greeks,  a  means  of  (re)integration  of  eEvoL  or  of 
individuals  returning  from  abroad;  132  Heracles,  however,  who  has  been 
EýEvu  j  vOs  (65)  for  so  long,  has  no  household  into  which  to  re- 
incorporate  himself,  because  he  has  no  hearth.  The  play  begins  with 
Heracles'  treating.  his  household  like  an  dpoupa  EKTOnOs  (32)  and  with 
his  family  being  äväQTaTOL  (39),  and  ends  with  similar  images  of 
displacement,  lack  of  fixity  and,  in  the  final  analysis,  lack  of  locality.  The 
locus,  the  domestic  place  in  its  physical  dimension,  is  utterly 
disintegrated,  and  with  it  an  essential  constituent  of  an  OLKOS  is 
irretrievably  lost. 
For  a  household's  destruction,  nonetheless,  to  be  complete,  the 
obliteration  of  its  locus  (the  domestic  space  with  its  hearth)  is  not 
enough:  the  oiKOs's  constitutive  act,  namely  marriage,  must  be  cancelled 
as  well.  And  this  is  what  happens,  on  a  symbolic  level,  when,  finally, 
Deianeira  rushes  into  the  bedroom  (912-13)  and  makes  the  bed  ready  for 
131  Cf.  Winning  ton-Ingram  (1969:  45):  "there  is  a  certain  rootlessness  about  the 
hero,  who  has  no  settled  home".  Gellie  (1972:  73-4)  gives  a  short  doxography  as 
well  as  his  own  (unsuccessful)  explanation  of  Heracles'  calling  for  his  mother 
and  children.  Sorum  (1978:  67-8)  and  Segal  (1995:  49)  miss  the  point.  C.  S.  Kraus' 
(1991:  97-98)  reading  of  this  passage  seems  to  me  perverse. 
132  For  the  meaning  of  this  ritual  see  Gernet  (1981:  333),  Vemant  (1983:  141). 161 
her  husband,  who  (as  we  have  repeatedly  stressed)  has  been  expected  as  a 
bridegroom.  Nonetheless,  Deianeira  makes  the  bed  ready  only  to  die  on  it: 
her  loosening  of  her  robe  (924-26)  is  a  gesture  fraught  with  marital  / 
sexual  connotations,  as  it  recalls  the  ritualized  act  of  a  new  bride's 
undressing  on  her  first  night  (e.  g.  Hom.  Od.  11.245;  Pi.  I.  8.45),  but  in  this 
case  this  gesture  is  only  a  preparation  for  Deianeira's  suicide.  133  In  the 
sinister  assimilation  of  the  conjugal  bed  to  the  death-bed  one  observes  an 
eerie  merging  of  marriage  and  death  imagery,  which  is  further  confirmed 
by  the  parallelism  of  two  images:  Hyllus'  making  ready  (902  atopvi)vO'  ) 
what  is  going  to  be  practically  his  father's  death-bed  (901  6  ivLa, 
presumably  a  hammock-like  bed134)  is  nicely  balanced  by  Deianeira's 
making  ready  (916  UTpwTQ.  ß6Xou(3-av  4äp-q135)  Heracles'  bed  (915-16 
8E  tLVLOL9  TOtS'HpaKX(oLs).  136  If  one  recalls  that  `to  make  a  bed  for  a 
man'  is  In  Homer  a  standard  euphemism  for  `having  sex  with  a  man'  (as 
Easterling  [ad  915-16]  points  out),  137  one  easily  sees  how  the  marital  bed 
becomes  for  Delaneira  the  death-bed,  while  Heracles'  death-bed  is 
referred  to  in  terms  reminiscent  of  a  marital  bed  (901).  138  Furthermore, 
the  use  of  ýUVO1KOÜV  a  little  later  (1055)  to  signify  the  clinging  of  the 
fatal  robe  to  Heracles'  body  (a  usage  for  whose  grim  irony  see  again  p. 
144)  adds  to  the  dismal  effect,  for  ýuvoLKEty  is  the  word  normally  used 
133  Cf.  Segal  (1995:  74-5). 
134  Jebb  (ad  901f.  ),  Easterling  (ad  901).  Seaford  (1986:  57  with  nn.  32,33)  adds  the 
interesting  point  that  Kotaa  (901),  applied  to  8EµvLa,  "suggests  both  the  grave 
and  the  enclosing  hollow  of  the  marriage  bed". 
135  Interestingly,  4äpos  can  also  be  a  shroud:  see  Garvie  (1986:  ad  1011)  (I  owe 
the  point  to  Mr  Garvie). 
136  Cf.  Winnington-Ingram  (1969:  47  n.  18). 
137  Cf.  Rehm  (1994:  77  with  n.  21). 
138  On  the  fusion  of  marriage  and  funeral  rituals  in  the  play  see  Seaford  (1986: 
56-7),  Segal  (1995:  73,81-2)  and  cf.  Ormand  (1993:  225-6).  On  the  similarities 
between  nuptial  and  funeral  rituals  in  general  see  Redfield  (1982:  188-91)  and, 
most  exhaustively,  Rehm  (1994:  11-42). 162 
in  Attic  legal  language  to  denote  legitimate  marriage.  139  The  same 
uncanny  merging  of  marriage  /  sexuality  and  death  becomes  prominent 
when  Hyllus,  with  bitter  irony,  remarks  that  Deianeira  deserves  to  get  the 
same  kind  of  `pleasure'  (819  TE  pg5Lv)  that  she  has  given  to  his  father. 
Here,  the  `negative'  reciprocity  of  retaliating  death  for  death  is  perversely 
put  in  terms  of  the  mutual  TEpI  LS  that  the  married  couple  should  be 
enjoying  in  a  healthily  reciprocal  relationship.  The  longed-for  wedding  of 
Heracles  to  Deianeira  has  not  only  been  corrupted,  with  the  introduction 
of  lole,  Into  intolerable  bigamy,  but  has  finally  resulted  in  death. 
The  dissolution  of  Heracles'  oLKOS  reveals  itself  not  only  in  the 
perversion  of  the  relationship  between  husband  and  wife,  but  also  in  that 
between  mother  and  son.  Their  blood  relationship  seems  at  first  to  be 
cancelled  out  altogether  when  Hyllus  disowns  his  mother  and  wishes  her 
dead  (735-6,817-20).  That  this  act  is  not  confined  only  to  Hyllus  and 
Delaneira  but  Implies  a  wider  disruption  of  familial  bonds  seems  to  be 
suggested  by  the  somewhat  curious  phrase  Täc  änai8as  ES  TO  AOLTröv 
toüa(ast  (911):  140  Deianeira's  rejection  by  her  son  means  for  her  that  she 
139I  owe  the  observation  to  Segal  (1975a:  35),  (1981:  65);  cf.  Ormand  (1993:  225), 
Rehm  (1994:  77-78).  See  also  Lacey  (1968:  110),  MacDowell  (1978:  87)  and  for 
further  literature  Rehm  (1994:  18  with  n.  34).  True,  tUVOLKELV  is  regularly  used 
of  feelings,  circumstances  etc.  affecting  people  (see  LSJ  s.  v.  üUVOLKEw,  II.  3);  but 
this  would  not  preclude  such  a  master  of  irony  as  Sophocles  from  exploiting  the 
marital  associations  of  the  word:  the  locus  classicus  is  Of  337-8  (where  the 
synonym  vatw  is  used). 
140  Easterling  (ad  910-11)  has  shown  that  what  we  need  here  is  a  balanced 
lament  over  Deianeira's  own  fate  and  that  of  her  household  /  family.  She 
rightly  suspects  that  the  fault  must  lie  in  ovQtas,  and  recommends  Reiske's 
EcTtas.  To  her  paleographic  argument  that  ECT  could  have  been  lost  by 
haplography  after  ECT  in  ECTOAOI  LION,  one  might  add  that  there  are  at  least 
two  reasons  why  oüatac  must  have  been  the  word  most  likely  to  fill  the  gap:  a) 
as  Dawe  (1996:  in  app.  cri  t.  )  has  ingeniously  hypothesized,  Oi2;  1  AE  might  have 
been  (part  of)  a  gloss  on  tQTtas,  thus  giving  rise  to  OYEIAE.  b)  etymologizing 
derivations  of  EvTta  from  ivcta  /  data  such  as  the  one  we  find  in  Pl.  Cray.  401 163 
is  cut  off  from  all  her  children,  that  she  has  become  practically  childless 
(ä1TaLs).  It  is  as  if  her  marriage  has  been  cancelled  out,  as  if  her  offspring 
never  existed.  What  is  more,  ITTaLc  also  implies  that  there  are  going  to  be 
no  more  descendants  in  the  house  of  Heracles,  the  destruction  of  his 
of  Kos  being  thus  absolute.  141  Thus,  the  symmetry  of  the  blood  relation 
uniting  mother  and  son(s)  is  destroyed,  for  the  son(s),  in  the  person  of 
Hyllus,  renounce  their  role  as  kin.  Nonetheless,  one  is  surprised  to  find 
out  that  this  symmetry  is  disrupted  not  only  by  Hyllus'  being  too  `far' 
from  his  mother,  i.  e.  by  his  being  alienated  from  her,  but  also  by  his 
being  too  `dose'  to  her.  When  he  realizes  that  his  imputations  against  his 
mother  were  unjustified  (940),  he  runs  back  into  the  house  and  falls  over 
Deianeira's  semi-naked  body  (cf.  924-26),  showers  kisses  on  her  lips  (938) 
and  -a  most  striking  detail  -  `lets  his  side  fall  at  her  side'  and  lies 
beside  her  (938-39  TrAEVpOOEV  I  Tr>EVpaV  TrapEIc  EKELTO).  Now,  the 
wording  used  of  Hyllus'  last  action  is  repeated,  almost  verbatim,  in  an 
explicitly  sexual  context,  namely  when  Heracles  compels  Hyllus  to  marry 
Iole,  so  as  to  not  let  any  other  man  have  the  woman  who  `has  lain  by  my 
side'  (1225-26TOL9  ýµots  1rXEupot9  bµoü  I  KXIOEtcav).  142  The  similarity 
c-d  may  also  have  been  part  of  a  scholion  or  marginal  note,  thus  further 
facilitating  the  insertion  of  ovvias  after  EQTI,  as  was  lost.  Pearson's  (CR  39  [1925] 
4-5)  oiidas,  favoured  by  Mazon  (1951:  10),  also  gives  the  sense  required,  but  is 
untragic.  See  in  general  Davies  (ad  911).  I  think  that  ärraL6as  must  be  retained 
(cf.  Mazon,  l.  c.  );  the  sense  obtained  by  Nauck's  &Tr&TOpac  is  more  easily 
understandable,  but  for  this  very  reason  his  emendation  should  perhaps  be 
considered  a  `correctio  facilior'.  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  171)  accept 
Dindorf  s  deletion  of  the  line. 
141  On  the  cardinal  importance  of  children  for  the  very  existence  of  the  olKOc 
see  Lacey  (1968:  15-16).  There  is  nothing  "illogical"  in  the  passage,  as  Segal 
(1975b:  614)  claims.  On  the  apparent  incongruence  with  the  legend,  according 
to  which  Hyllus  and  Tole  were  the  ancestors  of  the  Heraclids,  see  below  n.  151. 
142  MacKinnon  (1971)  has  suggested  that  Heracles  intends  Iole  to  be  only  a 
concubine  to  Hyllus,  not  his  wife;  this  view  is  shared  by  McCall  (1972:  161  n.  20), 
while  Stinton  too  (1990:  484  n.  105)  is  sympathetic.  Such  a  view,  however,  is 164 
between  the  two  passages  is  too  obvious  to  allow  for  a  `neutral'  or 
`innocent'  interpretation  of  Hyllus'  lying  by  his  mother's  body;  143  and  an 
incestuous  tendency  (if  only  implicitly  suggested)  on  Hyllus'  part  would 
be  an  exorbitant  violation  of  kin-ties  which  would  nicely  balance  his 
other  extreme  reaction,  namely  his  disowning  of  his  mother.  Hyllus  can 
no  longer  have  a  normal  relationship  with  his  mother;  he  would  indulge 
either  in  extreme  extroversion  (renouncing  her)  or,  on  the  other  hand,  in 
extreme  introversion  (betraying  incestuous  feelings  towards  her). 
The  perversion  of  familial  bonds  that  besets  this  fated  household 
only  becomes  worse:  Hyllus  is  forced  to  marry  Iole,  his  father's  concubine. 
It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  a  father's  handing  over  of  his  paramour 
to  his  son,  even  if  it  was  not,  strictly  speaking,  incestuous,  was  highly 
unusual.  Frazer  (1921:  269  n.  4)  notes  that  similar  customs  are  attested 
for  African  polygamous  tribes  and,  formerly,  for  Israel,  but  emphasizes 
that  this  is  an  entirely  un-Greek  practice.  Since  the  detail  of  Iole's  being 
handed  over  to  the  son  by  the  father  is  first  attested  in  Sophocles,  144  it 
would  be  tempting  to  assume  that  it  was  invented  by  him,  in  order  to 
highlight  all  the  more  the  theme  of  the  distortion  of  family  bonds  which 
dominates  the  end  of  the  play.  Be  that  as  it  may,  we  cannot  forget  that, 
untenable:  see  Rehm  (1994:  189  n.  33),  Segal  (1975a:  49  n.  30),  (1995:  237  n.  59).  In 
strictly  legal  terms  lole  is  certainly  Heracles'  concubine,  not  his  wife  (cf.  550- 
51);  her  status,  however,  is  practically  that  of  lawfully  wedded  wife,  since  she 
has  been  preferred  to  the  actual  wife  (547-49);  cf.  above,  p.  134f. 
143  Easterling  (1968:  66)  e.  g.  saw  here  only  "the  great  lovability  of  Deianeira  as 
a  mother".  Later,  however,  she  seems  to  have  taken  a  different  point  of  view 
(1981:  58):  "[Hyllus]  embraces  Delanira's  corpse  with  the  ardour  of  a  lover.  "  The 
incestuous  innuendos  have  been  fleetingly  remarked  upon  by  Hoey  (1970b:  15), 
(1977:  286)  and  reservedly  by  Segal  (1981:  82).  Rehm  (1994:  77)  also  recognizes 
the  erotic  overtones  of  Hyllus'  mourning  over  his  mother's  body,  but  fails  to 
adduce  adequate  supportive  evidence  or  to  see  its  full  significance. 
144  Apollod.  2.7.7  and  Ov.  Met  9.278-80  presumably  derive  from  him.  In 
Pherecydes'  version  of  the  story  (FGrHist  3F82a  Jacoby)  Heracles  asks  Eurytus 
for  Iole  as  a  wife  for  Hyllus,  not  himself. 165 
as  Hyllus  protests  (1233-4),  Iole  is  (if  unwittingly)  the  `murderer'  of  both 
of  his  parents  and  is,  therefore,  a  source  of  double  pollution.  Such 
persons,  according  to  Greek  religion,  were  to  be  shunned  by  all  means  - 
for  instance,  the  polluted  murderer  of  Laius  in  the  OT  was  to  be  kept 
clear  from  everyone's  houses  (OT  241)  -  but  Hyllus  on  the  contrary  has 
to  `share  the  same  house'  (1237)  with  the  doubly  polluted  Iole.  145  We 
already  suspect  that  Hyllus'  and  Iole's  marriage  is  far  from  being  an 
attempt  at  restoring  the  subverted  order.  This  suspicion  is  confirmed, 
when  we  consider  that  marriage  is  by  definition  a  means  of  creating  a 
new  OLKOs  and  new  familial  bonds,  but  the  woman  Hyllus  is  ordered  to 
marry  is  the  very  woman  who,  by  occasioning  the  death  of  both  his 
parents,  has  caused  the  destruction  of  his  paternal  oLKOg.  To  be  sure,  lole 
is  not  an  ordinary  bride:  her  advent  was,  ominously,  `uncelebrated'  (894 
ävEopToc),  146  and  the  offspring  of  her  `marriage'  to  Heracles  was  an  Erinys 
for  the  household  (893-95).  147  Ironically,  Hyllus'  prospective  marriage  to 
lole  is  referred  to  in  terms  disturbingly  similar  to  Heracles'  disastrous 
marriage  to  Deianeira:  for  that  marriage,  albeit  apparently  legitimate  and 
145  Segal  (1995:  86)  emphasizes  that  Hyllus'  union  to  Iole  is  dangerously 
endogamous,  and  as  such  may  be  a  further  cause  of  pollution;  cf.  Heiden  (1989: 
154-5).  This  approach  looks  promising,  but,  as  Ehrenberg  (1965:  389)  reminds 
us,  incest  is  not  among  the  objections  Hyllus  raises  to  his  father's  demands. 
146  Thus  codd.:  a  vEOpTOs  schol.  ad  894  (p.  331  Papageorgius).  For  a  defence  of 
the  MSS  reading  see  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  170)  and  cf.  Stinton  (1990: 
129).  Contra  Easterling  (ad  893-5).  For  the  implications  of  aVEopTOS  cf.  Segal 
(1995:  76). 
147  Heracles'  `marriage'  to  her  is  called  RAL  3a  at  842  and  aTa  at  850;  this  is 
perhaps  yet  another  allusion  to  the  Erinys-like  status  of  Iole,  since  "ATri  is 
closely  connected  with  the  Erinyes  at  e.  g.  A.  Ag.  1432  (cf.  E.  Wüst,  RE  Suppl.  8 
(1956],  87).  Furthermore,  '  A3Aa.  ß'LaL  was  evidently  a  euphemistic  appellation  of 
the  Erinyes  (Wüst,  ibid.  86),  and  it  may  be  that  BkzßaL  was  perhaps  another 
name  for  those  avenging  demons  (S.  Ant  1104  is  a  possible  instance,  cf.  Dawe 
[1968:  104]).  On  the  formal  association  of  the  keywords  (3Xä3a,  &ra  and  '  Eptvvs  in 
our  passage  see  Burton  (1980:  72-3). 166 
distinguished,  has  turned  out  to  be  a  81)ßnäpEVVOV  MKTpOV  (791)  and  a 
XvµavTijc  ßLov  (793;  cf.  856-61),  while  the  bride  herself  (Deianeira)  is 
seen,  like  Iole,  as  an  instrument  of  the  Erinyes  (1051-52).  148  This  certainly 
does  not  bode  well  for  Hyllus'  union  with  her,  `  the  `wedding'  with  which 
the  play  ends,  far  from  marking  a  fresh  start  for  Heracles'  household  and 
a  re-establishment  thereof  on  sounder  foundations,  means  only  the 
perpetuation  of  a  monstrosity,  of  a  marital  union  whose  fruit  Is  death 
instead  of  new  life-149  True,  according  to  the  legend  Hyllus  and  Iole  were 
the  ancestors  of  a  famous  historical  race,  the  Heraclids.  In  this  particular 
play,  however,  there  is  not  the  slightest  hint  of  a  continuation  of  Heracles' 
line;  on  the  contrary  it  is  on  the  monstrosity  of  Hyllus'  marriage  to  Iole 
that  the  emphasis  falls,  not  on  its  procreative  function.  150  Thus,  I  should 
118  Cf.  the  similar  passage  in  A.  Ag.  1580(also  1382-83),  where  Clytaemestra  does 
indeed  act  as  an  Erinys  (she  embodies  the  8pqu  c  &\daTwp  of  the  house:  Ag. 
1497-1503);  at  Ag.  749  Helen  may  be  visualized  as  an  Erinys  too.  See  Dodds  (1951: 
40),  Kitto  (1966:  176),  March  (1987:  70). 
149  Cf.  Segal  (1995:  86,89-90).  Rehm  (1994:  80-82)  strangely  believes  that  this 
heinous  marriage  actually  ensures  the  survival  of  the  olKOc;  cf.  Kane  (1988: 
205-8).  Iole's  presence  on  stage,  which  Hoey  (1977:  288)  postulates  as  a  sign  of 
the  new  household  that  is  about  to  be  established  from  the  ruins  of  the  old  one, 
is  of  course  out  of  the  question:  see  Hourmouziades  (1968:  280-84),  Easterling 
(1981:  70-71).  W.  Kraus  (1986:  105-108)  argues  that  Iole,  without  of  course  being 
on  stage,  is  nonetheless  addressed  at  1275  (cf.  Burton  [1980:  81-2]).  This  cannot 
be:  how  are  the  audience  to  understand  that  such  a  vague  word  as  TrapOEvE 
refers  specifically  to  Iole  and  not  to  the  girls  of  the  Chorus?  Iole's  marital  state 
in  the  play  is,  at  least,  ambiguous  (cf.  536);  true,  she  is  referred  to  as  Trap6Evoc 
at  1219,  but  there  Sophocles  is  careful  enough  to  add  the  specification 
EU'puTElav. 
150  See  Kitto's  (1961:  296-7),  (1966:  170-72)  excellent  remarks,  and  cf. 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  85).  It  is  surely  a  distortion  of  the  dramatic  facts  to 
say,  as  C.  S.  Kraus  (1991:  97)  does  (cf.  Kane  [1988:  207-8]  and,  already,  Musurillo 
[1967:  75]),  that  Heracles'  "brutal  demand  that  Hyys  marry  Iole  makes  us  aware 
that  Heracles  will  continue  to  live  through  his  descendants,  the  Heracleidae.  " 
This  is  precisely  what  the  play  does  not  say!  Cf.  Di  Benedetto's  (1983:  152) 
correct  remarks. 
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not  agree  with  e.  g.  Segal  (1995:  51,63)  or  Easterling  (1981:  68-69),  (1981: 
10-11)  who  see  in  the  prospective  marriage  of  Hyllus  and  Iole  a  kind  of 
ironic  link  with  the  legendary  /  historic  facts.  151  As  Easterling  (1981:  67) 
herself  has  remarked,  in  a  different  connection,  "...  a  dramatist  was  (and 
is)  always  free  to  impose  his  own  reading  on  a  tradition  and  (an  even 
more  fundamental  point)  any  myth  and  any  play  that  is  written  about  it 
are  essentially  different  media".  152 
All  in  all,  marriage  in  this  play  is  never  fully  and  properly 
accomplished.  153  It  is  always  undermined  by  the  overwhelming  power  of 
unbridled,  lawless  lust  -a  crude  natural  drive  that  proves  impossible  to 
confine  within  the  socially  sanctioned  institution  of  marriage.  Nessus' 
lawless  lust  for  Deianeira,  as  well  as  Heracles'  lust  for  Iole,  equally 
threaten  the  marriage  (and,  ultimately,  the  household)  of  Heracles  and 
Deianeira.  What  is  more,  in  both  cases  lust  engenders  a  perversion  of 
`positive'  reciprocity  (an  important  component  of  a  sound  household154): 
Nessus'  `gift'  is  not  a  gift,  and  Heracles'  oLKOÜpLa  (542)  are  in  fact  a 
TM  IOV)  ÜTr6QTE'YOS  (376).  Even  Deianeira,  who  confines  her  sexuality 
strictly  within  marriage  and  attempts  to  restore  the  `positive'  reciprocity 
of  the  spouses'  mutual  desire,  eventually  becomes  unwittingly  enmeshed 
in  the  complex  mechanisms  of  `negative'  reciprocity,  engineered  by 
Nessus'  and  Heracles'  unbridled  lust.  Trying  to  quench  her  husband's  lust 
151  The  relevant  legendary  background  is  very  poorly  documented,  for  all 
extant  references  to  an  offspring  of  Hyllus  and  Iole  (conveniently  listed  by 
Jebb  [ad  1224])  are  effectively  nomina  nuda:  Hes.  fr.  231  M.  -W.  (=Schol.  A.  R. 
1.824  [p.  350Kei1]),  fr.  251(a)  M.  -W.  (=P.  Oxy.  2498,  naturally  missing  from  Jebb's 
list),  251  (b)  M.  -W.  (=Paus.  4.2.1),  Hdt.  6.52.1,8.131.2,  Theopompos  FGrHist  115 
F393  (Jacoby). 
152  Cf.  also  Heiden  (1989:  150,156-7),  Rehm  (1994:  189:  32) 
153  Ironically,  even  Alcmena's  union  with  Zeus  turns  out  to  have  been  µärnv 
(1148-49);  cf.  Amphitryon's  protest  in  E.  HF  339ff.  On  the  ambiguities  of 
marriage  in  this  play  see  Segal  (1975b:  612-13),  (1995:  70,89-90,92);  cf.  also 
Gellie  (1972:  75). 
154  Cf.  again  Aj.  522  and  Vernant  (1983:  132),  quoted  above  (n.  69). 168 
for  another  woman,  she  finds  herself  obliged  to  resort  to  what  Is  the  token 
of  Nessus'  own  last  for  her  -  and,  simultaneously,  the  means  of  his 
revenge  (`negative'  reciprocity)  against  Heracles.  The  grim  result  of  this 
eerie  combination  of  lust  and  `negative'  (indeed,  perverted)  reciprocity  is, 
as  we  have  seen  (pp.  152-155),  death  (for  Nessus,  Heracles,  and  Deianeira) 
and  destruction  of  the  household.  If  one  wished  to  put  the  play's  action 
in  terms  of  the  divine  powers  that  act  in  it,  one  could  say  that  Aphrodite 
-  who  has  been  looming  ominously  in  the  background  of  the  play  since, 
at  least,  the  first  stasimon  -  finally  reveals  herself  as  a  deadly  power  that 
operates  like  an  Erinys.  the  power  she  administers,  namely  sexual  desire, 
whether  contained  within  marriage  or  not,  eventually  coincides  with 
what  is  the  Erinyes'  typical  function,  namely  retributive  justice,  revenge 
(i.  e.  what,  on  the  purely  human  plane,  we  could  also  call  `negative' 
reciprocity).  155  Sexual  desire,  instead  of  leading  to  its  socially  sanctioned 
form,  namely  marriage,  and  to  the  setting  up  of  a  household,  becomes 
destructive  lust  that  perverts  the  harmonious  mutuality  of  a  healthy 
oLKOS  into  a  lethal  chain  of  retributive  action  and  counter-action. 
Deianeira's  beauty  apparently  caused  her  the  a  yoS  she  feared  (25),  for 
her  marriage  to  Heracles  was  in  fact  anything  but  Ka1  (27;  cf.  again  p. 
124ff.  );  similarly,  Iole's  beauty  destroyed  her  life  and  her  native  land 
(465-67).  In  both  cases,  desire,  even  when  it  takes  the  socially  acceptable 
form  of  marriage,  eventually  results  in  the  utter  destruction  of  the 
household,  whether  It  is  located  in  Trachis  or  in  Oechalia.  156 
155  On  the  replacement  of  Aphrodite  by'  Erinyes  in  contexts  of  perverted 
marriage  see  Seaford  (1987:  125,129).  On  Aphrodite's  `chthonic'  aspect  and  her 
association  with  the  Erinyes  see  above  all  Parry  (1986:  108-11  and  passim), 
although  he  goes  too  far  sometimes;  for  the  ambiguity  of  Aphrodite  cf.  Segal 
(1995:  81,93).  Gellie  (1972:  69),  Wender  (1974:  14)  and  Heiden  (1989:  120-3) 
wrongly  undervalue  the  importance  of  Aphrodite  and  Eros. 
156  For  the  destructive  power  of  sex  in  this  play  see  Wender  (1974:  passim,  esp. 
15),  Sorum  (1978:  63),  Segal  (1995:  37). 3.3.2  The  collapse  of  the  CIKOs  (2):  a  monstrous  funeral' 
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The  enforcement  of  a  monstrous  ritual  (marriage  to  lole)  is  supplemented 
by  a  similarly  enforced,  and  equally  monstrous,  ritual,  namely  the 
cremation  of  Heracles'  body  in  the  pyre  on  Mt  Oeta.  Strangely,  Heracles 
commands  his  transportation  to  "the  summit  of  Oeta"  (1191  {J  aTOv 
zräyov),  1S7  an  utterly  remote  place,  therefore  inappropriate  for  funerary 
ceremonies,  which,  as  a  rule,  took  place  within  the  household.  158  How 
much  death  in  one's  homeland  was  valued  by  the  Greeks  is  clearly 
pointed  out  when  Heracles  asks  his  son  to  ship  him  away  from  Euboea 
(801-802),  presumably  in  order  to  avoid  a  death  on  foreign  land.  159  So, 
Heracles'  cremation  on  Oeta  is  a  major  departure  from  Greek  funerary 
vöµLµa  -a  departure  which,  it  seems,  one  should  not  disassociate  from 
an  all-important  theme  of  the  play,  namely  the  destruction  of  the 
household  by  the  forces  of  the  wild.  For  Oeta,  the  highest  mountain  In 
Malls  (cf.  again  436-37  with  its  powerful  recalling  of  Zeus'  lightning,  160 
and  1191),  clearly  belongs  to  the  remote,  untamed  wild:  sacrifices  may  be 
regularly  performed  on  its  summit  (cf.  1192),  but,  as  is  normally  the  case 
157  Easterling  (ad  1191)  keeps  the  MSS  reading  as  having  more  dramatic 
poignancy,,  and  Jebb  (ad  1191)  appositely  compares  436  TOO  KaT'  a"KpoV  O'Tatov 
värros  I  Ot6S  KaTacTpäzrrov  roc.  Wakefield's  4t  n  ou  has  been  accepted  by  Lloyd- 
Jones  &  Wilson  (1990a)  and  (1990b:  177),  and  by  Davies  (ad  1191). 
158  Especially  after  Solon's  restrictive  regulations,  the  prothesis  took  place  most 
probably  indoors,  or  at  least  in  the  courtyard  within  the  household:  see  Kurtz  & 
Boardman  (1971:  144),  Alexiou  (1974:  5),  Garland  (1985:  27-28). 
159  On  the  Greek  desire  for  death  at  home  cf.  also  A.  Ag.  503-7  and  539,  where  the 
herald  states  that  his  only  hope  that  was  not  shattered  is  to  die  in  his  homeland; 
also  El.  1131-42,  where  Electra  most  poignantly  expresses  her  despair  at  the  fact 
that  her  brother  has,  as  she  thinks,  died  in  a  foreign  land  and  has  not  received 
the  proper  funerary  rites.  Cf.  Kurtz  &  Boardman  (1971:  143)  and  Vermeule 
(1979:  12).  In  A.  Cho.  345-53  this  theme  is  reversed,  creating  tragic  pathos. 
160  Cf.  Segal  (1995:  60). 170 
with  peak  sanctuaries,  it  is  removed  from  human  settlements.  161  Its  first 
mention  in  the  play  (200  TO'v  OLTrIs  äTOµov  [...  ]  AE  Lµ(Zv  ')  suggests  lack 
of  civilized  activity,  162  while  Heracles'  meticulous  instructions  as  to  the 
gathering  and  piling  up  of  wild  wood  for  the  pyre  (cf.  especially  1196-97 
apaEv'  [...  ]  I  äypiov  E  iov)163  only  confirm  our  initial  impression.  164  So, 
Heracles'  incompatibility  with  the  notion  of  the  household  seems  to  be 
pushed  to  extremes:  even  his  funeral,  a  markedly  domestic  function,  will 
take  place  in  the  wild,  away  from  the  familiar,  humanized  ground  of  the 
household,  thus  providing  yet  another  confirmation  of  the  essential 
antinomy  we  have  established:  the  civilizing  hero  cannot  help  being,  at 
the  same  time,  overwhelmed  by  untamed  destructive  forces.  Heracles' 
`funeral'  taking  place  in  the  wilderness  is  not,  however,  as  shocking  as  his 
request  that  his  very  son  should  kindle  with  his  own  hands  (1194 
avTOXE  Lpa)  the  fire  that  will  consume  his  body.  Hyllus'  reaction  is  one  of 
sheer  horror  at  the  prospect  of  such  an  abominable  pollution  (1203- 
10),  165  and  only  at  the  eleventh  hour  does  he  manage  to  persuade  his 
father  to  spare  him  the  obligation  to  commit  patricide  (1211-15).  As  if 
these  perversions  of  funeral  ritual  were  not  enough,  Heracles  also  asks  his 
son  not  to  lament  him  with  y6oL  (1199-200),  that  is  not  to  mourn  him 
properly,  not  to  perform  what  is  not  only  yet  another  markedly  family 
161  Cf.  Burkert  (1985a:  26). 
162  The  exceptional  mention  of  Oetain  a  context  of  civilized  life  at  634-5  must  be 
construed  as  serving  the  specific  dramatic  purposes  of  the  second  stasimon  (cf. 
above,  p.  151).  As  a  single  exception,  it  must  not  be  taken  to  detract  from,  but 
actually  to  confirm,  the  mountain's  general  associations  with  the 
undomesticated  wilderness. 
163  Jebb  (ad  1195ff.  )  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  1196)  suggest  that  ap(Eva  may  refer  to 
the  "sturdy  vigour"  or  to  the  "rough  and  hard  wood"  of  the  olive-branch.  A 
wholly  different  view  is  taken  by  Hoey  (1977:  281-82). 
164  I  cannot  agree  with  Segal  (1975a:  47,49)  that  Heracles'  incineration  on  Oeta 
must  be  viewed  as  a  sacrifice  that  restores  the  order  which  has  been  disrupted 
by  the  perverted  sacrifice  at  Cenaeum. 
165  Cf.  Easterling  (1981:  64),  (1982:  9). 171 
task,  but  also  an  opportunity  for  display  of  kin-solidarity  and  family 
cohesion.  166  That  a  father's  demand  for  the  violation  of  domestic  vöµiµa 
pertaining  to  the  proper  conduct  of  his  own  funeral  is  most  astonishing, 
especially  in  conjunction  with  his  highly  unusual  insistence  to  hand  his 
own  `bride'  (cf.  894  vüµýa)  over  to  his  son,  should  be  clear  enough  to  an 
ancient  as  well  as  to  a  modern  audience.  The  absurdity  of  such  practices 
is,  nonetheless,  further  highlighted  by  a  series  of  startling  paradoxes, 
which  create  a  highly  ironical  effect: 
i)  Heracles  displays  an  almost  compulsive  preoccupation  with  ritual 
prescriptions  and  meticulously  binds  his  son  with  an  elaborate  ritual 
oath,  that  takes  ten  lines  to  be  formulated  and  sworn  (1181-90),  even  as 
he  forces  him  (cf.  1258  EýavayKäCELS)  to  pervert  wedding  and  funerary 
rituals.  He  puts  forth  obedience  to  the  Father  (1178)  as  the  `best  of  laws' 
(1177-78  yöu.  ov  I  Kä  »LaTOV)  -a  phrase  in  which  one  is  tempted  to 
detect  a  grimly  ironic  allusion  to  the  blatant  perversion  of  family  vöRLua 
166  Lamentation  is  an  indispensable  part  of  a  funeral  (cf.  e.  g.  A.  Cho.  432-3;  Ag. 
1554);  inextricably  interconnected  with  burial,  it  forms  with  it  the  axis  of  the 
funeral  rites:  Alexiou  (1974:  4),  Garland  (1985:  29-31).  For  lamentation,  esp. 
yboc,  as  a  duty  of  kinsfolk  see  Alexiou  (1974:  10-13),  Garland  (1985:  30),  and  cf. 
Vermeule  (1979:  15).  On  funeral  rites  in  general  as  a  family  responsibility  see 
Kurtz  &  Boardman  (1971:  143)  and  Vermeule  (1979:  13-17);  as  display  of  kin- 
solidarity:  Garland  (1985:  21).  In  Hom. 01.11.72-73  Elpenor  warns  Odysseus  that 
he  will  incur  the  wrath  of  the  gods  if  he  leaves  his  body  äKAavTOV.  Kane  (1988: 
205-8),  Segal  (1981:  100-1)  and  Rehm  (1994:  80)  curiously  fail  to  realize  that 
Heracles'  instructions  concerning  his  funeral  are  in  fact  a  parody  of  funerary 
ritual. that  obedience  to  this  v%Loc  entails  in  this  case.  167 
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ii)  Heracles  becomes  obsessed  with  Hyllus'  proving  himself  a  true  son  of 
his  glorious  father  (which  comes  down  to  his  affirming  the  coherence  of 
patrilinear  bonds  and  the  continuity  of  the  oLKOs),  even  as  he  pressurizes 
him  to  contribute  to  the  destruction  of  their  household.  Thus,  at  1064  (w 
zrat,  yEVOÜ  µOL  irats  E-rtjruµos  yEychs;  note  the  emphasis  on  the 
notion  of  `true  son')  he  asks  Hyllus  to  bring  his  mother  out  of  the  house, 
his  intention  being  (as  we  realize  from  1064-69  and,  most  explicitly,  from 
1133)  to  kill  her.  In  other  words,  Heracles  preposterously  asks  his  son  to 
prove  his  bonding  with  his  father  by  disrupting  the  bonds  with  his 
mother  (the  bonds  that  Hyllus  himself  renounced,  as  we  recall,  but  which 
he  will  soon  reassert,  cf.  1114-42).  168  Even  more  absurdly,  Heracles  insists 
again  on  Hyllus'  behaving  as  his  true  son  (1157-58,1200-1201,1204- 
1205)  at  the  very  moment  when  he  asks  him  to  practically  disown  his 
father  and  behave  as  if  he  were  a  complete  stranger  to  him:  he  is  to  light 
the  fire  that  will  burn  him  alive  (evidently  a  parody  of  the  customary 
167  Sorum  (1978:  69)  misses  the  irony  here.  I  disagree  with  Rehm  (1994:  82), 
who  thinks  that  ritual  order  is  restored  at  the  end  of  the  play,  and  that  this 
"mitigates  some  of  the  bleakness  that  modem  critics  ascribe  to  the  drama"  (cf. 
also  Sorum  [1978:  70-71]).  For  criticism  see  Segal  (1995:  236  n.  47),  who  had 
nonetheless  formerly  held  a  similar  opinion  (Segal  [1975a:  49-50],  [1995:  45]). 
Nor  can  I  agree  with  Easterling  (1981:  65)  who  argues  that  the  horror  of 
Heracles'  instructions  is  mitigated  by  the  fact  that  there  was  a  fire  ritual 
actually  performed  on  Mt  Oeta  (see  on  this  subject  the  classic  study  by  Nilsson 
[1951:  348-54]):  Heracles  does  demand  the  performance  of  a  perverse  ritual, 
regardless  of  the  cultic  reality  of  Sophocles'  time;  in  this  respect,  Hyllus' 
revulsion  is  very  Indicative  and  should  not  be  dismissed  as  merely  a  lack  of 
perspective.  Kott  (1974:  141)  has  some  interesting  remarks  -  albeit  from  a 
different  (existentialist)  point  of  view  -on  the  overturning  of  all  values  in  the 
logic  of  the  absurd. 
168  The  point  is  also  made,  briefly  but  clearly,  by  Sorum  (1978:  66).  Cf.  also  Segal 
(1981:  86),  (1995:  80).  One  recalls  that  at  798  Heracles  even  considered  having 
his  very  son  dead;  how  important  a  son  was  for  the  continuation  of  the  o1,  KOs 
needs  hardly  to  be  stressed.  See  again  Lacey  (1968:  15-16). 173 
lighting  of  the  funeral  pyre  by  a  kinsperson)  and,  what  is  more,  he  is  not 
to  mourn  him  properly.  As  Vernant  (1980:  51)  notes,  taking  up  the 
important  remarks  of  H.  J.  Wolff,  169  "the  key  to  the  entire  marriage  system 
of  Attica  lies  in  the  clearcut  distinction  made  between  the  nothoi  and  the 
gnesioi,  marriage  being  considered  in  the  framework  of  the  city  as  the 
means  of  ensuring  that  a  house  should  have  a  legitimate  line  of  descent, 
the  father's  existence  being  continued  through  a  son  who  is  `like  him',  his 
own  issue  [...  ].  This  ensured  that  none  of  the  limited  number  of 
matrimonial  hearths  which  go  to  make  up  the  city  was  at  any  time  left 
deserted.  "  Still,  the  "matrimonial  hearth"  of  the  house  of  Heracles  has 
collapsed,  while  Heracles  himself,  by  wishing  to  kill  his  wife,  is  simply 
dealing  the  coup  de  grace  to  his  marriage  and  his  household.  Thus,  little 
indeed  does  it  matter  whether  Hyllus  proves  to  be  Heracles'  yvljoLos  son, 
since  there  is  no  longer  an  OLKOS  to  preserve  and  perpetuate,  while  he 
himself  is  asked  to  behave  as  a  yviaLoc  son  would  never  do. 
iii)  What,  however,  unmistakably  pinpoints  the  outrageousness  of 
Heracles'  requests  is  that  he  keeps  threatening  his  son  with  the  visitation 
of  supernatural  avengers  (1202  apaLos,  170  1239  6E6v  äpä)  in  case  he  will 
not  indulge  his  father's  whims;  at  the  same  time,  however,  what  he  asks 
Hyllus  to  perform  is  the  very  act  that  avenging  spirits  should  care  to 
punish,  namely  patricide.  Given  that  a  central  role  of  such  supernatural 
forces  is  to  avenge  Intrafamilial  killing,  171  it  is  uncanny  that  Heracles 
should  insist  that  those  spirits  will  persecute  Hyllus  exactly  if  he  does  not 
pollute  himself  by  committing  patricide  or  by  marrying  the  woman 
169  In  Tradido  2  (1944)  43-95. 
170  As  Parker  (1983:  192  n.  11)  remarks,  äpatoc  seems  in  this  passage  to  have 
become  a  noun,  `curse-demon'.  On  the  word  see  Hatch  (1908:  165-69)  who  seems, 
however,  not  to  accept  the  meaning  `curse  demon'  for  the  word. 
171  On  this  central  function  of  avenging  demons  such  as  the  Erinyes  see  e.  g. 
Rohde  (1925:  179),  Parker  (1983:  107),  Lloyd-Jones  (1990:  204,207),  and  cf.  E. 
Wüst  RESuppl.  8  (1956)  116-17. 174 
responsible  for  the  deaths  of  both  his  parents!  172  Hyllus'  rejoinders  at  his 
father's  demands  nicely  balance  this  perverse  appeal  to  supernatural 
avengers,  for  the  young  man  points  out  what  the  normal  state  of  affairs 
truly  is:  such  superhuman  agents  protect  the  coherence  and  stability  of 
the  household  and  punish  the  subversion  of  family  taboos;  thus,  if  he 
kindles  the  fire  that  will  burn  his  father,  he  will  be  a  rra?  a.  µvatos  himself 
(1207),  thus  incurring  the  wrath  of  avenging  demons.  173  Hyllus  also 
points  out  that  to  obey  his  father's  commands  regarding  Iole  would  be 
virtually  a  crime  against  his  own  family,  since  he  would  have  to  be 
united  in  wedlock  (1237  UUVVatELV  öµoü174)  with  the  person  responsible 
for  the  deaths  of  both  his  mother  and  his  father  (1233-37);  thus,  far  from 
avoiding  his  father's  `curse  demon',  he  would  on  the  contrary  prove  to  be 
afflicted  by  such  a  demon  -  an  cMaTu  p  (1235).  175 
172  Silk  (1985:  9-10)  and  Friis  Johansen  (1986:  56-57)  fail  to  consider  this 
important  point. 
173  The  meaning  of  zraXagvaLos  here  seems  to  be  primarily  "b  &eXÖpEvOs 
µLäaµaTL  O'LKEic;  )"  (Hsch.  s.  v.  [=  W.  258.51  Schmidt],  cited  by  Kamerbeek  [ad 
1207]).  However,  Parker.  (1983:  108)  points  out  that  terms  like  iraXajivatos  can 
equally  well  be  "applied  to  the  killer,  the  demons  that  attack  him,  and  the 
(demonic)  pollution  that  radiates  from  him".  As  he  goes  on  to  explain  (ibid.,  p. 
109),  "the  unifying  factor  is  the  polluting  act,  which  sets  up  a  chain  of 
abnormal  relations  between  humans  -victim,  killer,  associates  of  killer  -the 
connecting  links  in  which  are  supernatural  powers.  "  On  this  polysemy  of  the 
word  see  also  Hatch  (1908:  175-80).  So,  Hyllus'  Tra)  ajivaios,  may  well  mean 
`polluted  killer'  in  this  specific  context;  still,  the  word,  because  of  its  polysemy, 
is  bound  to  recall  its  other  meanings  too,  notably  the  `curse  demons'  that  attack 
the  polluted  killer.  This  would  certainly  be  an  appropriate  retort  to  Heracles' 
perverse  insistence  on  `curse-demons'. 
174  For  the  marital  connotations  of  avvva1Ely,  vvvoLKEiv  etc.  cf.  above  p.  162  with 
n.  139. 
175  On  &AaTopEg  as  inciting  intrafamilial  crimes  see  e.  g.  E.  El.  979,  Or.  1668-9 
and  cf.  Willink  (1986:  ad  337).  Sorum  (1978:  71)  distorts  the  meaning  of  this 
phrase.  Interestingly,  it  is  to  a  polluting  act  of  (involuntary)  intrafamilial 
murder  that  Heracles'  attributes  his  miserable  lot  in  life  in  E.  HF  1258ff.  (he 
even  uses  the  word  TrpoaTpöiraLos,  semantically  akin  to  naM.  µvatos  and 175 
To  conclude:  the  contradictions  and  ambiguities  that  have  been 
dogging  Heracles  throughout  his  life  are  all  too  conspicuous  at  the 
moment  of  his  death.  First  and  foremost,  he  has  devoted  his  life  to 
ridding  Greece  of  monsters  and  to  making  a  habitable  place  out  of  her 
(1010-13),  but  we  have  seen  that  on  more  than  one  occasion  he  has 
shown  a  dangerous  proximity  to  animality,  and  now  we  realize  that  his 
own  home  (a  habitable  place  par  excellence)  provides  the  setting  for  the 
wild  to  prevail  eventually.  Furthermore,  Heracles,  as  the  prototype  of  the 
supermale,  could  have  been  a  model  figure  for  the  male-oriented  society 
that  was  Greece,  but  eventually  fails  to  maintain  this  role,  for  his  end  is 
tainted  by  his  verging  on  femininity  (1071-72,1075).  176  He  has  been 
notably  the  creator  of,  households  (his  marriage  to  Deianeira  was 
conspicuously  such  an  occasion),  but  he  has  also  been  the  destroyer  of 
households  (he  sacked  a  whole  city,  Oechalia,  to  get  Iole  as  his 
concubine),  and  just  before  his  end  he  becomes  the  destroyer  of  his  own 
OLKOS  too.  At  his  last  moments  he  tries  to  create  for  his  wrecked  oLKoc  an 
illusion  of  family  coherence  and  solidity,  of  observance  of  family  rules 
(such  as  obedience  to  the  Father)  and  rituals  (such  as  marriage  and 
funeral),  but  he  tries  in  vain:  his  family  is  scattered,  and  his  son  is  asked 
to  display  his  obedience  by  incurring  a  double  pollution  (contributing  to 
his  father's  death  and  contracting  a  marriage  with  the  fiendish  woman 
who  killed  both  his  parents).  The  hero  finds  himself  incapable  of  rising 
above  the  ambiguities  and  tensions  in  which  he  has  been  trapped.  His 
demise  is  quite  alien  to  the  uncanny  atmosphere  surrounding  the  deaths 
of  Oedipus  or  Ajax  for  both  those  heroes,  as  I  argue  in  Chapters  Four  and 
Five  respectively,  finally  rise  above  the  world  as  it  is  perceived, 
conceptualized  and  constructed  by  humans,  above  its  current  categories 
and  dichotomies,  to  attain  an  otherwordly  status,  the  status  of  a  hero. 
aTwp  1) 
176  Cf.  A  j.  319-20,651-2  for  a  comparable  anomaly. 176 
Heracles'  case,  however,  is  different:  granted,  he  destroys  his  own 
household  and  he  perverts  family  ties,  almost  like  Oedipus  in  the  OC, 
and  is  tortured  by  irresolvable  contradictions  (such  as  between  Savagery 
and  Culture),  like  Ajax.  Nonetheless,  nowhere  in  the  Trachiniae  are  we 
encouraged  to  think  that  Heracles  is  on  his  way  to  attain  a  superhuman 
status,  in  which  currently  valid  distinctions  and  categories  collapse,  as  in 
Ajax's  and  Oedipus'  case.  177 
This  may  seem  too  strong  a  contention,  especially  since  many  a 
critic178  has  suggested  that  the  pyre  on  Mt  Oeta,  where  Heracles  is  to  be 
incinerated,  must  give  a  hint  of  his  eventual  apotheosis.  True,  Heracles 
had  superhuman  (indeed  divine)  status  in  cult,  and,  as  Nilsson  (1951: 
348-54)  has  shown,  the  summit  of  Mt  Oeta  had  a  very  prominent  role  in 
this  cult.  179  What  is  more,  Heracles'  divine  status  is  already  attested  in 
Hesiod  (Th.  950-55)  and  in  many  literary  sources  and  artistic 
representations,  180  while  Sophocles  himself  in  a  later  play  explicitly 
177  Cf.  Fuqua  (1980:  78). 
178  For  a  comprehensive  list  of  such  critics  see  Stinton  (1990:  480  n.  89);  to  this 
list  add  now  Segal  (1975a:  49),  Scodel  (1984:  40-2),  Friis  Johansen  (1986:  55-6), 
March  (1987:  72-7),  Kane  (1988:  208-11),  Holt  (1989:  70-6)  and  C.  S.  Kraus  (1991: 
96-8);  also  Gardiner  (1987:  135-7),  with  original,  but  very  strained  arguments. 
For  a  list  of  critics  who  do  not  favour  apotheosis  see  again  Stinton  (1.  c.  ),  Hoey 
(1977:  290  n.  2)  and  Holt  (1989:  69  n.  1);  against  apotheosis  are  also  Ehrenberg 
(1965:  390-1),  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  158-60),  and  Mikalson  (1986:  92  n.  6,97-8)  who 
makes  the  important  point  that  Sophocles  (unlike  Euripides  in  his  HT)  does  not 
seem  to  link  the  end  of  his  play  with  actual  Athenian  cultic  practice.  Easterling 
(1981:  64-9)  remains  noncommittal. 
179  Cf.  further  Burkert  (1985b:  17). 
180  See  Stinton  (1990:  464  n.  3  1)  and  Holt  (1989:  70-74)  for  full  documentation. 177 
connects  pyre  and  deification  (Ph.  727-29).  181  Thus,  those  critics  have 
assumed,  the  audience  of  the  Trachiniae  would  watch  the  play  fully 
aware  that  they  are  watching  a  god  in  fled,  as  it  were;  so  it  is  only  natural 
to  suppose  that  they  would  latch  on  to  any  hint,  even  the  slightest  one, 
to  assure  themselves  that  Heracles,  despite  his  horrible  demise,  is  after  all 
soon  to  join  the  company  of  the  Olympians.  Several  objections,  however, 
suggest  themselves:  first,  as  Stinton  (1990:  464-65)  rightly  reminds  us, 
previous  familiarity  with  the  apotheosis-version  by  no  means  compels  an 
audience  to  expect  allusions  to  this  particular  version  in  any  other 
treatment  of  the  myth,  especially  if  it  is  a  tragic  one  (cf.  also  Easterling 
[1981:  671  quoted  on  p.  167).  In  Euripides'  Heracles,  for  instance,  despite 
some  critics'  fanciful  hypotheses,  there  is  no  hint  of  apotheosis:  no  other 
end  Is  thinkable  but  death.  182  This,  I  think,  is  enough  to  warn  us  against 
over-hasty  assumptions:  Euripides  was  able  to  write  a  play  in  which 
Heracles'  apotheosis,  without  being  denied,  was  nonetheless  not 
confirmed  either,  it  may  be,  then,  that  Sophocles  (as  Stinton  [1990:  479- 
90]  has  most  powerfully  argued183)  has  done  something  similar  in  this 
play,  especially  since  according  to  the  Homeric  version  of  the  myth  (Il. 
18.117-19)  even  Heracles  could  not  avoid  death.  184  One  should  certainly 
181  This,  pace  Easterling  (1981:  66),  seems  to  be  the  earliest  literary  association 
of  pyre  and  apotheosis  -E.  Hcld.  910-16  (ca.  430  BC)  has  been  shown  by  Stinton 
(1990:  481-82  with  n.  94),  after  Zielinski,  to  refer  simply  to  two  different  and 
incompatible  versions  concerning  Heracles'  demise.  In  fact,  as  Holt  (1989:  72- 
73)  allows,  the  Heraclidae  passage  may  suggest  that  death  in  the  pyre  with  no 
ensuing  apotheosis  was  the  current  version  in  Athens  circa,  perhaps,  430. 
Indeed,  Stanton  (1990:  493-507),  while  accepting  that  Heracles'  divine  status  was 
already  a  well-known  fact  at  the  time  of  the  play's  production,  argues  that 
apotheosis  by  means  of  the  pyre  was  probably  not  the  version  likely  to  be 
widely  known  then.  See  however,  contra,  Holt  (1989:  73-74),  with  admittedly 
strong  argumentation. 
182  Contra,  implausibly,  Holt  (1989:  73). 
183  Cf.  already  Jebb  (p.  xxxv)  and  Linforth  (1952). 
184  March  (1987:  73)  surprisingly  undervalues  the  influence  of  the  Homeric 178 
not  play  down  the  importance  of  the  cultic  and  legendary  background 
which  certainly  favoured  apotheosis  and  against  which  the  play  would  be 
performed;  on  the  other  hand,  however,  Sophocles  could  exploit  the 
audience's  knowledge  of  the  undoubtedly  influential  Iliadic  version,  in 
order  not  to  encourage  them  to  take  apotheosis  for  granted.  185  In 
Stinton's  (1990:  489)  words,  "the  audience's  knowledge  of  the  version  In 
Hesiod  and  in  cult,  which  ends  in  apotheosis,  will  already  modify  their 
response  to  the  play,  by  making  them  aware  that  Sophocles  is  diverging 
from  it,  after  the  Iliad.  This  divergence  itself  attests  the  poet's  confidence 
in  his  own  particular  version.  "186  Heracles'  demise  must  surely  be  viewed 
as  a  grim  finality,  beyond  which  there  is  no  deification,  but  only  Hades: 
see  1040-43,1201-1202  (VEp6EV  w"v),  1256  (TEXEUTij 
... 
ÜQTCCTr).  187  It  is 
pointless  to  look  for  `hints'  at  apotheosis  in  our  play:  the  repeated 
mentions  of  Oeta  (200,436,635,1191),  the  implications  of  1270  etc.  188  If 
version  of  the  myth  (death  without  apotheosis)  in  a  5th  century  audience's 
reception  of  relevant  dramatizations;  similarly  Holt  (1989:  72).  There  is  also 
another  Homeric  passage  related  to  Heracles'  afterlife,  namely  Qi.  11.601ff. 
(most  probably  interpolated:  A.  Heubeck  in  Heubeck  &  Hoekstra  [1989:  ad  '  11. 
601-27]):  there,  Heracles'  eidolon  is  in  Hades,  but  he  himself  lives  in  Olympus. 
Even  in  this  version,  however,  the  combination  of  death  and  immortality  is 
awkward,  and  hardly  mitigates  the  dismalness  of  Heracles'  fate:  significantly, 
Heracles  himself  never  as  much  as  hints  at  his  immortality  as  a  compensation 
for  his  toils  (Qi.  11.617-26). 
185  Hoey  (1977:  272-73),  pressing  this  point  further,  has  argued  that  the  play 
leaves  the  question  of  apotheosis  open,  "as  though  [it]  had  weighed  both 
options  and  felt  itself  unable  to  decide.  "  According  to  this  view,  the  play 
remains  `agnostic'  regarding  any  possible  afterlife  for  Heracles.  This  is 
perhaps  going  a  little  too  far  in  the  direction  of  an  ambiguous  approach  to 
drama:  see  Easterling  (1981:  68)  and  Stinton  (1990:  483)  for  criticism. 
186  Cf.  also  Roberts  (1988:  191-2)  and  Stinton  (1990:  500  n.  50). 
187  Contra  e.  g.  Hoey  (1977:  271-72),  Friis  Johansen  (1986:  57  n.  43,59),  March 
(1987:  76  with  n.  156),  who  have  variously  tried  to  dispute  the  sense  of  finality 
implicit  in  these  passages. 
188  G.  W.  Dickerson,  The  Structure  and  Interpretation  of  Sophoclesl  'Trachiniae' 
(diss.,  Princeton  1972),  467-70,497-500  (cited  by  Holt  [1989:  75  n.  29])  ingeniously 179 
Sophocles  wished  to  soothe  his  audience  by  bringing  the  apotheosis  into 
the  play,  he  did  not  need  to  resort  to  `hints'  of  doubtful  clarity:  as  Hoey 
(1977:  291  n.  9)  reminds  us,  according  to  some  versions  of  the  myth 
"Heracles  had  foreknowledge  of  the  future  immortality  which  had  been 
promised  him  by  oracle  if  he  should  successfully  complete  the  twelve 
labors"  (Apollod.  2.4.12,  D.  S.  4.10.7).  Whether  those  versions  pre-date  the 
Trachiniae  or  not,  they  are  instructive  in  that  they  show  what  a 
dramatist  could  do  in  order  to  introduce  apotheosis  into  his  dramatic 
treatment  of  the  myth.  Apotheosis  can  be  either  clearly  indicated  or 
simply  left  out;  to  suppose  that  Sophocles  does  hint  at  it,  but  only 
implicitly,  is  a  compromise  whose  dramatic  purpose  must  remain 
inexplicable,  unless  of  course  we  assume,  along  with  e.  g.  Bowra  (1944: 
159-60),  Lloyd-Jones  (1983:  127-28),  and  Holt  (1989:  76),  that  the 
allusion  to  apotheosis  is  only  faint  in  order  not  to  spoil  the  overall 
sombre  effect  of  the  play.  However,  as  Stanton  (1990:  482)  has  put  it,  this 
in  fact  boils  down  to  having  one's  cake  and  eating  it:  if  the  hint  of 
apotheosis  is  clear  enough  to  be  taken  by  the  audience,  then  it  will  of 
course  qualify,  if  not  destroy,  the  sombre  effect.  189  To  conclude,  Heracles' 
ambiguous  position  betwixt  and  between  savagery  and  civilization,  CI  K03 
and  wilderness,  male  and  female,  heroism  and  animality  is  not  an 
indication  of  some  superhuman,  otherwordly  status  he  is  about  to  attain, 
but  only  of  his  "human,  all  too  human"  predicament,  from  which  he 
proves  unable  to  disentangle  himself. 
explains  the  hints  of  the  coming  apotheosis  as  intended  to  raise  hopes  that  are 
deliberately  left  unfulfilled;  something  similar  has  been  proposed  also  by  Gellie 
(1972:  77  ).  As  for  1270  in  particular,  Hoey  (1977:  273-77,  esp.  276-77)  shows  how 
it  can  be  perfectly  well  interpreted  without  any  reference  to  a  future 
apotheosis. 
189  Cf.  already  Hoey  (1977:  273). 3.4.1  The  oracles  in  the  Trachiniae.  Conclusions 
180 
The  fundamental  antithesis  between  oLKos  and  the  wild  is  formulated 
also  by  means  of  a  special  mode  of  discourse,  namely  oracles,  whose  role 
in  the  Trachiniae,  as  in  the  whole  of  the  extant  Sophoclean  dramaturgy, 
is  central.  But  first  we  shall  glance  at  a  rather  exceptional  feature  of  the 
oracles  in  this  play,  namely  the  fact  that  they  seem  to  be  exceptionally 
precise:  they  give  accurate  specifications  as  to  the  exact  time  in  which 
Heracles  should  face  a  crisis  (82  pomj),  prophesying  that  fifteen  months 
after  his  last  departure  (44-48,155-68)  and  immediately  after  the  sack  of 
Oechalla  (79-81)  he  would  either  die  (79,166)  or  enjoy  a  happy  life  (81) 
free  of  toils  (168).  Throughout  the  play  meticulous  calculations  are 
persistently  made  about  the  precise  time  in  which  the  oracle  is  to  come 
true  (44-45,190  76-77  &  79-81,164-68,821-26191),  thus  conveying  a 
feeling  of  certitude  and  reliability,  of  knowledge  that  can  be  fully 
achieved  by  rational  means.  This  feeling  is  certainly  reinforced  by  the 
fact  that  the  text  of  the  oracles  is  impervious  to  distortion,  since  it  is 
190  Strictly  speaking,  these  lines  do  not  actually  mention  the  period  of  fifteen 
months  as  critical,  but  only  as  `long':  see  Reeve  (1970:  283-6)  who  suggested 
deleting  43-8  altogether  (after  Wunder,  who  deleted  44-8).  Nonetheless,  as  Reeve 
(1970:  284)  himself  suggests,  there  is  probably  a  less  radical  way  out: 
"punctuate  lightly  after  45,  so  that  the  6EXToc  can  serve  to  explain  why  the 
fifteen  months  disquiet  [Deianeira].  " 
191  The  Chorus  speak  here  of  `twelve  years',  not  fifteen  months  as  in  44f.  and 
164f.  This  has  been  considered  an  inconsistency,  but  Jebb's  (ad  44f.  &  824f.  ) 
explanation  remains  sound:  the  oracle  at  Dodona  specified  that  Heracles  should 
have  rest  at  the  end  of  twelve  years  (824);  "in  44f.  and  164f.,  the  reference  is 
merely  to  the  fifteen  months  which,  when  Heracles  left  home,  were  still 
wanting  to  those  twelve  years";  cf.  Lesky  (1972:  212).  For  an  attempt  to  fit  the 
mention  of  twelve  years  into  its  dramatic  context  see  Machin  (1981:  157).  The 
question  "whence  do  the  Chorus  derive  their  knowledge  of  the  twelve  years?  " 
is  irrelevant  dramatically  and  interests  only  those  who  see  Greek  dramas  as 
detective  stories:  cf.  Hester  (1979a:  13)  and  above  all  C.  S.  Kraus  (1991:  92-93  with 
n.  53). 181 
securely  written  down  (157-58,1165-68).  192  Thus,  it  seems  that,  in  this 
case  at  least,  the  oracles  are  a  safe  means  of  knowledge,  allowing  no  room 
for  misunderstandings. 
After  Heracles  has  been  located  and  his  family  have  been  assured 
that  he  is  safe  and  sound  and  soon  due  to  arrive,  everyone  reasonably 
assumes  that  the  dilemma  that  the  oracle  put,  namely  `death  or  delivery 
from  toils',  is  no  longer  meaningful:  death  is  simply  out  of  the  question, 
and  therefore  the  oracle  needs  no  longer  be  put  in  an  ambiguously 
disjunctive  form  (death  or  life  free  from  TrövoL),  but  in  a  positively 
categoric  one  (release  from  TrövoL).  As  821-30  and  1164-73  show,  however, 
the  dilemma  `death  or  release  from  toils'  does  collapse,  and  the  initially 
disjunctive  form  of  the  oracle  does  eventually  give  way  to  an  unequivocal 
one,  but  in  a  sense  that  is,  ironically,  exactly  the  opposite  of  what  the 
Chorus  had  thought:  they  (821ff.  )  and  Heracles  (1164ff.  )  realize  only  too 
late193  that  the  disjunction  `deliverance  from  toils  or  death'  no  longer 
holds  good,  because,  quite  simply,  deliverance  from  toils  is  death,  and 
192  The  same  point  is  made  by  Scodel  (1984:  36).  Cf.  Easterling's  (p.  3)  fine 
remarks  on  the  subject. 
193  Most  valuable  insights  on  the  motif  of  late  learning  in  the  play  are  offered 
by  Reinhardt  (1979:  61-2),  Whitman  (1951:  103-21  passim),  Easterling  (1981:  58- 
59),  (1982:  3),  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  144-5),  Kane  (1988).  Heiden  (1989:  3-17),  from  a 
deconstructive  point  of  view,  has  challenged  (with  only  partial  success,  I 
believe)  the  importance  of  this  theme  in  our  play;  according  to  him,  there  is  no 
knowledge  to  be  acquired,  even  too  late:  everything  is  a  matter  of 
interpretation. 182 
death  only  (not  easeful  life,  as  they  thought).  194  There  is  a  general  world- 
view  implied  in  this  twist  of  events:  "the  open  alternatives  suggestive  of 
man's  freedom  to  change  his  destiny  are  replaced  by  a  revelation  of  the 
decision  already  made  by  the  gods.  "  (Davies  [p.  269]).  In  the  light  that 
the  preceding  analysis  has  thrown  on  the  play,  one  easily  understands 
how  this  world-view  is  exemplified  in  Heracles'  case.  It  is  Heracles'  fate 
not  to  be  able  to  get  rid  of  his  constant  TTövoL,  whether  he  is  in  the 
wilderness,  running  errands  that  a  fretful  Eurystheus  imposes  on  him,  or 
in  domestic,  civilized  contexts.  For  we  have  seen  how  being  on  humanized 
ground  has  dramatically  untoward  effects  on  the  hero  who, 
paradoxically,  is  the  very  embodiment  of  the  values  of  civilized  life:  in 
domestic  settings  he  is  transformed  into  a  woman;  his  heroism  is 
challenged  by  Eurytus'  insults,  his  äpET9  marred  by  his  exceptional 
indulgence  in  deceitful  practices  (murder  of  Iphitus);  finally,  in  an  utter 
reversal  of  his  civilizing  function,  he  becomes  himself  the  destroyer  of 
OLKOL,  for  he  reduces  a  whole  city,  Oechalia,  to  ashes,  and  causes  Eurytus' 
family  to  dwell  no  longer  in  their  OLKOc  but  in  the  86µos  of  Hades,  that 
negation  of  an  abode.  What  is  more,  in  an  ultimately  ironic  twist  of 
events,  it  is  at  home  that  Heracles  has  to  face  the  intrusion  of  the  wild,  of 
the  beasts  he  has  seemingly  defeated;  his  excruciating  TrövoL,  from  which 
it  was  hoped  that  the  hero  would  at  last  be  released,  are  continued  even 
194Cf.  Diller  (1950:  11-4),  Gellie  (1972:  62,69),  Hoey  (1977:  271),  Lawrence  (1978: 
291),  Hester  (1979a:  12-13),  Segal  (1995:  70-71).  From  the  point  of  view  of 
dramatic  technique,  as  Hester  (1979a:  13)  and  Davies  (pp.  268-69)  have  shown, 
the  `alternative'  version  of  the  oracles  (`either...  or')  used  in  the  former  part  of 
the  play  served  to  indicate  a  time  of  crisis;  whereas  now  their  categoric  form 
serves  to  denote  the  fulfilment  of  a  long-predicted  destiny.  Cf.  also  Kirkwood 
(1958:  78-9  with  n.  41),  Lesky  (1972:  215-6),  Machin  (1981:  151-62),  Lloyd-Jones 
(1982:  229),  Scodel  (1984:  37-8).  Bowra's  (1944:  151)  attempt  to  explain  away  the 
inconsistencies  in  the  various  reports  of  the  oracle  in  terms  of  character 
portrayal  is  futile,  as  is  Heiden's  (1989:  45-7)  view  that  they  are  a  genuine 
misinterpretation  on  Deianeira's  part.  These  inconsistencies  have  been 
demonstrated  in  detail  by  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz  (1917:  119-33). 183 
within  his  household.  195  In  Heracles'  case,  the  division  between  the  house 
and  the  outdoors  is  invalidated,  for  the  house  is  not  a  "domestic 
enclosure,  a  place  of  security  where  each  feels  at  home"  (Vernant  [1983: 
140]),  but  turns  into  a  space  that  is  all  too  similar  to  the  wild,  In  that  it 
not  only  brings  no  release  from  toils,  but  on  the  contrary  ensures  their 
definite  overpowering  of  the  great  hero.  196  The  only  release  from  rrövoL  is 
death,  since  the  `abode'  of  Hades,  being  a  negation  of  locality,  lies  beyond 
the  division  between  the  house  and  the  outdoors,  and  thus  is  the  only 
space  that  can  accommodate  a  hero  who  cannot  escape  toil  at  any  place. 
For  his  toils  to  end,  Heracles  himself  must  be  turned  into  an  `inhabitant' 
of  Hades  (cf.  1041-43;  contr.  119-21!  );  and,  in  keeping  with  Heracles' 
incompatibility  with  the  notion  of  oLKOS,  his  death  (and  the  concomitant 
release  from  toils)  comes  from  a"ALBou  OiK1jTCup  (1161),  as  that  oracle  of 
old  had  predicted  (1159-61). 
So  (to  return  to  the  issue  of  the  oracles'  deceptive  precision  and 
clarity  in  the  Trachiniae)  one  reaches  again  the  conclusion  which  seems 
to  be  valid  for  Sophoclean  tragedy  in  general:  the  tragedy  of  the  human 
condition  consists  in  the  fact  that  our  knowledge  is  woefully  limited. 
There  are,  however,  numerous  occasions  on  which  an  appearance  of 
certainty,  and,  as  a  result,  a  confidence  in  one's  cognitive  potential,  is 
created  by  circumstances  largely  depending  on  the  gods  who  often  offer 
signs,  pointers  to  the  right  direction,  through  oracular  utterances 
(Heraclitus'  famous  dictum  about  the  Delphic  god  who  oüTE  MyEL  oüTE 
195  Interestingly,  in  E.  HF  1279-80Heracles  explicitly  regards  his  destruction  of 
his  own  house  (killing  of  Megara  and  his  children)  as  the  last  of  his  rrövoL. 
Loraux  (1995:  40  with  n.  153,54  with  n.  76),  in  a  different  context,  has  made  the 
important  remark  that  the  term  rrovos  (and  the  cognate  µöX6os)  is  used  in  the 
play  to  describe  both  Heracles'  laborious  exploits  in  the  wild  and  his  physical 
suffering  when  at  last  he  is  back  home.  Kirkwood  (1958:  74)  saw  that  an 
essential  part  of  Heracles'  persona  is  his  inability  to  find  rest  so  far  as  his  life 
goes  on. 
196  Cf.  Segal  (1975b:  616). 184 
Kp11TTEL  ä  GljýIaLVEL  [22  B  93  D.  -K.  ]  springs  immediately  to  mind). 
One  is  tempted  to  rely  on  those  utterances  which,  paradoxically,  though 
not  unreliable  in  themselves,  are  nonetheless  potentially  deceptive,  and 
often  appear  under  a  veneer  of  clarity,  precision  and  certain  guidance  (as 
in  the  Trachiniae).  Thus,  one  is  tempted  to  assume  that  those  divine 
signs  can  be  safely  interpreted  by  means  of  rational  procedures,  so  as  to 
yield  an  unambiguous  and  fully  understandable  meaning.  However,  one 
eventually  (and  always  too  late)  realizes  that  what  seemed  to  be'a  clear 
sign  from  the  gods,  interpretable  in  a  wholly  unequivocal  way,  did  in  fact 
admit  of  more  than  one  interpretation,  not  immediately  accessible  to  the 
human  mind,  and  that  this  hidden  `polysemy'  proves  catastrophic.  197 
"Die  Gottheit  redet  in  der  Sprache  ihres  Wissens,  der  Mensch  versteht 
nach  der  Fähigkeit  seiner  Aufnahmeorgane  und  versteht  notwendig  falsch, 
aber  nicht,  weil  die  Gottheit  ihn  irreführen  will,  sondern  aus  der 
strukturellen  Verschiedenheit  göttlicher  und  menschlicher  Einsicht 
heraus",  remarks  Diller  (1950:  26-7),  while  Lesky  (1972:  216)  puts  it  more 
memorably:  "Der  Wille  des  Gottes  ist  eindeutig,  seine  Kundgabe  im  Orakel 
aber  ist  menschlichem  Wähnen  und  Irren  ausgesetzt".  It  is  as  if  the 
oracles'  raison  d'  eire,  as  it  were,  was  only  to  pinpoint  how  great  is  the 
gap  between  human  and  divine  knowledge,  and  how  people  fail,  to  their 
ultimate  detriment,  to  make  full  and  right  use  of  the  divine  signs.  198  As 
Whitman  (1951:  108)  has  put  it,  "the  supposed  clarity  and  helpfulness  of 
these  oracles  are  deliberately  confusing.  They  represent  what  hindsight,  or 
knowledge  free  from  time,  might  know,  but  which  no  one  in  the  moment 
197  On  the  ambiguous  discourse  of  prophecy  see  Bushnell  (1988:  3-4,14-7,24-6); 
cf.  also  Diller  (1950:  13). 
198  Cf.  Bowra  (1944:  152-4),  Kitto  (1961:  291-2),  Solmsen  (1985:  493  n.  13).  I  should 
not  accept  Gellie's  (1972:  70)  contention  that  the  revelation  of  the  true  meaning 
of  the  oracles  conveys  a  feeling  that  there  is  at  least  a  certain  order,  a 
knowable  pattern  in  all  this  suffering;  Kott  (1974:  139-40)  is  a  little  better  in 
this.  Heiden  (1989:  144-8)  gratuitously  questions  the  validity  of  Heracles' 
exposition  of  the  true  meaning  of  the  oracles  at  the  end  of  the  Trachiniae. 185 
of  action  could  conceivably  know.  "  The  realization  of  the  essential 
human  inability  to  comprehend  divinity  and  cosmic  order  is  the  farthest 
point  that  the  human  mind,  with  its  limited  capacity,  can  reach.  Hyllus' 
last  words  (1264-74),  along  with  the  Chorus'  final  `tag'  (1275-78),  199  with 
the  bitter  complaint,  on  the  one  hand,  about  the  gods'  callousness  (1267 
äyvwitoa  ni11)  and  `shameful  deeds'  (1272  aLQXpä)200  and  with  the 
resigned  acceptance,  on  the  other  hand,  of  divine  presence  in  all  that  has 
happened  (1278  KOÜBEV  TOÜTOW  O',  TL  µ7I  ZEVs)  express  exactly  this 
feeling  of  utter  desolation  in  front  of  the  tremendously  overwhelming,  yet 
incomprehensible  and  unaccountable,  ways  of  the  gods.  201 
199  With  Kamerbeek  (ad  1278),  Hourmouziades  (1968:  285),  Burton  (1980:  79-81), 
Easterling  (ad  1275-8),  W.  Kraus  (1986:  103),  Stinton  (1990:  486)  I  take  the  lines 
to  be  spoken  by  the  Chorus,  not  Hyllus.  Contra  Jebb  (ad  1275-1278)  and,  most 
recently,  Lloyd-Jones  &Wilson  (1990b:  177-78).  At  any  rate,  as  Easterling  (1981: 
70)  remarks,  the  interpretation  of  the  play  remains  much  the  same  either  way. 
I  cannot  accept  the  view  propounded  by  Webster  (1936:  179),  Kirkwood  (1958: 
278),  Lesky  (1972:  215)  and  others  that,  if  the  Chorus  speak  the  final  lines,  then 
Hyllus'  condemnation  of  the  gods  is  modified:  see  rightly  Torrance  (1965:  326  n. 
35);  nor  can  I  agree  with  e.  g.  Musurillo  (1967:  78-9  with  n.  1)  and  Hoey  (1977: 
286-88)  that  these  closing  lines  express  serenity:  it  is  the  horrified  realization 
of  human  powerlessness  in  front  of  the  gods  (as  well  as  of  the  limitations  of 
human  knowledge)  that  is  the  central  point,  whether  we  give  the  lines  to 
Hyllus  or  to  the  Chorus;  cf.  the  right  views  of  G.  Murray  (1946:  122-3),  Whitman 
(1951:  120),  Gellie  (1972:  77-8),  Lawrence  (1978:  304),  Buxton  (1982:  115-16), 
Mikalson  (1986:  92  with  n.  5).  Even  Bowra  (1944:  157),  who  was  usually  only  too 
eager  to  justify  the  Sophoclean  gods,  found  himself  obliged  to  admit  that  the 
play's  "close  raises  more  questions  than  it  answers.  " 
200  Whether  aLoXpä  is  a  general  moral  judgement  or,  as  Winnington-Ingram 
(1980:  74  n.  3)  suggests,  a  specific  reference  to  Zeus'  neglect  of  his  paternal 
obligations  towards  his  son,  my  point  remains  essentially  unaffected. 
201  On  the  contrast  between  the  clouded  human  understanding  and  the 
incomprehensible  divine  purposes  see  Kamerbeek  (1948:  87-8),  Fuqua  (1980:  61, 
71),  Easterling  (1981:  63,67-8),  Stinton  (1990:  487),  Segal  (1981:  107-8),  (1995:  63- 
65,94),  Heiden  (1989:  160).  Pace  Segal  (1971:  107),  (1975a:  47-49),  Sorum  (1978: 
66-73  passim,  esp.  73),  Fuqua  (1980:  58-9),  Silk  (1985:  9;  but  contr.  11-12!  ),  Friis 
Johansen  (1986:  59)  and  (somewhat  differently)  Holt  (1987:  215-7),  Heracles  is 186 
This  pattern  is  also  exemplified,  with  particular  clarity,  in 
Deianeira's  case.  "As  the  play  begins,  night  dominates",  writes  Segal 
(1995:  56),  and  one  is  tempted  to  associate  the  physical  darkness  with 
the  darkness  of  Deianeira's  utter  ignorance  of  her  husband's  whereabouts. 
As  she  says,  such  a  state  of  affairs  `brings  shame'  (66  aLQXvvrIv  4E  pE  LV  ); 
ignorance  is  undesirable,  and  reluctance  to  search  for  truth  seems  to  be 
shameful.  Before  the  prologue  ends,  however,  there  is  already  a  glimpse  of 
light  -  and  knowledge:  Hyllus  brings  some  fresh  news  about  his  father 
(67ff.  )  and  Deianeira,  prompted  by  her  knowledge  of  an  oracle,  has  her 
son  investigate  the  fortunes  of  the  missing  Heracles  (76-85).  At  the  end  of 
the  first  episode,  as  we  have  already  remarked  (pp.  127-129),  the  news  of 
the  hero's  homecoming  (186  caVEVTa)202  is  likened  to  the  rising  of  a 
celestial  body,  probably  the  sun  (203-204);  203  similarly,  the  arrival  of  the 
messenger  Lichas,  bringer  of  presumably  good  news  (228  XapTÖV),  is 
described  with  an  accumulation  of  verba  videndi  (224  (3XETrELV 
... 
Evapyf,  225-26  öpw 
... 
%µ  aTos  4poupäv 
... 
i1EÜQQELV),  while  at  291 
the  two  themes.  of  good  news  and  light-imagery  are  combined:  TEpýLs 
E  t4avtjs.  204  Soon,  however,  Deianeira  will  be  thrown  again  into  the 
not  freed  at  the  end  from  the  limitations  of  human  knowledge:  his  (only  too 
late)  understanding  of  the  oracles  does  not  endow  him  with  superhuman,  or 
even  clearer,  vision,  for  all  he  does  is  simply  to  piece  together  all  the  various 
oracles  (cf.  1164-65):  cf.  Hoey  (1977:  272),  notwithstanding  his  arguing  in 
favour  of  apotheosis.  On  the  impenetrability  of  divine  voi)s  cf.  Easterling's 
(1968:  68)  remarks;  her  view  that  the  tragic  universe  is  orderly,  not  chaotic 
(ibid.,  pp.  65,68)  should  be  read  in  the  light  of  Kitto's  (1966:  186-7)  important 
qualification:  "[Sophocles]  is  seeing  our  universe  as  one  which  is  orderly 
throughout  [...  ]  or  let  us  say,  since  we  are  apt  to  confuse  order  with  comfort  and 
`natural  justice',  a  universe  which  has  its  own  steady  mode  of  working  and  is 
the  reverse  of  chaotic.  "  Erbse's  (1993:  65,67)  moralistic  view  is  to  be  rejected. 
202  On  the  function  of  visual  vocabulary  here  cf.  Seale  (1982:  186). 
203  So  Holt  (1987:  209-10). 
204  For  light  imagery  in  a  similar  context  cf.  A.  Pers.  299-301  (suggestion  of  Mr 
Garvie).  Evapyij  and  XEÜUaELV  (cf.  AEVKbs)  are  also  particularly  associated  with 187 
darkness  of  ignorance,  through  Lichas'  lies;  this  time,  the  revelation  of 
truth  by  the  Messenger  will  be  accompanied  not  by  the  light  of  joy,  but 
by  the  realization  of  how  dangerous  the  `most  resplendent'  (379  KäpTa 
Aanrpä)  Iole  is;  205  light  imagery  is  now  associated  with  the  imminent 
collapse  of  the  household:  the  sudden  manifestation  of  Heracles'  lust  for 
Iole  is  described  with  the  word  4avE(S  (433),  which,  as  Jebb  (ad  432f.  ) 
remarks,  implies  "...  that  this  manifestation  was  sudden  and  violent,  - 
like  a  fire  blazing  forth"  (my  emphasis).  So,  Deianeira's  quest  for 
knowledge  has  yielded  no  agreeable  results  so  fan  the  darkness  of  her 
initial  ignorance  has  been  replaced  by  the  light  of  a  preliminary 
knowledge  of  Heracles'  condition  (he  is  alive,  safe  and  sound,  and  soon  to 
appear,  cf.  181-86);  not  long  after  that,  however,  the  scorching  light  of 
undesirable  knowledge  will  shine  forth:  Iole's  ominous  `splendour' 
threatens  Deianeira's  status,  and  the  fire  of  Heracles'  lust  for  her  (cf.  368) 
is  an  immediate  threat  to  his  OLKOS.  Deianeira's  realization  of  her 
husband's  feelings  for  Iole  is  an  unbearable  burden  (cf.  537-38);  still,  as 
"  human  thirst  for  knowing  is  unquenchable,  knowledge  is  what  Deianeira 
desires  most,  even  if  she  feels  that  learning  will  only  lead  to  suffering.  She 
has  been  informed  by  the  Messenger  (335ff.  )  that  Iole  is  her  husband's 
new  8äµap,  and  has  fully  realized  what  that  means  (375-79),  but  insists 
on  hearing  the  bitter  truth  from  Lichas  too.  2w  Albeit  aware  that  what  she 
is  about  to  hear  is  painful,  she  nevertheless  claims  that  what  would  really 
the  notions  of  light  and  brightness;  cf.  Seale  (1982:  189).  The  most  thorough 
exploration  of  light-and-darkness  imagery  in  this  play  is  offered  by  Segal 
(1975a:  41-42),  (1981:  74),  (1995:  45,56-58  with  n.  128)  and  by  Holt  (1987),  on 
whose  fine  remarks  I  have  freely  drawn  for  this  and  the  following  paragraphs. 
205  Cf.  Seale  (1982:  196). 
206  Deianeira's  persistence  in  finding  out  the  whole  truth  has  been  naturally 
compared  to  that  of  Oedipus:  Kott  (1974:  130)  has  some  very  fine  remarks  on 
this:  see  also  Whitman  (1951:  117),  Beck  (1953:  18-20),  Lawrence  (1978:  294-95). 
On  the  correspondences  between  the  Trachiniae  and  the  CT  see  Di  Benedetto 
(1983:  145-9). 188 
hurt  her  is  to  remain  in  the  dark  (458),  whereas  knowing  cannot  be 
BELVOV  (459).  207  As  in  the  prologue  she  considered  reluctance  to  track 
Heracles  down  as  aLQXpöv,  so  now,  on  realizing  that  Lichas  has  been 
trying  to  conceal  from  her  the  crucial  fact  that  Iole  is  Heracles'  new 
86µap  (428,429),  she  insists  four  times  that  lying  (=concealing 
knowledge)  is  KaKÖV  (450,452,454,468  ),  debasing,  and  ill  becomes  a  free 
person  (453-54).  Her  impasse  '  becomes  apparent:  not  knowing  is 
shameful,  as  is  concealing  knowledge;  knowing,  on  the  other  hand,  brings 
suffering,  for  it  seems  that  all  one  ends  up  knowing  is  the  misery  of  one's 
own  condition;  as  Lawrence  (1978:  295)  remarks,  Lichas'  'scene  reveals 
"the  naivety  of  the  notion  that  the  truth  is  always  for  the  best.  "208 
All  the  same,  Deianeira  herself  will  all  too  soon  indulge  in  shameful 
practices  similar  to  those  of  Lichas,  for  she  will  try,  for  the  first  and  last 
time,  to  manipulate  her  knowledge  in  order  to  commit  deceit.  Now  she 
thinks  she  knows:  she  has  learned  the  truth  about  Iole,  and  she 
remembers  (578  Evvoiaaf)  that  she  possesses  a  secure  source  of  useful 
knowledge,  namely  Nessus'  instructions  about,  the  philtre,  which  she 
decides  to  put  into  practice  as  accurately  as  if  they  were  safely  written 
down  (680-83).  209  A  similarity  with  the  oracles,  which  were  likewise 
written  down  (this  being  no  guarantee  of  their  correct  interpretation, 
207  The  importance  of  458-9  has  been  made  clearer  to  me  thanks  to  Whitman 
(1951:  111-12)  and  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  143);  the  latter  also  remarks  that  at  321 
Deianeira  described  lack  of  knowledge  as  ývg4opä.  "Uncertainty,  darkness, 
night,  the  inability  to  judge  -these  are  the  sources  of  Deianeira's  fear  and 
misery":  Whitman  (1951:  117);  cf.  Gellie  (1972:  56),  Coray  (1993:  4). 
208  Cf.  Whitman  (1951:  110);  Seale  (1982:  196-7,209-11);  Holt  (1987:  207,211-13). 
If,  as  Beck  (1953:  13-4,16-20)  plausibly  argues,  Iole's  presence  on  stage  and, 
subsequently,  Lichas'  Lügenszene  were  Sophocles'  own  innovation,  then  it 
seems  all  the  more  probable  that  Sophocles  took  care  to  give  special 
prominence  to  the  theme  of  knowledge  and  ignorance:  see  Halleran  (1986:  239- 
40).  '  On  Sophocles'  independence  from  earlier  tradition  in  this  respect  see 
further  Davies  (1984),  as  against  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz  (1917:  108-16,  esp.  112). 
209  Cf.  Heiden  (1989:  89,102-4),  C.  S.  Kraus  (1991:  90). 189 
however),  may  be  seen  here,  especially  since  Nessus'  dying  words  are 
quoted  as  almost  oracular  (cf.  682  OEa  iG3v);  210  in  both  cases,  the  fact  that 
the  oracular  (or  quasi-oracular)  utterances  are  thought  of  as  safely 
written  down  implies  that  the  human  recipients  can  acquire  accurate 
knowledge  thereof.  In  fact,  however,  as  Lawrence  (1978:  297-98,303) 
points  out,  Deianeira  proceeds  on  grossly  insufficient  evidence,  for  as  she 
admits  (cf.  588-93)  her  knowledge  actually  consists  only  in  TO  80KEZV 
(590)  and  has  not  been  verified  by  TrELpa  (591).  211  Nonetheless,  she  resorts 
all  too  eagerly  to  `dark'  (cf.  596  aKOT(P),  deceitful  practices,  shameful  (597 
aLQXpä)  as  they  are,  hoping  that  if  she  takes  all  necessary  precautions 
(596  EL  QTE'YOLµLEA  '-)  she  will  avoid  shame  (597  o31toT'  aLaXvv1 
irec  rj).  212  Excessive  confidence  in  one's  knowledge,  however,  is  always 
dangerous,  and,  in  fact,  shame  is  exactly  what  will  accrue  to  Deianeira:  as 
soon  as  she  realizes  the  real  nature  of  the  `philtre',  she  understands  what 
a  disgrace  her  act  will  incur  (721  KaK(1s  KXüouaav;  cf.  722  µtl  *  KaKdl 
TrE#KEVaL);  the  repetition  of  KaKÖc-words  helps  bring  out  the 
correspondence  with  the  Lichas  scene,  where  manipulation  of  knowledge 
210  The  point  is  made  by  Scodel  (1984:  36)  and  C.  S.  Kraus  (1991:  88  n.  39); 
somewhat  differently  Heiden  (1989:  103). 
211  Cf.  also  Long's  (1968:  135)  excellent  remarks,  who  points  out  that  "TriaTLs  and 
8OKEtV  (590-1)  are  contrasted  with  TrEdpa  and  8pc  rav  (591-2).  "  See  also  Di 
Benedetto  (1983:  144).  The  insufficiency  of  the  evidence  possessed  by  Deianeira 
would  be  all  the  more  poignantly  emphasized  if  one  accepts  Solmsen's  (1985) 
and  W.  Kraus'  (1986:  99-100)  interpretations  of  591-92  (cf.  Coray  [1993:  14]);  for 
criticism  see  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  163).  On  the  unreliability  of 
knowledge  in  the  Trachiniae  see  also  Whitman  (1951:  110-11),  Bröcker  (1971: 
15)  and  Gellie  (1972:  62);  Torrance  (1965:  302)  seems  rather  to  have  missed  the 
point. 
212  Whitman  (1951:  266  n.  37)  thought  that  aLLaXpä  TrpdaucrKr6  (597)  means  `fare 
shamefully',  not  `act  shamefully'.  But  see  Kirkwood  (1958:  114  n.  16)  and 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  79  n.  23).  For  an  examination  of  the  shame-theme  in 
this  play,  with  special  reference  to  its  social  parameters,  see  Gasti  (1993).  On 
Deianeira's  8öAos  as  bound  to  end  in  disaster,  as  do  all  cases  of  86Xoc  in  this  Play, 
see  Halleran  (1986);  cf.  Cairns  (1993:  360n.  52,363  n.  59). 190 
by  way  of  guile  was  unequivocally  condemned  by  Deianeira  herself  as 
KaKÖV.  Disgrace,  however,  is  not  the  only  fruit  of  her  deceit:  as  in  the  case 
of  her  learning  about  her  husband's  intentions  regarding  Iole,  Deianeira's 
realization  of  the  horrible  truth  also  brings  unbearable  suffering.  This 
realization  is  significantly  surrounded  again  by  verba  videndi  (666 
4avi  aOµaL,  213  706  op(Z,  711  µ609GLV,  714  oL8a,  cf.  739  LQOL,  742-43  TO' 
ýavOE  V  );  214  the  light  of  knowledge,  of  course,  is  no  longer  associated  with 
joy  and  relief,  as  in  the  prologue  and  in  the  first  episode,  but  with  the 
destruction  of  the  piece  of  wool  by  the  sunlight  (695ff.  )215  -  an  ominous 
portent  (693  4  MV)  foreshadowing  the  fate  of  Heracles  himself.  216  The 
enlightenment  for  which  the  Chorus  prayed  in  the  parodos  (esp.  94-102) 
turns  out  to  be  the  revelation  of  Aphrodite's  pernicious  role  (860-61 
4avEpä 
... 
E4Wq).  217  The  `dark'  implications  of  light  imagery  are  also 
apparent  in  such  events  as  the  `foreshadowing'  (cf.  849  TTpo4a'LvEL)  of  a 
forthcoming  ITa  (850),  the  burning  energy  of  the  fatal  robe  (cf.  840 
ETr1C  aavTa),  after  it  was  `shown  forth'  to  the  light  (608-609  4avEpog 
E  µýavwg  ... 
18E  ii),  and  finally,  of  course,  the  oracles'  coming  forth  to 
light  (1159,1163  TrpOavTOV,  1164  ýavw,  1174  Xa.  µnrpd218)  -  the  oracles 
which  reveal,  however,  only  that  Heracles  is  soon  to  be  bereft  of  the  light 
of  life  (11444Eyyos  OÜKET'  EUTL  VOL). 
To  sum  up,  Deianeira  goes  through  two  distinct  phases,  as  far  as 
213  See  Seale  (1982:  200). 
214  "EKµGNOQVELV  and 
EKSLSGLUKELV 
and  words  of  `showing'  and  `seeing'  are 
insistently  repeated":  Easterling  (p.  3  with  n.  6). 
215  Cf.  Holt  (1987:  211). 
216  The  meaning  `omen,  portent,  monstrum,  prodigiuni  for  the  word  $$TLS  is 
convincingly  defended  by  Holt  (1988). 
217  Cf.  Seale  (1982:  202-3). 
218  Differently,  Segal  (1981:  101).  Lawrence  (1978:  302  n.  16)  reminds  us  that 
kcµrrp63  is  the  epithet  used  of  the  sun's  light  at  99.  For  the  use  of  light-imagery 
in  relation  to  the  revelation  of  the  oracles  see  Seale  (1982:  206-7),  Holt  (1987: 
214). 191 
the  state  of  her  knowledge  is  concerned:  at  first,  she  is  utterly  ignorant  of 
her  husband's  condition,  and  makes  clear  that  she  considers  this 
ignorance  shameful.  When  she  acquires  positive  information  about 
Heracles,  however,  she  realizes  (and  we  realize  too)  how  painful  her  new 
knowledge  is.  As  soon  as  she  learns  the  alarming  news,  and  obviously 
prompted  by  it,  the  deceived  and  ignorant  Deianeira  is  suddenly  turned, 
to  our  surprise,  into  the  knowing  deceiver  (shameful  though  such 
practices  are),  only  to  find  out  that  her  knowledge  has,  yet  again,  been 
defective  and  has  caused  her  not  only  more  disgrace  but  also  more 
suffering  and,  ultimately,  death  for  herself  and  her  husband.  Shame  and 
suffering  seem  to  be  Deianeira's  lot  in  life,  whether  she  possesses 
knowledge  or  not,  whether  she  deceives  or  is  deceived.  The  Sophoclean 
dramatic  universe  as  it  appears  from  the  Trachiniae,  is  (to  quote  Scodel's 
[1984:  36]  formulation)  "a  world  where  to  act  without  full  knowledge  is 
dangerous,  yet  knowledge  is  almost  impossible  to  obtain.  "  All  sources  of 
significant  knowledge  are  in  this  play,  as  so  often  in  Sophocles,  non- 
human:  it  is  either  the  gods'  oracles  or  a  beast's  secret  advice  that  seem 
to  offer  us  safe  and  privileged  knowledge.  However,  the  vantage  point 
which  we  are  tempted  to  believe  this  knowledge  ensures  us  turns  out,  too 
late,  to  be  an  illusion:  confined  within  the  restricted  boundaries  of 
human  knowledge  as  we  are,  we  are  bound  to  misunderstand  the  gods' 
rngµE  to  or  not  to  suspect  the  beast's  guile;  in  both  cases  the  outcome  is, 
invariably,  shame,  suffering  and  catastrophe.  219 
219  The  above  remarks  can  be  read  as  supplementary  to  the  excellent  article  by 
Lawrence  (1978).  He  gives  a  careful  account  of  the  theme  of  illusory  and 
uncertain  knowledge,  concentrating  on  the  epistemologic  terminology  used  in 
the  play.  He  too  notices  that  knowledge,  though  desirable  in  principle,  can  all 
too  often  be  painful.  C.  S.  Kraus  (1991)  emphasizes  Deianeira's  inability  to 
interpret  the  past  in  a  definitive  way  as  the  cause  of  her  catastrophe;  again, 
that  is,  the  central  problem  of  the  play  is  put  in  epistemological  /  cognitive 
terms.  Kane  (1988)  offers  a  good  analysis  of  the  various  anagnoriseis  contained 
in  the  play  and  of  their  role  in  defming  its  structure. APPENDIX 
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In  the  recapitulation  of  Heracles'  labours  towards  the  end  of  the  play 
(1090ff.  ),  not  only  is  special  prominence  given  to  the  Centaurs  and  the 
Hydra,  i.  e.  the  two  original  perpetrators  of  his  death  (Centaurs:  1059,220 
1095-96  with  extraordinary  emphasis  on  their  uncivilized  nature;  221 
Hydra:  1094),  but  also  the  rest  of  his  monstrous  opponents  are  arranged 
into  two  main  groups  which  may  be  viewed  as  bearing  typical  traits  of 
either  Nessus  or  the  Hydra:  the  Erymanthian  boar  is  a  6rjp  (1097),  like 
Nessus  himself  (556,568,680,707,935,1162)  and  the  rest  of  the  Centaurs 
(1059,1096).  The  monster  that  guards  the  golden  apples  of  Hesperides  is 
a  serpent,  8paKWV  (1100),  while  Cerberus  too  is  the  offspring  of  a  serpent, 
8E  LVrjs  '  EXL8vTls  OpE  µµa  (1099)  -  both  resembling,  in  their  serpentine 
nature,  the  Lernaean  Hydra,  which  was  itself  also  born  from  Echidna  (Hes. 
Th.  313-4)  and  of  which  the  word  8päxuw  is  used  at  834.  Finally,  the 
Nemean  lion  is  änXaTOV  6pEUµa  KäTrpOafj'yopOV  (1093)222  -  the  phrasing 
recalls  the  Centaurs  (1095  ä1ELKTOV,  `not  mingling  with  others',  i.  e. 
`savage'223).  By  contrast,  our  introduction  to  the  play  was,  virtually, 
Heracles'  triumphal  defeat  of  Achelous,  a  monster  that  could  assume, 
among  other  things,  a  serpent  like  (11-12  a  oXos  16paKwv)  and  a 
Centaur-like  (12-13  äV8PE'W,  KlTEL  I  ßoitrpcppos)224  guise. 
220  As  commentators  note,  Cicero  (Tusc.  2.8:  "non  biformato  impetu  I 
Centaurus")  took  the  phrase  to  refer  specifically  to  the  Centaurs;  Kamerbeek 
(ad  1059)  unreservedly  shares  this  view,  whereas  Jebb  (ad  1058f.  )  and 
Easterling  (ad  1059)  think  it  is  unnecessarily  restrictive. 
221  Cf.  Segal  (1975a:  45). 
222  Jebb  (ad  1092f.  )  translates  "unapproachable"  and  "not  affable" 
respectively. 
223  I  give  Easterling's  (ad  1095-6)  rendering  of  the  word.  Commentators 
appositely  adduce  E.  Cycl.  429  äµELKTOV  Mpa  (of  Cyclops).  Davies  (ad  1093) 
compares  the  use  of  privative  ä-  in  emphatic  litotes  at  1093  with  the  similar  use 
thereof  at  1095-6.  On  the  imagery  surrounding  these  monsters  as  enemies  of 
civilization  in  general  see  Sorum  (1978:  61). 
224  With  Easterling  (ad  12-14)  and  Uoyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  150-51)  1  accept 193 
the  reading  offered  by  Strabo  (10.458;  cf.  Philostr.  jun.  Imag.  4.1)  as  against  the 
MSS  äv8pdq)  TÜTrW  ßoüKpavoc.  Davies  (ad  12-13)  offers  a  judicious  discussion  of 
this  passage.  I  also  agree  with  Easterling  (ad  10-14)  that  the  mixed  creature  of 
our  passage  is  "a  kind  of  centaur,  with  human  torso  and  arms  and  the  face  and 
beard  of  a  man,  but  a  bull's  forehead,  ears  and  horn,  and  animal  legs";  for 
Kentaurges  talt  depictions  of  Achelous  in  general  see  H.  P.  Isler,  LIMC  1.1  (1989) 
25-28,30;  in  his  battle  with  Heracles:  Isler,  ibid.  27-8;  on  the  Manns  tier  type  in 
general  (human-headed,  homed  quadruped)  see  again  Isler  (ibid  pp.  13-18,30). 
As  Easterling  (l.  c.  )  again  points  out,  "on  vases  illustrating  the  fight  between 
Achelous  and  Heracles  the  bull  always  has  a  man's  face  and  beard"  (cf.  Isler 
ibid.  p.  32)  and  remarks  (ad  12-14)  that  ßoürrpypoc  would  be  especially 
appropriate  of  a  homed  creature  (Trp(pp-  possibly  suggesting  that  which 
protrudes  furthest',  the  `forward  end'  of  a  thing);  thus,  I  should  hesitate  to 
agree  with  Isler  (ibid.  p.  30)  and  Davies  (ad  12-13)  that  our  lines  imply  a 
Minotaur-like  monster,  with  a  bull's  head  -an  assumption  which,  furthermore, 
would  be  contradicted  by  8aaKiou  'yEVELäbos  (13). VOL,  2 
CHAPTER  FOUR 
WITHIN  AND  BEYOND  THE  POLIS: 
INTEGRATION  AND  TRANSCENDENCE 
IN  THE  OEDIPUS  AT  COLONUS 
For  he  is  Death  and  he  Life 
He  the  Unforeseen  and  he  the  Laws 
Odysseus  Dlytis,  ?  fie  lion  Esti 
(trans[.  E.  1Vf  eley  &  G.  Savidis) 
4.1.1  The  place:  between  the  volts  and  the  outdoors 
The  title  of  the  play,  whether  original  or  not,  1  is  particularly  significant: 
as  it  implies,  the  notion  of  the  polis2  (and  the  concomitant  concepts  of 
locality  and  custom,  vöpLµov)  plays  a  major  part  in  the  Oedipus  at 
Colonus.  But  regardless  of  the  title,  the  importance  of  the  polis-notion  is 
manifest  already  at  the  first  lines  of  the  play:  1-2  T(vas  I  Xc,  'pous 
... 
fl 
TI,  VOW  äv8pwv  Tr6XLv;  3  Nonetheless,  it  will  soon  transpire  that  the  place  is 
neither  an  outdoor  Xwpos  nor  a  "city  of  men",  i.  e.  it  is  neither  within  nor 
1  It  seems  more  probable  that  the  title  is  not  the  original  one:  O.  Taplin,  JHS  95 
(1975)  184-6. 
2  By  the  term  `polis'  I  mean  here  the  politically  organized  community,  with  its 
set  laws  and  customs,  as  against  the  wild,  the  outdoors  space,  that  lacks  by 
definition  such  organization.  Thus,  'polls'  in  the  GC  can  mean  both  the  &rru  of 
Athens  and  the  political  community  of  local  people  at  Colonus:  see  Krummen 
(1993:  194  with  n.  7),  Blundell  (1993:  289,290).  On  the  complexities  in  the  use  of 
the  terms  polis  and  ärru  see,  however,  Henrichs  (1990:  259  with  n.  11).  I  have 
gained  valuable  insights  into  the  concept  of  the  ' polis  in  the  C  thanks  to  the 
kindness  of  Professor  P.  E.  Easterling,  who  provided  me  with  an  unpublished 
paper  of  hers  delivered  in  Athens  in  1994(:  Easterling  1994). 
3  On  this  disjunction  cf.  Edmunds  (1996:  101). 194 
without  the  framework  of  the  polis.  4  For  the  character  of  this  place  is 
defined  by  a  striking  ambiguity:  on  the  one  hand,  it  is  inhabited  by 
people  who  clearly  form  a  political  society  (they  are  called  8rß  löTaL  at 
78,5  and  we  are  told  that  they  are  subject  to  a  central  authority,  the  king 
in  the  äcTV,  67);  these  8rq  iöTaL,  according  to  normal  Attic  practice,  are 
named  after  a  hero  (59-61,65;  note  the  technical  term  ETrwvvµoL  used  in 
the  latter  instance,  alluding  to  the  ETTwvvµos  fpws  of  each  tribe),  6  whom 
they  worship  along  with  Poseidon  and  Prometheus  (54-56),  gods  of  the 
official  cult  of  the  polis.  At  the  same  time,  however,  Colonus  is  quite 
distinct  -  not  only  geographically  -  from  the  polis  of  Athens:  whereas 
Antigone  is  perfectly  able  to  understand  that  what  she  sees  in  the 
distance  is  a  city,  because  its  walls  leave  no  doubt  about  it  (14-15),  she 
has  difficulties  in  identifying  the  place  they  are  in  (24),  for  it  bears  no 
recognizable  trait  of  a  polls  (16-19:  abundant  vegetation  and  an  unhewn 
rock7  are  suggestive  of  an  uninhabited  place,  beyond  the  borders  of  the 
polls).  And  although  she  assumes  at  first  that  the  place  is  certainly 
habitable,  (28;  note  the  assentient  &.  \  '  EQTL  ir.  y8  oLKTITÖs),  this  turns 
out  eventually  not  to  be  the  case:  the  Coloniate  Stranger,  who  soon 
enters,  clearly  warns  them  that  the  place  is  not  to  be  trodden;  this  is 
specially  stressed  by  an  accumulation  of  synonyms  (37  Xwpov  oiX 
4  For  a  different  interpretation  see  Allison  (1984:  70). 
5I  cannot  agree  with  Ulrich  von  Wilamowitz  in  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz  (1917: 
329  n.  1),  when  he  claims  that  "Sri  tö  ris  nicht  im  technischen  Sinne  gesagt  ist, 
der  für  diesen  Stil  auch  nicht  paßt". 
6  See  Walker  (1995:  176  with  n.  17).  On  the  eponymous  heroes  of  the  demes  see 
Kearns  (1989:  92-102). 
7  Err  ä  Earov  1TETPOU  (19).  Contrast  01.8.6,  where  ýEQTOL  X1606  (whether  it 
means  `hewn'  or  `polished'  stones:  see  Garvie  [1994:  ad  8.6])  are  signs  of 
civilized  he  (I  owe  the  reference  to  Mr.  A.  F.  Garvie). 
8  Jebb  (ad  28),  Denniston  GP2  343  (3). 195 
QyvV  V  TraTE  v,  39  üeLKTOS  01)8  '  O1K11T09;  Cf.  126  QOTL(Es  äXGOs,  167 
apaTwv).  This  place  is  a  Hades-like  territory  (57  XdKolTovg  0'80g;  cf.  the 
XQAKEOc  oü86's  of  Hades  in  epic,  e.  g.  11.8.15,  Hes.  Th.  811,  and  the  schol. 
ad  57  [p.  9  De  Marco]:  "4)>1Qi  8E  '  ATroAXö6wpos  8L'  aOTOÜ  KaTOaaLV 
ELvaL  ELS  "AL8ov"),  9  haunted  by  the  dreadful  daughters  of  Earth  and 
primordial  Darkness  (39-40)10  -a  fact  which  would  normally  exclude 
any  notion  of  civic  life  (note  again  äeLKTO(;  o,  8'  OLKIITÖC,  39).  Still,  as 
we  learn  from  the  Stranger,  the  deme  Colonus  is  [o1K11TÖc]  KaL  KapTa 
(65),  the  grove  is  the  `stay  of  Athens'  (58  EpELa  i'  'A811vc3011  and  the 
chthonic  Semnai  coexist,  somewhat  paradoxically,  with  the  Olympian 
deities  of  the  official  cult  (54-56):  note  that  both  in  40  and  in  54  the 
same  verb,  namely  E  XE  Lv,  is  used;  12  thus,  the  whole  place  is  incorporated 
9  See  also  Jebb  (ad  57),  Gruppe  (1912:  361-64),  Kamerbeek  (ad  56-58).  Contra 
Robert  (1915:  1.23ff.  ). 
10  The  terms  Erinyes,  Eumenides  or  Semnai  will  be  used  interchangeably,  since 
these  three  names,  in  Greek  literature  at  least,  reflect  only  different  aspects  of 
the  same  deities:  see  most  recently  (against  A.  L.  Brown,  QZ  n.  s.  34  [1987]  260-81) 
Lloyd-Jones  (1990:  208-11),  with  special  reference  to  CD;  also  Henrichs  (1984:  264 
with  n.  39)  on  their  association  in  Athenian  cult  (despite  his  reservations  on 
their  cultic  associations  in  general).  On  the  connection  between  Eumenides  and 
Erinyes  in  the  CL  see  Linforth's  (1951:  96),  Knox's  (1964:  194  n.  12)  and 
Blundell's  (1989:  257)  important  remarks  (contra  Di  Benedetto  [1983:  241  n.  62]  ). 
Such  views  as  Krummen's  (1993:  201),  namely  that  "the  semnai  theai  are  so 
peaceful  in  this  play  and  exclusively  referred  to  as  `Eumenides'  (not  as 
Erinyes)"  are  misleading:  the  Chorus'  attitude  to  the  goddesses'  grove  (125-33) 
indicates  anything  but  peacefulness;  while  it  is  their  dreadful  aspect  as  Erinyes 
that  Oedipus  invokes  when  cursing  his  sons  (1391). 
11  On  E  pc  tap  a  see  Kirkwood  (1986:  104-105). 
12  OnE'XELV  in  this  context  cf.  Krummen  (1993:  195  n.  9).  That  the  Erinyes  were 
thought  of  as  somewhat  incompatible  with  the  Olympian  gods  is,  I  think, 
adequately  evidenced.  Even  if  the  distinction  drawn  in  A.  Eu.  71-73  (EITEIL  KaKÖV  I 
QK6TOV  VEýLOVTQL  [sc.  'EpLVÜES]  TapTapov  6  ÜAÖ  X60Vbs, 
I  LLa1 
LaT  QVsp(JV  KaL 
6EWV'0XV[LTth  v)  is  thought  to  be  too  clear-cut,  one  must  also  take  into  account 196 
into  the  framework  of  the  city,  whereas  at  the  same  time  it  paradoxically 
lies  (in  more  than  one  aspect)  beyond  it.  13 
The  ambivalence  of  the  place  seems  to  be  fully  embraced  by 
Oedipus.  '4  For  the  reason  why  he  proclaims  himself  determined  to  make 
his  abode  in  this  place  (see  esp.  90  98pav 
... 
ýEVbaTaaLV,  92 
oiK1  YavTa15),  is,  it  seems,  the  fact  that  it,  precisely,  lacks  all  traits  of  a 
civilized  dwelling.  it  is  significant,  Oedipus  says,  that  he  sat  on  this 
POOpov 
... 
äaKETrapvov  (101),  this  visual  symbol  of  the  wilderness  (cf. 
above  p.  194  with  n.  7),  and  also  that  he  has  come  to  a  place  whose 
that,  e.  g.,  sacrifices  to  them  differed  from  those  offered  to  the  other  gods  in 
that  they  should  not  contain  wine  (Henrichs  [1983:  97  with  n.  521  reminds  us 
that  wineless  libations  had  a  distinctly  abnormal  and  `liminal'  character,  does 
this  not  imply  a  `regular  irregularity',  an  abnormality  inherent  in  the  very 
nature  of  the  Eumenides?  )  and  that  they  were  performed  at  night,  wpav 
oü8EV0,  s  KOLV  VOiv  (A.  Eu.  108-109);  also,  people  did  not  greet  them  when 
passing  by  their  sanctuary  (130ff.  ),  which  was  clearly  against  common  Greek 
practice.  On  Olympian  and  chthonic  see  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  269), 
Burkert  (1985a:  199-203),  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  95  n.  9)  and  esp.  S. 
Scullion,  ClAnt  13  (1994)  75-119. 
13The  paradox  that  dominates  Colonus  (it  is  habitable  and  non-habitable  at  the 
same  time)  has  been  noticed  by  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  339),  and  fully 
explored  by  Segal  (1981:  364-65,371-72);  cf.  also  Gould  (1973:  90)  on  "the 
primitively  mysterious  power  of  boundaries  and  thresholds"  in  the  X.  This 
ambivalence  has  not  been  understood  by  Krummen  (1993:  196  and  passim). 
Vidal-Naquet  (1986a:  205-208),  Blundell  (1993:  287;  cf.  288)  and  Easterling  (1994) 
rightly  stress  the  liminal  character  of  Colonus  in  relation  -to  the  Athenian 
polis,  while  Walker  (1995:  174-75)  perceives  the  sharp  distinction  drawn 
between  the  city  of  Athens  and  Colonus. 
14  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  363-64),  Easterling  (1994). 
15  This  is  the  MSS.  reading,  rightly  preferred  by  the  editors  to  Hermann's  OiKl.  a- 
.  See  jebb  (ad  92f.  ). 197 
`inhabitants',  the  Semnai,  share  with  him  a  distinctive  trait,  16  namely 
abstinence  from  wine  (100  vtjýwv  äo(voLc)  -  wine  being 
characteristically  a  trait  of  civilized  life  (see  e.  g.  S.  Ph.  715:  the  outcast 
[a'TroXLs,  1018]  Philoctetes  has  not  tasted  wine  for  ten  years).  17  It  is  this 
ambivalent  `uninhabitable  abode'  that,  paradoxically,  will  provide  the 
setting  for  Oedipus'  reintegration  into  the  framework  of  the  polis. 
It  is  a  further  paradox  that  Oedipus'  course  towards  integration  is 
initiated  with  a  violation  of  the  vöµLµa  of  the  very  place  into  which  he 
wishes  (cf.  12-13)  to  integrate:  his  firm  intention  to  settle  in  the  grove  (45 
T  oüX  E6pac  yfj  18  TTia8'  äv  E  X6oLµ'  ETL)  marks  a  first  reversal  of 
the  polls'  order,  the  V%UL  La  are  violated  (167-68  apaTwv  w  ropag,  `Lva 
16  On  Oedipus'  "kinship"  with  the  Erinyes  see  further  Winnington-Ingram 
(1980:  267-68),  Segal  (1981:  375-76)  and  Blundell  (1989:  257-58);  cf.  also  Kirkwood 
(1958:  62)  and  Wallace  (1979:  41).  Contra  Linforth  (1951:  94). 
17  On  wineless  libations  in  general  see  Henrichs  (1984:  257-60).  Fitton-Brown 
(1976:  103-105)  has  denied  that  vi4wv  äolvoLS  denotes  an  affinity  between 
Oedipus  and  the  Eumenides,  but  the  alternative  interpretation  he  propounds  is 
strained  and  rather  irrelevant,  whereas  he  himself  (ibid.  104)  accepts  that  we 
have  to  recognize  a  kind  of  affinity  -even  a  "negative"  one  -between  the  man 
and  the  goddesses.  This  is  also  admitted  by  Henrichs  (1983:  93  n.  25),  who 
nevertheless  explains  the  passage  in  terms  of  "ritual  reciprocity"  between 
Oedipus  (the  potential  worshipper  -  by  way  of  wineless  offerings  -  of  the 
deities)  and  the  Eumenides  (the  potential  receivers  of  Oedipus'  wineless 
offerings).  Nonetheless,  one  should  view  line  100  in  its  wider  context,  which 
undoubtedly  suggests  an  affinity  between  Oedipus  and  the  Eumenides  -  an 
affinity  which  I  trust  is  best  explained  with  my  consideration  of  the  antitheses 
between  civilized  life  in  the  polls  and  lack  of  civilization  in  the  wild. 
18  The  MSS.  reading  yfj  is  significant,  because  it  denotes  Oedipus'  special  bond 
with  the  land  in  which  he  intends  to  settle  (cf.  Allison  [1984:  72];  Edmunds 
[1996:  46  with  n.  20;  101  with  n.  42]).  Therefore,  it  should  not  be  changed  into  -ye 
(Musgrave,  printed  by  Pearson  [1923]  and  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  [1990a])  or  y' 
EK  (Tournier).  See  Jebb  (ad  45),  Kamerbeek  (ad  44-46).  The  arguments  put 
forward  by  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  215)  have  been  adequately  answered 
by  Bremer  (1993:  99-100). 198 
TrdnL  yöuos;  cf.  142  dvoµov),  and  the  sacred  becomes  profane  (cf.  52 
IE3T1KaµEv,  harking  back  to  10  ßE  3iXoLS;  cf.  also  56  ETrLaTE(ßELS  with  37 
TraTE  Lv;  also  126  QaTL3E 
,  155-57  TrE  päS  ...  TrE  päS  ...  TrpoTrE  a1,  j5,  and  167 
apaTwv).  This  is  later  emphasized  anew  by  the  Chorus  (117-36):  whereas 
people  normally  avoid  any  utterance  or  glance  when  passing  by  the 
Eumenides'  grove  (129-33),  this  foreigner  (123-24  TrXaväTaS  ...  o,  8 
EyXu)poS)  has  reversed  the  normal  order,  for  now  the  Chorus  are  obliged 
to  speak  and  look  (118,121-22,134).  19  The  paradox  is  further  enhanced 
when  we  learn  that  the  violation  of  this  sacrosanct  (39)  territory  has  been 
prompted,  insofar  as  it  was  prophesied,  by  Apollo  himself  (86-93,  cf.  101- 
103)120  Thus,  there  emerges  a  tension  between  the  Erinyes  and  Apollo 
which  has  to  be  resolved  (86),  21  so  that  the  god's  oracle  may  not  be 
thwarted  (cf.  102-103),  and  Oedipus  may  be  admitted  into  the  sanctuary 
and  `entertained'  (90  eEVÖQTaaLV)  by  the  Semnai.  Consequently, 
Oedipus,  although  he  feels  he  has  been  summoned  there  by  the 
19  It  seems  that  the  disjunction  Oedipus  has  used  with  reference  to  the  place  (10 
f1  Trpöc  1EI1  1c  fi  Trpok  äX«EVLv  OECSv)  turns  out  to  have  been  ironically 
significant:  the  grove  is  an  äa  oc  Oc6v  which  has  become  ßEßilAov  because 
Oedipus  has  trespassed  on  it.  This  threatened  collapse  of  the  distinction  between 
sacred  and  profane  is  associated  with  the  danger  of  confusion  of  social 
categories  -a  danger  inherent  in  the  very  act  of  supplication,  as  Gould  (1973: 
90,100,101)  has  pointed  out.  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  366-67). 
20  On  the  paradox  of  the  grove's  being  forbidden  to  all,  yet  reserved  for  one  see 
Birge  (1984:  14-15,17). 
21  One  should  perhaps  compare  the  situation  in  Aeschylus'  Eumenides,  where  a 
similar  tension  exists  between  Apollo  and  the  Erinyes.  Cf.  Winnington-Ingram 
(1980:  265  n.  48). 199 
Eumenides  themselves  (97-98),  22  knows  that  he  has  to  propitiate  them  all 
the  same  (84-110).  23 
To  conclude,  two  main  paradoxes  have  suggested  themselves  so  far: 
first,  the  setting  for  Oedipus'  incorporation  into  the  polis  will  be  provided 
by  a  markedly  un-civic  and  uncivilized  place;  and  second,  Oedipus' 
course  towards  political  integration  is  initiated  by  a  violation  of  the  polis' 
BEQµoL,  while  his  fulfilment  of  Apollo's  oracle  must  run  counter  to  the 
prerogatives  of  another  divine  power,  namely  the  Eumenides. 
4.2.1  Oedlnus  embarks  on  his  integration 
Oedipus'  willingness  to  learn,  and  comply  with,  the  land's  vöµLµa  is 
voiced  already  at  the  outset  (12-13).  24  It  Is  noteworthy  that  this  gradual 
compliance  Is  theatrically  enacted  through  Oedipus'  movements  on  the 
stage:  the  more  his  eagerness  to  comply  with  the  vöµLµa  is  manifested, 
the  further  he  moves  away  from  the  wild,  forbidden  grove,  and  the  closer 
he  comes  to  the  civilized,  civic  space  of  Colonus.  Thus,  when  he  first 
appears  before  the  Chorus  of  citizens  (138ff.  )  standing  inside  the  grove,  he 
implores  them  not  to  regard  him  as  a  lawless  one  (142  ävoµov);  after  a 
while,  when  he  is  exhorted  by  the  Chorus  to  stand  and  address  them 
22  OnTr-re  pöv  ('omen',  `sign')  see  L.  Campbell  (ad  97),  Jebb  (ad  97),  Kamerbeek 
(ad  96-98). 
23  Note  Oedipus'  apologetic  persistence  on  his  act  of  encroachment  (84-85  E8pac 
I  ... 
EKagtßi',  90E6pav  ... 
ýEvÖaTaaLV,  100ýCopTiv)  and  his  plea  for  acceptance  (86, 
96-98,101-10). 
24  Oedipus'  "docility  and  eagerness  to  be  instructed  in  matters  of  religion"  is 
also  demonstrated  by  Knox  (1964:  151-52  with  n.  16)  ä  propos  of  464-85. 200 
"where  it  is  lawful  for  all"  (168  `Lva  TräQL  vö  o  , 
25  and  accepts 
Antigone's  suggestion  that  they  must  conform  to  the  customs  of  the 
äaTO'L  (171-72),  he  starts  to  move  out  of  the  sacrosanct  ground  (173ff.; 
note  the  verbs  denoting  movement:  175  µETavaaTäc,  179  ET1  Pa7LVE26 
Tropao,  180-81  Trpoß(ßaIE,  Kovpa,  TröpaU,  182  gTrEO);  finally,  the  Chorus' 
command  (184-87)  that  Oedipus  fully  comply  with  the  city's  settled 
predilections  and  dislikes  (with  its  whole  political  framework,  that  is)27  is 
met  by  Oedipus'  complete  agreement,  and  is  followed  by  his  settling  in 
permitted  ground  (189  E1QEßiac  &1TLßa(vovTEc),  28  and  indeed  on  a  13f  is 
(192)  -a  term  which  inevitably  recalls  the  assembly  of  the  people.  29  This 
settling  of  Oedipus  is  given  in  remarkable  detail:  the  Chorus  bid'him  stop 
at  a  certain  point  (192-93  aüTO0'  N.  11KETL  ... 
EýW  Tro8a  KXiv1  s,  194  Rig) 
and  sit  down  (195-96)  -  an  action  that  is  focused  on  through  its 
detailed  description  (197-202).  30  This  prolongation  of  Oedipus'  settling 
25  The  term  McFXa  (167)  might  also  have  political  connotations  (="serious  and 
authoritative  discussion  that  takes  place  in  a  political  assembly  of  the  people": 
Walker  [1995:  176]).  In  that  case,  the  idea  of  Oedipus'  compliance  with  Athenian 
political  vöpLµa  is  all  the  more  underlined. 
26  ETL  ßctLVE  Reiske:  ETTLßaLVE  codd. 
27  On  the  use  of  the  perfect  tense  TETpo4)EV  in  this  context  see  Jebb's  (ad  186) 
excellent  remarks.  Cf.  also  Daly  (1986b:  67-68). 
28  Jebb  (ad  189ff.  )  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  188-191)  rightly  remark  that  the  literal 
(as  well  as  the  figurative)  meaning  of  ETTLßaLVOVTES  is  clearly  to  be  perceived 
here.  On  EüvE  (3(ac  see  Birge's  (1984:  15-16)  interesting  remarks. 
29  Cf.,  en  passant,  Edmunds  (1996:  51).  This  ßfµa  must  be  different  from  the 
dCETrOs  TrETpoS  of  line  19  (Jebb  [ad  192ff.  ]);  and  if  the  MSS.  &VTLTrETpOU  (or  the 
word  that  has  been  ousted  by  it)  could  be  understood  as  implying  that  "ä  la 
pierre  non  taillee  sur  laquelle  etait  installe  Oedipe  s'  oppose  un  degre  taille" 
(Vidal-Naquet  [1986a:  209  n.  95]),  then  Oedipus'  progress  from  the  wild  towards 
civilization  would  be  all  the  more  stressed. 
30  On  the  singularity  of  the  whole  scene  see  Jones  (1962:  219);  cf.  Allison  (1984: 
72-73). 201 
down  is  certainly  meant  to  recall  and  ann  ulft  the  lack  of  fixity  that 
characterized  his  life  so  far.  One  remembers  that  Oedipus  has  been 
almost  continuously  on  the  move:  after  a  long  journey  (20)  he  finally  sat 
on  a  rock  (19),  which  however  he  was  soon  forced  to  leave  withdrawing 
into  the  grove  (113-14),  whence  he  came  forth  again  after  a  while  (138). 
Now  this  continuous  and  painful  movement  must  stop. 
Up  to  this  point  it  was  Oedipus  who,  being  TTXaVaTas  o1')8'  EyXWpos 
(124-25),  has  been  running  counter  to  the  polls'  customs  and  rules,  by  his 
trespassing  upon  the  sanctuary.  Now,  however,  it  is  exactly  this  äTr6TroXLS 
(208)  who,  veering  though  he  is  between  the  polls  and  the  outdoors,  will 
teach  the  Coloniate  citizens  to  respect  their  own  rules  and  customs!  For 
the  Chorus,  as  soon  as  they  realize  Oedipus'  identity,  forcefully  summon 
him  to  leave  their  polls  and  regress  to  the  wild  whence  he  has  come. 
Oedipus,  however,  is  in  a  position  to  reproach  the  Coloniates  for  this 
violation  of  the  v6p  qia  of  their  own  country:  Athens'  reputation  for 
eEOQE[ELa  (260,  cf.  277-81;  note  the  resulting  ring-composition)  will 
prove  to  be  false  (258-59),  if  they  expel  a  suppliant  despite  their  promise 
(176-77,  cf.  227,263-64).  The  Chorus'  annulment  of  their  own  laws  is  all 
the  more  stressed  by  the  fact  that,  while  casting  Oedipus  out  of  their 
land,  they  use  the  same  language  as  when  they  invited  him  to  leave 
forbidden  ground  and  approach  the  part  of  the  land  where  it  is  lawful  for 
all  to  stand:  31  226  EýW  TTÖpaw  ßaIVETE  Xw'pas  (contr.  179  ETL  ßatVE 
Tr6paW),  232  EKTOTTO(;  (contr.  119  EKT6TTLOC  GVeEIC),  234  dýopµos  Eµds 
XOOVÖC  EKeopE  (contr.  162-64  ILETdaTae',  MTOPCOL.  TTOX\  KEXEVeoc 
EpaTÜoL32),  235-36  µßj  TL  TTEpa  XpEOc  I  Eµd  Tr6XEL  TTpoadgM  c  (contr. 
153-54  ob  µäv  Ev  y'  E1101  I  TTpoaerjrnl  Täa6'  äpäc).  Having  adopted 
the  Coloniates'  polis-standards  (184-91),  the  two  Thebans  are  now,  as 
31  Cf.  Walker  (1995:  177  with  n.  24). 
32  EparüoL  Musgrave  :  -GEL  codd. 202 
Antigone  says,  practically  their  kinspeople  (245-46),  who  can  appeal  to 
the  patriotic  values  of  the  Coloniates  (250-5133),  in  order  to  induce  them 
not  to  annihilate  the  vöµLµa  of  their  own  home,  and  not  to  denigrate  the 
splendour  of  Athens  by  indulging  in  Epya  avöQLa  (282-83). 
Oedipus'  impetus  to  be  incorporated  into  the  city's  body  is  such 
that  he  not  only  readjusts  the  locals  to  the  observance  of  their  vöµLµa, 
but  also  effects  a  kind  of  reconciliation  between  them  and  the  central 
authority,  the  KaT'  äJTV  ßaaLXEVc  (67).  For  it  seems  that  (surprising 
though  this  may  sound)  a  sort  of  political  rift  exists  between  the 
Coloniates  and  their  king.  The  Coloniate  Stranger  has  already  declared 
that  he  would  refer  the  matter  of  Oedipus'  supplication  to  the  EvO68' 
avTo  D  Slpµ  TaL  -  who  constitute  some  kind  of  local  authority  as  appears 
from  145  Tfia8'  E4opoL  Xw'pas  (cf.  831  yfs  aVaKTEs,  1348  ävspES  Trja6E 
8tlµoOXoL  X6ovös)34  -  and  not  to  "those  in  the  äaTv",  (78),  a  fact  that 
reveals  perhaps  an  underlying  resentfulness,  on  the  Coloniates'  part,  at 
the  fact  that  their  land  is  officially  administered  by  "the  king  in  the 
aOl-u"  (67).  35  Now,  however,  the  dispute  becomes  instantly  settled:  the 
Stranger,  despite  his  expressed  intention  to  refer  the  matter  only  to  his 
fellow-demesmen,  turns  out  to  have  gone  to  Athens,  in  order  to  fetch  the 
king  himself  (297-98)  -  the  king  who,  is  no  longer  the  KaT  '  daTu 
33  Elmsley's  oLicoüEV,  instead  of  the  MSS.  EK  vEOEV  or  EKa9EV  seems  indispensable; 
cf.  Ph.  469.  On  the  patriotic  ring  of  Antigone's  appeal  at  250-1  cf.  e.  g.  A.  Pers. 
402-5. 
34  See  Walker  (1995:  175).  Burton's  (1980:  295)  attempt  to  reduce  the  Chorus  to 
"simple  countrymen"  and  mere  guardians  of  the  grove  is  rightly  criticized  by 
Gardiner  (1987:  110  with  n.  38). 
35  As  Walker  (1995:  175)  remarks  (but  in  reference  to  297,  which  seems  to  me 
wrong;  cf.  below  n.  37),  the  word  ä  rrv  (unlike  the  ambiguous  iröAi.  S)  opposes  the 
city  to  Colonus,  and  may  imply  a  touch  of  resentment  on  the  Coloniates'  part.  Cf. 
Allison  (1984:  69-70).  Contra  Blundell  (1989:  44,125-27),  (1993:  295);  Edmunds 
(1996:  103).  Cf.  above  n.  2. 203 
ßaaiXEÜc,  but  TijaÖE  yfjs  ävaý  (cf.  294-95;  contrast  the  Coryphaeus' 
explicitness  with  Oedipus'  carefully  vague  wording  [289]:  v  t(V  öaTL9 
EQTLV  iry¬µhv),  36  whereas  the  ä6TU  is  now  significantly  termed  TraTpwov 
(297),  37  and  viewed  as  an  organic  part  of  their  land  (297  yTis).  One  may 
maintain  that  this  reinforcement  of  the  deme's  bonds  with  the  iaTu 
comes  down  to  a  reassertion  of  the  spirit  of  Theseus'  colossal  political 
reform,  namely  the  Synoikismos.  38  Paradoxically,  the  upheaval  in  the 
structures  of  the  polls  caused  by  the  presence  of  the  ävoµoc  Theban  has 
nonetheless  brought  about  for  his  hosts  an  invigorated  sense  of 
attachment  to  their  V%R[ta,  as  well  as  a  fresh  atmosphere  of  concord 
with  their  king. 
4.2.2  The  Ismene  scene 
The  anomalies  that  denigrated  Athens'  image  as  a  city  of  eunomic  order 
having  been  smoothed  away,  there  comes,  as  a  foil,  its  negative  mirror- 
image,  namely  Thebes  (or  the  "anti-Athens",  as  it  has  been  termed,  39 
36  Cf.  Edmunds  (1996:  104).  Kamerbeek  (ad  288-91)  has  missed  the  point. 
37  This  can  mean  Theseus'  hereditary  kingdom,  but  also  (in  spite  of  Jebb  [ad 
297]  and  Kamerbeek  [ad  296-298])  the  people's  patrimonial  possession.  So  297 
does  not  necessarily  imply  resentment,  as  Walker  (1995:  175)  thought  (cf.  above 
n.  35). 
38  Ancient  sources:  Thuc.  2.15.2,  Isoc.  10.35,  Plut.  Thes.  24  with  Ampolo  & 
Manfredini  (1988:  ad  loc.  ).  Cf.  Krummen  (1993:  202):  "the  concept  of  the 
synoikismos  appears  in  the  fact  that  the  deme  is  both  a  self-contained  unit  and 
oriented  towards  a  strong  centre,  the  city,  by  which  it  is  also  ruled".  On  the 
concept  of  Synoikismos  in  the  history  of  the  political  origins  of  Athens  and 
Rome  see  J.  Cobet  in  P.  Oliva  &  A.  Frolikovä  (eds),  Concilium  Eirene  XVI,  Vol.  I 
(Prague  1983)  21-6. 
39  Zeitlin  (1990:  144-50);  cf.  Vidal-Naquet  (1986a:  181-82). 204 
being  Athens'  anomic  counterpart).  Ismene's  unexpected  arrival  (310ff.  ) 
will  serve  to  reveal  all  aspects  of  Theban  disorder  as  opposed,  one  by  one, 
to  Athenian  ordered  life.  To  begin  with,  Oedipus,  as  soon  as  he  learns  that 
his  sons  E  CT 
.  oüTrEp  J  UL  (336),  i.  e.  have  not  followed  Ismene,  bursts  into 
a  fierce  tirade,  in  which  he  voices  his  indignation  at  the  fact  that  his 
sons'  behaviour  has  caused  the  vöµLµa  in  Thebes  to  undergo  a  radical 
reversal.  Alluding,  perhaps,  to  the  homonymy  between  Greek  and 
Egyptian  Thebes,  he  declares  that  Eteocles  and  Polyneices,  by  remaining  at 
home  and  letting  their  sisters  toil  for  their  father,  have  adopted  the 
Egyptian  customs  (337  Tots  Ev  ALyüTrTq)  vö  oLc),  according  to  which 
men  are  to  stay  at  home  and  do  the  housework,  whereas  women  labour 
to  win  the  daily  bread.  Considering  now  that  Sophocles  is  certainly 
alluding  to  Herodotus'  (2.35.2)  statement  that  ALyüTrTLOL  [...  ]  Ta  Tro»ä 
TTQVTa  EInrQ..  LV  TOZ(TL  d.  XOLQL  610061TOLQL  EaTTQaVTO  7  QEQ  TE  KQL 
vbitouS,  4°  the  extent  of  Theban  anomia  can  be  fully  comprehended. 
However,  it  will  soon  become  obvious  that  the  reversal  of  vöµLµa  in 
Thebes  does  not  consist  only  in  that  Oedipus'  sons  have  unduly  remained 
at  home,  but  also  in  that  they  have  not  made  sure  that  they  both  stay  at 
home!  To  put  It  more  clearly,  Ismene  tells  us  that  Eteocles,  albeit  being 
younger,  has  deprived  his  elder  brother  of  the  throne  and  has  cast  him 
out  of  the  land  (376);  the  anomic  character  of  this  act  is  brought  out  by 
the  extreme  emphasis  on  the  violation  of  Polyneices'  primogeniture:  374 
VE(XWV  KaL  XPOVGJ  ýIEI  )V  'YE'Ytc,  375  TÖV  1Tp6QOE  'YEVV116EVTa 
TloXuvE(Kr!.  41  So,  Thebes,  being  initially  ordered  and  united  (367-69),  42 
40  See  Jebb  (ad  337),  Daly  (1986a:  79-80). 
41  Cf.  Burian  (1974:  424  n.  38).  Blundell  (1989:  244-45)  tries  unsuccessfully  to 
undervalue  the  importance  of  primogeniture. 
42  At  367  the  MSS.  ijv  EPLS  cannot  stand:  Thebes  is  clearly  viewed  as 
degenerating  from  a  state  of  unanimity  to  a  state  of  strife  and  disorder; 
therefore,  Brunck's  ijPEQEV  (revived  by  Winnington-Ingram  [1979:  11],  and 205 
has  become  the  city  of  strife  (372  Epis  KaKrl),  unlike  Athens  that  (as  we 
have  seen)  has  moved  in  the  opposite  direction. 
Thus,  the  image  of  Thebes  as  anti-Athens  is  now  complete,  and  at 
this  point  Oedipus'  willingness  to  integrate  into  Athens,  having  already 
been  `positively'  displayed  (by  his  eagerness  to  adopt  the  polls'  vöµLµa), 
is  also  `negatively'  confirmed  by  his  desire  to  cut  himself  off  from  his 
Theban  past  (421-60).  His  momentary  hesitation  as  he  veers  between  his 
old  and  his  new  polls  (406-407)  Oedipus  overcomes  immediately,  and 
proceeds  by  giving  vent  to  his  anger  in  a  second  tirade,  in  which  he 
declares  the  reasons  why  he  denounces  so  categorically  his  fatherland.  As 
one  should  expect,  he  resorts  mainly  to  political  arguments:  for  one 
thing,  he  says,  he  was  violently  cast  away  (note  the  technical  terms  428 
TraTpi6oc  E  AoüµEVOV,  43  429  äväßTaToc,  44  430  &  444  #y(jf;,  45  442 
ijXauvE46)..  What  is  more,  Thebes  will  place  him  at  a  borderline  area  just 
outside  its  boundaries  (399-405;  cf.  602,785),  unlike  Athens  that  is  about 
to  provide  a  stable  space  within  its  territory  for  him  to  settle  in  (Colonus' 
marginal  and  ambivalent  character,  albeit  clearly  established  in  the 
prologue,  is  for  the  time  being  glossed  over,  see  further  section  4.2.3). 
Therefore,  not  only  will  he  refuse  to  offer  himself  as  an  ally  to  the  polls 
printed  by  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  [1990a];  cf.  [1990b:  227])  is  preferable.  Vidal- 
Naquet  (1986a:  183  with  n.  20)  refers  to  the  Hesiodic  (Cp.  11ff.  )  concept  of 
`double  Eris'  (=good  and  bad  strife);  cf.  Daly  (1986a:  86-87):  according  to  this 
view,  Oedipus'  sons  would  move  from  a  good,  constructive  pis  (367)  to  a  bad, 
disastrous  one  (372).  Surely,  however,  Oedipus'  sons  could  not  have  competed 
against  each  other  in  order  to  leave  the  throne  to  Creon. 
43  For  the  use  Of  ECAEtaOaL  in  a  political  context  see  below  770,1296,1363  and 
cf.  Hdt.  4.13,5.124. 
44  See  LSJ  s.  v.,  1.1  for  instances. 
45  See  LSJ  s.  v.,  I. 
'6  Cf.  the  political  uses  Of  CL1TEka  VELV  and  EtEXCtüVELV  (instances  in  LSJ  s.  vv.  ).  On 
Oedipus'  blaming  of  the  polis,  here  as  well  as  at  5  10-48,  see  Knox  (1983:  22-23). 206 
(456)  that  has  expelled  him  (450),  but  also  he  will  energetically  league 
with  the  polls  in  which  he  has  just  been  incorporated  (459)  against  the 
one  he  has  just  denounced  (458-60).  47 
4.2.3  8oü  vüO  Ka±  6v  TWVBE  Bat  iu  i  wv:  the  ritual  offerin  S  to  rl oaE 
the  Eumenides  and  the  restoration  of  vöiioc 
0 
The  ensuing  ritual  to  the  Eumenides  marks  Oedipus'  complete 
admittance  into  his  new  land,  and  seals  the  restoration  of  order  that  has 
been  disrupted  by  transgressions  and  violations  of  vopn  to  on  the  part 
both  of  Oedipus  (with  his  trespassing  on  the  sanctuary  of  the  Eumenides) 
and  of  the  Coloniates  (who  broke  their  promise  trying  to  expel  the 
suppliant).  Naturally  enough,  a  V%HL  LOV  par  excellence,  namely  a  ritual, 
is  now  resorted  to  for  civic  order  to  be  restored:  the  KaOapµös,  on  the  one 
hand,  legitimizes  Oedipus'  presence  in  the  grove,  while  on  the  other  it 
releases  the  Coloniates  from  their  fear  of  the  Eumenides'  wrath  (490-92; 
contrast  e.  g.  39-40,126-33  etc.,  and  note  that  it  is  the  goddesses' 
benevolent  aspect  that  is  now  stressed:  486-87),  48  thus  obliterating  any 
possibility  of  their  indulging  again  in  anomic  practices  in  their  attempt 
to  protect  the  inviolability  of  their  vöµLµa.  The  detail  in  which  the  ritual 
is  described49  stresses  the  completeness  of  Oedipus'  compliance  with  every 
aspect  of  his  new  land's  vöµLµa,  even  with  the  most  idiosyncratic  (note 
47  Cf.  Slatkin's  (1986:  218)  fine  remarks,  although  she  adopts  a  different 
standpoint. 
48  On  this  double  function  of  the  ritual  cf.  Krummen  (1993:  197-98). 
49  Linforth  (1951:  141),  attempting  to  belittle  the  significance  of  the  religious 
element  in  the  play  (an  attempt  exemplified  in  an  extreme  form  in  Bröcker 
[1971:  46-9]),  fails  to  appreciate  the  meaning  of  this  ritual.  On  its  integrative 
function  see  rightly  Burkert  (1985b:  8-14,  esp.  12-3). 207 
that  the  Coloniate  Stranger  has  implied  that  the  cult  of  Eumenides  is 
peculiar  to  Colonus:  42-4350).  The  marginal  character  of  the  place 
(betwixt  and  between  the  polls  and  the  outdoors;  cf.  section  4.1.1)  seems 
no  longer  to  be  prominent:  now  it  is  the  existence  of  specific  vöµLµa,  of 
set  rules  and  customs,  that  is  underlined  by  means  of  the  detailed 
account  of  the  ritual.  The  antithesis  between  the  polls  (the  politically 
ordered  community,  with  its  set  rules  and  customs)  and  the  anomic  wild, 
an  antithesis  that  seemed  to  be  typical  of  Colonus,  is  clouded  over,  while 
the  implicit  tension  between  Apollo  and  the  Eumenides  is  finally 
resolved.  Oedipus  will  no  longer  be  a  trespasser,  for  he  is  at  last  `officially' 
(i.  e.  by  way  of  ritual)  accepted  into  a  place  where  he  is  to  settle  and 
remain  for  ever. 
The  lyric  dialogue  at  510-48  comes  as  a  conclusion  to  the 
description  of  the  ritual,  and  firmly  asserts  Oedipus'  position  within  the 
polls'  frame.  A  comparison  of  this  lyric  dialogue  with  the  previous 
`epirrhematic'  scene  of  138-253  (esp.  203-36)  proves  particularly 
instructive:  then  Oedipus  was  not  allowed  to  speak  because  he  stood  on 
forbidden  ground  (166-69,188-91),  51  whereas  now  he  is  not  only  free  to 
speak,  but  is  also  urged  by  the  Chorus  to  do  so  (510-20)  -  the  Chorus 
who  now  suggestively  implore  (519  LKE  TE  Ü(x))  52  the  former  suppliant  (cf. 
142  LKETEÜ(L);  he  is  no  longer  an  dvoµoc  outcast  (142,168)  but  has  been 
50  &Aa  8'  &NXaXOID  KaM  means  `in  other  places  other  v6ROL  are  practised':  cf. 
glut.  Them.  27  ()  CEVE,  VOROL  8L#EpouCiLV  äv6ptJTr(JV"  äMa  8'  äuNoLs  Kaki,  and 
see  further  L.  Campbell  (ad  43),  Kamerbeek  (ad  41-43).  Contra  Jebb  (ad  43), 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  264,267). 
51  Even  when  the  Chorus  bade  Oedipus  speak  (203ff.  ),  they  soon  regressed  and 
ordered  him  to  stop  and  leave  the  place  (226). 
52  This,  of  course,  is  only  `figurative  supplication',  as  Gould  (1973:  77)  has 
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offered  ýEvia  by  the  Coloniates  (515),  thus  becoming  a  member  of  the 
community. 
This  lyric  dialogue  also  shows  how  Oedipus'  newly  acquired  sense  of 
political  identity  may  constitute  the  background  for  a  fresh  vindication 
of  his  innocence.  Significantly,  he  draws  on  the  laws  of  his  new  polls  in 
order  to  defend  his  case:  Athenian  homicide  law  provided  that  a  killing 
was  justified  if  it  was  proved  to  have  been  committed  unintentionally53 
and  /  or  in  self-defence.  54  So,  Oedipus  contends  that  he  is  not  guilty  of 
parricide  (as  he  puts  it,  his  act  had  Trpös  8LKas  TL  [546],  and  he  is  vöµ(p 
KaOapös)  on  the  basis  precisely  of  these  two  provisos  of  Athenian  law:  he 
did  the  deed  unawares  (äL8pLs),  55  and  (if  Mekler's  restoration  of  547  is 
correct)  he  acted  in  self-defence:  Kai  yäp  äv,  oüs  EýOVEUQ,  'p' 
53  Ostwald  (1969:  47),  MacDowell  (1963:  45-47,58-69);  (1978:  114-16). 
54  MacDowell  (1978:  114).  Cf.  also  H.  Funke,  Die  sogenannte  tragische  Schuld. 
Studien  zur  Rechtsidee  in  dergriechischen  Tragödie  (Diss.  Köln  1963),  54-62:  an 
Athenian  lawcourt  would  have  acquitted  Oedipus  on  the  grounds  that  his  act 
was  committed  in  self-defence  without  premeditation.  See  now  Edmunds  (1996: 
134-8). 
55  Oedipus'  killing  of  Laius,  albeit  not  involuntary,  was  committed  without 
knowledge  of  the  victim's  identity:  since  cases  of  unwitting  parricide  (as  in  the 
case  of  Oedipus)  do  not  seem  to  have  been  taken  into  account  in  Attic  law,  one 
has  to  accept  that  the  important  distinction  (fundamental  in  Attic  law:  see 
above  n.  53)  between  act  and  intention,  which  Oedipus  draws  here,  is 
justification  enough  for  his  past  act:  see  Arist.  EN  1109b30-11b3,  and  esp. 
1135a28-30;  cf.  e.  g.  Blundell  (1989:  249  with  n.  79),  Bowra  (1944:  317), 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  261-62).  I  am  grateful  to  Professor  D.  M.  MacDowell 
for  discussing  this  matter  with  me. 209 
äTrc3Xeaav.  56  Obviously  he  now  picks  up  and  rounds  off  the  twofold 
argument  he  put  forward  (rather  tentatively)  at  270-74,57  namely  that  he 
acted  in  ignorance  as  well  as  in  self-defence.  Moreover,  he  now  attempts 
(practically  for  the  first  time;  contrast  270-74)  to  justify  his  incest  too, 
again  in  terms  of  the  polis.  58  His  marriage  to  his  own  mother  was  not  his 
own  choice  (cf.  539  0I')  EpEýa),  but  a  political  decision  by  the  city  of 
Thebes  (cf.  525  TrOXis,  541  Trö?  os59),  which  he  accepted  in  ignorance 
(525  oiu8EV  L8pLV):  the  harm  that  one  polls  (Thebes)  has  done  can  be 
undone  by  another  polls  (Athens)  which  provides  the  necessary  legal 
framework  (i.  e.  the  all-important  distinction  between  act  and  intention 
[cf.  n.  53])  for  Oedipus  to  vindicate  his  innocence. 
4.3.1  The  Theseus  scene:  Oedipus  ?  LLTroALc.  Transition  to  the 
second  part  of  the  play:  the  first  signs  of  reversal 
The  intense  struggle  we  have  been  witnessing  since  the  outset  between 
Oedipus  the  newcomer  and  the  Coloniate  citizens  (a  struggle  the 
56  Mekler's  text  is  printed  by  Jebb;  see  however  Burton's  (1980:  263) 
misgivings;  cf.  also  Ulrich  von  Wilamowitz  in  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz  (1917:  349 
n.  1),  who  has  put  forward  (ibid.  349)  an  interpretation  along  the  same  lines 
(on  the  basis  of  Dem.  23.53),  reading  Hermann's  ä  oi'c  for  the  MSS  &  ouc.  Even 
if,  as  Howe  (1962:  140-41)  proposes,  we  regard  as  a  Sophoclean  innovation  the 
plea  that  one  should  not  be  considered  as  guilty  who  kills  even  his  father  in 
self-defence,  Oedipus  still  appeals  to  the  `self-defence'  proviso  of  Attic  law. 
Rosenmeyer  (1952:  96-97)  is  entirely  unjustified  in  dismissing  Oedipus'  apology 
as  specious. 
57  On  the  connection  between  the  two  scenes  cf.  Burton 
_(1980: 
262-63).  Lesky 
(1952:  101)  does  not  see  the  point  of  this  seeming  reiteration. 
58  Reinhardt  (1979:  207). 
59  Hermann's  slight  correction  of  the  MSS.  zrS)E  is  thematically  appropriate 
(cf.  525)  and  should  be  retained,  pace  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990a)  -cf.  (1990b: 
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Coloniate  Stranger  had  succinctly  encapsulated  in  a  disjunction:  µ(µvELV 
11  7ropE6E(AaL  Tr6kv  80),  seems  to  have  reached  an  end.  Oedipus  has  at 
last  wholeheartedly  complied  with  the  vöµoL  of  his  new  polls,  and  has 
been  incorporated  into  the  political  framework  within  which  his  blessings 
will  be  fully  manifested  and  conferred  on  the  polls:  being  EW  roXLS  6o 
(637),  he  will  pay  proper  6aaµös  to  his  new  land  (635)  by  protecting 
them  against  their  enemies  (576-78,621-23).  Theseus  merely  ratifies 
Oedipus'  integration  into  the  polis  -  an  integration  that  has  been 
essentially  effected  with  the  ritual  to  the  Eumenides.  Significantly, 
Theseus  picks  up  where  the  Chorus  have  left  off,  taking  over  from  them 
and  rounding  off  the  procedure  of  Oedipus'  admission:  he  begins  by 
expressing  his  pity  (556)  for  the  stranger,  whereas  the  Chorus  had  begun 
with  downright  hostility  (226),  moved  on  to  fear  (292  TapßEty)  and  only 
at  461  (KaTOLKTLQal)  did  they  end  up  pitying  him.  Theseus  is  not  afraid 
of  listening  to  or  looking  at  Oedipus  (551  äKo  )wv,  554  ?  'n  as  iv61), 
whereas  for  the  Chorus  the  blind  man  was  SELVÖs  µEv  öpdv,  6E1v0'9  8E 
KXl  EW  (141);  finally,  Theseus  urges  Oedipus  to  speak  (557  'TrE  pE  Q6aL,  560 
SLSacKE,  561  ÄEýac,  575  8L8a(YX'),  whereas  the  Chorus  had  reached  this 
point  only  at  510-48.62  The  Theseus  scene  suggests  itself  as  the  end  of 
60  LTrokv  is  Musgrave's  widely  (and  correctly)  accepted  correction  of  the  MSS. 
E  tiraAw.  See  Jebb  (ad  637).  Vidal-Naquet  (1986a:  191-204)  does  not  favour  the 
emendation,  and  maintains  that  Oedipus  is  not  granted  full  citizenship,  but 
becomes  "un  meteque  privilegie"  (ibid.  204);  however,  it  is  no  use  to  pretend 
that  the  MSS.  E  urakv  makes  sense.  Vidal-Naquet's  view  is  justly  criticized  by 
Easterling  (1994). 
61  Nauck's  emendation  for  the  MSS.  dittography  (cf.  551)  Coco  u  v. 
62  Cf.  also  Burian  (1974:  414-15).  I  would  not,  as  Blundell  (1993:  292-93)  does, 
draw  too  sharp  a  distinction  between  the  Chorus'  religious  anxiety  about 
pollution  and  Theseus'  concern  for  ethics:  Theseus'  behaviour  is  rather  the 
culmination  and  ratification  of  the  Chorus'  progressively  changing  attitude. 
See  Slatkin  (1986:  219);  contra  Walker  (1995:  179). 211 
Oedipus'  long-lasting  troubles,  and  conveys  a  marked  feeling  of 
permanence  and  stability:  even  when  the  king  mentions  the  mutability 
of  the  human  condition  (562-64,566-68),  he  does  so  only  in  order  to 
stress  that  he  will  by  all  means  see  to  it  that,  in  Oedipus'  case,  the 
vicissitudes  of  fortune  come  to  an  end:  for  he  will  now  be  accepted  into 
Athens,  whose  political  framework  ensures  coherence,  certitude,  and 
predictability  in  human  life.  63 
Oedipus,  however,  will  destroy  quite  soon  this  illusion  by  pointing 
out  that  this  is  not,  after  all,  the  end  of  his  painful  struggle  towards 
reintegration.  For  he  makes  it  quite  clear  that  keeping  him  within  their 
borders  will  be  a  test  for  his  new  fellow-citizens  (587;  note  the  emphatic 
repetition  of  ob);  what  is  more,  he  will  teach  (607ff.  )  the  statesman 
Theseus  that  nothing  but  the  gods  is  permanent,  whereas  politics  is  as 
fickle  and  mutable  a  business  as  anything.  In  the  prospect  of  long  time 
(609,617-18)  nothing  can  be  certain  or  predictable  (614-5);  64  in  fact, 
even  in  the  short  term  '  certitude  and  insouciance  are  by  no  means 
guaranteed  (586-7).  These  unsettling  considerations  seem  to  qualify  even 
Oedipus'  confidence  in  Theseus'  ability  to  protect  him,  for  he  manifests 
thrice  his  anxiety  that  the  king  should  keep  his  word  (625-6,648,650), 
while  the  agitated  ävTLXaßa'L  at  652-6  underline  this  fact  with  the 
starkest  clarity.  Nonetheless,  Theseus,  as  I  have  already  implied,  is  a 
statesman,  unaware  of  what  lies  beyond  the  determinate,  fixed  frame  of 
the  polls;  so,  he  is  not  able  (or  willing)  to  comprehend  such  admonitions. 
Thus,  in  his  answer  (631-41)  he  conspicuously  fails  to  take  into 
63  Thus;  I  cannot  agree  with  Knox  (1964:  152),  who  prefers  to  see  a  "tragic  sense 
of  life"  in  Theseus'  words;  similar  views  in  Bowra  (1944:  332),  Buxton  (1982: 
135),  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  231).  However,  Lesky  (1952:  102)  has  carefully 
reminded  us  that  Theseus'  youth,  although  he  was  a  ýEvoc,  was  free  of  sorrow 
(unlike  Oedipus'  old  age). 
64  See  Sgroi  (1962:  286);  Torrance  (1965:  287);  De  Romilly  (1968:  99-100). 212 
consideration  Oedipus'  meditations  on  the  vicissitudes  of  life:  the  old 
man  has  emphatically  referred  to  a  future  disruption  of  the  Athenian- 
Theban  alliance  (616-23),  but  Theseus  dwells  on  the  present  friendship 
between  the  two  cities  -a  friendship  which  he  significantly  calls  `eternal' 
(633  aiLEv);  he  also  says  that  the  old  suppliant  is  a  benefactor  sent  by  the 
gods  (634-35),  whereas  Oedipus  himself  has  twice  qualified,  with 
conditional  clauses,  his  certainty  about  the  gods'  plan  (623  E  'L  ZE  Vs  E  TL 
ZEVS  XGJ  OLÖS  4Otf  oc  craft-,  628  ELTrEP  µli  OE01  JJEUGOUQL  [tj5EÜ80UQL 
K]  µE).  65  Therefore,  it  turns  out  that  what  we  have  been  expecting  to.  be 
Oedipus'  unperturbed  settling  in  his  new  polis  may  actually  be  only  a 
temporary  state  of  affairs,  liable  to  be  thwarted  by  unpredictable  factors. 
Indeed,  the  first  unsettling  signs  indicating  a  reversal  of  the 
procedure  of  Oedipus'  naturalization  are  not  long  to  appear.  We  have 
witnessed  the  tensions  and  ambivalences  that  defined  Colonus  (section 
4.1.1)  being  happily  resolved,  with  Oedipus  being  ensured  permanent 
residence  there,  but  now  (in  a  typically  Sophoclean  coup  de  theatre)  we 
are  presented  with  unmistakable  hints  suggesting  that  the  painfully 
gained  fixity  and  immutability  are  gradually  disintegrating  into 
instability  and  impermanence.  Such  hints  are  offered  in  the  first 
stasimon  (668-719).  66  Prima  facie,  this  is  an  ode  meant  to  bid  Oedipus 
welcome  to  his  new  land,  and  this  is  of  course  its  chief  function.  However, 
as  often  in  Sophocles,  appearance  deludes.  For  all  its  specific  references  to 
Attic  locale,  which  create  a  distinct  feeling  of  fixedness  and  permanence, 
this  song  also  reverses  the  themes  that  characterized  the  procedure  of 
65  Cf.  Linforth  (1951:  88-89,145).  Note,  at  the  former  passage,  the  ETL:  the  time 
factor  seems  to  be  important  even  for  the  gods!  On  the  significance  of 
conditional  clauses  in  Sophocles  see  Introduction,  section  0.4.2. 
66  For  three  different,  but  equally  interesting,  interpretations  of  this  famous 
ode  see  Knox  (1964:  154-56),  Burton  (1980:  274-80),  Segal  (1981:  373-74).  Most 
recently,  Edmunds  (1996:  92-4)  has  offered  a  political  interpetation  thereof. 213 
Oedipus'  settling  in  the  land.  So,  the  word  ETrau  a.  (669)  used  of  Colonus 
is  ambiguous,  for  it  can  mean  both  `dwelling,  abode'  and  `fold  for  cattle' 
(see  LSJ  s.  v.  ),  while  the  cognate  ETravXi.  s  is  generally  used  of  farmsteads  or 
military  bivouacs  (cf.  aüXICEGOC  i,  `to  bivouac');  67  in  both  cases,  that  is, 
the  word  clearly  does  not  refer  to  permanent  civilized  residence  as  we 
know  it,  but  either  to  housings  for  animals  or  to  temporary  quarters  -a 
first  indication  that  Colonus  is  not  going,  after  all,  to  be  the  place  where 
Oedipus  will  settle  for  good.  Furthermore,  the  vineyards  of  Colonus  are 
suggestively  referred  to  with  the  adjective  äßaToc  (675;  only  Dionysus 
EµßaTEVEL  there,  67968),  which  unmistakably  recalls  167  aPaT  v  aTroßas; 
so,  as  soon  as  Oedipus  has  (or  seems  to  have)  settled  at  Colonus  for  good, 
we  are  again  reminded  that  this  is  a  place  not  to  be  trodden  upon.  A 
similar  effect  is  created  by  the  allusion  to  the  Mop'LaL  (cf.  705  Mop'Lov 
DL6s),  69  the  sacred  olives  that  were  state  property  not  to  be  approached 
by  individuals;  again,  that  is,  the  idea  of  forbidden  ground  is  brought  up. 
And  if  the  motifs  of  stability  and  permanence  recur  once  more  (672 
8aµdCovaa  µä)  LaT(1,674  EXovaa,  679  äE'L,  682  KaT  ijµap  aki,  688  aLEV 
ET  %iaTL),  70  it  is  only  in  order  to  be  set  off  by  an  upsurge  of  the  themes 
of  motion  and  restlessness  (685-86  ävTrvoL,  687  voµä8Es,  71  716-17 
67  See  LSJ  s.  vv.  The  latter  meaning  is  not  taken  into  account  either  by  McDevitt 
(1972b:  230)  or  by  Kirkwood  (1986:  106). 
68  One  should  not,  as  Vicaire  (1968:  366-67)  does,  see  a  "tableau  idyllique"  in  this 
reference  to  Dionysus  -a  view  underlying  even  the  much  subtler  treatment  of 
Zeitlin  (1990:  164-5).  It  is  Dionysus'  uncanny  aspect  that  is  recalled  here. 
69  See  Jebb  (ad  705). 
70  Cf.  Burton  (1980:  275  with  n.  25). 
71  Jebb  (ad  687)  thinks  that  irrigation  canals  are  meant;  but  Kirsten  (1973:  22) 
correctly  considers  "mit  wechselndem  Bett"  as  a  possible  meaning. 214 
XEpaov  I  TrapaTrTOµEVa  TrMTa72):  to  be  sure,  Colonus  is  an  area  defined 
by  pervasive  antitheses  between  stability  and  change,  permanence  and 
temporariness.  73  Furthermore,  as  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  236-37)  has 
remarked,  the  political  dimension  is  totally  absent  from  this  ode:  Attica 
seems  to  be  inhabited  by  plants,  animals,  and  gods,  but  not  by  people 
(contrast  the  third  stasimon  in  E.  Med.  where  the  Erechtheids  are  given  a 
prominent  place);  that  is  to  say,  "la  polls  come  organizzazione  politica  e 
del  tutto  fuori  campo"  (ibid.  236)74  Far  from  being  a  place  that  would 
provide  (as  we  have  been  expecting)  a  permanent  framework  for  Oedipus' 
incorporation  into  the  polls,  it  proves  to  be  a  borderline  area  in  which 
limits  are  subverted:  even  the  fundamental  distinction  between 
Upperworld  and  Underworld  is  confounded,  for  on  the  one  hand  the 
powers  of  life  seem  to  reign  there  (673  XkopaLc,  676  µuplöKapTrov,  681  & 
700  06AAEL,  682  KaJNXßoTpUc,  689  tKUTOKOS,  697  IAacTOV,  701 
TraL8oTpöýou,  etc.  ),  whereas  on  the  other  the  presence  of  death  looms 
ominous  over  the  place,  for  the  narcissus  (683)  and  the  crocus  (685)  are 
plants  usually  associated  with  the  dead;  75  even  the  numerous 
nightingales  that  chirped  harmoniously  at  the  outset  (17-18)  have  been 
now  replaced  by  a  solitary  är186v  that  laments  with  a  plaintive  voice 
(671  AL-JE  La  p.  LvvpETaL)  76  To  sum  up:  once  Oedipus'  long  and  painful 
72  With  Dawe's  (1996:  in  textu)  very  plausible  emendation  of  the  MSS.  XE  PULL  See 
Dawe  (1978:  141-42).  Another  solution  is  propounded  by  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson 
(1990b:  238-39).  Stinton's  (1990:  268-69)  speculations  are  unconvincing. 
73  For  a  brilliant  discussion  of  the  antitheses  between  death  and  life,  light  and 
darkness,  joy  and  gloom  in  this  ode  see  McDevitt  (1972b:  232-35),  although  I  do 
not  fully  agree  with  his  conclusions  (ibid.  236-37). 
74  Cf.  Sgroi  (1962:  284-85). 
75  See  Jebb  (ad  683,  and  685),  McDevitt  (1972b:  233-34). 
76  See  LSJ  s.  v.  XL-yvc,  II:  "mostly  of  sad  sounds".  OnpLvüpeaOaL  see  Knox  (1964:  195 
n.  22).  McDevitt  (1972b:  231-32)  deftly  explores  the  nightingale's  associations 
with  lamentation  and  death;  in  the  light  of  his  remarks,  I  think  that  Whitman 215 
struggle  towards  integration  into  the  polls  seems  to  have  reached  an  end, 
there  come  disturbing  signs,  warning  us  that  what  we  think  of  as  settled 
and  established  is  in  fact  liable  to  change  and  reversal.  Locality,  a  most 
important  constituent  of  the  polls-concept,  starts  to  disintegrate,  as  the 
notions  of  incoherence  and  confusion  of  limits  prevail.  One  may  now 
suspect  that,  after  the  fixedness  of  locality  has  been  disturbed,  a  major 
subversion  of  the  polls'  vöpi  ia,  which  Oedipus  has  been  so  eager  to 
embrace,  will  ensue.  And  this  is  indeed  what  happens  in  the  following 
Creon  scene. 
4.4.1.  Second  Hart.  The  Creon  scene.  The  polis  of  Athens.  the 
polls  of  Thebes.  and  Oedipus  the  autonomous  individual 
No  doubt,  Creon  is  an  unqualified  scoundrel.  My  concern,  however,  is  not 
to  offer  yet  another  castigation  of  his  wretchedness,  but  to  detect  the 
dramatic  importance  of  his  part  for  the  interplay  between  Oedipus' 
incorporation  into  the  polis'  framework  and  his  subversion  of  its  vöp  qia 
-  an  interplay  that  seems  to  have  established  itself  as  the  main  pattern 
of  the  play.  And  one  must  admit  that  Creon,  for  all  his  baseness,  firmly 
adheres  to  the  interests  of  his  polis  and  tries  to  serve  the  common 
purpose. 
These  generalizations  can  be  illustrated  by  a  detailed  examination 
of  Creon's  debates  first  with  Oedipus  and  then  with  Theseus.  In  the 
former  scene,  a  most  striking  fact  is  that  Oedipus  unexpectedly  gives  up 
his  previous  persistence  in  the  polis-concept  (a  concept  by  virtue  of 
which,  one  recalls,  he  has  defended  his  right  not  only  to  remain  in  the 
(1951:  201-202)  makes  too  much  of  the  nightingale's  supposedly  idyllic  song  in 
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sanctuary  as  a  suppliant,  but  also  to  be  incorporated  into  the  Athenian 
political  framework,  by  accepting  its  vö  toL;  see  sections  4.2.1-4.2.3 
passim);  thus,  the  clash  with  Thebes  is  no  longer  a  political  matter  for 
Oedipus:  surprisingly,  it  is  its  personal  dimension  that  now  prevails  by 
far.  The  contrast  between  Creon  the  statesman  and  Oedipus  the 
autonomous  individual  is  striking.  Creon  emphatically  proclaims  that  he 
represents  the  entire  Thebes  (737-38,741-42,850-51);  77  he  is  fully  aware 
that  he  has  come  to  a  foreign  Tröks  (733)  where  he  no  longer  possesses 
the  authority  he  does  in  Thebes  (732-34;  cf.  1018,1036-37),  but  he  also 
points  out  that  Oedipus  should  be  equally  aware  of  his  patriotic  duties 
towards  his  native  polis  of  Thebes  (757-60;  cf.  849-55)78  -  an  important 
reminder  which,  on  the  level  of  form,  is  graphically  expressed  by  the 
sharp  distinction  To1a6',  oü  QE  (813):  here,  as  Jebb  (ad  813f.  )  has  seen, 
"Creon  refuses  to  identify  [Oedipus]  with  [the  Coloniates],  bitterly 
reminding  the  Theban  that  his  real  ties  are  elsewhere".  79  Creon's 
77  Bowra  (1944:  335-37)  has  fully  perceived  the  political  background  of  Creon's 
actions;  see  also  Seidensticker  (1972:  270).  Machin's  (1981:  115),  and  especially 
Blundell's  (1993:  304)  -cf.  idem  (1989:  236-37)  -attempts  to  dissociate  Creon's 
practices  from  the  Theban  mandate,  which  allegedly  demanded  "persuasion" 
(cf.  736)  stumbles  on  the  notorious  ambiguity  and  polysemy  of  the  word  rrELO 
in  Greek:  see  Buxton  (1982:  64-66).  Segal  (1981:  379)  argues  that  Creon  violates 
the  laws  of  the  polis  because  he  intends  to  keep  Oedipus  as  a  rrapauAoc,  thus 
denying  him  a  basic  property  of  a  citizen.  In  fact,  however,  Creon  only  protects 
his  own  city  from  Oedipus'  pollution  (407)  -a  pollution  that  Oedipus  never 
denies  (as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  confirms  it  at  1130-37).  Cf.  below  p.  219. 
78  Note  that  Creon's  argument  at  854-55  is  also  used  by  Theseus  (592)  and  by 
Antigone  (1197  -1200);  therefore  it  cannot  be  rejected  out  of  hand  (as  is  done 
e.  g.  by  Blundell  [1989:  2411),  the  more  so  since  it  further  demonstrates  how 
Oedipus  allows  his  individual  temperament  (OuVog)  to  prevail  over  any  other 
consideration.  On  the  theme  of  Oedipus'  Ouµös,  which  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this 
chapter,  see  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  159-60with  n.  35)  and  cf.  below  p.  234. 217 
awareness  of  the  distinct  character  of  the  Athenian  political  framework  is 
made  all  the  more  obvious  when  he  resorts,  after  Oedipus'  refusal  to  come 
to  Thebes  (811),  to  a  markedly  Athenian  legal  practice,  namely  "calling 
on  any  onlookers  to  act  as  witnesses,  who  will  be  prepared  to  testify  if  the 
victim  brings  a  case  to  court":  80  he  even  uses  the  formula  µapTÜpoµaL 
(813),  which  was  the  standard  phrase  for  this  political  act. 
Oedipus,  on  the  other  hand,  resorts  to  distinctly  non-political 
arguments:  whereas  at  421-60  his  exile  was  regarded  as  effected  by  the 
polls  as  a  whole  (see  p.  205f.  ),  now  it  becomes  completely  devoid  of  its 
political  significance,  and  the  whole  matter  is  presented  by  Oedipus  as  a 
personal  dispute  between  himself  and  Creon8i  (note  the  second  person 
singular  constantly  used:  767,770-71,772,774,781,784,785,787,794; 
contrast  455-56  where  it  was  against  Thebes  as  a  political  power,  not 
against  a  particular  individual,  that  Oedipus  was  .  ready  to  fight:  KaL 
KpEOVTa 
...  KE'L  TLS  ä\X09  EV  TTÖAEL  QeEVEL).  The  argumentum  ad 
hominem  in  776-780  is  very  instructive  for  the  extremely  personal  colour 
that  Oedipus  attempts  to  lend  to  the  dispute  with  Thebes,  while  797-99 
and  802-803  further  confirm  the  element  of  personal  hostility  against 
Creon.  Even  when  the  polls  comes  into  question  (785-86),  it  is  referred  to 
as  if  it  were  Creon's  private  property  (785  TroXLc  8E  aoL  -  "thy  city" 
79  Contra  Daly  (1986b:  71-72);  see  further  Edmunds  (1996:  118).  Creon  of  course 
ignores  the  fact  that  Oedipus  has  already  denounced  his  native  land  and  has 
been  made  E  LTroXLc  in  a  new  land.  This  only  casts  the  markedly  political 
character  of  his  practices  in  a  higher  relief:  we  know  that  in  fact  he  struggles 
to  regain  a  former  Theban  citizen. 
80  Dunbar  (1995:  ad  1031);  see  also  Dover  (1993:  ad  528),  MacDowell  (1971:  ad 
143  6).  Antipho  i.  29  is  an  instructive  relevant  passage.  Even  if  µapTÜpEaem  was 
a  Theban  practice  as  well  (which  we  have  no  means  of  verifying),  an  Athenian 
audience  would  inevitably  see  here  a  reference  to  their  own  legal  system. 
81  This  has  been  noted,  in  passing,  by  Bowra  (1944:  337),  and  in  more  detail  by 
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Jebb),  i.  e.  the  matter  is  put  again  in  terms  of  personal  dispute.  82  Likewise, 
whereas  at  457-60  he  invoked  the  assistance  of  Eumenides  (along  with 
the  Coloniates')  against  the  polis  of  Thebes,  now  his  ä).  äaTwp  is  viewed  as 
a  personal  punishment  against  Creon  only  (note  the  emphatically 
doubled  GOL  in  787  and  the  significant  personal  pronoun  cMaTwp  oÜg6g 
in  788). 
A  similar  attitude  is  easily  detectable  at  887ff.  too:  83  Oedipus  no 
longer  uses  the  distinctly  political  concept  vöµw  KaOapög  ,  put  forward  at 
548,  in  order  to  defend  himself  against  the  accusation  of  parricide.  On 
the  contrary,  he  remarkably  resorts  to  arguments  that  are  as  un-political 
as  any,  namely  divine  wrath  (964-65;  cf.  998),  fate  and  oracles 
predetermining  the  course  of  events  (969-73),  even  metaphysical 
speculation  (998-99);  84  and  whereas,  for  his  murder  of  Laius  to  be 
justified,  the  appeal  to  8(K11  was  previously.  an  all-important  argument 
(547  Trpös  ,  B&Kac  TI),  it  is  now  dismissed  only  too  easily  (996  o)R 
To1)v8LK0V  TrEpLß)  TroLS).  It  is  indicative  that  an  argument  which  could 
have  absolved  Oedipus  before  an  Athenian  court,  namely  that  he 
committed  the  killing  in  self-defence  (an  argument  which  Oedipus  used 
at  270-72  and  perhaps  at  547:  see  above  p.  208f.  ),  is  transformed  into  yet 
another  argumentum  ad  hominem  (991-96),  thus  losing  its  potential 
political  power.  Likewise,  although  Oedipus  attempts  to  extenuate  his 
parricide  and  incest  by  appealing  again  to  ignorance  (967,983),  as  he  did 
back  at  525  and  548,  this  time  the  potentially  political  character  of  this 
argument  remains  inert:  for  this  specific  argument  forms  part  and  parcel 
of  a  wider  context  of  accumulated  un-political  arguments;  so  it 
82  Knox  (1964:  156)  sees  in  this  only  that  Oedipus  speaks  now  as  an  Athenian. 
83  This  somewhat  topsy-turvy  treatment  of  the  scenes  will,  I  hope,  be  conceded 
for  the  sake  of  coherence  and  homogeneity. 
84  Machin  (1981:  136)  remarks  that  what  is  new  in  this  last  apology  of  Oedipus  is 
the  attribution  of  his  past  horrors  to  divinity;  cf.  Torrance  (1965:  289). 219 
inescapably  becomes  divested  of  its  potential  political  force.  The 
personal,  non-political,  character  of  Oedipus'  defence  is  further  stressed, 
on  the  formal  level,  by  the  repetition  of  the  first  person  pronoun  twen  ty- 
three  times  in  960-1013,  three  times  consecutively  at  verse-end  (983-5).  85 
Oedipus  is  shifting  from  the  state  of  a  fully  integrated  citizen  to  an 
unrestrained  individualism  that  ignores  the  polls'  framework  and 
prevails  over  its  functions,  customs,  and  institutions.  So,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  now  even  the  Erinyes  are  summoned  not  as  allies  of 
Athens  against  Thebes,  as  in  457-60,  but  as  protectresses  of  Oedipus  alone 
(1010  E  ioL;  cf..  788). 
Interestingly,  even  when  it  (unavoidably)  comes  to  politics  (1004- 
13),  Sophocles  makes  Oedipus  pick  a  rather  double-edged  argument  in 
favour  of  Athens,  namely  that  it  honours  the  gods  (1005-1009):  for  he 
knows,  and  we  know, 
.  only  too  well  that  -  the  Coloniates  may  have 
respected  the  sanctuary's  sacrosanct  character,  when  they  decided  to 
expel  him  forcefully  out  of  their  land,  but  on  the  other  hand  they  showed 
disrespect  to  the  gods  by  violating  the  sacred  rights  of  a  suppliant  (cf. 
Oedipus'  appeal  to  their  alleged  eEOQE1ELa,  258-62,275-85;  cf.  above.  p. 
201f.  ).  In  other  words,  the  Coloniates,  when  confronted  with  conflicting 
claims,  reckoned  that  Oedipus'  status  as  suppliant  was  not  of  such 
importance  as  to  counterbalance  his  pollution,  and  that  it  was  not 
sufficient  to  prevent  them  from  driving  him  out  of  the  place  of  his 
supplication.  The  Chorus,  that  is,  displayed  the  same  attitude  as  Creon 
does  now  (cf.  944-50  where  he  claims  that  Oedipus'  rights  as  suppliant 
must  be  forfeited  on  account  of  his  pJ  aaµa);  still,  Creon  is  called  WE  ß,  js 
(823),  which  means  that,  inevitably,  Oedipus'  praise  of  Athenian 
E  ÜQE  ßE  La  cannot  but  strike  us  as  severely  qualified.  Therefore,  yet 
85  Cf.  Daly  (1986b:  80).  We  noted  an  analogous  (and  equally  indicative) 
recurrence  of  the  second  person  pronoun  above,  p.  217. 220 
another  argument  that  could  seem  to  be  of  a  political  nature  backfires 
because,  although  it  is  seemingly  a  eulogy  of  Athens'  respect  for  Tä  OEta, 
it  subliminally  brings  out  sinister  similarities  with  what  Oedipus  has 
termed  Creon's  (QE  ßE  La;  thus,  the  argument  turns  out  to  be  self- 
cancelling  or,  at  least,  self-mitigating.  86  It  seems  that  every  dramatic  fact, 
every  feature  of  structure  and  language,  confirms  the  scheme  propounded 
here:  Oedipus  is  shifting  from  the  polis'  vöµoL  to  the  state  of  the 
autonomous  individual.  This  change  accounts  for,  and  at  the  same  time 
is  confirmed  by,  another  remarkable  change  that  can  be  detected  in  the 
Chorus'  attitude:  while  at  629-30  they  stress  the  political  aspect  of 
Oedipus'  settling  at  Colonus  (note  esp.  'y,  TTf  8E)  and  at  726-27  they 
foreshadow  the  political  character  of  the  ensuing  debate  with  Creon  (cf. 
TÖ  -Ma8E  Xwpac  ...  QOEvos),  suddenly  at  1014-15  they  give  up  all 
political  considerations  and  they  attune  themselves  to  Oedipus'  change 
of  attitude  by  significantly  mentioning  only  his  personal  asseverations 
and  demands. 
4.4.2  The  abduction  of  the  Kd  at  Ismeneand  Antip-one 
Creon's  adherence  to  the  polis-concept  does  not,  of  course,  make  him  a 
man  of  morals.  Immediately  upon  Oedipus'  refusal  to  return  to  Thebes, 
Creon  sets  out  to  implement  in  full  his  political  power.  He  reveals  that  he 
has  already  abducted  Ismene,  and  that  he  intends  to  do  the  same  with 
86  On  the  Chorus'  ambivalent  EÜQE3ELa,  liable  to  be  shaken  by  competing 
religious  obligations,  cf.  Bowra  (1944:  333),  Blundell  (1989:  230),  (1993:  291-92); 
Burton  (1980:  253)  calls  it  "a  conventional  view  of  morality".  Slatkin  (1986:  213- 
17)  explores  the  tension  between  conflicting  religious  and  moral  claims,  and 
emphasizes  the  political  implications  of  the  reproach  which  Oedipus  addresses 
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Antigone  as  well  (818-19).  There  is  no  doubt  that  this  is  an  inhuman  and 
immoral  action,  a  fitting  supplement  of  his  blatant  lies  about  Oedipus' 
homecoming  (741,757-58;  we  know  the  truth  from  Ismene's  account: 
399-400,404-405).  Still,  Creon  displays  a  characteristically  political 
frame  of  mind  (although,  as  Knox  [1982:  23]  has  put  it,  "the  case  for  the 
polis  could  hardly  have  had  a  more  contemptible  spokesman"),  and 
clearly  respects  the  limits  between  different  cities:  it  is  important  to  note 
that,  against  common  practices,  he  carries  off  as  hostages  not  Athenian 
citizens,  but  only  `his  own  people'  (832  Toils  Eµoüs  dyw),  i.  e.  his  kin  and 
fellow-Thebans,  who  (unlike  Oedipus  himself)  are  not  suppliants87  (cf. 
830  oiX  aq  oµai  T008'  äv8pös,  ä»ä  Tfjs  Eµtis).  Even  his  use  of  p1aLOv 
(858)  may  imply  a  normal  political  procedure.  88  What  is  more,  his  threat 
87  Nowhere  in  the  play  are  the  girls  referred  to  as  tKETLSES:  cf.  esp.  1008-1009 
(TÖV  lKeTr1V  'y4povT  E  [LE  I  airröv  T 
...  TaT  Köpac  T)  where  a  distinction 
between  the  suppliant  Oedipus  and  his  daughters  seems  to  be  implied.  Theseus' 
words  in  923  might  seem  to  contradict  this,  but  a)  Creon's  avoidance  of 
abducting  Oedipus  (see  immediately  below  in  the  text)  is  Inexplicable,  unless  we' 
assume  that  he  is  a  suppliant,  while  his  daughters  are  not,  b)  the  word  4x  is 
normally  used  of  a  man  (E.  Hel.  1094  is  admittedly  an  exception),  and  so  q5wTWv 
IKTrjpLa'  x  Tac  .  KTTlpiovs  can  hardly  comprise  the  girls,  as  Jebb  (ad  922f.  )  and 
Kamerbeek  (ad  919-923)  think.  I  think  that  the  passage  could  perfectly  well 
mean:  "this  wretched  man's  IKETTIpiaL  ý608oL"  (an  interpretation  known  to 
Jebb  [ad922f.  ]  but  rejected  by  him).  The  girls  are  at  least  twice  likened  to  their 
blind  father's  `crutches'  (aKiirrpa  848,1109)  because  he  cannot  walk  without 
them;  could  they  not  also  be  his  `staff  of  supplication'  as  well  (since  he  cannot 
perform  his  supplication  without  them)?  Admittedly,  such  a  meaning  of  b  cn  pLa 
(4KETT1pial)  is  not  attested,  but  I  cannot  see  any  objection  to  it.  At  any  rate, 
emendation  into  tKTr  piac  is  easy:  line-ends  being  often  corrupted,  1KTnpiac 
could  have  been  easily  misread  for  -pta.  I  treat  the  problem  more  fully  in  my 
unpublished  article  "Sophoclea". 
88  Cf.  e.  g.  A.  Su.  412,424,728  (suggested  to  me  by  Mr  Garvie).  See  most  recently 
Edmunds  (1996:  9).  Contra  Vidal-Naquet  (1986a:  185  with  n.  26).  On  the  political 
uses  of  hostages  see  e.  g.  M.  Amit,  RFIC  98  (1970)  129-47  (esp.  147)  and  A. 222 
to  abduct  Oedipus  as  well  (a  threat  that  is  never  effected)89  is 
significantly  qualified  by  an  important  proviso  that  shows  his  respect  for 
the  ruler  even  of  a  rival  polis  (862):  ýv  µt  j  p'  ö  Kpaivwv  n  a8E  yTjs 
äneLpyäOrl  90  This  cannot  be  only  an  idle  contention,  for  Creon  adheres  to 
this  principle  throughout  this  scene:  obedient  to  the  Athenian  king's  will, 
he  never  carries  Oedipus  off;  moreover,  he  completely  conforms  with 
Theseus'  commands  at  1018-37,  significantly  stressing  (1036-37)  that  it  is 
his  state  as  ýEvos  (note  the  antithesis  between  EvO68'  and  OtKOL)  that 
compels  him  to  obey.  91  On  the  whole,  the  `abduction  scene'  signifies  a 
wider  political  clash  between  the  city  of  Thebes  (837  1T6XEL  µaXYj,  858-59 
ýüa  LOV  T  6XE  L  TäXa  10r  ¬  LS  ),  and  the  city  of  Athens  (842  Tr6X.  s 
EVQLpETaL,  Tr64S  E[i&  QOEVEL,  879  TQVS'  ap'  OV'KETL  VEµw  Tr6XLv,  884 
(w  Trds  AECSs,  iw  'yds  Trp4tOL).  Creon  is  fully  aware  of  this,  and  this  is 
reflected  in  his  actions.  This  provides  a  further  contrast  with  Oedipus' 
remarkably  un-political  turn  of  mind  and  his  attempts  to  reduce  the 
Panagopoulos,  Captives  and  Hostages  in  the  Peloponnesian  War  (Athens  1978) 
187-91;  cf.  Edmunds  (1996:  120-1).  Detailed  treatment  of  the  subject  in  B.  Bravo, 
"Sulän.  Represailles  et  justice  privee  contre  des  strangers  Bans  les  cites 
grecques",  ASNP  10  (1980)  675-987. 
89  Sophocles  could  just  as  well  have  made  Creon  take  away  the  suppliant  Oedipus 
too,  had  he  wished  to  show  Creon  defying  the  polis-concept  (cf.  Gellie  [1972: 
172]).  However,  Creon  (by  way  of  the  delay  caused  by  the  theatrical  pretext 
mentioned  in  the  text,  namely  his  threat  to  carry  off  Oedipus  too)  remains  on 
stage  and  makes  his  case  in  front  of  Theseus,  putting  forth  again  political 
arguments  that,  as  we  shall  see,  deserve  serious  consideration.  -  Of  course, 
Creon's  threats  also  serve  the  more  practical  purpose  of  creating  dramatic 
tension. 
90  Piderit's  attribution  of  the  line  to  the  Chorus  (with  a'  instead  of  µ'),  defended 
by  Jebb  (ad  862),  misses  the  point:  Creon  is,  after  all,  aware  that  he  is  in  a 
foreign  polls  which  is  ruled  by  its  own  laws  and  leaders.  Most  later  editors 
rightly  stick  to  the  tradition. 
91  The  majority  of  critics  have  wrongly  denied  that  Creon  is  aware  of  the 
distinctions  between  different  cities:  thus,  most  recently,  Bushnell  (1988:  93). 223 
tension  between  the  two  political  poles,  Athens  and  Thebes,  to  a  personal 
dispute  between  himself  and  Creon. 
4.4.2.1  Subversion  of  Athenian  v6juji  . 
The  abduction  of  the 
Köp  (Persephone) 
When  Theseus  enters  again,  it  is  to  restore  order,  at  the  request  of  the 
Chorus  (884-86).  Indeed,  in  his  ensuing  rhesis  he  dwells  on  what  he 
regards  as  Creon's  anomic  practices  (see  esp.  913-18,924-28).  He  sets  out 
to  refute  Creon's  claim  that  he  would  respect  the  king's  will  (862),  by 
accusing  him  of  having  acted  without  his  prior  permission  (926  ävEU  yE 
Tov  KPaLVOVToc  ...  XOovös;  the  verbal  similarities  with  862  are 
noteworthy).  Moreover,  like  Oedipus,  Theseus  attempts  to  undervalue  the 
political  character  of  the  controversy  and  to  reduce  it  to  the  level  of 
personal  dispute.  So,  he  stresses  the  fact  that  Thebes  is  not  an  anomic 
polls  (912,919-23,929-30),  92  his  syllogism  being  that,  since  Thebes 
respects  laws,  Creon's  lawless  practices  cannot  represent  Thebes;  therefore 
Creon  is  not  performing  a  political  duty  (contr.  737-38,837,850-51,858 
etc.  ),  but  only  trying  to  impose  his  own  perverse  personal  `vöµoL'  (907;  cf. 
92  Theseus  is  thus  deviating  from  Thebes'  standard  image  in  tragedy  as  `anti- 
Athens'  (i.  e.  Athens'  negative  counterpart),  on  which  see  above,  p.  203  with  n. 
39.  If  Athens'  political  superiority  is  no  longer  defined  e  contrario  by  Thebes' 
negative  example,  then  her  distinct  image  as  paragon  of  political  integrity  can 
scarcely  be  maintained.  It  is  indicative  that  Robert  (1915  I:  483-5),  disturbed  by 
this  unexpected  `laus  Thebarum'  (on  which  see  Di  Benedetto  [1983:  231-32]), 
wished  to  delete  919-231Daly's  (1986b:  72-73)  approach  is  also  completely  off  the 
mark.  For  a  helpful  discussion  of  the  attempts  to  interpret  this  passage  see 
Burian  (1974:  420  n.  30),  Easterling  (1993:  192-97);  literature  also  in  Blundell 
(1993:  301n.  58). 224 
1032-33).  93  Nonetheless,  Theseus'  encomium  of  Athenian  Eiuvoµia  is 
significantly  encircled  by  two  important  statements  suggesting  that  the 
champion  of  the  polls'  vöµiµa  is  only  too  ready  to  give  them  up:  first,  at 
907-908  Theseus  surprisingly  states  that  he,  the  king  of  a  polls  that 
"sanctions  nothing  without  law"  (914;  Jebb's  transl.  ),  will  adopt  Creon's 
vöµoL,  for  all  their  perversity-,  94  second,  at  934-35  he  further  undermines 
his  own  polls'  vöµtm  by  declaring  that  he  will  not  only  seize  Creon  as  a 
hostage  but  also  make  him  a  µETOLKOS  by  force  (935  ßio.  TE  KOÜX  EKwV) 
-  which  is  of  course  completely  inconceivable,  for  the  very  essence  of  this 
Athenian  institution  was  its  optional  character195  Granted,  907-908  may 
simply  mean  that  Creon  will  be  held  hostage  just  as  he  has  taken 
Antigone  and  Ismene  hostages  (this  is,  In  effect,  the  explanation  given 
already  by  the  ancient  scholiast  ad  '908);  96  and  934-35  may  be  only  a 
sarcastic  -  metaphor  97  Nonetheless,  to  begin  with  the  latter  objection, 
Whitehead  (1977:  34-35)  has  rightly  stressed  that  "all  three  major 
tragedians  were  drawing  upon  the  characteristics  and  implications  of  a 
93  Zeitlin  (1990:  167)  correctly  remarks  that  Theseus'  dissociation  of  Creon's 
practices  from  the  city  of  Thebes  is  in  fact  "the  furthest  extension  of  Oedipus' 
emphasis  on  individual  responsibility";  however,  she  fails  to  notice  that 
Theseus  generally  continues  the  un-political  argumentation  initiated  by 
Oedipus. 
94  The  political  connotations  of  908  apµoa&I  aETaL  -cf.  the  Spartan  äpµoaTai  - 
may  be  of  importance:  a  political  procedure  that  is  aimed  at  the  preservation  of 
order  (&pR6TTELV)  results  in  the  disarray  of  Athenian  laws  through  the 
adoption  of  Creon's  vöµoL. 
95  Furthermore,  ßi4  TE  KoiX  EKWV  harks  back  to  922  ßt¢,  thus  significantly 
emphasizing  that  Theseus  adopts  the  very  practices  he  has  just  condemned! 
Vidal-Naquet  (1986a:  197)  notices  the  absurdity  but  fails  to  perceive  its 
implications. 
96  p.  43  De  Marco:  ag  aTro'  EVW  'Yff$  aTrEUTraacv,  OUT(i)  KaL  a&TOS  EITL  ýEVTjs  'TiS 
&TroO'TraaOQETQL.  Cf.  Bowra  (1944:  338),  Blundell  (1989:  250). 
97  The  lines  are  thus  interpreted  by  e.  g.  Jebb  (ad  934). 225 
contemporary  institution  when  they  illustrated  their  ideas  by  reference  to 
the  metoikos  and  the  metoikia..  ":  98  in  other  words,  designating  a  person 
as  `metic'  in  Greek  tragedy  is  never  just  a  harmless  metaphor;  it  always 
has  hidden  implications  99  Turning  now  to  the  former  objection,  suffice  it 
to  say  that  in  a  context  loaded  with  such  notions  as  polis  or  vöµos, 
permeated  by  the  theme  of  integration  into  the  polis-framework,  and 
marked  by  forceful  contrasts  between  conflicting  political  claims,  there  is 
no  room  for  innocent  ironies:  any  slight  hint,  any  latent  innuendo 
associated  with  the  pervasive  themes  of  polis  and  vöµos  is  bound  to  be 
construed  in  the  light  of  the  polis-related  notions,  which  have  proved  by 
now  to  be  thematic. 
For  the  absurdity  of  the  situation  to  be  further  amplified,  Creon 
reminds  Theseus  not  only  that  he  attempted  merely  to  take  his  ýüvaiµoi 
(943)  back  where  they  belong,  but  also  that  the  Areopagus  (947),  an 
institution  almost  `rooted'  in  Attic  soil  (948  XOöviov),  100  would  not 
permit  the  residence  in  Athens  of  defiled  (945  ävayvov)  persons  like 
Oedipus;  101  in  other  words,  the  Theban  has  to  correct  the  Athenian  as  to 
98  Cf.  also  Garvie  (1986:  ad  684).  Especially  on  Eurystheus'  status  as  a  metoikos 
hero  in  Euripides'  Heracleidae  see  Kearns  (1990:  333-4). 
99  Whitehead  (ibid.  38)  further  adds  that  "all  three  poets  introduced  the  metic 
in  contexts  which,  to  a  citizen  audience,  suggested  something  unattractive, 
precarious  [...  ]  and  pathetic.  " 
100  On  the  meaning  of  X60vLo9  see  Ellendt  &  Genthe  (1872:  s.  v.  ):  "[XBövLoL]  ... 
quasi  qui  radices  in  patrio  solo  fixerint  altissime";  cf.  Walker  (1995:  180). 
Bergk's  emendation  XpövLov,  revived  by  Page  and  printed  by  Dawe  (1996),  is  in 
my  view  unnecessary.  See  11oyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  245). 
101  See  Jebb  (ad  947),  Parker  (1983:  118);  cf.  E.  Med  846-50,  where  the  Chorus 
wonder  how  a  pious  city  like  Athens  will  welcome  a  murderess  like  Medea;  also 
E.  El.  1194-7  (a  suggestion  I  owe  to  Mr  Garvie).  Not  even  Oedipus  himself  denies 
he  is  defiled:  see  1130-36.  Creon's  emphasis  on  Oedipus'  ritual  pollution  does  not 
contradict  Oedipus'  defence  of  his  moral  and  legal  innocence:  pollution  and 
moral  guilt  are  fundamentally  distinct  (see  here  n.  175). 226 
the  observance  of  Attic  laws  from  which  the  latter  has  deviated!  102 
Despite  Oedipus'  and  Theseus'  attempts  to  deprive  the  controversy  with 
Thebes  of  any  political  meaning,  its  political  impact  does  not  fail  to 
reveal  itself.  103  What  is  more,  there  are  hints  that  Athens'  vöµoL  emerge 
out  of  this  clash  with  Thebes  less  solid  than  they  seemed  to  be,  the  more 
so  since  Theseus,  whose  legendary  labour,  the  Synoikismos,  brought  order 
and  political  coherence  to  Athens,  104  seems  strangely  to  run  counter  to 
the  6Eaµtm  of  his  own  land,  thus  jeopardizing  his  own  life's  work. 
Interestingly,  Theseus  goes  as  far  as  to  suspect  (1028-31)  that  Creon  has 
been  assisted  by  Attic  accomplices'05  -a  fact  which,  despite  Theseus' 
eloquent  praise  of  Athenian  good  order  (913-18),  is  certainly  neither  to 
his  nor  to  his  polls'  credit.  106 
102  Gellie  (1972:  172)  notes  that  Creon's  point  is  not  answered  by  Theseus  (how 
could  it  be?  ),  but  conspicuously  fails  -  by  reason  of  his  rigidly  formalistic 
method  -to  give  an  adequate  explanation  of  this  dramatic  fact. 
103  Such  views  as  Knox's  (1964:  157-58),  Wallace's  (1979:  50),  Krummen's  (1993: 
199),  and  Walker's  (1995:  181),  namely  that  Oedipus  speaks  as  if  he  were 
pleading  before  the  Areopagus,  seem  to  me  not  to  take  account  of  the  crucial 
fact  that  it  is  exactly  the  Athenian  institutions  that  are  undermined  by  Oedipus' 
attitude  in  this  second  part  of  the  play. 
104  We  recall  the  reaffirmation  of  its  spirit,  at  the  outset  of  the  play,  thanks  to 
Oedipus'  `reconciliation'  of  the  Coloniates  and  Theseus:  cf.  above,  p.  203. 
105  Jebb  (ad  1028ff.  ),  Blundell  (1993:  296).  Pace  Kamerbeek  (ad  1028-1031),  if  we 
assume  that  Theseus  does  not  suspect  Attic  assistance  to  Creon,  then  there  is  no 
point  in  his  insistence  on  taking  care  of  the  matter  personally  without 
entrusting  it  to  anyone  else  (1019,1028).  Moreover,  pace  Easterling  (1993:  197), 
(1994),  I  think  that  Housman's  transposition  of  1028-1033  between  1019  and 
1020  only  underlines  Theseus'  suspicions. 
106  The  vast  majority  of  scholars  regard  Theseus  as  an  ideal  patriot,  a  paragon 
of  `enlightened  monarchy',  and  a  protector  of  v6lim.  See  e.  g.  Reinhardt  (1979: 
213),  Bushnell  (1988:  94),  Walker  (1995:  171);  older  literature  in  Wallace  (1979: 
46-7).  However,  if  my  view  (however  iconoclastic)  has  some  validity,  then  the 
avoidance  of  all  dear-cut  distinctions,  of  all  melodramatic  disjunctions  between 227 
The  hints  at  Theseus'  subversion  of  vöµtµa  become  more  numerous 
and  clear  later.  For,  as  I  shall  venture  to  demonstrate,  Sophocles 
allusively  likens  the  quest  for  Oedipus'  KöpaL  (902)  to  Theseus'  and 
Peirithous'  dismal  sin,  namely  their  abortive  attempt  to  abduct 
Persephone.  107  The  clearest  hints  are  provided  by  the  second  stasimon 
(1044-95),  where  the  Chorus  curiously  dwells  on  details  of  Attic 
geography  that  are  markedly  associated  with  Persephone  or  Demeterlo8 
note  e.  g.  their  extensive  reference  to  Eleusis  (1047ff.  )  and  to  the 
Eleusinianý  Mysteries  (esp.  1049  Aanir  cu'  aKTais  -  an  allusion  to  the 
Aa[iTra8Tlýopta  performed  during  the  Mysteries;  1050  TrOTVLaL,  Demeter 
and  Persephone;  1053  TrpooTrk  v  E1  LOXTrLBdv  -  chief  ministrants  of  the 
Eleusinia).  109  Although,  regrettably,  we  cannot  today  recover  the  meaning 
of  the  other  geographical  reference  in  this  ode,  namely  1059-61,110  the 
fact  remains  that  the  Insistence  on  the  Eleusinia  seems  pointless  in  an 
ode  so  closely  related  to  Theseus  (cf.  1054-55  To'v  EypEµMXav  O-qQEa, 
1066  O11(TEL8dv),  unless  we  suppose  that  Theseus'  KaTäßaQLc  is  meant  to 
be,  obliquely,  recalled.  Moreover,  immediately  after  this  ode  the  language 
used  is  strangely  reminiscent  of  keywords  closely  associated  with  the 
Mysteries:  cf.  esp.  1097-98  Täc  Köpac  ...  TrpoaTroAovµEvac  (hinting  at 
`good'  and  `bad'  characters,  is  confirmed  once  more  as  a  typical  Sophoclean 
trait. 
107  This  story  is  "among  our  earliest  attested  examples  of  a  Theseus  exploit": 
Gantz  (1993:  291)  with  all  the  relevant  sources. 
108  Demeter  and  Kore/Persephone  seem  to  have  been  originally  a  single 
personality  dualized  into  two  personalities,  which  were  hardly  dissociable  even 
in  classical  times;  cf.  their  names  TG)  OE(,  ')  and  Atjµi  repEc.  See  Farnell  (1907a: 
114),  Nilsson  (1967:  463,  cf.  480),  Richardson  (1974:  14),  Burkert  (1985a:  159). 
109  For  an  illumination  of  these  allusions  see  Jebb  (ad  1046ff.  -1053). 
110  See  discussion  in  Jebb  (ad  1059ff.,  and  pp.  286-88).  The  location  of  the  demes 
Oa  and  Oe,  one  of  which  must  be  referred  to  here,  is  disputed:  see  S.  Dow,  AJPh 
84  (1963)  166-81(esp.  167,175);  cf.  Kirsten  (1973:  12n.  13). 228 
the  Kopr  and  her  1TpöaTro)o1  [1053]),  111  as  well  as  the  key-words 
8po  1Eva  (1144)  and  8ELKVUµL  (1145),  112  which  are  heard  at  the  end  of 
this  enterprise.  It  is  not  only  these  cryptic  hints,  however,  that  -  creating 
as  they  do  an  eerie  atmosphere  reminiscent  of  the  Mysteries  -  underline 
Theseus'  sinister  associations  with  Persephone;  there  is  also  another  series 
of  implications  confirming  these  associations:  Theseus,  when  embarking 
on  the  pursuit  of  the  abductors,  suggestively  terms  the  forthcoming 
mission  EKE!  o8Ös  (1019),  and  refers  to  himself  as  Tro  rrrog;  now,  E  KE  L 
being  a  quite  common  euphemism  for  Hades  (copious  evidence  in  LSJ 
s.  v.,  I  .  2),  0'80s  being  often  used  of  a  person's  last  travel  to  the 
Underworld  (e.  g.  Ant.  807  Tav  VEäTav  o8ov),  and  finally  Troµirös  being  a 
stock-epithet  of  Hermes,  the  escort  of  the  dead  (cf.  1548),  the  conclusion 
comes  inevitably  that  the  whole  scene  of  the  girls'  rescue  has  been 
deliberately.  (if  cryptically)  tinted  by  allusions  to  Theseus'  sinful  attempt 
to  carry  off  Persephone  -  particularly  if  one  considers  that  the  battle 
takes  place  where  three  roads  meet  (900-901),  and  that  Tpto6oL  were 
typically  chthonic  places.  113  The  meaning  of  these  allusions  for  the  play 
111  TrpoaiToaovµEvas  should  not  be  suspected  (Dawe  [1996]  prints  Hartung's 
emendation  TrpoaTrckoµEvac):  see  Jebb  (ad  1098).  The  fact  that  it  is,  as  I1oyd- 
Jones  &  Wilson  (1990a:  in  app.  cri  t)  say,  "hoc  sensu  unicum"  shows  that  it  was 
meant  to  be  all  the  more  distinctly  felt  as  an  allusion  to  the  1rp6QTro>oL  (it  is  not 
simply  a  "catachresis",  as  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  249)  suggest). 
112  6pWµEva  was  the  standard  term  used  with  reference  to  the  Mysteries  (see 
Richardson  [1974:  ad  476]  for  discussion  and  literature);  Edmunds  (1996:  79-81) 
prefers  to  see  a  metatheatrical  significance  in  the  word.  As  for  8ELKVVVaL  in  the 
vocabulary  of  the  Eleusinia  see  Richardson  (1974:  ad  474-76). 
113  See  recently  Halliwell  (1986:  187-90).  The  fact  that  in  900  the  roads  are  called 
B&QTOROL  must  not  cause  misgivings:  a  Tp'Lo8oc  can  just  as  well  be  described  as 
the  bifurcation  of  one  road.  Cf.  Theog.  911:  Ev  T  L68w  8'  Eo-rfKa:  86  '  EtvL  TO 
Trp6v6Ev  68o'L  µoL,  and  Irigoin  apud  Taplin  (1983:  181):  "une  TpioSoc  est  [...  ]  un 
endroit  oü  la  route  se  divise  en  deux  [...  ],  comme  un  Y  avec  ses  deux  branches.  " 229 
should  be  clear  enough:  he  who  has  given  Creon  a  piece  of  his  mind  for 
violating  Athenian  civic  order,  and  has  set  out  to  restore  this  order  by 
bringing  back  the  KöpaL  (902),  turns  out  to  be  a  man  who  has  subverted 
not  merely  civic  but  also  cosmic  order,  by  confounding  the  limits  between 
Upperworld  and  Underworld  in  his  attempt  to  abduct  the  KopTl.  114  The 
destruction  of  the  frameworks  that  lend  coherence  to  our  world  (a 
destruction  substantiated  either  as  subversion  of  a  polis'  vöµoL  or  as 
disarraying  of  cosmic  order)  seems  indeed  to  be  a  major  theme  in  this 
play. 
4.5.1  The  Polyneices  scene.  Utter  destruction  of  the  Labdacids 
The  next,  and  final,  stage  in  this  progressive  confusion  of  limits,  categories 
and  distinctions  is  the  destruction  of  family  bonds,  which  is  brought 
about  in.  the  Polyneices  scene. 
One  of  the  most  striking  facts  of  this  scene  is  the  conspicuous 
similarity  between  Oedipus'  and  Polyneices'  states.  11s  Both  of  them  are 
ex-kings  (Pol.:  1354)  who  have  been  beset  by  their  race's  hereditary  curse 
(Pol.:  369-72,  cf.  1298-99;  Oed.:  964-65,997-98),  have  been  banished 
114  The  emphasis  on  bridles,  horsemen,  and  horses  at  1067-73  may  be  viewed  as 
alluding  to  the  myths  about  the  birth  of  the  first  horse  from  Poseidon's  rape  of 
Demeter;  this  would  be  a  dedoublement  of  Theseus'  sin  against  Persephone 
(remember  that  Peirithous  wished  to  marry  Persephone:  Hes.  fr.  280  M.  -W.; 
Hellanikos  FGrHist  4F134  Jacoby;  Diod.  4.63;  Hyg.  Fab.  79),  establishing  the 
scheme:  Theseus  /  Poseidon  (=son  and  father)  vs.  Persephone  /  Demeter 
(=daughter  and  mother).  See  Appendix  for  a  more  detailed  treatment  of  the 
mythological  data  in  relation  to  our  play. 
115  On  this  similarity  see  Burian  (1974:  422-23),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  277). 
Easterling  (1967:  7-8),  albeit  aware  of  it,  plays  down  its  importance. 230 
(Polyneices:  374-76;  Oedipus:  427-30,440-44  etc.  ),  116  have  become  their 
country's  enemies  (Pol.:  377-81;  Oed.:  450,457-60  etc.  ),  and  have  sought 
refuge  as  suppliants  at  Athens  (Pol.:  1156-59;  117  Oed.:  258ff.  etc.  );  all  that 
Polyneices  requires  is  to  be  granted  an  audience  and  depart  safely  (1164- 
65,  cf.  1285-90),  exactly  as  Oedipus  has  done  (174-75,  cf.  263-65). 
However,  for  all  their  similarities  -  emphatically  summarized  by 
Polygces  at  1335-39,  and  acknowledged  by  Oedipus  himself  too  at  1358- 
60  -  there  is  a  great  difference  between  them:  Oedipus'  supplication, 
despite  the  difficulties,  has  been  successful,  whereas  Polyneices'  own  is 
practically  frustrated  before  he  even  enters  the  stage.  Oedipus  fiercely 
refuses  to  listen  to  his  son  (1173-74,1177-78),  even  though  all  Polyneices 
wishes  to  communicate  to  his  father  is  a  ßpaXüs  µ06os  (1162),  in 
contrast  to  Creon's  `forensic'  verbosity  which  Oedipus  has  disdainfully 
castigated  (794-96,808-809).  Even  when  at  last  he  condescends  to  lend 
an  ear  to  his  son,  he  does  so  not  out  of  respect  for  Polyneices'  status  as  a 
suppliant  (whereas  this  was  exactly  what  he  had  asked  the  Chorus  to 
respect  at  258ff.,  and  what  Theseus  bids  him  do  now,  1179-80118),  but  as 
a  favour  he  begrudges  to  Theseus  and  Antigone  (1204  ßapElav  r18ovIjv)! 
And,  as  if  to  warn  us  that  the  failure  of  Polyneices'  supplication  is 
predetermined,  Sophocles  has  Oedipus  concluding  with  a  strong  refusal  to 
give  up  his  obstinacy  and  yield  to  his  son's  pleas  (1206-1207):  he  has 
made  up  his  mind  to  reject  his  son's  supplication  (äTgµäaaL;  cf.  1273, 
1278),  i.  e.  to  do  exactly  what  he  had  implored  not  to  be  done  to  him  (49, 
286  etc.  )!  Furthermore,  Oedipus'  silence  at  his  son's  supplication  (1271- 
116  Buxton  (1982:  142)  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  Theseus  is  also  a  former 
exile  (562-66). 
117  Machin  (1981:  142-43  with  n.  259),  following  Moulinier,  tries  in  an  unusually 
pettifogging  way  to  prove  that  Polyneices  is  not,  properly  speaking,  an  LKErns. 
118  See  Blundell  (1989:  238). 231 
80,1283)119  is  starkly  contrasted  with  Theseus'  emphatically  asking  the 
suppliant  Oedipus  to  speak  (see  above,  p.  210).  Antigone  significantly 
says  with  reference  to  her  father's  behaviour  (1203-1204):  aiTÖV  µýV  Ev  I 
TTQQxELV,  1Tae0VTa  8'  OV'K  EITLQTaJeaL  TLVELV.  120 
When  Polyneices  actually  appears,  we  realize  all  the  more  clearly 
how  unjustified  is  Oedipus'  attitude  towards  him.  For,  as  turns  out, 
Polynices  fully  complies  with  his  father's  wishes  (exactly  as  they  were 
expressed  in  his  complaints  at  414-19):  121  namely,  he  declares  that  he 
has  come,  incited  by  the  new  oracle  (1331-32),  to  make  up  for  his  unfilial 
behaviour  (whose  dismal  effects  upon  his  father  he  does  not  try  to 
conceal,  cf.  1254-66122)  and  restore  him  -  to  his  house  (1342);  without  his 
119  Interesting  analyses  of  Oedipus'  silence  are  provided,  from  different 
standpoints,  by  Segal  (1981:  397)  and  Bushnell  (1988:  98-99). 
120  1  think  that  Blundell  (1989:  241)  misses  the  point  when  she  writes  that 
Oedipus  avoids  "inconsistency  with  two  fundamental  principles,  the  piety  of 
respecting  suppliants  and  the  justice  of  reciprocal  charis". 
121  Blundell  (1989:  244  n.  57)  tries  to  avoid  this  inevitable  conclusion  by 
resorting  to  a  completely  impossible  interpretation  of  418-19:  `my  sons  value 
power  more  than  their  father,  because  only  on  hearing  the  new  oracle  did  they 
become  concerned  about  me'  is  not  what  the  Greek  says;  therefore,  the  only 
acceptable  interpretation  of  418-19  remains  that  of  Jebb  and  most  editors 
(Oedipus  complains  that  his  sons,  despite  being  aware  of  the  oracles  that  made 
him  posthumously  arbiter  of  Theban  welfare,  preferred  to  keep  the  throne  for 
themselves). 
122  Polyneices'  sincere  repentance  is  a  most  conspicuous  trait:  contrast  his 
openness,  esp.  at  1265-66  (papTUp6S 
...  Täµä  µiß  'ý  äVwv  Trü6rl),  with  Creon's 
hypocritical  keenness  on  "concealing  the  shame"  (755-57)  of  Oedipus'  misery 
(on  the  reading  757  Kpüsov,  which  seems  to  be  sound,  see  Jebb  [ad  754ff.  ], 
Kamerbeek  [ad  755-760];  contra  Lloyd  Jones  &  Wilson  [1990b:  240]):  the  tears 
streaming  from  his  eyes  (1250-51)  -the  first  thing  Antigone  notices  as  her 
brother  enters  the  stage  -show  his  true  repentance.  His  sincerity  is  proved  by 
two  more  details:  a)  his  account  of  the  situation  in  Thebes  (1292-1307)  is  not 
different  from  Ismene's  own  (367-81);  b)  we  clearly  remember  that  Creon 
avoided  mentioning  the  oracle,  whereas  Polyneices  is  quite  articulate  about  it 232 
father's  support,  he  does  not  even  have  the  power  (or  the  will)  123  to  stay 
alive  (1344-45).  Still,  Oedipus  does  not  hesitate  to  designate  his  own  son 
as  QTuyvös  Trats  (1173)  and  his  voice  as  E  XOLQTOV  48E  yµa  TraTp.  L 
(1177)  -a  grim  reversal  of  Antigone's  maxim  Tw  TEKOVTI,  TrdV  4(XOV 
(1108)!  124  Antigone  has  also  underlined  in  the  most  emphatic  manner 
that  a  father's  revenge  against  his  son,  even  if  he  has  suffered  the  most 
terrible  BuaaEßELa  from  him,  is  simply  inconceivable  (1189-91),  125  and 
that  d8chs  in  that  case  is  only  natural  (1192-94).  126  And  although 
Polyneices  reiterates  the  plea  for  a186s,  the  goddess  who  is  seated  by  the 
throne  of  Zeus  (1267-69),  Oedipus  declares  that,  for  him,  the  true 
ýVvE8pos  ZT>vös  is  only  D'LKTI  (1382),  i.  e.  retaliation.  127  Accordingly,  he 
(1331-32;  cf.  1300,  if  sound);  see  further  Burian  (1974:  423-25)  and  Taplin  (1983: 
160).  Commentators  have  been,  I  think,  too  unsympathetic  against  Polyneices: 
cf.  e.  g.  Linforth  (1951:  160-61);  Easterling  (1967:  6-12);  Hester  (1977:  29-30); 
Segal  (1981:  383-84,386-92);  Kirkwood  (1986:  114);  their  main  arguments  are 
that  Polyneices  is  selfish  (but  so  is  Oedipus,  cf.  Rosenmeyer  [1952:  101]);  that  he 
hates  his  brother  (but  Oedipus  also  hates  his  own  sons);  and  that  he  insists  on 
destroying  his  own  homeland  (but  Oedipus  will  also  be  hostile  to  Thebes  after 
his  heroisation).  An  important  exception  is  Taplin  (1983:  159-60),  who  has  made 
an  excellent  case  in  favour  of  Polyneices  in  terms  of  his  movements  within  the 
theatrical  space  in  relation  to  the  overall  geography  of  the  play.  For  another 
sympathetic  account  of  Polyneices  see  Cairns  (1993:  224n.  27). 
123  Depending  on  whether  we  read  v6Evw  (cold.  pl  urr.  )  or  O?  (QR)  at  1345. 
124  On  the  "gnomic  ring"  of  this  formulation  see  Kamerbeek  (ad  1106-1109). 
125  Dover  (1974:  274)  notes  that  a  child  telling  her  parent  what  to  do  "is  a  note 
unusual  for  the  fifth  century".  "The  more  remarkable,  therefore",  adds 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  262n.  41). 
126  1  accept  Jebb's  (ad  1192)  tentative,  but  paleographically  very  plausible, 
suggestion  to  read  aiBoü  vw  at  1192  (printed  by  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  [1990a]). 
Ironically,  at  237ff.  Antigone  implored  the  Chorus,  on  her  father's  behalf,  to 
show  aiShs  (237  ai664povEs,  with  Jebb's  note). 
127  On  Polyneices'  appeal  to  At8ti9  see  Taplin  (1983:  161-62).  On  ai,  &  c  and  the 
rights  of  suppliants  see  Gould  (1973:  85-90)  and  especially  Cairns  (1993:  276-87). 233 
denounces  his  paternity  of  Polyneices  and  Eteocles  (1369  ü  LE  is  8'  aTr 
äAXOV  KOÜK  E  LOÜ  TTE4ÜKaTOV,  1383  äTräm  pE  ioO),  thus  confirming 
Polyneices'  worst  fears,  namely  that  he  may  actually  be  the  son  not  of  his 
father,  but  of  KaKÖs  1TOTµos  (1323-24).  128  This  is  no  idle  play  with 
words:  Oedipus  truly  shows  his  disowned  sons  to  be  the  offspring  of  "ill 
fate",  for  he  proceeds  to  cast  upon  them  an  all-encompassing  curse, 
whose  effects  (as  we  shall  see  forthwith)  spread  over  the  entire  yEvos  of 
the  Labdacids.  He  curses  Polyneices  to  kill  his  ýüvaiµos,  by  whom  he  has 
been  banished  (1388),  and  to  be  killed  by  him  (1373-74,1387-88).  Now, 
in  the  house  of  Oedipus  the  word  ýüvalµos  has  sinister  implications,  for 
Oedipus  is  at  the  same  time  his  sons'  brother  (cf.  534-35,  with  reference 
to  Antigone  and  Ismene).  So,  by  cursing  Polyneices  to  kill  his  brother,  he 
simultaneously  perpetuates  the  present  dismal  situation,  for  Polyneices  is 
already  the  murderer  of  his  brother-father  (1361  aoü  ýovEws 
µEµvr11  VC,  0),  since  he  has  not  prevented  his  exile;  129  while  by  cursing  him 
to  be  killed  by  his  brother  by  whom  he  has  been  also  sent  into  exile,  ' he 
commits  both  fratricide  and  filicide,  for  Polyneices  is  both  his  brother 
(already  condemned  by  Oedipus  to  exile:  425-27!  )  and  his  son.  In  short, 
Polyneices  is  to  kill  both  his  brother  (Eteocles)  and  his  brother-father 
(Oedipus),  whereas  he  will  at  the  same  time  be  killed  by  his  brother  and 
his  brother-father.  To  put  it  differently,  Oedipus  with  his  curses  has 
perpetrated  (for  it  is  an  indubitable  fact,  cf.  1440  Es  Trpoi  rrTOV  "'  AL8-qv)  a 
On  the  retaliation-theme  in  the  Polyneices  scene  see  Winning  ton-Ingram 
(1980:  263-64),  Blundell  (1989:  239),  and  cf.  Reinhardt  (1979:  216).  That  Oedipus' 
harshness,  despite  his  appeal  to  Dike,  may  not  be  presented  unambiguously  for 
the  audience's  approval  has  been  pointed  out  by  Cairns  (1993:  225-26). 
128  Note  the  telling  contrast  with  the  rest  of  the  Seven,  who  are  mentioned 
along  with  their  parent's  name!  Differently  Easterling  (1967:  8). 
129  On  the  apparent  inconsistencies  (not  affecting  my  argument)  in  Oedipus' 
attribution  of  responsibility  for  his  exile  see  Machin  (1981:  108-20). 234 
quadruple  killing:  Polyneices'  by  Eteocles  and  vice-versa,  Polyneices'  by 
Oedipus  and  vice-versa.  130  The  bonds  of  kinship  are  no  longer  valid,  and 
the  coherence  they  used  to  create  has  ceased  to  exist:  the  patrimonial 
Erinys  (1299,1434,  cf.  421-22  -n'lv  1TE1TpwµEvl]v  I  Epty)  will  now  take  hold 
of  the  Labdacids'  race.  131 
A  brief  digression  is  necessary.  Despite  the  widespread  view  that  the 
dismal  future  awaiting  Polyneices  is  his  own  free  choice,  132  it  is  clear  that 
his  destruction  (as  well  as  his  brother's)  is  Oedipus'  own  desire  of  old 
(422-23;  esp.  1426  Xp1  ei  yd  133),  a  desire  he  fulfils  by  gratuitously 
indulging  in  his  own  revengeful  6uµ65  (1193)  which  was  also  responsible 
for  his  parricide  and  incest,  as  Antigone  has  already  reminded  us  (1195- 
98).  134  The  paternal  curse  binds  Polyneices  to  be  doomed,  since  it  leaves 
no  room  for  choice:  Polyneices'  emphasis  (1298-99,1434)  on  his  father's 
Erinyes  as  a  cause  of  his  misfortune  is  hardly  disputable,  135  if  one 
compares  Ismene's  account  at  371  (where  supernatural  motivation 
counts  at  least  as  much  as  the  sons'  responsibility),  and  especially 
130  On  the  complicated  network  of  relations  in  the  house  of  Labdacids  cf.  Zeitlin 
(1990:  134). 
131  Cf.  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  266). 
132  See  e.  g.  Whitman  (1951:  211-12),  Zeitlin  (1990:  161-2),  Blundell  (1989:  248) 
and,  a  little  more  reservedly,  Daly  (1986a:  83-85  with  n.  27);  in  the  same  vein, 
Linforth  (1951:  113-14)  tries  to  minimize  the  importance  of  Oedipus'  curse. 
133  See  Jebb  (ad  1426);  cf.  Ferrari  (1983:  61). 
134  On  Oedipus'  6vµös  cf.  above  n.  78. 
135  Pace  e.  g.  Machin  (1981:  144).  Disagreeing  also  with  e.  g.  Reinhardt  (1979: 
219)  and  Knox  (1964:  151,159-60),  I  do  not  interpret  1443-44  as  meaning  that 
Polyneices  dismisses  Oedipus'  prophecy:  see  Taplin  (1983:  161),  Bushnell  (1988: 
100;  cf.  further  96-7).  Finally,  line  1426,  with  Ferrari's  (1983:  61-2) 
interrogative  punctuation,  accepted  by  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  257), 
shows  Polyneices  succumbing  to  his  father's  will  in  a  mood  of  grim 
resignation. 235 
Oedipus'  own  invocation  of  the  dread  goddesses  against  his  son  at 
1391.136 
To  return  to  our  main  argument:  ironically,  the  man  who  -  by 
eagerly  accepting  Athenian  (political  and  religious)  vöµLµa  -  managed 
to  gain  admittance  into  a  new  polls  and  even  to  appease  the  Erinyes, 
thus  mitigating,  up  to  a  point,  his  previous  violation  of  (familial)  vöµLµa 
through  patricide  and  incest  -  that  very  man  is  now  effecting  the 
destruction  of  his  entire  race,  thereby  perpetrating  another  violation  of 
vö  tLµa.  For  the  shattering  of  patrilineal  bonds  is,  par  excellence,  a 
disintegration  of  vöµoL,  of  the  settled  structures  of  kinship;  this  is  all  too 
obvious  in  the  last  words  of  Oedipus'  rhesis:  paternal  yE  pa  (1396),  which 
would  normally  assert  and  reinforce  family  ties,  are  now  perverted  into 
their  opposite,  namely  utter  destruction  of  the  yEvos.  To  quote  Segal 
(1981:  388):  "What  Polyneices  will  inherit  as  the  privileges  of  rank  from 
his  father,  (gera,  1396)  should  include  both  the  prerogatives  of  the  house 
and  the  royal  power,  but  they  are  replaced  by  death  outside  the  city  at 
the  hand  of  a  brother".  137 
136  Tau&  8a(µovac,  i.  e.  the  Semnai  /  Eumenides:  on  their  identification  with  the 
Erinyes  cf.  above,  n.  10.  The  future  tenses  at  1372-74  doubtlessly  contribute  to 
the  feeling  that  Oedipus'  curses  inexorably  predetermine  his  sons'  future  (cf. 
the  interesting  comparison  of  this  scene  with  the  Teiresias  scene  in  the  CT  by 
Seidensticker  [1972:  268-69]).  Moreover,  if  L.  Campbell's  (ad  1375)  idea,  adopted 
by  Rosenmeyer  (1952:  109  with  n.  70)  and  Knox  (1964:  194n.  14),  that  1375  refers 
to  curses  already  pronounced  before  Oedipus'  departure  from  Thebes  has  some 
validity,  (although,  as  Winnington-Ingram  [1980:  266  n.  50]  notes,  such  an 
assumption  "spoils  rather  than  enhances  a  carefully  designed  effect  of 
cumulative  wrath"),  then  the  sons'  strife  would  indeed  be  a  result  of  their 
father's  curse,  as  in  earlier  versions  (e.  g.  A.  Sept  785-91,  E.  Ph.  67-68). 
137  On  Oedipus'  transcendence  of  the  family  cf.  also  Torrance  (1965:  284-6).  As 
will  become  clear  later,  I  am  not  concerned  with  either  justifying  or 
condemning  Oedipus'  curse  and  the  subsequent  destruction  of  vöµlµa;  for  a 
useful  summary  of  attempts  in  both  directions  see  Burian  (1974:  426  n.  41),  who 236 
The  perversion  of  vbµuµa  is  also  stressed,  e  contrario  as  it  were,  by 
Polyneices'  beseeching  his  sisters  to  grant  him  all  due  funerary  honours 
(1405-13),  i.  e.  to  perform  a  markedly  familial  duty,  affirmative  of 
kinship  ties  -  now  that  their  father  has  thrown  into  utter  disarray  all 
family  bonds  and  their  concomitant  system  of  vöµLµa!  The  pathos  of  the 
scene  is  all  the  more  enhanced  through  sinister  allusions  to  Antigone's 
future:  her  brother  wishes  her  well  if  she  performs  the  proper  rites  to  his 
dead  body  (1435;  cf.  1444-46),  but  the  audience  know  that  Antigone's 
woes  and,  eventually,  her  death  will  result  exactly  from  her  observance  of 
these  vöµLµa,  i.  e.  from  her  attempt  to  reaffirm  the  family  bonds  which 
her  father  has  disrupted.  Therefore,  Oedipus,  by  condemning  his  sons  to 
death,  unwittingly  casts  the  same  curse  upon  his  beloved  daughter,  thus 
causing  his  entire  race  to  be  utterly  destroyed.  138  This  perversion  of 
family  vö  igia  is  also  translated  into  terms  of  political  and  cosmic  order: 
Polyneices'  death  is  closely  associated  (by  force  of  his  father's  curse)  with 
a  total  reversal  and  annulment  of  the  polis-concept:  his  new  abode  will 
be  not  another  land,  but  the-  Underworld  (1389-90  KaL  Kaki  TO 
TapTapou  I  QTUyvöv  TraTpcsov  EpEßoS,  (big  a'  aTroLK(o-p)  -a  place 
where  by  definition  the  standards  of  civic  life  cease  to  exist.  The  word 
TraTpwov,  used  of  Polyneices'  new  abode,  is  of  extreme  significance:  the 
EpEßoc  of  the  Underworld  holds  already  Oedipus'  father,  Laius,  killed  by 
rightly  points  out  (ibid.  427)  that  "Oedipus'  curse  stands  outside  the  boundaries 
of  ordinary  moral  judgment". 
138  See  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  255,274-75),  Taplin  (1983:  162)  and  cf. 
Kirkwood  (1986;  114),  Blundell  (1989:  259)  and  I1oyd-Jones  (1990:  210)  as  against 
Bowra's  (1944:  349)  jejune  opinion  that  at  the  end  of  the  play  no  unresolved 
discords  remain  (a  view  similar  to  Bowra's  is  taken  by  Linforth  [1951:  180]  and 
Gellie  [1972:  182]).  I  think,  however,  that  both  Winnington-Ingram  and  Taplin 
overstress  Oedipus'  limited  foreknowledge  (he  does  not  foresee  his  daughter's 
catastrophe):  I  would  put  more  emphasis  on  the  fact  that  his  curse  spreads  over 
his  whole  race,  regardless  of  his  being  aware  or  unaware  of  it. 237 
his  son's  hand,  whereas  it  will  soon  receive  Eteocles  and  Polyneices,  killed 
by  their  father's  word,  139  and  will  thus  be  their  sole  patrimony  (cf.  again 
1396  yEpa).  1-a 
In  the  light  of  these  remarks,  I  believe  that  the  famous  third 
stasimon  (1211-48)  can  be  interpreted  as  a  foreshadowing  of  the  literal 
`genocide'  (the  extinction  of  the  Labdacid  yEvoc)  that  is  going  to  follow. 
This  ode  is,  so  to  speak,  a  synopsis  of  Oedipus'  long  and  painful  life: 
longevity  can  only  bring  grief,  say  the  Chorus  (1211-20).  Lifel41  means 
only  Kov4aL  ä  pooivaL  (1230),  TrAayä  iroXüµox6os  (1231),  142  and 
139  Cf.  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  257)  on  words  being  as  powerful  as  deeds. 
Bushnell  (1988:  96)  has  perceived  that  "Oedipus  speaks  not  promises  and  vows, 
the  discourse  of  civilization,  but  curses,  a  primeval  binding  language"  (see  also 
ibid.  95,98  on  the  "magic"  of  words  in  the  context  of  curse);  Slatkin  (1986:  219) 
remarks  that  "what  Polyneices  and  Oedipus  say  to  each  other  replaces  what 
Oedipus  and  Laius  did  to  each  other"  (her  italics);  on  the  power  of  language  in 
the  CL  see  Segal  (1981:  392-99).  In  Steven  Berkoff's  resplendently  sordid  play 
Greek  the  central  character  Eddie  (-Oedipus)  kills  his  father  (whom,  of  course, 
he  takes  to  be  a  stranger)  by  verbal,  not  physical,  violence. 
140  See  discussion  of  rraTpwov  in  Jebb  (ad  1390)  and  in  Bowra  (1944:  329),  who 
perceptively  notes:  "Oedipus  condemns  Polynices  to  uttermost  destruction,  to 
severance  from  the  ordered  life  of  the  world,  to  a  place  in  primal  chaos  and 
pain.  " 
141  Lines  1229ff.  may  need  some  explanation.  Neither  Jebb's  (ad  1229f.  )  nor 
Kamerbeek's  (ad  1229-1232)  interpretations  are  satisfactory:  if,  as  they  say,  T6 
vEov  (1229)  refers  to  the  short  happy  span  of  life  before  adult  age  (cf.  Burton's 
[1980:  2861  similar  view),  then  we  miss  the  poet's  point,  i.  e.  that  `the  best  is  not 
to  be  born  at  all'  (1224-25),  a  statement  that  implies  that  there  cannot  be  even  a 
short  period  of  happiness  in  human  life.  Both  youth  and  old  age  are  full  of 
trouble  and  sorrow.  On  the  other  hand,  Winnington-Ingram's  (1980:  252  n.  10) 
view  that  "what  is  said  of  youth  (1229ff.  )  relates  to  Polynices  (and  his  brother); 
what  is  said  of  age  is  true  of  Oedipus"  is  too  restrictive,  given  the  connotations 
of  such  words  as  ä4poaiuvri  or  rrkxya  (see  below  in  the  text). 
142  Dawe's  (1978:  145)  objections  to  Herwerden's  lrkyä  (for  the  MSS.  irkiyxan) 
fortunately  did  not  affect  his  text  (1996). 238 
UTäQE  Ls,  E  pLs,  µäXaL  I  Kai  4övoL  (1234-35)143  -a  statement  which,  in 
the  context  of  Oedipus'  past,  creates  a  penetrating  irony:  ä4  poaiwi  ,  being 
a  euphemism  for  `illicit  love',  1-14  cannot  but  recall  Oedipus'  incestuous 
relationship  with  his  mother,  while  TrXaya  Tro)4LoXOos  would  be  the 
most  suitable  word  to  describe  Oedipus'  fatal  blow  against  Laius;  finally, 
EpLc  (372,422)  and  µäXTi  (423)  have  already  been  used  of  Eteocles'  and 
Polyneices'  strife,  which  is  to  end  with  their  mutual  4övos.  145  On  the 
other  hand,  from  this  wretched  life  only  death  can  deliver  Oedipus.  So, 
death  is  ETT'KOUpOc  (1220),  but  (significantly  enough)  it  is  also 
ävup  vaLOc,  `wedless':  wedding  is,  par  excellence,  an  institution  creative 
of  family  ties,  but  Oedipus  has  undermined  the  very  essence  of  these  ties; 
death,  albeit  En'LKOUpos  for  himself,  will  be  ävuµEVaios  both  for 
Polyneices  (for  his  death  will  annul  his  Kl60s  KaLVöv,  379)  and  for 
Antigone  (who,  in  Ant.  813-16,  is  married  to  Acheron!  ).  Oedipus'  yfpas 
has  indeed  proved  ä-ýLAov  (1237),  for  it  has  destroyed  4LAi,  a,  kinship. 
4.6.1  No  vö,  toc,  no  place.  no  sight:  the  final  moments 
However,  the  disintegration  of  familial  vö  igia  is  not  over  yet:  Oedipus' 
tomb  will,  abnormally,  remain  unknown  to  his  daughters  (1529,1640-44, 
143  466vos  ... 
4övoL  (for  the  MSS.  46v0L...  4  06vos  or  sim.  )  is  Faehse's  emendation, 
restoring  the  climax:  see  Kamerbeek  (ad  1234,5).  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson's  (1990b: 
252)  objections,  based  as  they  are  on  as  late  an  author  as  Horace,  do  not  seem 
cogent  tome. 
144  Cf.  the  uses  of  a  pwv  ='having  control  over  the  sensual  desires'  (LSJ  s.  v.,  II 
for  examples),  and  of  iu  pia  in  e.  g.  E.  Hipp.  644  (on  which  see  Barrett  [19641), 
Ion  545. 
145  Edmunds  (1996:  94-5)  prefers  to  see  in  these  words  a  political  /  historical 
significance. 239 
1724-36,1756-67);  contrary  to  common  Greek  practice,  there  will  be  no 
cn  to  (cf.  1681  äaKOTrOL  Tr  . KEs),  146  and'  Oedipus  -  although  he  is 
honoured  with  the  preparatory  funerary  offices  described  at  1598-1603147 
-  will  not  receive  the  proper  rites  at  his  tomb  (cf.  Antigone's  EpT  ios 
EOavEs  18E'  . toi.  [1714]).  Still,  an  extraordinary  paradox  suggests  itself: 
the  ties  of  4LX[a  (kinship)  having  been  blasted,  the  mutual  ýLALa  (love) 
between  father  and  daughters  (and,  of  course,  between  sisters  and 
146  Edmunds  (1996:  95-100)  points  out  that  the  playwright  seems  to  have 
assumed  widespread  contemporary  uncertainty  about,  or  even  ignorance  of, 
Oedipus'  grave  at  Colonus.  He  also  points  out,  after  a  careful  examination  of  the 
evidence  (cf.  also  Edmunds  [1981a]),  that  the  existence  of  a  tradition  about 
Oedipus'  death  at  Colonus  (which  is  well  evidenced)  does  not  imply  the 
existence  of  a  grave,  let  alone  of  cult.  Even  if  a  grave  did  exist,  its  hiddenness 
would  clearly  be  an  anomaly:  cf.  Kearns  (1989:  208-209),  despite  the  parallels  of 
secret  tombs  she  provides  (ibid.  5  1-52);  this  important  fact  has  not  been  taken 
into  account  by  Seaford  (1994a:  134-35).  Jacoby  on  FGrHist  324F62  (Suppl.  3b 
[vol.  II],  p.  155  n.  5)  has  completely  denied  that  Oedipus  had  either  a  tomb  or  a 
cult  in  Athens;  according  to  him,  the  tomb  in  the  precinct  of  the  Semnai  (Paus. 
1.28.7)  would  be  a  later  invention;  cf.  also  Colchester  (1942:  23)  and  Rosenmeyer 
(1952:  99-100  with  n.  30).  Henrichs  (1983:  94  with  nn.  28,29;  95  with  n.  33), 
although  he  tentatively  assumes  the  existence  of  a  hero-cult  of  Oedipus,  is 
aware  of  the  uncertainty  about  Oedipus'  tomb  and  cult  in  Sophocles'  time. 
Linforth  (1951:  103)  cautiously  leaves  the  question  open.  -  On  the  grave 
monument's  "indexical  function"  as  ofi1a,  i.  e.  as  sign  and  symbol  of  the  dead 
person  see  the  synopsis  offered  by  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1995:  139-42).  Cf.  also 
Burkert  (1985a:  193-94).  Albini  (1974:  228-29)  and  Segal  (1981:  402,405)  make 
some  interesting  points  on  the  concealment  of  Oedipus'  burial  place. 
147  These  offices  are  referred  to  by  the  significant  verb  voµ(CETat  (1603);  on 
funerary  vo  uCC  IEva  see  Kurtz  &  Boardman  (1971:  143-44),  Alexiou  (1974:  5,39). 
But  even  in  this  case  the  v6p  qta  are  not  fully  observed,  not  only  because  it  is  a 
living  person  who  receives  them,  but  also  because  the  lament  ("un  6pfvoc  sui 
generis":  Di  Benedetto  [1983:  240])  abnormally  precedes  the  death;  cf.  Alexiou 
(1974:  4,38). 240 
brother148)  remains  admirably  unaffected  (1615-19,  esp.  1617  TO  ... 
4LXEtv,  1697-98,1702-3);  149  indeed,  while  mere  words  were  able  to 
destroy  4LX[a-bonds  (in  the  form  of  Oedipus'  curses  against  his  son),  a 
simple  word  (1615-16  Ev 
...  µövov  ... 
Eiros),  i.  e.  TO  4LXCiv  (1617),  are 
equally  able  to  reassert  them.  150  The  disruption  of  ýiXia  is  at  the  same 
time  its  assertion.  In  other  words,  the  system  of  kinship  ties  (a  vöµos,  in 
the  broadest  sense  of  the  term)  is  at  the  same  time  destroyed  and 
preserved:  the  destruction  of  family  bonds  in  the  case  of  Oedipus'  sons  is 
combined  with  their  affirmation  in  the  case  of  his  daughters. 
This  holds  good  on  the  level  of  the  polls  as  well.  On  the  one  hand, 
the  very  essence  of  the  polis  (i.  e.  its  constituent  notions  of  locality  and 
vöµos) 
ä  destroyed.  To  start  with  the  former,  one  easily  perceives  that 
the  end  of  the  play  is  generally  marked  by  an  overall  disintegration  of 
the  notion  of  locality.  The  lack  of  fixedness  of  place  was  -already 
foreshadowed  in  the  epode  (1239-48)  of  the  third  stasimon:  Oedipus 
stands,  as  it  were,  in  a  no  man's  land,  where  the  four  corners  of  the  world 
seem  to  meet'  -  an  impossibility  stressing  the  disarray  into  which  locality 
disintegrates.  151  Furthermore,  Oedipus'  curse  against  Polyneices  combines 
the  destruction  of  locality  with  the  destruction  of  family  structures:  his 
son  will  be  driven  away  from  his  land  and  become  an  ä1TOLKOS  of  Hades 
(1389-90),  152  an  abode  which  is'  nothing  like  the  kinds  of  locality  with 
which  we  are  familiar,  and  which  is  commonly  (and  significantly) 
referred  to  by  a  vague  E  KE  t,  as  opposed  to  the  palpable  E  v06BE  of  our 
148  Cf.  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  227-28). 
149  On  this  paradox  see  Burian  (1974:  428),  Segal  (1981:  382),  Bushnell  (1988:  101- 
102).  On  the  4tka-theme  see  further  Edmunds  (1996:  125-8). 
150  Cf.  Kirkwood  (1958:  245),  Jones  (1962:  234),  Segal  (1981:  398,399). 
151  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  377). 
152  "Send  away  from  home"  and  "colonize  a  place"  are  the  two  basic  senses  of 
ärroLKdCELV  (see  LSJ  s.  v.  ).  On  Oedipus'  curses  against  his  sons  cf.  above  p.  233. 241 
common  experience  in  the  Upperworld.  '53  His  daughters  too  will 
painfully  experience  the  absence  of  fixed  place:  their  life  henceforth  will 
consist  in  wandering  over  distant  lands  or  angry  seas  (1685-88);  they  feel 
they  have  no  way  to  go  back  home  (1742-43).  '54  Moreover,  the 
transcendence  of  the  polis'  frame  will  manifest  itself  in  another  aspect: 
for  Oedipus'  promised  boons  to  lie  always  unmarred  in  the  polis  (1518- 
19,1524-25,1533-34),  no  citizen  must  ever  know  where  the  source  of 
these  blessings,  namely  his  tomb,  is  hidden  (1522-23,1528  äaTwv);  the 
common  good  of  his  presence  in  Athens  will  be  known  only  to  a  single 
person,  i.  e.  to  each  successive  leader  (1531-32).  Nonetheless,  to  quote 
Bowra  (1944:  341),  "the  circumstances  and  their  consequences  are 
unusual.  A  hero's  grave  was  usually  known  and  was  the  place  where  he 
was  honored".  155  Thus,  Oedipus,  although  he  throws  his  new  city's 
153  Vermeule  (1979:  48)  remarks  that  house-like  tombs  are  but  an  exception  in 
the  Greek  world:  Hades,  despite  often  being  called  a  `house'  in  Greek  literature, 
must  have  been  envisaged  as  a  negation  of  the  familiarity  of  the  Upperworld  - 
as  an  unknowable,  disturbing  realm,  as  the  absolute  `other'.  Sourvinou-Inwood 
(1995:  303-56)  further  argues  that  the  development  (as  evidenced  by  the 
literary  and  archeological  record)  of  such  `mediating'  figures  as  Charon  the 
ferryman  or  Hermes  the  guide  of  the  dead  in  the  archaic  and  classical  eras 
betrays  a  growing  anxiety  and  uncertainty  about  the  unknown  kingdom  of  the 
dead-i.  e.  an  increasing  awareness  of  its  `otherness'. 
154  Gellie  (1972:  182)  refuses  to  see  the  obvious  when  he  writes:  "There  is  a 
danger  that  the  protracted  dirge  will  take  us  away  from  the  mood  of 
contentment  in  which  Oedipus  went  to  his  death  [...  ]"  (similar  views  in  Bowra 
[1944:  346]).  This  mood  of  contentment,  however,  has  been  achieved  at  the 
expense  of  both  the  polis'  vöpLµa  and  the  ties  of  kinship;  the  dirge  reveals  all 
too  clearly  how  painful,  on  the  human  plane,  Oedipus'  translation  into  quasi- 
divine  status  has  been.  See  Burton's  (1980:  272  with  n.  22)  salutary  remarks,  as 
well  as  Di  Benedetto's  (1983:  239-42)  interesting  views. 
155  See  also  Bushnell  (1988:  105),  who  also  quotes  Bowra.  So,  with  Oedipus'  tomb 
remaining  unknown,  we  have  a  twofold  disruption  of  vöpLµa:  familial  ones  (his 242 
political  structures  into  utter  disorder,  will  through  this  destruction 
benefit  the  city  all  the  same;  in  other  words,  he  must  transcend  the  polls' 
vö  i  ia,  and  disassemble  its  political  framework,  in  order  to  fully  grant 
his  blessings  to  this  polls.  Nonetheless,  an  important  warning  is  heard: 
the  benefits  emanating  from  this  tomb  may  not  remain  intact  in  the  long 
term;  for  if  Athens  ignore  such  vöµLµa  as  the  rules  of  political  decency 
(1535)  and  the  religious  observances  (1537),  the  gods  will  certainly  take 
notice  of  it  (1534-38);  156  in  other  words,  the  transcendence  of  vöµLµa, 
through  which  Oedipus  will  confer  welfare  on  Athens,  will  be  catastrophic 
if  practised  by  Athens  itself?  The  autonomous  individual  may  well  have 
to  transcend  the  vöµLµa  of  the  political  community  in  order  to  benefit 
the  community  itself;  the  polls,  however,  must  keep  well  within  the  limits 
imposed  by  this  set  framework  of  vöµiµa,  for  the  blessings  to  become 
permanent.  157  This  paradoxical  . 
tension  between  observing  and 
transcending  the  vöµnµa  dominates  the  play  and  is  essential  for  its 
interpretation.  Its  full  significance  in  relation  to  the  typically  Sophoclean 
notion  of  the  unknowable  God  will  be  examined  at  the  end  of  this 
chapter. 
At  the  end  of  the  play  it  is  implied  that  Oedipus  transcends  even 
the  final  and  most  frightful  limit,  the  limit  between  Hades  and 
Upperworld,  by  reiterating  Theseus'  anomic  tcaToaaLS:  absurd  though  it 
may  seem,  his  forthcoming  descent  to  Hades  is,  at  1590-97,  curiously 
kin  will  not  be  able  to  tend  the  grave)  and  political  ones  (the  citizens  will  not 
be  able  to  honour  the  hero  at  his  tomb). 
156  Cf.  Kirkwood  (1986:  113  with  n.  33),  Blundell  (1993:  305). 
157  Knox  (1964:  153)  perceives  another  relevant  paradox:  Oedipus  may  well 
admonish  Theseus  (607-28)  as  to  the  mutability  of  the  human  condition,  but  he 
himself,  insofar  as  he  is  about  to  become  a  heros,  is  not  bound  by  it:  "[Oedipus] 
speaks  not  as  one  subject  to  the  law  he  lays  down  but  as  one  of  the  powers  that 
administer  it". 243 
associated  with  Theseus'  and  Peirithous'  hubristic  journey  there.  Oedipus 
pauses  at  the  KaTappäKTT19  öbös  (1590),  where,  according  to  the  scholiast 
ad  1590  (p.  62  De  Marco),  Persephone  was  abducted  and  led  to  the 
Underworld  by  Pluto;  158  the  water  for  his  last  bath  is  fetched  from  a  hill 
on  which  a  temple  of  Demeter  Euchloos  was  situated  (1600)159  -  we 
remember  the  dual  antitheses  Demeter  /  Persephone  vs.  Poseidon  / 
Theseus  (above,  n.  114).  Moreover,  if  the  OopiKlos  1T  Tpos  (1595)  was  the 
rock  whence  the  first  horse  sprang,  born  from  Poseidon's  spilt  semen, 
6opös,  160  then  a  further  allusion  to  the  myth  of  Demeter's  rape  by 
Poseidon  is  here  provided.  This  would  multiply  the  connections  between 
the  place  of  Oedipus'  descent  and  the  old  insults  against  Persephone  / 
Demeter,  perpetrated  by  Theseus  /  Poseidon  (respectively,  king  and 
E1TLQTäTfls  [889]  of  Colonus,  the  place  where  Oedipus  is  to  be  heroised). 
Be  that  as  it  may,  our  text  provides  us,  with  more,  and  more  certain, 
sinister  innuendos:  Oedipus  stands  by  the  KotXos  .  Kpa-rrjp  (1593-94) 
where  Theseus'  and  Peirithous'  oaths  of  friendship  were  engraved;  161  and 
158  Jebb  (ad  1596)  plausibly  suggests,  on  the  analogy  of  parallels  from  popular 
religion,  that  perhaps  the  KOtXr  äXEp8os  (1596)  was  also  associated  with 
Persephone's  abduction  by  Pluto.  However,  one  should  not,  like  Allison  (1984: 
88-89),  overstress  the  importance  of  locale  in  this  last  scene;  I  have  already 
argued  that  any  notion  of  fixedness  and  stability  is  disintegrated  at  the  end  of 
the  play.  Thus,  there  may  be  some  plausibility  in  Rosenmeyer's  (1952:  104-106 
with  n.  48)  suggestion  that  one  should  not  try  to  equate  the  various  data  in  the 
text  with  identifiable  landmarks  in  the  vicinity  of  Colonus  (but  Kirsten's  [1973: 
19-21]remarks  are  very  much  worth  considering). 
159  With  LRV's  rrpovöýLov;  see  Jebb  (ad  1600f.  ),  Kamerbeek  (ad  1600-1603).  On 
Demeter  Euchloos  see  Kirsten  (1973:  22-23). 
160  See  Gruppe  (1912:  365-66)  but  contr.  ibid.  373;  Robert  (1915:  I.  20),  Segal 
(1981:  369  with  n.  25)  and,  most  recently,  Nagy  (1990a:  231).  Contra  Ulrich  von 
Wilamowitz  in  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz  (1917:  325  n.  1).  See  further  Appendix. 
161  See  Jebb  (ad  1593,1594).  Probably  this  was  supposed  to  be  the  very  place 
whence  Theseus  and  Peirithous  were  thought  to  have  descended  to  Hades:  see 244 
it  is  all  the  more  remarkable  that  similar  pledges  of  oath  are  given  by 
Theseus  to  Oedipus  at  that  very  place  (1631-37;  cf.  1767-68).  The 
subversion  of  cosmic  order,  implicit  in  all  these  associations  of  Oedipus' 
KaTäßao  Ls  with  Theseus'  sin,  is  confirmed  at  the  end  of  the  Messenger's 
speech,  who  reveals  that  the  limits  between  Olympus  and  Hades,  the  two 
poles  defining  the  stability  of  cosmic  order,  have  been  confounded  too: 
Theseus  makes  reverence  simultaneously  to  the  Earth  and  to  the  6Ewv 
"OAvµrros  (1654-55),  162  while  the  Messenger  himself  (1661-62)  puts 
forward  as  equally  plausible  possibilities  the  assumption  of  Oedipus  to 
heaven  and  his  descent  to  Hades.  163  Nonetheless,  Oedipus"  KaTäßaa1s  will 
not  end  as  Theseus'  did:  Persephone  (1556  TäV  ä4  avij  6E6v;  cf.  Oedipus' 
own  words  at  1548  ij  TE  vEpTEpa  6EÖs)  will  benevolently  receive  the 
descending  Oedipus  (as  implored  by  the  Chorus,  1556-64),  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  this  polluted  man  has  been  granted  asylum  by  Theseus,  who 
once  tried  to  abduct  her,  and  has  been  declared  Ei  roXis  in  a  place  whose 
pride  are  horses  (58-61,668,711),  offspring  of  Poseidon's  (the  place's 
Judeich  (1931:  414),  Kirsten  (1973:  9,18),  Burkert  (1985b:  12);  discussion  in 
Robert  (1915:  1.23,30). 
162  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  271  with  n.  60)  remarks  that  this  must  have  been 
a  familiar  ritual  gesture  (cf.  Ar.  Eq.  156);  but,  as  he  rightly  points  out,  this 
[Blaydes  gesture  receives  too  much  emphasis  (cf.  1654-5äµa  ...  Ev  TQÜTW  XpövW 
)«öyw  codd.  )  to  be  insignificant. 
163  On  the  collapse  of  limits  between  Olympian  and  chthonic  cf.  Benardete 
(1966:  121),  Segal  (1981:  369,399-400  with  n.  91,404),  Kirkwood  (1986:  109). 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  270-71)  adds  two  more  points:  first,  at  1460-61 
Oedipus  says  that  "the  winged  thunder  of  Zeus  will  lead  him  to  Hades"  (so  the 
two  poles,  heaven  and  Hades,  are  brought  together  again);  secondly,  the 
thunderous  noises  summoning  Oedipus  are  described  by  the  Chorus  (1456)  as 
coming  from  the  heaven  (alft),  whereas  the  Messenger  (1606)  says  KT6T1TjCTE 
j.  LEV  ZEÜS  XO6VL0$. 245 
ETTLQTCLTfls  [8891)  rape  of  Demeter.  164  Furthermore,  if  the  X6ÖVLaL  6EaL 
(1568)  who  are  asked  to  welcome  Oedipus  are  indeed  the  Erinyes,  as  the 
scholiast  ad  1568  (p.  60  De  Marco)  and  Jebb  (ad  1568)  have  suggested, 
then  this  might  serve  as  a  kind  of  synopsis  of  the  polarities  dominating 
the  play:  on  the  one  hand  the  initial  tension  between  Oedipus  and  the 
Eumenides  (because  of  the  violation  of  their  sanctuary)  is  clearly  recalled, 
while  on  the  other  hand  their  close  association  with  Demeter  / 
Persephone165  is  perhaps  meant  to  remind  us  again  (this  time  from  a 
different  standpoint)  that  there  is  also  a  tension  between  Poseidon  / 
Theseus  and  Demeter  /  Persephone  -  in  spite  of  which  Oedipus  is  now 
welcomed  by  the  gods  of  the  Underworld.  Finally,  Cerberus  who, 
according  to  one  version  of  the  myth,  166  devoured  Peirithous  during  his 
infamous  journey  along  with  Theseus,  will  now  clear  the  way167  for  the 
dying  Oedipus  (1568-78). 
164  Colchester  (1942:  24-28),  followed  by  Bernidaki-Aldous  (1990:  198-200),  has 
detected  interesting  innuendos  in  the  text  that  may  be  construed  as  implying  a 
connection  of  Oedipus  with  the  Eleusinian  Mysteries  -culminating  in  his  final 
transformation  into  a  Hierophant.  In  that  case,  Oedipus'  initiation  into  the 
Mysteries  of  the  Two  Goddesses  paradoxically  takes  place  under  the  auspices  of 
Theseus  -an  archetypal  `opposite  pole'  (along  with  Poseidon)  to  Persephone  / 
Demeter. 
165  Farnell  (1907a:  54-55),  Richardson  (1974:  306);  cf.  Bernidaki-Aldous  (1990: 
196).  Edmunds  (1981a:  229-38)  makes  an  interesting  case  for  an  original  cultic 
association  between  Oedipus  on  the  one  hand  and  Demeter  and  the  Erinyes  on 
the  other.  On  the  connection  between  Demeter  and  the  Erinyes  see  Appendix  n. 
185. 
166  See  Hellanikos  FGrHist  323F18  Jacoby  (=Plut.  Th.  31),  Tzetzes  on  Ar.  Ra.  142a 
(N.  3,  p.  743  Koster).  Cf.  also  Plut.  Th.  35.1  for  a  rationalization  of  this  version. 
Kamerbeek  (ad  1568-1573)  seems  to  have  felt  the  allusion  to  the  Theseus- 
Peirithous  saga. 
167  If  this  is  the  correct  interpretation  of  1575  Ev  KaOapw  ßfjvaL  -a  text  perhaps 
corrupt.  See  Jebb  (ad  1575f.  ),  Ulrich  von  Wilamowitz  in  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz 246 
To  be  sure,  all  these  paradoxes  are  äXöyLQTa  (1675),  unfathomable 
and  unintelligible.  168  It  is  of  supreme  significance  that  the  ultimate 
reversal  of  the  play  is  that  of  the  notions  of  vision  and  blindness:  the 
daughters,  who  were  virtually  their  father's  eyes  (866-67),  now  use  the 
vocabulary  of  blindness  (1681  aaKOTroL,  1682  #avE  t,  1683-84  vc  v  8' 
ÖAEOp(a  I  vbý  ETr  ÖµµaQLV  iMßaKE,  169  1689  Ob  KäTOLBa,  1701  QKÖTOV), 
whereas  their  father  has  acquired  a  kind  of  wondrous  vision  and  become 
a  KaLVÖs  iqyEµwv  (1542-43)  to  those  who  used  to  guide  him  (cf.  also 
1521,1587-89).  170  The  Chorus  are  basically  in  the  same  position:  their 
repeatedly  expressed  terror  in  view  of  the  uncanny  natural  phenomena 
that  have  suddenly  broken  out  (1462-71,1477-85),  is  contrasted  to 
Oedipus'  remarkable  certainty  of  what  is  in  store  for  him  (1460-61,1472- 
76);  it  is  not  the  blind  (äýEyyijs,  cf.  1549)171  Oedipus,  but  the  `seeing' 
Chorus.  that  cannot  explain  these  wondrous  occurrences,  which  they 
significantly  term  64EyyES  TL  (1480-81),  `dark',  `uncanny', 
'inexplicable'.  172  Sophocles,  using  a  device  dear  to  him  since,  at  least,  the 
time  of  his  Oedipus  Tyrannus  (cf.  e.  g.  OT  284-5,370-73,747),  opposes 
(1917:  364  n.  2),  Kamerbeek  (ad  1574-1578),  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  260- 
61). 
168  "Things  which  baffle  )oyLvµös,  things  which  transcend  human  reason": 
Jebb  (ad  1675f.  ).  Cf.  Coray  (1993:  407). 
169  On  the  figurative  use  of  vVE  for  `blindness'  cf.  Or  374-75.  Jebb  (ad  1683f.  )  and 
Kamerbeek  (ad  1683,4)  give  different  interpretations.  An  intermediate  position 
is  held  by  Segal  (1981:  401). 
170  On  the  splendid  dramatic  effect  of  Oedipus  guiding  his  former  guides,  as  if 
he  had  his  eyes,  see  Jebb  (ad  1542-1555),  Shields  (1961:  71-72),  Knox  (1964:  161), 
Seidensticker  (1972:  262),  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  223-24),  Seale  (1982:  136-7),  Allison 
(1984:  86).  On  its  theatrical  significance  see  Linforth  (1951:  174). 
171  Cf.  the  use  of  KOTE  Lvös  =  'blind'  in  a'  1326. 
172  Cf.  Burian  (1974:  428)  and  Segal  (1981:  396,400). 247 
delusive  physical  eyesight  to  (genuine)  mental  vision:  173  this  is  his  way  to 
illustrate  his  view  on  the  unreliability  of  human  perception,  and  the 
illusory  character  of  human  knowledge. 
To  conclude:  the  play  demonstrates,  along  the  lines  of  Sophoclean 
`apophatism',  that  vöµLµa,  respectable  though  they  may  be,  are 
nevertheless  merely  human  conventions:  they  are  only  a  single  mental 
and  social  reality  out  of  the  chaos  of  innumerable  possibilities  that  can 
potentially  be  substantiated  -  structured  and  conceptualized  -  as 
mental  and  social  categories.  To  quote  Knox  (1982:  26),  "the  polls,  as 
Sophocles  had  his  chorus  sing  in  Antigone,  is  a  human  invention,  perhaps 
man's  greatest  creation,  but  it  is  no  more  than  that.  "  Moreover,  what  is 
considered  E  ücE  ßE  La  or  äyvE  La  by  man  is  not  necessarily  so  for  god: 
Oedipus,  despite  his  shattering  of  all  vöµoi  and  frameworks  (kinship, 
polls,  cosmic  order),  is  finally  translated  by  the  gods  into  a  level  of  god- 
like  existence.  The  more  Oedipus'  prophetic  power  grows  in  him,  174  the 
more  he  proceeds  towards  the  transcendence  of  all  kinds  of  vöµLµa;  in 
other  words,  the  more  he  acquires  a  gift  that,  by  definition,  is  a  non- 
communal  property  of  an  exceptional  individual,  the  more  he  transcends 
the  coherence  and  predictability  of  social  framework,  notably  as 
substantiated  in  its  vöµ1µa,  in  which,  by  definition,  it  is  the  collective 
identity  of  a  social  entity  (not  the  exceptional  individual)  that  is 
manifested.  Thus,  the  utter  destruction  of  all  kinds  of  vö  xgia  coincides 
173  On  this  paradox  see  Shields  (1961:  65-73),  Buxton  (1980:  23  ). 
174  According  to  the  pattern  that  Knox  (1964:  148-61)  has  detected  and  described. 
The  demonic  power  displayed  gradually  by  Oedipus  is  rightly  recognized  by 
Bowra  (1944:  329-30),  Wassermann  (1953:  565-67),  Kitto  (1961:  386-89),  Sgroi 
(1962:  294),  Burian  (1974:  425  and  passim),  Edmunds  (1981a:  228-29),  Allison 
(1984:  85-86),  and  very  convincingly  by  Daly  (1986b:  82-83).  It  is  undervalued 
(with  his  human  aspects  being  brought  out  instead)  by  Linforth  (1951:  119-29), 
Waldock  (1951:  225-26),  Easterling  (1967:  1-2,10),  Hester  (1977:  30),  Di  Benedetto 
(1983:  225),  and  Blundell  (1989:  253-54). 248 
with  Oedipus'  assumption  to  a  superhuman  status.  The  Chorus  fear  that 
they  may  be  punished  for  having  associated  with  a  polluted  man  (1480- 
84)  They  do  not  understand  how  a  man  who  remains  polluted  until  the 
end  -a  fact  not  denied  even  by  Oedipus  himself  (1132-36)175  -  can  still 
be  summoned  by  the  gods  (1460,1511-12,1514-15),  and  indeed  in  such 
a  splendidly  mysterious  way  (1626-28).  176  The  common  man's  limited 
understanding  of  the  cosmos  (as  against  the  heroised  individual's 
superhuman  perception)  is  condensed  in  the  Chorus'  comment  on  the 
impending  destruction  of  the  Labdacids:  they  state  that,  if  these  woes  are 
ä  to  is  8aLµ0vcuv  (1451-52),  they  cannot  be  meaningless  (µaTdv, 
1451).  177  They  do  not  attempt  to  explain  this  new  turnabout:  their  words 
at  1565-67,  and  especially  8aiµwv  8(KaL09,  only  observe  -  they  do  not 
interpret  -  the  counterbalancing  vicissitudes  of  human  fortune,  the 
175  See  the  interesting  remarks  of  Jebb  (ad  1132ff.  ),  Bowra  (1944:  310,314), 
Knox  (1964:  152),  Gellie  (1972:  162-63,167-68),  Parker  (1983:  310);  wrongly 
Colchester  (1942:  27),  Letters  (1953:  300),  Segal  (1981:  385),  Gardiner  (1987:  112- 
13  with  n.  41),  Blundell  (1989:  249  with  in.  80),  and  Walker  (1995:  184);  the 
passage  is  deplorably  misunderstood  by  Bernidaki-Aldous  (1990:  189).  Pace 
Adkins  (1960:  136),  Eva¬ßrc  at  287  does  not  mean  `ritually  clean'.  On  the 
contrary,  the  important  distinction  between  `pollution'  (µ(aaµa)  and  moral 
innocence  holds  good  in  this  passage  as  well  as  throughout  the  play;  on  this 
distinction  see  Adkins  (1960:  87-91,105-106)  and  Parker  (1983:  116-7,310  etc.  ); 
cf.  also  Whitman  (1951:  203-204),  Jones  (1962:  229-31),  Lesky  (1972:  250),  Hester 
(1977:  25-26),  Cairns  (1993:  222  n.  19).  Nor  should  one  introduce  such 
psychological  interpretations  as  "the  blush  of  unexpungeable  shame"  (Howe 
[1962:  141  with  n.  59;  cf.  134])  neglecting  the  all  too  important,  and  much  more 
tangible,  factor  of  the  miasma  of  pollution;  the  same  goes  also  for  Linforth 
(1951:  106-109)  who  does  not  clearly  distinguish  between  pollution  and  moral 
innocence. 
176  On  the  uncanny  character  of  this  scene  see  e.  g.  Reinhardt  (1979:  223),  Knox 
(1964:  161),  Kirkwood  (1958:  272),  Lesky  (1960:  377-78)  and  (1972:  255). 
177  See  Jebb's  (ad  1447ff.  )  interesting  remarks;  also,  more  recently,  Krause 
(1976:  195-6). 249 
"impersonal  universal  cycle,  dispensing  alternately  good  and  bad  fortune 
to  mortals  with  little  regard  for  merit"  (Blundell  [1989:  254]).  178  They 
simply  avow  their  compliance  with  an  unintelligible  and  inexplicable 
cosmic  order:  "Time"  (in  Jebb's  translation  of  1454-55)  is  "overthrowing 
some  fortunes,  and  on  the  morrow  lifting  others,  again,  to  honour".  This 
is  as  far  into  divine  decrees  as  human  understanding  can  possibly  go. 
APPENDIX 
At  887-89  Theseus  announces  that  he  was  obliged  to  interrupt  a  sacrifice 
he  has  been  performing  in  honour  of  Poseidon  (for  this  important 
sacrifice  cf.  also  1492-95).  It  is  well  known  that  Poseidon  was  Theseus' 
divine  father,  179  and  that  the  Attic  hero  was  very  closely  associated  with 
178  Sophodes  has  already  (394-95)  warned  us  against  the  idea  of  a  simple 
theodicy;  it  is  not  the  case  that  gods  eventually  make  up  for  the  woes  they 
inflicted  long  ago.  See  Linforth  (1951:  100-104,114-17,190-91),  Kitto  (1958:  47- 
54),  Kitto  (1961:  393),  Jones  (1962:  233),  Blundell  (1989:  254-55  with  n.  96);  cf.  De 
Romilly  (1968:  93).  Whitman  (1951:  199-200),  albeit  rejecting  the  idea  of  `divine 
amends'  in  the  play,  wrongly  thinks  that  the  Chorus  interpret  Oedipus' 
heroization  in  this  way.  The  most  fervid  advocate  of  the  `divine  amends'  view  is 
perhaps  Bowra  (1944:  314-15);  see  also  Letters  (1953:  299),  Wassermann  (1953: 
563),  Albini  (1974:  231),  Burton  (1980:  293-94).  I  also  disagree  with  Di 
Benedetto's  (1983:  245-46)  view  that  the  ending  of  the  play,  far  from 
demonstrating  the  gods'  justice,  shows  a  bitter  reality,  i.  e.  that  "la  giustizia  del 
dio  nel  favorire  1'  uomo  consiste  esclusivamente  nel  procurargli  una  buona 
morte". 
179  E.  Hipp.  887,1169f.,  1315,1318,1411.  Barrett  (1964:  ad  887)  points  out  that, 
although  it  was  at  Trozen  that  Theseus  was  thought  to  be  Poseidon's  son 
(whereas  at  Athens  he  was  Aegeus'  son),  Athens  had  to  "accept  Poseidon's 
paternity  in  legends  of  which  it  forms  an  integral  part.  The  resultant  joint 
paternity,  divine  and  human,  is  far  from  unique:  cf.  Herakles  son  of  Zeus  and 250 
him  in  cult,  as  it  may  be  inferred  from  the  place  their  feasts  occupied  in 
the  Athenian  religious  calendar:  one  of  the  reasons  Plutarch  (Thes.  36.4- 
6)  offers  as  an  explanation  of  the  Athenian  custom  of  honouring  Theseus 
on  the  eighth  day  of  each  month  (apart  from  their  "major  sacrifice"  to 
him,  i.  e.  the  Theseia)  is  that  they  thought  ETEPOU  JiwXov  EKELVW  [sc. 
Theseus]  TTPOQTIKELV  TO'V  QPL6µOV  TOÜTOV  [Sc.  eight]  EK  TTOQELS(SV0S 
'YE'YOVEVQL  XEyo  L  vq  '  Kai  'YQP  TIOQELSWVa  TQLS  OY80QL9  TLýI.  (3QLV 
... 
180  On  the  other  hand,  Poseidon  is  also  the  horse-god,  protector  (889 
E1TLVTäT9.  )  of  EU'LTrTros  (668)  Colonus  (cf.  also  58-61,711,  and  see  above, 
p.  244),  where,  Sophocles  tells  us,  he  first  created  the  bridle  for  the  horse 
(712-15).  If  the  scholiast  on  712  (p.  40  De  Marco)  is  to  be  trusted,  the 
Sophoclean  version  of  the  myth  is  an  ETrL  TO  QEµvöTEPov  modification 
of  an  Attic  legend,  which  is  presumably  summarized  by  Tz.  ad  Lyc.  766 
(II.  244  Scheer)  : 
KaL  TTE  PL  TOÜS  ITETPOUS  ý  TOD  EV'  AOi  vaic  KoXwvoü  Ka8Eu610'as  [SC.  0 
TIOQE  LS(SJV  ]  CLTrEa1TE  Pµ]VE  KQL  'LTTTroc  IKÜ$LOS  E  ýf  XOE  Vb  KaL 
2;  KLPWVLTITJ9181  AEyöµEVOc. 
Cf.  also  schol.  Pi.  P.  4.246  (II.  131  Drachmann): 
Amphitryon,  and  the  Dioskoroi  who  are  also  Tyndaridai.  "  See  also  Gantz  (1993: 
248-9).  For  a  genetic  examination  of  the  `double  paternity'  motif  (and  of  the 
conflation  of  the  Trozenian  and  the  Athenian  versions)  in  the  Theseus  myth 
see  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1979:  18-21). 
180  Cf.  Deubner  (1932:  215),  and  the  commentary  of  Ampolo  &  Manfredini  (1988) 
ad  loc.  Calame  (1990:  266)  misinterprets  this  passage  as  implying  "la 
coincidence  de  la  celebration  des  Theseia  avec  le  jour  consacre,  le  8 
Hecatombalon,  au  dieu  des  assises  de  la  terre":  the  Posidea  were,  of  course, 
celebrated  in  the  month  Posideon  (probably  on  the  8th:  Deubner  1.  c.  ),  the 
Theseia  on  the  8th  of  Pyanopsion  (Deubner  [1932:  2241). 
181  On  the  spelling  IMP-rather  than  EKELp-see  L.  Threatte,  The  Grammar  of 
Attic  Inscriptions,  Vol.  I:  Phonology  (Berlin  &  New  York  1980),  193. 251 
TIETpatoc  TLp.  dTaL  IIOQELBWV  TTapc  OEaaaXoLS  [...  ]  O'TL  E1T1  TLVOS 
TTETpaS  KOL[I1jOEL!  9  C11TECfTTEP  I  TLoE,  KCLL  TO'V  6OpOV  8Ee%tEVTj  TI  'YTS 
CLVE8WKEV  LTTTTOV  1TpCJTOV,  SV  E1TEKä  ECTaV  XKÜýLOV.  182 
The  scholiasts'  Ka6EU81jCras  and  KOLµr6E(S  have  been  taken  (most 
recently  by  Nagy  [1990a:  231-33])  at  face  value:  Poseidon  falls  asleep  and 
has,  apparently,  an  övE'LPW  LS.  Nonetheless,  one  is  tempted  to  detect  here 
an  attenuated  version  of  a  story  in  which,  originally,  Poseidon  spilled  his 
semen  during  intercourse.  Such  a  hypothesis  is  strongly  reinforced  by  a 
parallel  Boeotian  (and,  secondarily,  Arcadian)  legend:  183  Demeter  was 
pursued  by  Poseidon,  so  she  changed  herself  into  a  mare  to  avoid  him; 
but  the  god  assumed  the  form  of  a  stallion,  raped  her,  and  begat  upon 
her  the  first  horse,  Arion.  184  Demeter  became  indignant  at  the  insult,  and 
182  Cf.  also  Burkert  (1985a:  403  n.  32),  Nagy  (1990a:  23  1-33). 
183  The  Boeotian  version:  Thebais  frr.  8(I),  8(11)  Bernabe  =  frr.  6c,  6b  Davies 
(=schol.  Ii.  23.346  [II  259,24  Dind.,  cf.  V  424  Erbse];  Schol.  Ii.  247  [V  424-25 
Erbse]  ).  Sources  for  the  Arcadian  version:  Fontenrose  (1959:  367  with  n.  4).  Wüst 
("Erinys",  RE  Suppl.  VIII  [1956]  96-100)  and  others  have  supposed  with  great 
probability  that  the  clearly  prior  Boeotian  legend  was  later  transferred  to 
Arcadia,  where  it  was  mingled  with  the  earlier  local  cult  of  Demeter  and  Kore; 
Burkert  (1979:  127)  too  seems  to  opt  for  the  priority  of  the  Boeotian  legend. 
Contra,  however,  Kern  (s.  v.  "Demeter",  RE4  [1901]  2733-34],  Wilamowitz  (1959  I: 
401),  Nilsson  (1967:  447  n.  5).  Fontenrose  (1959:  369-70)  adopts  an  agnostic  point 
of  view;  so  also,  more  recently,  A.  Schachter,  Cults  of  Boioda  (BICS  Suppl.  38.1), 
Vol.  I  (London  1981),  164who  seems,  however,  too  sceptical  as  to  the  validity  of 
the  Boeotian  version. 
184  Farnell  (1907a:  50);  Burkert  (1985a:  138  with  nn.  32-35).  Demeter's 
transformation  into  a  mare  is  not  mentioned  in  the  Boeotian  version  of  the 
legend  as  it  has  reached  us.  In  Attica,  the  close  connection  between  Demeter 
and  Poseidon  has  left  its  traces  in  their  common  temple  at  the  deme  Lakiadai 
(Paus.  137.2)  -see  Wüst  (s.  v.  "Poseidon",  RE  22.1  [1953]  508-509)  -and  also 
elsewhere:  see  see  Kern,  s.  v.  "Demeter",  RE  4  (1901)  2739  and,  above  all, 
Schachermeyr  (1950:  36-7). 252 
was  subsequently  given  the  name  Erinys;  185  thus,  the  first  horse  "was 
brought  forth  by  an  infuriated,  wrathful  mother".  186  This  version  of  the 
legend  has  left  no  traces  in  Attica,  as  far  as  our  sources  let  us  see. 
However,  given  that  the  Boeotian  version  seems  to  be  the  original  one  (n. 
183),  and  that  it  has  most  probably  influenced  the  shaping  of  the 
Arcadian  version,  one  should  not  hold  it  improbable  that  it  has  also 
shaped  or  influenced,  in  one  way  or  another,  the  Athenian  legend  about 
the  birth  of  the  first  horse  at  Colonus.  187  In  fact,  Carl  Robert  (1915:  I.  19- 
20)  has  forcefully  advocated  this  view:  "Erwägt  man  nun,  daß  auf  dem 
Kolonos  auch  die  Erinyen  eine  hochheilige  Kultstätte  haben,  und  daß 
anderwärts  in  der  Entwickelung  des  Mythos  vom  Ur-Roß  schon  früh 
anstelle  des  den  Samen  aufnehmenden  Erd-  oder  Felsbodens  die  Erdgöttin 
selbst  tritt,  als  Demeter  Erinys  in  Thelpusa  [i.  e.  Arcadia],  einfach  als 
Erinys  in  der  Thebais,  so  erscheint  der  Schluß  nicht  nur  erlaubt,  sondern 
185  In  the  Boeotian  sources  (see  above  n.  183)  we  are  told  of  Poseidon's  mating 
with  a  deity  named  simply  Erinys.  However,  Apollod.  Bibl.  3.6.8  (Ord  u  -nip 
ELKaaOELaa'EpLVV'L  KaT&  rv  auvouaLav)  and  the  later  Arcadian  version  (see 
again  n.  183)  speak  clearly  of  Demeter  (or  Gaia),  who  assumed  the  epithet 
'EpLvug  "TOO  µtiviµaToc 
EVEKa  [...  ],  ÖTL  T(il  OU.  CJ  XpýCTOaL  KU.  ÄOOQLV  EpLVÜELV  OL 
'ApKä8Ec"  (Paus.  8.25.6).  There  is  evidence  to  suggest  that  Demeter  and  the 
Erinyes  were  associated:  see  Colchester  (1942:  27-28),  Fontenrose  (1959:  367  n. 
4),  Kirkwood  (1986:  108-109). 
186  Burkert  (1979:  127).  Emphasis  mine. 
187  Religious  contact  between  Athens  and  Boeotia  is  indubitably  established  in 
the  case  of  Demeter's  cult:  Hdt.  5.61.2  says  that  fugitives  from  rE4upa  (Tanagra's 
former  name:  see  Hekataios  FGrHist  1F  118  Jacoby  =  Steph.  Byz.  s.  v.  rE4vpa) 
transferred  to  Athens  the  cult  of  '  AXalirJ  OB  u  rTIp  (cf.  also  Ar.  Ach.  708-709 
with  schol.  ad  708  c  [p.  94  Wilson];  EM  180,34  Gaisford  =  2204  Lasserre- 
Livadaras).  See  Kern  (s.  v.  "Demeter",  RE4  [1901]  2719). 253 
direkt  geboten,  daß  auch  auf  dem  Kolonos  schon  bald  die  Demeter  Erinys 
als  Mutter  des  Rosses  gedacht  wurde  [...  ]".  188 
There  is  also  a  (less  close)  Orphic  parallel,  according  to  which  Zeus 
-  indeed,  Zeus  chthonios,  189  who  perhaps  should  not  be  too  sharply 
divorced  from  his  brother  Poseidon,  the  god  of  the  earth's  entrails'90  - 
mated  with  his  mother  Rhea  (fr.  153  Kern),  who  is  identical  with  Demeter 
188  This  view  seems  to  have  been  accepted  by  Schachermeyr  (1950:  142  n.  61). 
Robert  (l.  c.  )  also  makes  the  point  that  Poseidon's  Attic  epithet  MEkzvOos  (schol. 
Lycophr.  766)  betrays  a  further  association  with  Demeter  Melaina  in  Phigaleia 
(Paus.  8.42.4).  Even  the  Hesiodic  (and  thus  perhaps  Panhellenic)  version  of  the 
myth  (Th.  280ff.  ),  according  to  which  the  horse  Pegasus  was  born,  along  with 
Chrysaor,  from  Medusa's  head,  after  her  copulation  with  Poseidon,  can  be 
subordinated  to  the  Demeter-Erinys  myth,  since  she  was  originally  identical 
with  Medusa  (see  Fontenrose  [1959:  370-71],  Richardson  [1974:  140]).  Another 
version  of  the  same  story  is  evidently  Pegasus'  birth  from  Gorgon  (Apollod. 
2[32]3,2,1);  see  Burkert  (1979:  127).  -If  the  hypothesis  suggested  here  is  right, 
then  the  `censorship'  detected  in  the  euphemisms  Ka6EVSTjaac  and  KogrgOELS 
(above,  p.  251)  would  be  paralleled  by  another  such  euphemism  in  the  schoL  Pi. 
P.  4.246:  T6v  6op6v  8EtatEVr1  n  yn  may  well  be  a  tamer  version  of  the  story 
about  the  rape  of  Demeter-Earth. 
189  See  West  (1983b:  95). 
190  The  three  brothers,  Zeus,  Poseidon,  and  Hades,  are  sometimes  represented  as 
a  single  divinity  combining  emblems  of  all  three  of  them  (Farnell  [1907b:  59- 
60];  on  Zenoposeidon  cf.  also  Schachermeyr  [1950:  188]),  a  fact  that  may  suggest 
their  essential  identity.  Farnell  (1907b:  6-7,49-52)  unwisely  denied  Poseidon 
any  chthonic  character  whatsoever,  but  subsequent  research  has  established 
his  chthonic  aspect  beyond  any  doubt  see  above  all  Schachermeyr  (1950), 
index  s.  v.  "Poseidon  als  chthonischer  Gott";  also  s.  v.  "P.  [oseidon]  neben  Da, 
Demeter  and  Ge"  and  "neben  Medusa".  For  the  cultic  associations  of  Poseidon 
and  Demeter  particularly  in  Attica  see  above,  n.  184.  On  the  name  Poseidon  as 
meaning  "spouse  (TröaLS)  of  Da"  (cf.  Da-mater)  see  Schachermeyr  (1950:  13-15). 
On  the  chthonic  associations  of  the  horse,  Poseidon's  animal,  see  Schachermeyr 
(1950)  index,  s.  v.  "Pferd  -Verhältnis  zu  Unterwelt  and  Tod";  also  Detienne  & 
Vernant  (1978:  187-96passim)  with  further  bibliography. 254 
(fr.  145  Kern);  the  fruit  of  this  copulation  was  Persephone.  191  What  is 
more,  in  the  version  of  the  story  found  in  the  Derveni  papyrus,  192  the 
violence  of  the  copulation  is  particularly  stressed:  in  col.  xviii.  13  the 
author  states  that  "the  goddess  is  also  called  Deo  `because  she  was 
ravaged  (8'gLovv-DTjLt)  in  her  copulation'".  193  Although,  admittedly, 
there  is  no  mention  of  the  horse  in  this  myth,  it  seems  probable  that  the 
wrath  of  Demeter  might  have  been  implicit  in  it. 
To  sum  up:  Theseus  incurs  the  hostility  of  Demeter  and  the  Kore 
not  only  on  account  of  his  attempted  abduction  of  the  latter  (above,  p. 
227  with  n.  107),  but  also  by  virtue  of  his  being  Poseidon's  son  and 
double  -  after  all,  as  I  stress  in  n.  114,  Poseidon's  and  Theseus'  crimes 
seem  to  be  dedoublements  of  each  other,  as  they  are  both  committed  for 
sexual  purposes  against  essentially  the  same  unwilling  goddess.  194  Of  this 
hostility  the  horse  would  have  been  a  perpetual  reminder,  a  powerful 
visual  symbol;  and  so,  the  emphasis  on  horses  and  horsemen  in  the 
important  second  stasimon  (1044-95;  esp.  1067-73)195  finds  an  adequate 
and  dramatically  significant  explanation:  beside  the  allusion  to  Theseus' 
abortive  attempt  to  abduct  Persephone,  the  pursuit  of  the  Thebans  by 
Athenian  horsemen  probably  alludes  to  Demeter's  pursuit  by  the  stallion- 
Poseidon.  Lines  897-900  seem  to  reinforce  this  view.  the  horsemen  are  bid 
to  rush  forth  t  ro'  puTrjpoc  (900),  `with  slack  rein';  196  now,  that  is,  the 
violent,  unchecked,  wild  aspect  of  the  horse  is  stressed  (to  match  the 
191  See  further  West  (1983b:  93  with  n.  43). 
192  Provisional  publication  in  ZPE47  (1982),  following  p.  300. 
193  Quotation  from  West  (1983b:  93-4). 
194  On  the  essential  identity  of  Demeter  and  Kore  /  Persephone  see  again  n.  108. 
195  On  the  recurrent  equine  element  of  the  CL  see  Kirkwood  (1986:  107), 
although  he  takes  a  different  viewpoint. 
196  Jebb  (ad  899ff.  )  rightly  remarks  that  "these  horsemen  are  the  important 
pursuers,  &'L7mov  being  added  merely  to  give  the  notion  of  a  pursuit  en  masse.  " 255 
myth  of  Demeter's  rape),  and  that  certainly  reverses  Poseidon's  image  as 
creator  of  the  bridle  (712-15)197  which  `heals'  (714  äKeornipa)  the  rage  of 
wild  horses.  198 
197  Stinton  (1990:  266-67)  wanted  to  see  a  second  meaning  in  Xakvöv,  namely 
`anchor'  or  `mooring  cable';  but  this  is  impossible  in  the  context  of  the  ode  (714 
LTrTroLULV,  715äyvLa7Ls). 
198  See  Jebb  (ad  714),  Burton  (1980:  278  with  n.  27),  Kamerbeek  (ad  712-715). 
Detienne  &  Vernant  (1978:  196-206,212  n.  92)  note  that  the  mention  of  Poseidon 
as  the  creator  of  the  bridle  here  is  exceptional,  since  it  was  Athena  who  was 
normally  associated  therewith.  This  would  intensify  the  ironical  contrast  with 
the  equine  Poseidon's  `unbridled'  assault  on  Demeter. CHAPTER  FIVE 
MADNESS,  DEATH,  HEROIZATION, 
AND  THE  COLLAPSE  OF  LIMITS 
IN  THE  AJAX 
`IIYfE  P.  TSZ'I  `YVILL  *ELL  TO  TXOSE 
DORMN7O  HADES" 
"Indeed,  "said  the  proconsul,  closing  the  book, 
'this  line  is  6eautzfut  and  very  true. 
Sophocles  wrote  it  in  a  deeply  philosophic  mood 
flow  much  we  'lt  tett  down  there,  how  much, 
and  how  very  different  we  'll  appear. 
What  we  protect  here  lilt  sleeptessguards, 
wounds  andsecrets  voclcd  inside  us, 
protect  with  suchgreat  anety  day  after  day, 
we  'll  reveal  freely  and  clearly  down  there.  " 
'Yyou  might  add  "said  the  sophist,  ha  f  smiling, 
"'iithey  tafkabout  things  lily  that  down  there, 
if  they  bother  about  them  at  all  any  more.  ' 
C.  P.  Cavafy 
(trans.  by  EdmuncfKeely  ey  Philip  SFierrard) 
5.0.1  Ajax's  first  impasse:  belonging  neither  to  the  Dolls  nor  to 
the  wild 
The  basic  thesis  of  this  chapter  is  that  Ajax's  death  as  well  as  his 
subsequent  heroization  are  the  result  of  a  series  of  impossible  situations, 
of  impasses.  In  a  major  part  of  this  chapter  (namely  sections  5.1.1, 
S.  1.2  and  5.2.1)  we  shall  be  examining  a  fundamental  aspect  of  these 
impasses,  namely  Ajax's  veering  between  the  world  of  the  polls  and  that 
of  the  wild,  without  belonging  to  either.  The  reason  why  this  constitutes 257 
an  unsurmountable  deadlock  is  clear  enough:  such  a  vacillation  between 
the  polls  and  the  outdoors  signifies  an  essential  inability  to  belong  to 
either  of  the  two  basic  categories,  by  means  of  which  the  archaic  Greek 
mind  conceived  and  interpreted  the  world;  in  other  words,  if  one  belongs 
neither  to  the  polls  nor  to  the  wild,  one  can  belong  nowhere  -  and  this, 
to  be  sure,  is  a  tremendous  impasse;  this  will  be  further  clarified  in 
section  5.3.1. 
In  particular,  in  sections  S.  1.1  and  5.1.2  we  shall  be  dealing  with 
Ajax's  veering  between  retaining  his  status  as  a  hoplite  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  assuming  the  qualities  of  a  `black,  hunter'  (more  on  this  term 
later).  This  is  an  impossible  situation,  whose  symbolic  meaning  is 
obvious:  the  hoplite,  being  but  a  citizen  in  arms,  '  stands  for  the  ordered 
world  of  the  polls  with  its  set  structures  (laws,  rules,  rituals),  whereas  the 
`black  hunter'  represents  the  wild,  with  its  systematic  inversion  of  all 
categories;  as  we  said,  however,  Ajax  belongs  to  neither  world. 
Finally,  in  section  5.2.1  we  shall  be  looking  at  Ajax's  inability 
either  to  perform  a  proper  sacrifice  (a  function  typical  of  the  polis)  or  to 
be  a  proper  hunter  (i.  e  to  belong  fully  to  the  wild). 
5.1.1  Belonging  neither  to  the  polls  nor  to  the  wild  (1)  :  Ajax 
can  be  neither  a  hoolite  nor  a  `black  hunter' 
The  play  begins  with  a  pointed  antithesis  between  Odysseus  the  hunter 
on  the  one  hand  and  Ajax  the  hoplite  on  the  other.  The  very  first  line 
makes  clear  that  hunting  is  Odysseus'  typical  feature,  his  unaltering 
characteristic  (1-2  QEL 
... 
Qpthp  voV,  5  KUV11'YETOÜVTa,  8,37  KUVa'yLgt);  2 
1  See  below  p.  308  with  n.  147. 
2  On  the  hunting  metaphor  see  Kamerbeek  (ad  2,31,32,33),  Stanford  (ad  2,5-6, 258 
Ajax  on  the  other  hand  appears  to  be  a  typical  hoplite3  (4  Täß  Wv 
Eaxärnv;  4  19  A'iaVTL  T(4  QaKE#6pq):  the  descriptive  epithet  refers  to  a 
permanent  and  typical  feature,  and  alludes  to  the  Iliadic  formula  aäKOs 
TIOTE  1TÜpyov,  5  said  of  Ajax's  shield  -a  shield  which  seems  to  have  been 
visualized,  in  5th  Athens,  as  a  normal  hoplite  shield,  either  circular  or 
scalloped,  and  not  as  a  tower-shield,  despite  the  Homeric  formula:  see 
Appendix  A.  ).  6  It  seems,  however,  that  in  this  night  normality  has  been 
subverted:  Odysseus,  despite  Athena's  praise  for  his  hunting  skills  (7-8), 
has  been  unsuccessful  in  his  hunt  (23,33),  so  he  needs  the  goddess'  help 
(13,34-35)  -a  help  consisting  essentially  in  her  providing  Odysseus  with 
a  skill  which,  albeit  typical  of  a  hunter,  he  Is  paradoxically  lacking, 
namely  the  power  of  perception,  of  seeing  and  knowing?  (cf.  e.  g.  13 
19,32-33,59-60)  and,  most  importantly,  Jouanna  (1977);  on  Odysseus  as  a  hunter 
par  excellence  see  Taplin  (1978:  41).  That  Odysseus  is  a  hunter,  belonging 
therefore  to  the  wild,  does  not  mean  that  he  cannot  at  the  same  time  serve  the 
community,  the  polis:  his  admirable  versatility  (a  traditional  trait  of  his 
persona)  makes  him  belong  to  both  worlds.  He  is  thus  starkly  contrasted  with 
the  monolithic  Ajax,  who  hovers  between  the  polls  and  the  wild  without 
belonging  to  either.  See  further  p.  267. 
3  In  5th  century,  as  well  as  in  this  play,  Ajax  was  thought  of,  anachronistically, 
as  a  hoplite;  see  Appendix  A. 
4  Pace  Segal  (1981:  122)  and  Bowie  (1983:  114),  Ajax's  having  his  station  at  the 
end  of  the  Greek  encampment  implies  anything  but  his  `liminality'  or  his  anti- 
hoplite  ethos;  see  Jebb  (ad  4):  "...  the  posts  of  danger  and  honour  at  the  eastern 
and  western  ends  respectively  were  held  by  Achilles  and  Ajax  [...  ]  (Il.  11.8f.  )"; 
cf.  Sorum  (1986:  363-64). 
5  E.  g.  Il.  7.219.  See  Kamerbeek  (ad  19),  Stanford  (ad  159);  cf.  von  der  Mühll 
(1930:  10-11,38). 
6  On  the  centrality  of  the  shield  in  the  hoplite  ideology  see  esp.  Tyrtaeus  11.21- 
38  West. 
7  Cf.  Guthrie  (1947:  116):  "The  one-time  wily  Odysseus  is  completely  at  a  loss". 
That  seeing  and  knowing  is  normally  a  typical  feature  of  the  hunter  Odysseus  is 
apparent  from  379-801.  d  rravO'  opwv  [...  ]  TEKVOV  AapTiou. 259 
µä6rýs,  35  4p¬vi,  66  TrEp14  avi  ,  67  EiaLbchv,  81  1rEpLýav(3s).  On  the  other 
hand,  Ajax  seems  no  longer  to  be  a  pure  hoplite;  we  learn  (41)  that  his 
hoplite  honour  has  suffered  a  grave  insult,  for  Achilles'  arms  were 
awarded  not  to  him  but  to  Odysseus  (Athena  at  41  says  in  fact  much  less 
than  that,  but  an  audience  familiar  with  the  myth  should  have,  no 
doubt,  taken  her  hint  so  as  to  reconstruct  the  outlines  of  the  myth;  Ajax 
will  soon  clarify  this  at  98,100).  What  is  more,  Ajax,  in  his  attempt  to 
exact  retribution  for  his  slighted  honour,  `regressed',  as  it  were,  to  a  type 
of  behaviour  expected  not  of  a  hoplite  but  of  a  `black  hunter'  (to  use  a 
term  coined  by  Vidal-Naquet  [1986b:  106ff.  ]),  i.  e.  of  an  ephebe8  who, 
before  becoming  a  full  hoplite  (as  well  as  a  full  member  of  the 
community)  by  joining  the  phalanx,  spends,  paradoxically,  a  period  of 
complete  and  systematic  anti-hoplite  behaviour  (by  way  of  what  Vidal- 
Naquet  [1986b:  114]  calls  "the  law  of  symmetrical  inversion"): 
-  unlike  a  hoplite,  he  remains  outwith  the  phalanx  (he  is  usually 
situated  in  such  a  peripheral  area  as  the  countryside  or  the  borders),  and 
lives  as  a  solitary  warrior,  i.  e.  with  no  solidarity  for  his  fellow  soldiers; 
-  he  bears  no  heavy  armour, 
8  This  does  not  mean,  of  course,  that  Ajax  is  an  ephebe  or  is  undergoing  a  kind 
of  initiation  process:  see  further  p.  262. 260 
-  he  practises  guile,  and  fights  at  night. 
In  other  words,  the  pre-hoplite  ephebe,  before  becoming  a  hoplite,  had  to 
be  an  anti-hoplite  (Vidal-Naquet  [1986b:  120]).  10  This  is  the  kind  of 
behaviour  to  which  Ajax,  formerly  an  exemplary  hoplite,  seems  to  have 
anomalously  relapsed  this  night:  without,  of  course,  becoming  literally  a 
hunter,  he  nonetheless  displays  several  anti-hoplite  or  non-hoplite 
9  Vidal-Naquet  (1986b:  89,147-48).  On  the  systematic  antithesis  between  the 
hoplite  on  the  one  hand  and  the  pre-hoplite  /  anti-hoplite  ephebe  ('black 
hunter')  on  the  other  see  the  list  drawn  up  by  Vidal-Naquet  (1986b:  113;  cf.  140- 
41,147-48);  for  the  Ajax  case  cf.  Bowie  (1983:  114).  An  important  distinction 
must  be  made:  the  Athenian  ephebeia  apparently  had  its  roots  in  rites  of 
passage,  in  which  the  ephebe,  before  being  fully  admitted  into  the  community 
as  a  member  of  the  hoplite  phalanx,  was  sent  out  to  the  frontier  area  to 
perform,  as  a  guileful  `black  hunter',  a  symbolic  exploit  (Vidal-Naquet  [1986b: 
144]).  Nonetheless,  in  classical  Athens  -at  the  time  when  the  Ajax  was  written 
-only  traces  of  these  initiatory  rituals  can  be  perceived,  e.  g.  in  passages  like 
Thuc.  4.67-68,8.92.2  (on  which  see  Vidal-Naquet  [1986b:  107-108,143]),  whereas 
in  societies  like  Sparta  or  Crete  rituals  of  this  type  were  real  enough  (Vidal- 
Naquet  l.  c.  and  p.  144).  In  other  words,  in  Athens  it  is  only  at  the  level  of  myth 
that  the  antithesis  between  the  pre-hoplite  ephebe  and  the  full  hoplite  is 
demonstrated  -and  myth  is  the  area  par  excellence  which  tragedy  exploits. 
10  Regarding  the  term  `black  hunter'  it  is  notable  that  vase-paintings  often 
depict  non-hoplites  (e.  g.  archers,  peltastai,  etc.  )  as  Negroids.  Lissague  (1990: 
21-34,177-87).  This  could  hardly  have  been  the  case  in  real  life:  it  is  rather  a 
strict  polarity,  i.  e.  "hoplite  /  Greek  :  non-hoplite  /  non-Greek",  that  seems  to  be 
implied  here  -a  polarity  that  is,  conceivably,  an  extreme  expression  of  the  fact 
that  hoplites  were  full  members  of  the  community  whereas  non-hoplites  were 
not  (Sage  [1996:  33-4]  points  out  that  citizenship  and  hoplite  status  were 
identified).  Indeed,  many  (although  not,  of  course,  all)  non-hoplites  were 
foreigners,  e.  g.  Scythian  archers  (cf.  Sage  [1996:  40-1]);  also,  in  the  Ajax,  there 
is  a  dear-cut  antithesis  between  Ajax  as  a  'yvijnLos  son  and  (normally)  a  fully 
integrated  citizen  and  a  hoplite,  and  Teucer  as  a  vOeos  son  (1013),  a  barbarian 
(1262-3)  -at  least  in  Agamemnon's  eyes  -and  an  archer  (1120-22).  In  A.  Pers. 
147-9,239-40and  in  Ar.  Vesp.  1081-85  the  bow  is  a  markedly  non-Greek  weapon; 
cf.  Hall  (1989:  85-6).  Cf.  in  general  below  nn.  145  and  149. 261 
features,  which  are  succinctly  summarized  by  Athena  (47):  Ajax  has  been 
acting  treacherously  (8oXLos),  11  alone  (µövos),  and  at  night  (vvKTÜ  p)  "12  A 
little  later,  we  hear  again,  this  time  from  Tecmessa,  that  Ajax  set  out  on 
his  expedition  at  dead  of  night  (285-86);  13  his  enterprise  is  significantly 
called  TrE  tpa  (290),  a  term  used  of  Odysseus'  hunt  at  line  2,  while  the  fact 
that  it  took  place,  abnormally,  at  night  (as  a  `black  hunt'  does)  gains 
more  emphasis  by  the  following  temporal  clause  (285-86)  ifvLX'  goTrEpoL 
Xa  tir-rf  pES  OÜKET'  6ov.  14  What  is  more,  Ajax  apparently  bore  no 
armour  except  for  his  sword  (286-87)15  and  went  out  without  having 
11  Bradshaw  (1991:  116)  erroneously  treats  dolos  as  a  rather  normal  feature  of 
Ajax.  In  [E.  ]  Rhes.  510ff.  the  hoplite  (see  below  p.  338  with  n.  221)  Rhesus  sees 
treachery  as  unworthy  of  a  true  warrior. 
12  Cf.  Bowie  (1983:  114).  Cohen  (1978:  27)  perceives  the  importance  of  this  line 
and  contrasts  it  with  IL  17.645-46,  where  Ajax  prays  to  Zeus  that,  if  he  must  die, 
may  it  at  least  be  in  the  light;  cf.  Stanford  (1978:  passim).  On  the  strangeness  of 
Ajax's  behaviour  see  also  Rosenmeyer  (1971:  176-77),  Segal  (1981:  110,124), 
Gardiner  (1987:  74,77),  Poe  (1987:  38  with  n.  69),  Blundell  (1989:  85). 
Interestingly,  in  Ovid,  Met.  '13.14-5,100  Ajax  accuses  Odysseus  of  having 
achieved  none  of  his  feats  in  the  light  of  day  (cf.  on  this  point  e.  g.  Sen.,  Tro. 
755-6). 
13  On  the  meaning  of  cucpac  vvicTds  see  Jebb  (ad  285),  Stanford  (ad  285-86).  On 
the  association  of  night  with  guile  see  Buxton  (1982:  64). 
14  On  the  importance  of  the  darkness-theme  throughout  the  opening  scenes  of 
the  play  see  Davidson  (1975:  166);  cf.  generally  Stanford  (1978). 
15  This  is  admittedly  an  argumentum  e  silentio,  but  I  do  not  see  why  Sophocles 
should  have  Tecmessa  mentioning  only  the  sword  if  Ajax  was  in  full  armour.  Cf. 
Ovid,  Met.  13.103-4  (Ajax  speaking  of  the  guileful  Odysseus):  `...  qui  clam,  qui 
semper  inermis  I  rem  gerit'  etc.  -I  believe  with  Taplin  (1978:  85  with  n.  7),  pace 
Seale  (1982:  177n.  10),  Heath  (1987:  168n.  7)  and  Ley  (1988:  89),  that  Ajax  in  his 
first  appearance  in  the  prologue  must  carry  the  sword,  not  a  whip.  Athena's 
questions  at  95  and  97  seem  to  refer  to  a  visible  stage-prop:  if  she  assumes  that 
Ajax  has  been  using  the  sword,  it  is  probably  because  she  sees  him  holding  it. 
Contrast  108-10.  -Ajax  has  to  specify  that  he  intends  to  use  a  whip  (110  µäQTVyL) 
because  this  is  probably  not  visible. 262 
been  summoned  by  a  messenger  nor  having  been  warned  by  a  trumpet 
(289-91),  16  as  was  the  normal  military  practice.  Ajax's  image  as  a  `black 
hunter'  is  completed,  it  would  seem,  by  the  fact  that  his  act  took  place 
not  in  the  battlefield,  but  in  the  peripheral,  remote  space  of  the  äypös 
(30  TrESta,  cf.  also  233  KEtOEV  KEtOEV,  295  EKEt,  which  suggest  an  area 
outwith  the  camp,  within  which  a  hoplite  is  normally  supposed  to  stay). 
All  the  above  are,  however,  qualified  by  an  important  parameter: 
Ajax's  `regression'  to  anti-hoplite  practices  is  an  exceptional,  temporary 
situation,  which  (and  this  is  most  important)  aims  at  the  restoration  of 
his  offended  hoplite  honour  (we  remember  that  this  was  the  reason  of  his 
night  attack,  cf.  41).  The  fact  that  this  is  an  anomalous  situation,  and 
that  Ajax  did  not  normally  display  characteristics  of  a  `black  hunter',  is 
made  clear  by  Tecmessa:  as  appears  from  216-17,  it  is  only  on  this  fatal 
night  that  the  famous  warrior  (216  KAELVO9)  Ajax  has  indulged  in  an 
activity  typically  associated  with  the  `black  hunter',  namely  night 
expeditions  (217  VÜKTEpOs);  the  juxtaposition  of  KAELvog  and  VÜKTEpOs 
(the  former  at  the  end  of  one  line,  the  latter  at  the  beginning  of  the 
following)  underlines  the  antithesis  between  Ajax's  normal  status  and  his 
anomalous  deviation  from  it.  17  That  is  not  to  say,  of  course,  that  Ajax's 
regression  to  a  `black  hunter'  status  means  that  he  is  to  be  regarded  as  an 
ephebe  or  as  undergoing  an  initiation  process:  Ajax  is  a  mature  man,  and 
has  been  a  full  hoplite,  fully  integrated  into  the  army,  for  a  long  time.  His 
16äKXTTTO9  is  emphatically  elaborated  upon  by  the  two  following  clauses  (joined 
by  the  emphatic  of  TE  ...  oüTE  ):  see  Jebb  (ad  289ff.  ). 
17  Stanford  (ad  216-17)  suspects  the  truth  when  he  writes:  "But  the  word-order 
is  peculiar  -perhaps  to  express  anguish  that  so  famous  a  warrior  should  be  so 
ignominiously  dishonoured  in  the  darkness".  Cf.  Cohen  (1978:  28),  Winnington- 
Ingram  (1980:  17  n.  19).  As  Davidson  (1975:  166)  has  remarked,  the  epithet 
v  1KTEpOS,  "used  instead  of  an  adverb,  associates  Ajax  himself  more  directly  with 
darkness". 263 
regression  should  rather  be  viewed  in  terms  of  the  precarious  `liminality' 
that  characterizes  transitional  phases  such  as  between  adolescence  and 
manhood.  In  other  words,  Ajax,  without  being  literally  an  adolescent, 
finds  himself  in  a  critical  situation  analogous  to  that  of  a  `black  hunter': 
he  is  betwixt  and  between  the  communality  of  the  army  and  the 
solitariness  of  the  hunt;  betwixt  and  between  the  order  and  its  reversal; 
betwixt  and  between  the  polis  and  the  wild.  Limina  are  by  definition 
dangerous,  uncertain,  dark:  18  the  human  mind,  with  its  penchant  for 
classification  and  clear-cut  taxonomies,  cannot  easily  accommodate  such 
ambiguous  states.  Ajax  oscillates  between  the  two  opposite  poles  of  the 
polis  and  of  the  wild  without  belonging  to  either,  and  this  is  what  reduces 
him  to  the  liminal,  precarious  state  of  a  (cum  grano  sans)  `black 
hunter',  19  who  also  hovers  between  two  worlds. 
Ajax's  impasse  is  lyrically  elaborated  upon  and-  becomes  much 
clearer  in  the  parodos  (134-200).  The  introductory  anapaestic  lines  (134- 
71),  emphatically  placed  outside  the  strophic  system,  highlight  Ajax's 
hoplite  apE-nl.  His  solidarity  for  his  comrades  is  emphasized  (158-61),  20 
and  his  heroic  qualities  are  conjured  up  in  the  audience's  minds:  i'pyou 
püµa  (159)  recalls  the  Homeric  GaKOc  1IÜTE  nüpyov  (see  above  p.  258 
18  See  Douglas  (1966:  95-6,103-5).  (I  owe  this  point  to  Dr  Sonia  Greger).  It  is  not, 
perhaps,  accidental  that  the  Greek  word  for  `being  on  the  verge  of  is  Ku/6vvE1  ) 
(lit.  `to  be  in  danger'). 
19  As  I  have  already  intimated  (p.  260f.  ),  the  term  `black  hunter'  must  not  been 
taken  too  literally:  I  use  it  as  a  collective  term  for  any  non-hoplite  or  anti- 
hoplite  kind  of  behaviour. 
20  I  do  not  mean,  of  course,  to  suggest  that  Sophocles'  Ajax  lacks  entirely  the 
individualism  and  the  anxiety  for  personal  KXos  that  characterizes  Homeric 
heroes;  however,  I  think  that  these  should  not  be  overstressed,  as  is  done  by 
e.  g.  Knox  (1979:  145-47),  Blundell  (1989:  68-81  &  passim)  and  others.  See 
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with  n.  5),  EpKOs  '  AXaLwv  (e.  g.  Il.  3.229)21  and  rüpyos  (once  in  the  Od. 
11.556).  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  hints  reminding  an  alert  audience 
that  Ajax  is  no  longer  a  pure  hoplite:  lines  172-81  are  quite  important  in 
that  they  implicitly  reflect  the  paradox  (hoplite  vs.  hunter)  which  is 
besetting  Ajax  on  this  day.  Artemis,  the  hunting-goddess  (cf.  178 
EXa4)aßoXLa1s),  is  surprisingly  referred  to  in  military-hoplite  terms  (176 
VLKas,  177  KXUT(.  i)V  Eväpwv),  whereas  Enyalios,  the  war-god  (cf.  179 
Xa)ucoew'paa,  180  ýuvoü  8opös),  22  is  assigned  traits  of  the  'black  hunter' 
(180-81  EVVUXLoLs  µaXavats)!  23  So,  the  disarray  in  the  limits  between 
hoplite  and  hunter  (due  to  Ajax's  deviation  from  his  normal  hoplite 
status),  and  the  resulting  `liminal',  marginal  condition  in  which  Ajax 
finds  himself,  turn  out  not  to  be  merely  an  anomaly  confined  to  the 
human  world,  but  to  bear  an  eerie  similarity  to  what  seems  to  be  the  case 
in  the  world  of  the  gods.  Stich  a  disorder  that  obliterates  distinctions  and 
categories  which  are  otherwise  clear-cut  can  only  be  the  result  of  divine 
intervention:  as  the  Chorus  suggestively  remark  (185),  f  KOL  yap  äv  6E  La 
v6Qos.  24  Sophocleän  gods  are  characteristically  beyond  and  above  the 
categories  and  taxonomies  set  by  the  human  mind. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  same  confusion  of  limits  is  also  extended  to 
the  goddess  ultimately  responsible  for  Ajax's  plight,  namely  Athena 
21  See  further  Stanford  (xiv  n.  13). 
22  On  the  probable  equivalence  of  Enyalios  and  Ares  (despite  their  originally 
distinct  character)  see  G.  Nagy,  Comparative  Studies  in  Greek  and  Indic  Meter 
(Cambridge,  Mass.  1974)  136;  also  Burkert  (1985a:  43-44).  On  Ares  as  a  hoplite  in 
art  see  Appendix  B.  Contra  Jebb  (222-23)  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  179)  who  think 
that,  in  our  passage,  Enyalios  should  be  distinguished  from  Ares. 
23  Similarities  between  Ajax  and  the  gods  Artemis  and  Enyalios  have  also  been 
noticed  by  Blundell  (1989:  66),  but  from  a  different  standpoint. 
24  Winnington-Ingram.  (1980:  25  n.  44)  gives  to  this  phrase  an  entirely 
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herself.  225  She  is  the  hoplite  goddess  par  excellence,  the  goddess  of  the 
shield:  yopycýlrts  (450),  an  allusion  to  the  Gorgon's  head  which  Athena 
wore  as  an  emblem  of  terror,  is  an  appropriate  epithet  for  the  war- 
goddess,  26  while  the  likening  of  her  voice  to  an  Etruscan  trumpet  at  1727 
is  probably  meant  to  associate  her  with  the  phalanx.  However,  on  this 
fatal  day  she  seems  to  have  become  a  huntress  as  well:  she  hurls  Ajax  into 
hunting  nets  (60  9p  KT  ),  28  and  she  obviously  practises  hunting  guile  (her 
infliction  of  madness  upon  her  prey  is  thought  of  as  deceit:  86 
TEXvo41  vOV).  29  Her  hunt  is  totally  successful,  unlike  Ajax's,  whose 
attempt  to  deviate  from  his  normal  hoplite  status  and  indulge  in 
hunting  practices  is  thwarted:  Athena  deprives  him  of  his  visual  and 
mental  faculties  (51-52;  cf.  69-70,30  85),  i.  e.  of  what  a  hunter  needs 
most.  31  So,  Ajax's  hunt  -  which  would  have  certainly  been  successful  (48- 
49),  but  for  the  goddess'  intervention  (45;  cf.  451-52)  -  is  corrupted:  it 
25  Blundell  (1989:  65),  from  a  different  point  of  view,  notices  Ajax's  similarity 
with  Athena,  but  associates  it  with  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  that  the  unsociable 
man,  like  Ajax,  is  either  god  or  beast  (ibid.  69  with  n.  42).  For  an  explanation  on 
the  basis  of  Vernant's  structuralist  analysis  of  Greek  sacrifice  see  Tyrell  (1985: 
162). 
26  See  Farnell  (1896:  288).  For  the  Gorgoneion  as  Schildepisema  see  I.  Krauskopf, 
LIMC  IV.  1,300-303.  Seale  (1982:  155),  after  L.  Campbell  (ad  450),  interprets  the 
word  differently. 
27  On  this  kind  of  trumpet  see  Jebb  (ad  17;  also  p.  213).  On  the  meaning  of  the 
simile  cf.  Segal  (1981:  130). 
28  On  the  use  of  nets  in  `black  hunt'  see  Vidal-Naquet  (1986b:  117-19). 
29  Cf.  Podlecki  (1980:  55):  "...  the  proper  emphasis  is  to  be  placed  on  TEXV- 
WIIEVOU.  " 
30  For  a  case  against  the  deletion  of  68-70  (Fraenkel  [1963],  after  Reichard)  see 
Long  (1964);  also  Heath  (1987:  168n.  6)  with  bibliography. 
31  We  recall,  however,  that  the  same  goddess  helped  Odysseus  out,  when  his 
hunting  skills  failed  him,  by  backing  up  exactly  his  powers  of  perception,  of 
sigh  t  and  understanding  (see  p.  258)!  Cf.  Jouanna  (1977:  182-3). 266 
becomes  an  abnormal  hunt,  a  hunt  of  domestic  animals  (53  7roLµv(xs,  54 
13ouK6Awv  4)poup1j  iaTa).  We  know  that  it  was  normally  wild  animals  that 
were  hunted  like  enemies;  32  however,  Ajax  treats  the  sheep  and  cattle  he 
has  attacked  as  `game',  äypa  (64,93,407).  Moreover,  not  only  did 
Athena,  through  her  intervention,  prevent  Ajax  from  becoming  a  proper 
hunter,  but  she  also  turned  him  into  a  hunter's  exact  opposite,  namely 
into  her  prey.  33 
To  conclude:  Ajax  is  now  facing  his  first  impasse:  he  can  be  neither 
a  hoplite  proper  nor  a  normal  hunter.  His  attempt  to  regain  his  hoplite 
honour,  which  has  been  offended  by  his  not  having  been  awarded  the 
arms  of  Achilles,  fails  because  the  hunt  by  means  of  which  he  tries, 
exceptionally,  to  achieve  his  purpose,  is  not  merely  impeded  but  also 
perverted  by  Athena,  who  thus  deprives  him  of  the  chance  both  to 
remain  a  hoplite  and  to  become  a  hunter.  On  the  other  hand,  Odysseus  is 
helped  by  Athena  to  remain  a  hunter  (although  he  seemed  to  be  failing 
in  his  hunting  expedition),  while  at  the  same  time  assuming  an 
extraordinary  hoplite  status  by  being  awarded  the  glorious  arms  of 
Achilles  (a  status  which  he  retains  throughout  the  play,  although  he 
32  Vemant  (1991:  298):  "...  in  Greece  wild  beasts  [...  )  were  killed  without  scruple 
tike  enemies  in  the  hunt.  " 
33  See  Kamerbeek  (ad  60),  Stanford  (ad  59-60),  Jouanna  (1977:  183-5)  and  Segal 
(1981:  123-24,130)  on  Ajax  as  the  hunter  who  is  finally  hunted  himself. 267 
admits  to  being  inferior  to  Ajax  [1339-41]34).  Thus,  Odysseus'  traditional 
versatility  is  confirmed  once  again:  he  can  belong  both  to  the  polls 
(hoplite)  and  to  the  wild  (hunter);  more  impressively  still,  he  can  serve 
the  community,  the  polls,  not  as  a  hoplite  but  as  a  hunter  (cf.  24,  where 
it  is  implied  that  his  hunting  expedition  has  been  taken  up  on  behalf  of 
the  army).  By  contrast,  Ajax  fails  to  accommodate  himself  into  either 
world  and,  far  from  continuing  to  serve  his  community,  incurs  its 
hostility. 
5.1.2  Ajax's  impasse  continued 
My  contention  is  that  the  irresolvable  ambiguities,  the  impasses,  one  of 
which  we  have  just  examined,  are  continued  throughout  the  play  and,  in 
fact,  constitute  its  main  axes.  What  is  more,  Ajax  finds  himself  unable  to 
avoid  them:  they  are  interwoven,  as  it  were,  into  his  fate,  into  the  very 
essence  that  his  name  signifies  (this  is  what  his  exclamation  at  430-32 
means).  Let  us  examine  first  how  the  ambiguity  between  Ajax  as  a  hoplite 
and  Ajax  as  a  `black  hunter'  is  developed  in  the  remaining  part  of  the 
play.  In  his  first  speech  (430-80)  Ajax  makes  clear  that,  as  far  as  he  is 
concerned,  he  has  by  no  means  fallen  short  of  his  glorious  father  (434-39) 
34  This  is  a  controversial  point:  I  share  the  views  of  Knox  (1979:  146  with  n. 
112),  Cresci  (1974:  224n.  19),  Fisher  (1992:  312n.  92)  and  March  (1991-1993:  7-8); 
cf.  the  words  of  the  Homeric  Odysseus  (al.  11.550-1,556-8).  See  contra,  however, 
Kirkwood  (1958:  72),  Gellie  (1972:  282  n.  24),  Hester  (1979b:  245);  also  Poe  (1987: 
37  n.  68;  97  n.  176),  Blundell  (1989:  100-101)  and  Van  Erp  Taalman  Kip  (1996:  524- 
31)  with  very  sound  argumentation.  Machin  (1981:  31-59)  takes  an  intermediate 
view:  by  means  of  imperceptible  dramatic  shifts,  Sophocles  makes  the  audience 
believe,  at  the  outset,  that  the  vote  was  impeccable,  whereas  by  the  end  of  the 
play  he  has  them  persuaded  that  the  Atreidae  are  undoubtedly  culpable. 
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and  that  his  hoplite  valour  is  his  most  permanent  and  indisputable  trait, 
a  fact  which  Achilles  himself  would  certainly  have  been  prepared  to 
appreciate  (441-44).  It  is  the  anomalous  events  of  the  past  night,  brought 
about  by  Athena's  intervention,  that  have  made  him  lose  his  hoplite 
honour  (äTLµoc  440).  What  he  deplores  is  that  he  has  proved  unable  to 
be  a  proper  hoplite  and  to  defend  his  heroic  Tqn  by  becoming  (if 
temporarily  and  exceptionally)  a  proper  h  un  ter,  thus  restoring  to  himself 
Achilles'  arms;  that  but  for  Athena  he  would  have  inflicted  the  much- 
desired  punishment  upon  the  Argives  (447-53).  At  any  rate,  his 
dishonour  is  now  fait  accompli,  and  Ajax  subsequently  devotes  lines  457- 
80  to  a  consideration  of  possible  ways  of  restoring  his  denigrated  honour, 
in  an  attempt  to  escape  the  impossible  situation  in  which  he  has  found 
himself  (Reinhardt  [1979:  19]  has  appositely  called  this  speech  "Ajax's 
powerful  survey  of  the  hopelessness  of  his  position";  cf.  also  Moore  [1977: 
58]). 
The  encounter  with  Eurysaces  (545ff.  )  helps  define  this  irresolvable 
ambiguity  even  more  clearly.  He  entrusts  his  son's  upbringing  to  Teucer 
the  hunter  (cf.  564  &i  pav)35  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  his  soldiers  on  the 
other,  who  are  significantly  called  äanLQTrjpES  (565)  -  the  shield  being  a 
35  Admittedly,  at  564Teucer  is  said  to  be  on  an  expedition  against  the  8vatEv¬ts, 
apparently  using  his  hunting  skills  for  the  sake  of  the  community  (cf.  also 
1288).  However,  nowhere  else  in  this  play  is  Teucer  said  to  be  an  integral  part 
of  the  army;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  his  marginal  position  that  is  emphasized:  cf. 
Menelaus'  (prejudiced  but  not  necessarily  untrue)  remarks  at  1120,1122. 
Significantly,  the  mission  referred  to  at  564  is  clearly  outwith  the  camp:  564 
-i-riA  üirös;  720-1  Mvaiwv  ärro  I  Kp711Ivwv.  Moreover,  that  the  whole  of  the  army 
(719-32,  esp.  722  Toil  rrdULV  '  ApyEloLS  ogoü,  725  oiTL9  E(TA'  ös  O  U")  can  shower 
abuse  on  him  (722,724-5)  may  be  a  corollary  not  only  of  his  being  a  relative  of 
Ajax,  but  also,  perhaps,  of  his  lower  and  peripheral  status  in  relation  to  the  rest 
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hoplite's  most  conspicuous  feature.  36  The  symbolic  meaning  of  this  act  is 
clear  enough:  Ajax  is  trying  to  escape  from  his  ambiguous  state  (being 
neither  a  hoplite  nor  a  hunter)  by  seeing  to  it  that  his  son  should  be  both 
a  hoplite  and  a  hunter  (i.  e.  assume  a  privileged  state  similar  to 
Odysseus').  Likewise,  Ajax's  first  (548  a1TtK')  wish  about  his  son  is  huois 
aÜTOV  EV  VÖ  1OL  ITaTPÖS  I  [...  ]  Tu  XoSaIiVEtV  KQýOI.  IALOÜQeaL  ÜQLV 
(548-49).  This  passage  encapsulates  the  essential  antinomy  which  is 
besetting  Ajax  and  to  which  he  is  paradoxically  adhering:  Eurysaces' 
nature  must  be  assimilated  to  his  father's  61i6l  vöµoL,  i.  e.  to  the 
anomalous  state  of  affairs  (6µö-n]S  being  associated  with  the  world  of  the 
wild,  of  `the  raw',  which  the  `black  hunter'  represents37)  in  which  Ajax  has 
found  himself  on  this  day;  as  Linforth  (1931:  197)  has  written,  "the 
oxymoron  latent  in  th1i.  6i  vöµoL,  which  is  equivalent  to  vöµoL  ävoµoL, 
suggests  that  the  boy  is  to  be  an  outlaw  like  his  father,  beyond  the  pale  of 
society  with  its  civilizing  restraints.  "38  At  the  same  time,  however, 
Eurysaces'  upbringing  is  paradoxically  termed  lm  Xo8aµvEty:  this  word, 
unmistakably  associated  with  the  taming  of  wild  temper  (such  as  a 
hunter's  free  spirit),  is  an  appropriate  metaphor  for  the  discipline  and 
36  That  the  Chorus  are  sailors  as  well  as  warriors  has  been  demonstrated  by 
Gardiner  (1987:  52)  as  against  Burton  (1980:  6). 
37  Vidal-Naquet  (1986b:  113). 
38  On  the  oxymoron  see  also  Goldhill  (1986:  187).  On  Ajax's  c'µ6Tris  see  Stanford 
(xxvii-xxix),  although  he  treats  it  as  an  inborn  trait  of  Ajax.  In  my  opinion, 
both  the  ancient  scholiast  on  548a  (p.  132  Christodoulou)  and  Kamerbeek  (ad 
548,549)  -cf.  also  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  74)  -are  wrong  in  insisting  that  Ajax 
V6µ0Us  T  1/  ()ÜQLV  thv  µLa(TEV  Kai  T6  E60s  TOD  'YE'YEVVTIK6TOs.  I  doubt  whether 
Sophocles  could  so  easily  mix  up  two  concepts  (4üyLs  and  vopos)  whose 
definition  and  boundaries  were  so  forcefully  debated  in  the  fifth  century:  on 
this  debate  see  e.  g.  W.  K.  C.  Guthrie,  A  History  of  Greek  Philosophy,  vol.  III 
(Cambridge  1969)  55-134.  On  another  possible  paradox  in  the  phrase  wµoi.  v0  [10L 
see  Segal  (1981:  116). 270 
the  orderly  life  of  a  hoplite,  and  constitutes  a  fitting  preamble  to  the 
culmination  of  this  scene,  namely  Ajax's  bequeathing  of  his  hoplite  shield 
to  his  son.  Now  it  is  stressed  that  this  shield  (described  by  a  majestic 
accumulation  of  adjectives,  with  the  essential  word,  a(Ixos,  being  reserved 
for  the  last  place  in  the  sentence:  574-76)  will  define  Eurysaces'  essence, 
as  it  has  defined  his  father's  up  to  this  day,  by  giving  him  his  name  (574 
ETrtvuµov).  39  So,  Ajax  wishes  the  part  of  himself  that  will  survive,  namely 
his  son,  to  maintain  and  integrate  naturally  into  his  4üais  what  was  for 
himself  only  an  irreconcilable  paradox,  an  chµös  (=ävoµos)  v%tos,  a 
violent  rearrangement  of  normal  order  amounting  to  a  collapse  of 
categories  and  distinctions  and  resulting  in  irresolvable  tension. 
This  irresolvable  tension  is,  I  think,  what  the  Chorus  deplore  in  the 
first  stasimon  (596-645).  However,  before  we  proceed  to  an  examination 
of  this  important  ode,  we  must  get  rid,  once  and  for  all,  of  such 
misconceptions  as  Winnington-Ingram's  (1980:  26,32-43);  namely  that 
the  Chorus  still  think  that  their  chief  has  not  yet  recovered  from.  his 
madness.  Tecmessa  has  clearly  stated  that  Ajax's  crisis  is  past  (257),  a 
fact  which  the  Chorus  acknowledge  forthwith  (263-64);  and  although 
they  momentarily  have  doubts  about  the  mental  state  of  their  chief 
(337-38),  they  soon  realize  that  he  seems  to  have  recovered  (344)  and 
that  what  he  says  is  not  "supposititious"  (481  v7rößXflTov),  but  "born  of 
his  own  soul"  (482  Tijs  aauTOÜ  )pEVÖs)  -a  pointed  distinction  between 
Ajax's  present  state  and  his  previous  derangement  which  was  described  as 
ov  ... 
4pEVOOEV  (182)!  0  Padel  (1995:  32-33)  has  shown  that,  for  the 
39  On  the  traditional  practice  of  naming  the  son  after  his  father's  primary 
heroic  characteristics  see  Nagy  (1979:  146  §9n2).  Pace  Heath  (1987:  183  n.  36)  I 
think  that  the  shield  is  on  the  stage  (it  could  have  been  on  the  ekkyklema 
representing  the  interior  of  Ajax's  hut);  Taplin  (1978:  64)  and  Seale  (1982:  157) 
are  hesitant. 
40  For  views  similar  to  Winnington-Ingram's  see  Musurillo  (1967:  11-12,14  n.  4, 271 
Greeks,  madness  is  a  temporary  phenomenon,  and  lasts  as  long  as  its 
external  signs  last.  So,  what  the  Chorus  lament  in  the  first  stasimon  is  not 
their  chiefs  madness  (as  one  might  be  led  to  believe  by  words  like  e.  g. 
609  8u(T9EpäTrEUToc),  but  its  results,  "the  gloomy  and  ominous  despair 
which  has  replaced  his  frenzy"  (Jebb  ad  614),  41  as  well  as  the  impossible 
situation  in  which  he  has  been  trapped  because  of  his  past  derangement, 
namely  the  impasse  of  falling  into  neither  of  two  opposite  categories,  i.  e. 
of  being  neither  a  hoplite  nor  a  hunter,  of  belonging  neither  to  the  polls 
nor  to  the  wild. 
To  return  to  the  first  stasimon:  there  are  unmistakable  hints  of 
Ajax's  deadlock.  In  612-20  Ajax's  military-hoplite  prowess  is  unreservedly 
praised  (612-13  OoupL(P  KpaTOÜVT  Ev  'ApEL).  However,  all  too  soon  an 
all-important  vüv  8'  av  (614)  is  heard:  Ajax  has  now  deviated  from  his 
usual  ethos;  he  is  "a  lonely  pasturer  of  his  thoughts"  (Jebb  ad  614),  not 
caring  about  the  TiEvOos  he  has  unduly  inflicted  upon  his  4LXOL  (615).  42 
20-22),  Vandvik  (1952),  Seale  (1982:  153).  For  criticism  of  such  views  see  Hester 
(1979b:  247  n.  8),  Holt  (1980:  22  with  n.  3);  cf.  Burton  (1980:  19-20),  Di  Benedetto 
(1983:  39),  Gardiner  (1987:  64-65,  cf.  77).  Less  extreme  is  the  position  of  Biggs 
(1966:  224-25),  Gel  lie  (1972:  7-8)  and  Segal  (1981:  128),  who  think  that  Ajax's 
madness  was  inherent  in  his  natural  disposition;  see  however  criticism  of  such 
views  in  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  34  n.  5).  I  cannot  accept  Simpson's  (1969:  89-92,100 
n.  21)  view  that  Ajax  is  already  mad  when  he  sets  off  to  kill  the  Atreidae  -a 
madness  originating  in  the  fact  that  he  can  restore  his  slighted  honour  only  by 
harming  his  ýi?  oL,  whom  he  was  supposed  to  help.  Lines  447-49  are  enough  to 
disprove  this  perverse  view;  Simpson  (1969:  102  n.  33)  is  perfectly  aware  of  this 
non  liquet,  but  fails  to  tackle  it.  Moreover,  Simpson  has  to  resort  to  the  naively 
allegorizing  view  that  Athena's  infliction  of  madness  on  Ajax  is  merely  a 
'personification'  of  the  derangement  of  his  mental  faculties  (see,  contra, 
Kirkwood  [1958:  274]).  All  in  all,  one  should  heed  Mattes'  (1970:  82,97)  salutary 
remark  that  Sophocles  is  not  interested  in  the  depiction  of  the  madness  as  such. 
41  Cf.  also  Holt  (1980:  24-25,31  n.  11). 
42  Moreover,  if  in  ýpEvöc  oLoßtTac  one.  sees  an  allusion  to  Ajax's  solitary  (oio-) 
expedition  that  degenerated  into  a  slaughter  of  sheep  (oio-  p6iTac  may  hide  a 272 
He  is  no  longer  the  heroic  Ajax  he  used  to  be:  the  deeds  of  his  supreme 
valour  (618-19;  note  the  use  of  standard  terms  for  heroic-hoplite 
excellence:  Epya,  äpETdc)  are  now  past  (618  TrpLv):  Ajax  has  breached, 
with  his  guileful  night  attack,  a  fundamental  rule  of  the  hoplite  code, 
namely  solidarity  between  fellow-warriors  (cf.  the  oath  of  the  Athenian 
ephebes:  oü8E  AE  LAW  TO'V  1TapacTäTr1v  ö1Tov  äv  UTOLXIIGW)  43  His 
former  heroic  deeds  have  now  been  reduced  to  hostile  acts  (620  ä4LXa 
... 
ETrEUE),  exactly  as  the  Atreidae  have  shown  themselves  to  be  ä4LXOL  (620, 
evidently  alluding  to  the  Contest  of  the  Arms,  as  Stanford  ad  619-20  and 
Heath  (1987:  185]  rightly  remark).  The  same  feeling  is  discernible  at  639- 
40  (OÜKETL  aUVTpÖ  OLc  öpyaLs  E[ITrE8os,  &IV\'  EKTÖS  Ö  L1AEI,  ).  Apart 
from  the  obvious  interpretation  of  the  lines  as  referring  to  Ajax's  mental 
disarray  (an  interpretation  put  forward  most  clearly  by  Stanford  ad  639- 
40),  I  think  it  not  implausible  to  suggest  that  this  passage  contains  also 
allusions  to  Ajax's  ambiguous  position:  he  is  no  longer  true  to  his 
w  vTpocoL  öpya'L,  namely  the  ethos  of  the  hoplite.  4  Ajax  now  lies 
beyond  (E  KTbs)  what  used  to  be  his  usual  mode  of  life.  This  is  made  clear 
by  the  contrast  between  Ajax's  present  state  and  the  unambiguously 
heroic  past  of  his  race  (636  Jig  naTp6as  fKWV  yEVEdc  äpLQTa,  4S  643-45 
aTaV,  iv  o3im  TLS  EOpE#v  a'LWV  A'LaKLSdV  &TEpOE  TO1D8E;  4'  cf.  also 
word-play  with  &LET  and  f3oTä),  then  Ajax's  abnormal  deviation  from  his  former 
status  would  be  all  the  more  highlighted. 
43  For  ancient  sources,  as  well  as  modern  published  texts,  of  the  oath  see  Siewert 
(1977:  102  n.  4).  On  its  antiquity  see  Pelekidis  (1962:  75-76). 
44  Differently  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  36-38). 
45  I  print  here  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson's  text  (1990a);  cf.  (1990b:  22).  EI;  is  Lloyd- 
Jones'  (JHS  [1956]  112)  elegant  emendation  of  the  MSS.  Ex  (cf.  Dawe  [1973:  147- 
48]);  äpLrTa  was  only  in  the  now  lost  codex  Livineius  `V',  and  was  also  known  to 
the  schol.  LN  (see  the  app.  crit  of  Christodoulou's  edition,  p.  150). 
46  The  mention  of  the  Aeacidae  may  be  meant  to  recall  also  the  other  great 273 
434-36).  However,  as  we  have  already  seen,  even  this  deviation  from 
Ajax's  normal  state  cannot  be  completed,  for  Athena's  intervention  has 
deprived  him  of  both  possibilities:  he  can  neither  regain  his  hoplite 
honour  by  taking  Achilles'  arms  nor  become  a  proper  hunter.  What 
Athena  does  is  cause  utter  chaos  by  destroying  the  limits  between  what 
Ajax  used  to  be  (i.  e.  a  hoplite)  and  what  he  attempted  to  become  (i.  e.  a 
hunter).  The  only  way  out  of  this  81)c4opos  d'Ta  (643)  seems  to  be  death 
(479-80):  with  so  many  unsurmountable  impasses  to  confront,  life  is 
certainly  no  longer  livable.  47 
So,  the  first  stasimon  brings  out  the  irresolvable  tensions  and 
ambiguities  inflicted  upon  Ajax  by  the  gods.  The  second  stasimon  (693- 
718)  is  a  song  of  the  same  kind,  since  it  highlights  the  same  impasses 
from  a  different  viewpoint.  It  begins  with  an  invitation  to  Pan  to  lead  the 
Chorus'  -  joyful  dance  (693-701);  but  is  Pan  not  the  god  of  wild  frenzy 
too?  "  As  Burkert  (1985a:  110)  rightly  remarks,  the  `blessed'  madness  of 
song  and  dance  (cf.  here 
. 
698  XoporroL'  dvaý)  is  only  the  other  aspect  of 
god-sent  madness.  Should  we  construe  the  invocation  to  such  a  god,  after 
all  the  trouble  Ajax's  frenzy  has  caused,  as  an  innocent  demonstration  of 
'descendant  of  this  glorious  clan,  namely  Achilles  (Ajax  was  second  only  after 
Achilles,  cf.  1340-41);  cf.  Stanford  (1963:  ad  644-45).  If  this  is  correct,  then 
Ajax's  deviation  from  the  great  traditions  of  his  race  is  highlighted  all  the 
more  conspicuously.  On  Ajax's  Aeacid  genealogy  see  von  der  Mühll  (1930:  21- 
22). 
47  Interestingly,  the  Chorus  think  that  Eriboia  will  lament  far  more  strongly 
over  Ajax's  desperate  impasse  (originating  in  his  temporary  crisis  of  madness) 
than  she  would  have  lamented  over  his  death  (624-34):  yap  at  635  makes  this 
clear.  This,  as  e.  g.  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz  (1917:  63  n.  1),  Cohen  (1978:  25)  and 
Burton  (1980:  25)  have  seen,  seems  to  suggest  that  Ajax  would  be  better  dead 
than  entangled  in  such  a  senseless  confusion  of  categories. 
48  See  Mattes  (1970:  43-44).  On  Pan's  associations  with  dance  cf.  e.  g.  A.  Pers.  4488- 
49  and  see  Burton  (1980:  28). 274 
sheer  joy?  I  think  not:  although  the  Chorus,  qua  dramatis  persona,  is  of 
course  supposed  not  to  be  aware  of  these  implications,  the  audience  are 
bound  to  perceive  them  and  appreciate  them,  the  more  so  since  there  are 
more  sinister  hints  to  come.  The  strophe  ends  with  an  invocation  of 
Apollo,  the  god  of  the  bow  (a  markedly  non-hoplitic  weapon),  who  is 
thus  contrasted  with  Ares,  the  hoplite  god,  whose  name  is  heard  in  the 
first  line  of  the  antistrophe  (706):  49  wild  frenzy  (Pan)  in  relation  with  the 
antinomy  between  hoplitic  (Ares)  and  non-hoplitic  /  anti-hoplitic  modes 
of  behaviour  (Apollo)  has  been  the  theme  dominating  the  play  so  far  -a 
theme  already  announced,  perhaps,  in  the  parodos,  172-81,  with  the 
tentative  attribution  of  Ajax's  madness-  to  Enyalios  (-Ares,  paradigm  of 
the  hoplite)  or  to  Apollo's  twin  sister,  the  archer  Artemis.  50  This  theme  is 
now  taken  up  and  lyrically  reworked  in  this  ode.  So,  although  the  Chorus 
think  that  their  chief  LETavEyvcaQf  (717)  and  that  Eüvoµia  (713),  viz. 
the  opposite  of  the  utter  disorder  which  has  thrown  Ajax's  life  into  ruins, 
will  after  all  reign,  we  realize  that  nothing  could  be  farther  from  the 
truth:  Ajax  is  still  trapped  in  the  same  unsurmountable  impasses. 
5.1.3  The  `deception'  and  the  `suicide'  speeches 
In  both  the  `deception'  and  the  `suicide'  speeches  a  common  basic 
pattern  can  be  identified.  In  each  there  are  hints  suggesting  that  the 
tension  will  be  at  last  resolved  and  that  the  balance  will  be  finally  tipped 
49  Granted,  neither  Apollo's  nor  Ares'  typical  attributes,  namely  the  bow  and 
the  hoplite  armour,  are  explicitly  referred  to  here.  However,  the  bow  and  the 
hoplite  armour  were  part  of  those  gods'  `canonic'  representation  in  art,  and 
therefore  they  must  have  been  their  standard  attributes.  See  Appendix  B  for 
documentation. 
50  Cf.  above  p.  264f. 275 
towards  either  the  order  for  which  the  hoplite  stands,  or  the  systematic 
reversal  of  categories  which  the  `black  hunter'  represents.  However,  it 
eventually  turns  out  that  neither  is  the  case,  and  that  the  tension  is 
definitely  irresolvable. 
The  `deception  speech'  is  on  the  whole  an  aTrcrn1  (this  is  confirmed 
by  Tecmessa's  exclamation  at  807-80851)  -  and  one  hardly  needs  to 
restate  that  guile  constitutes  the  very  essence  of  `black  hunt'.  However,  it 
is  an  unusual  deceit:  it  is  not  a  false  story,  but  an  ambiguous  one,  for 
almost  everything  in  it  has  a  double  meaning.  52  Thus,  as  many  have 
remarked,  53  EeTjX6VOT1V  aTÖµa  (651),  due  to  the  ambiguity  of  the  word 
(YTÖµa  (=`mouth'  and  `edge  of  sword'),  may  mean  `the  edge  of  my  sword 
has  become  obtuse'  (therefore,  `I  am  not  going  to  commit  suicide';  this  is 
how  the  Chorus  understand  it)  or  `I  have  weakened  only  verbally'. 
Likewise,  652-53  can  mean  both  `I  will  not  leave  Tecmessa  a  widow  and 
my  son  an  orphan'  (='I  will  not  die')  and  `I  will  not  abandon  my  widow 
and  my  orphan  son  to  the  enemies'  (='I  will  die,  but  I  will  entrust  these 
two  to  Teucer';  cf.  567-71).  54  Lines  654-56  contain  a  double  ambiguity:  as 
51  Knox  (1979:  138)  and  Taplin  (1979:  129)  unduly  play  down  the  importance  of 
these  lines,  which  has  been  recognized  by  Waldock  (1966:  74-75)  and  others. 
52  See  Appendix  C. 
53  E.  g.  Jebb  ad  650f.,  Kamerbeek  ad  650-652,  Moore  (1977:  49  n.  5),  Knox  (1979: 
138-9),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  48  n.  111),  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  47  n.  33), 
Stevens  (1986:  330).  Contra  Fraenkel  (1967:  80  n.  4),  Sicherl  (1977:  90  n.  99). 
54  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  31)  argued  that  Ajax's  confidence  in  Teucer  is 
unrealistic;  Heath  (1987:  183)  has  given  the  correct  answer  to  this.  -Jebb  ad 
652f.,  Kamerbeek  ad  652,653,  Stanford  ad  652-3,  Simpson  (1969:  97),  Burton 
(1980:  26)  and  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  48)  have  curiously  seen  another  ambiguity  in 
this  passage,  namely  that  oIKTLpw  X  rEiv  =  1)  `pity  forbids  me  to  leave  her',  and 
2)  `I  regret  to  leave  her'.  This  I  cannot  accept:  only  the  former  meaning  is 
possible,  because  verbs  like  oiKTLpeLV,  a1UXüVEU6aL,  aL8EtC8aL  +  inf.  mean 
`regret,  shame  etc.  forbid  one  to  do  something';  the  latter  meaning  would  only 
be  obtained  if  a  participle  followed;  contra  Stevens  [1986:  330  with  n.  181). 276 
Knox  (1979:  134-35  with  n.  65)  has  remarked,  XouTpä  (654)  may  refer 
both  to  Ajax's  purification  and  to  his  funeral  bath;  55  furthermore,  655 
X  aO'  äyvtaac  Eµä  may  suggest  to  the  on-stage  audience  `I  will  purify 
myself  (with  water,  cf.  XouTpä)',  56  but  for  the  spectators  it  may  also  carry 
the  meaning  `I  will  purify  myself  with  (my  own)  blood'57  (therefore  `I  will 
kill  myself).  Finally,  658-60  contain  an  ambiguity  on  which  many 
commentators  have  remarked:  Ajax  will  bury  his  sword,  as  was  the 
practice  with  polluted  objects,  58  but  he  will  also  `bury'  /  `hide'  the  sword 
inside  his  own  body.  59  Even  688-9,  which  for  many  a  commentator 
unequivocally  reveal  Ajax's  true  intentions,  may  be  interpeted 
ambiguously,  if  one  accepts  West's  (1978:  112-3)  very  plausible  reading 
pAAELv  µtv  i5  i  v,  EüvoEty  8'  TJ  tv  äµa,  as  well  as  his  explanation  that 
"Ajax  may  well  seek  benevolence  for  himself  both  in  the  overt  situation 
and  in  view  of  his  actual  intentions.  " 
What  is  more,  these  verbal  double  entendres  form,  at  the  same 
time,  a  second  class  of  ambiguities,  much  deeper  and  more  significant. 
Their  function  is  to  make  it  appear,  at  the  same  time,  both  that  Ajax  is 
going  to  assume  again  the  status  of  a  proper  hoplite  and  that  he  is  going 
to  opt  for  the  world  of  `black  hunt'.  Thus,  Ajax  clearly  states  that  he  is  off 
Sicherl  (1977:  92  n.  105)  appositely  cites  Kühner-Gerth,  Gr.  Gr.  If,  pp.  6.2  and  73, 
n.  3.  See  also  Smyth,  Gr.  Gr.  §  2100  and  2126. 
55  Cf.  also  Sicherl  (1977:  78),  Poe  (1987:  53-54). 
56  On  the  cathartic  power  of  sea-water  see  the  bibliography  provided  by  Sicherl 
(1977:  78  n.  42). 
57  I  cannot  agree  with  Segal's  (1981:  138,140)  and  Easterling's  (1988:  98)  view 
that  Ajax  is  here  rejecting  the  `normal'  ritual  purification  with  water. 
Purification  from  bloodshed  with  blood  was  extremely  common  in  antiquity:  see 
Parker  (1983:  371-73). 
58  Scullion  (1994:  112  n.  93),  with  full  bibliography. 
59  See  Kamerbeek  ad  658  &  660;  Sicherl  (1977:  79-80).  Contra,  wrongly,  Poe  (1987: 
54). 277 
to  the  seashore  (654-55):  60  as  we  have  already  seen,  this  apparently 
means  that  he  is  going  to  purify  himself,  that  is  to  perform  a  vöµLµov,  an 
act  that  belongs  by  definition  to  the  world  of  the  polis,  the  world  of  the 
hoplite.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  seashore  is  a  place  typically 
belonging  to  the  outdoors,  beyond  the  polis  (cf.  657  XCopov  ... 
äaTLf  fi), 
exactly  like  the  places  where  the  `black  hunter'  roams.  Furthermore,  he 
says  that  he  is  going  to  hide  his  weapon  in  the  earth,  an  act  which 
apparently  means  (as  Ajax  explains  at  661:  yap)  that  he  will  denounce 
those  who  should  be  his  enemies  (Hector,  cf.  664-65)  and  reaffirm, 
therefore  (666  TOLyap),  61  his  bonds  of  alliance  with  the  Atreidae.  This 
apparently  suggests  that  he  will  become  a  proper  hoplite,  harming  his 
foes  and  assisting  his  fellow  warriors,  but  there  comes  yet  another  warning 
against  such  an  over-simplification:  Ajax  significantly  terms  his  sword, 
the  centre  of  all  these  thoughts,  13EXoc  (658).  62  Arrows  and  bows  are 
associated  with  marginal  modes  of  fighting,  not  fully  integrated  into  the 
60  I  strongly  disagree  with  Scullion  (1994:  116-28),  who  thinks  that  Ajax  does 
not  go  to  the  seashore  but  comes  back  to  his  hut  and  commits  suicide  in  a 
nearby  thicket.  Teucer  (997)  says  clearly  that  he  has  been  `hunting  down'  Ajax 
-which  implies  that  he  did  not  look  for  Ajax  in  the  "likeliest"  place,  i.  e.  near 
his  hut,  as  Scullion  (1994:  122)  thinks.  What  is  more,  the  most  natural 
interpretation  of  983-86  is,  pace  Scullion  (1994:  123-24),  that  Eurysaces  is  in 
Ajax's  hut,  which  seems  to  be  at  a  considerable  distance,  since  it  takes  some  180 
lines  for  Tecmessa  (or  whoever  lines  985ff.  are  addressed  to)  to  fetch  him 
(1168ff.  );  cf.  Segal  (1981:  127  with  n.  52).  Finally,  Gardiner  (1979:  12)  has  shown 
that  there  is  insistent  verbal  preparation  for  the  shift  of  scene  from  Ajax's  hut 
to  the  seashore. 
61  For  possible  interpretations  of  TO  yäp  see  Sicherl  (1977:  81),  Heath  (1987: 
187),  Seaford  (1994a:  393). 
62  The  catachrestic  use  of  Dos  =  `weapon'  (and,  indeed,  `sword')  does  not  seem 
to  be  common  in  Sophocles;  see  Ellendt-Genthe  (1872)  s.  v.  Thus,  its  occu 
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standard  hoplite  battle;  consequently,  the  archer  often  stands  for  the 
antipode  of  the  hoplite.  63 
However,  despite  all  these  allusions  to  non-hoplitic  or  anti-hoplitic 
forms  of  behaviour,  the  apparent  meaning  of  the  deception  speech  is 
diametrically  different:  as  its  recipients,  viz.  the  Chorus,  think,  Ajax,  far 
from  indulging  in  a  reversal  of  the  polls'  set  categories,  embraces  its 
O  ap.  ia  (712),  its  institutions,  its  organization.  On  the  other  hand,  we,  the 
audience,  know  that  the  speech  is  a  8oXos,  or  at  least  that  it  does  deceive 
the  on-stage  audience.  Thus,  due  to  its  fundamental  ambiguity,  the 
meaning  of  this  speech  hovers  between,  on  the  one  hand,  a  vindication  of 
the  lack  of  vöµoL  (of  standards  and  absolutes)  characterizing  the  wild, 
the  world  beyond  the  polls,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  reaffirmation  of 
the  EüvopIa  (713)  characterizing  the  world  of  the  polls.  Thus,  what  marks 
this  speech  so  far  is  a  feeling  of  instability  and  uncertainty:  Ajax  is  still 
hovering  between  two  worlds,  the  polls  (hoplite)  and  the  wild  ('black 
hunter'),  which  means  that  he  is  still  trapped  in  the  same  impasses.  This 
feeling  is  reinforced  by  Ajax's  theorizing  on  the  instability  of  all  things 
(669-83).  His  thoughts  about  winter  giving  way  to  summer  or  night  giving 
way  to  day  are  an  expression  of  the  law  of  eternal  change,  of  the  lack  of 
absolutes,  r  of  the  impossibility  of  maintaining  any  set  distinctions  or 
categories.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  Chorus'  words  at  714:  TravO'  o  µEyac 
63  See  below  n.  149  for  documentation.  Cf.  also  above,  n.  10. 
64  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  52),  Heath  (1987:  187-88),  Bradshaw  (1991:  120  n. 
42);  for  possible  Heraclitean  /  mystic  influences  see  Seaford  (1994a:  401-402). 
The  reference  to  the  instability  of  the  oath  (648-49)  may  of  course  be  a 
reference  to  the  oath  Ajax  swore  to  Tyndareos,  as  Knox  (1979:  138  with  n.  82) 
suggested.  But  an  Athenian  audience  might  have  perceived  a  further  allusion 
to  the  hoplite  oath,  from  which  Ajax  is  deviating  so  blatantly.  Linforth  (1954: 
13)  and  Heath  (1987:  186)  do  not  see  any  particular  significance  in  the  mention 
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Xpövoc  µapaLvE  L  TE  KaL  ýXEyE  L,  65  evidently  referring  to  Ajax's  supposed 
change  of  heart:  everything  in  nature  is  bound  to  become  its  opposite. 
This  train  of  thought  culminates  in  the  maxim  of  678-83:  the  categories 
`friend'  and  `enemy'  are  fictitious  and  conventional  distinctions,  for  what 
we  call  a  `friend'  is  liable  to  become  a  `foe',  and,  inversely,  what  we  call  a 
`foe'  can  just  as  well  become  a  `friend'.  The  key  word  for  the  character 
and  quality  of  the  world  in  which  we  live  is  äTrLQTOS  (683),  `not  to  be 
counted  upon'  -  evidently  because  of  its  ultimate  instability  and  lack  of 
standards  and  absolutes.  Nonetheless,  one  should  not  complacently 
content  oneself  with  an  absolute  conviction  about  the  impermanence  of 
all  things.  What  Sophocles  continuously  does,  as  we  have  seen,  is 
challenge  the  human  propensity  to  form  fixed  conceptual  frameworks; 
and,  in  a  sense,  belief  in  a  complete  lack  of  absolutes  is  such  a  fixed 
conceptual  framework.  Thus,  'as  if  to  mock  this  natural  tendency, 
Sophocles  inserts,  in  the  core  of  this  speech  about  impermanence,  a  slight 
hint  at  a  possibility  that  even  impermanence  might  not  be  permanent: 
shortly  before  his  meditations  about  friends  becoming  enemies  and  vice 
versa,  Ajax  appeals  to  a  proverb  (TrapoLµia:  664-65)  -  i.  e.  to  what  is  par 
excellence  an  expression  of  a  set  and  ordered  state  of  affairs  -  in  order  to 
reassert  the  traditional  belief  that  an  enemy  can  never  be  beneficent,  and 
that  a  gift  from  an  enemy  is  bound  to  be,  in  fact,  a  `non-gift'  (665  E  X6pc3v 
65  Thus  the  majority  of  MSS,  but  Stobaeus  I.  8.24  (I.  97  Wachsmuth)  Omits  TE  Kai 
(AEYEL.  Accepting  TE  KäL  4VyEL  means  destroying  responsion  with  the 
strophe;  instead  of  assuming  a  lacuna  at  701,  critics  (after  Livineius)  have 
deleted  the  words  TE  KaL  ()MyEL.  However,  Knox's  (1979:  159n.  128)  arguments 
in  favour  of  the  majority  of  the  MSS  seem  to  me  compelling;  cf.  De  Romilly 
(1968:  100),  Kamerbeek  ad  714,  whereas  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  43  n.  95)  is 
doubtful.  Rosenmeyer  (1971:  161)  bases  his  interpretation  on  Stobaeus'  text,  but 
does  not  even  mention  the  textual  problem.  Goldhill  (1986:  191  with  n.  46)  is 
duly  cautious. 280 
d8cüpa  8wpa  KOÜK  övr!  QLµa).  As  Blundell  (1989:  87)  has  put  it,  "this 
proverb,  which  asserts  the  permanence  of  enmity,  undermines  Ajax's 
specious  submission  to  transience".  So,  at  a  moment  when  one  has  been 
led  to  believe  that  one  might  hold,  at  least,  a  firm  belief  in  the  instability 
of  all  things,  the  playwright  warns  us  against  such  an  indulgence  in  fixed 
ideas:  the  all-pervading  flux  he  puts  forward  as  his  hero's 
Weltanschauung  excludes  systematically  anything  that  is  set  and 
permanent,  even  a  set  and  permanent  belief  in  the  impermanence  and 
instability  of  the  cosmos! 
So,  what  the  deception  speech  is  about  is  not,  after  all,  the 
inversion  of  all  categories,  i.  e.  the  typical  feature  of  the  world  of  the 
`black  hunter',  for  even  such  an  inversion  is  a  `symmetrical',  a  systematic 
and  ordered,  one.  66  On  the  contrary,  what  the  deception  speech  is  about 
is  the  lack  of  order  and  permanence;  67  about  Ajax's  inability  to 
accommodate  himself  into  some  kind  of  structured  framework,  be  it  the 
polls  or  the  wild.  A  similar  pattern  is  also  discernible  in  the  `suicide 
speech'  (815-65).  This  time  one  thinks  that  it  is  the  order,  the  normality 
and  predictability  of  the  hoplite's  world  (i.  e.  of  the  world  of  the  polls) 
that  is  going  to  prevail:  Ajax's  speech  is  replete  with  images  of  universal 
order.  He  invokes  the  gods,  and  first  of  all  he  appeals  to  Zeus,  as  is 
natural  (824  Kai  'Yap  E  LKÖS),  since  he  is  the  god  who  warrants  cosmic 
66  Cf.  above  p.  259.  Vidal-Naquet  (1986b:  113)  rightly  notes  that  the  life  of  the 
hoplite  and  the  life  of  the  hunter  (in  particular,  of  the  pre-hoplite  ephebe)  are 
"symmetrical  opposites";  however,  I  cannot  agree  with  his  suggestion  that  in  a 
hunter's  world  "there  is  nothing  but  [...  ]  disorder,  irrationality'  (my 
emphasis):  one  must  see  hunt  as  a  no  less  `rational',  organized  and  orderly 
activity  than  hoplite  life,  precisely  because  the  former  is  the  latter's 
symmetrical  opposite.  Vidal-Naquet  (1986c:  138)  seems  to  correct  himself  when 
he  says:  "the  `disorder'  is  here  a  constructed  one,  an  organized  disorder". 
67  Pace  Kamerbeek  (1948:  89). 281 
order.  He  prays  for  his  body  not  to  be  thrown  away,  thus  implicitly 
asking  for  a  proper  funerary  ritual  (826-30)  -  ritual  being  par  excellence 
a  vöµLµov,  an  expression  of  the  community's  wish  to  construct  a 
commonly  accepted,  recognizable  and  repeatable  (i.  e.  an  ordered)  reality. 
Then,  he  proceeds  to  an  invocation  of  Hermes  by  his  standard  epithet, 
nolnraLoc  (831-34),  as  well  as  of  the  Erinyes,  significantly  stressing  the 
permanence  of  their  existence  and  of  their  function  as  avengers  (835-36 
äE,  L  TE  ...  a'E  (  9).  68  Finally,  the  wish  that  the  Sun  should  stop  and 
announce  his  death  to  his  parents  (845-51),  far  from  being  a 
megalomaniac  desire  to  interfere  with  the  order  of  the  universe,  as 
Vandvik  (1942:  173)  and  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  45  n.  104)  have 
implied,  has  literary  parallels  elsewhere69  and  must  be  taken  as  a 
traditional  function  of  the  Sun-god.  This  feeling  of  order  and 
permanence  is  reinforced  by  Ajax's  reference  to  his  mother's  dirge 
spreading  all  over  the  city  (851)  -  yet  another  allusion  to  the  order 
expressed  by  the  funerary  vö  igia  -,  as  well  as  by  his  address  to 
characteristic  landmarks  which  lend  coherence  to  a  person's  life,  serve  as 
points  of  reference  and  help  make  the  world  less  disorderly:  Ajax 
addresses  his  homeland  (859-60),  the  hearth  (EQTLa)  of  his  father's  house 
(860),  and  the  famous  Athens  along  with  the  genos  of  the  Salaminians 
(861)  -  an  unmistakable  reference  to  the  ordered  framework  of  the  polis. 
As  Knox  (1979:  150)  has  put  it,  Ajax's  "final  words  are  addressed  to  things 
68  Especially  if,  with  Jebb  (ad  835f.  ),  we  translate  Tag  a  CL  TE  rrap6Evovc  by  "the 
maidens  who  live  for  ever";  but  Stanford's  (ad  835-8)  translation  "those  who 
are  ever  virgins"  is  also  possible;  in  any  case,  äE'L  is  of  central  importance.  Cf. 
Knox  (1979:  142)  and  Seaford  (1994a:  136).  Rosenmeyer  (1971:  185-86)  sees  the 
invocation  to  Erinyes  as  Ajax's  attempt  "to  re-establish  the  sacred  fixity  without 
which  he  cannot  live". 
69  Qi.  8.270-71,  A.  Ag.  632-33,  S.  Tr.  94-102;  see  Stinton  (1990:  446-49). 282 
eternal,  unchanging,  timeless".  70  The  end  of  his  speech,  however,  comes  as 
a  surprise:  the  springs,  the  rivers,  and  the  land  of  Troy,  which  are  no 
doubt  hostile  to  Ajax  (Troy  was  termed  TroXe[da  at  the  outset  of  this 
speech  [819]),  are  now  called,  in  a  characteristically  Sophoclean  coup  de 
theatre,  Ajax's  Tpo4)Tjs,  assuming  an  equal  status  with  his  GVVT  o  ov 
yEvos  of  the  Salaminians,  i.  e.  with  the  people  who  are  his  4(XoL  by 
definition171  A  similar  surprise  marked  the  beginning  of  the  suicide 
speech:  Hector  was  unequivocally  called  there  the  most  hated  of  Ajax's 
eEvoL  (818  µä)LaTa  RLUT1eEyTO9  , 
Ex6(QTOV  8'  opdv:  the  accumulation 
of  near-synonyms  is  again  significant),  while  the  sword  he  gave  to  Ajax  is 
placed  in  the  hostile  land  of  Troy  (819).  Nonetheless,  the  sword  itself  - 
an  ä8u  pov  8wpov,  an  enemy's  gift  which  should  have  been  as  hostile  as 
the  giver  -  was  called  `most  friendly'  (822  Eüvo1QTaTOV)172  The  reversal 
of  seemingly  strict  antitheses  (such  as  "friend  :  enemy"),  the  collapse  of 
what  seem  to  be  sets  of  clear-cut  distinctions,  the  obliteration  of  self- 
evident  oppositions  and  symmetries,  is  an  incessant  procedure,  in  which 
Sophocles  engages  himself  in  his  unremitting  struggle  to  challenge  the 
way  we  perceive,  construe  and  conceptualize  the  world. 
70  Contra,  wrongly,  Segal  (1981:  115,123,124). 
71  Cf.  Tyrell  (1985:  170),  Rose  (1995:  77).  Cohen  (1978:  32)  fails  to  see  this  coup  de 
theatre.  Segal  (1981:  123)  notices  the  paradox,  but  gives  a  different 
interpretation. 
72  On  this  paradox  see  Taplin  (1978:  85-88),  (1979:  127),  Heath  (1987:  194), 
Blundell  (1989:  87-88),  Rose  (1995:  77)  and,  above  all,  Tyrell  (1985:  169)  and 
Seaford  (1994a:  392-93).  Cohen  (1978:  26-33)  makes  some  fine  remarks  on  the 
prominence  of  the  sword  in  this  play  (on  which  cf.  also  Kirkwood  [1958:  222-23] 
and  Seale  [1982:  175]),  but  fails,  I  think,  to  see  the  paradox  (ibid.,  31-32). 283 
5.2.1  Belonging  neither  to  the  Dolls  nor  to  the  wild  (2)-,  Max 
can  neither  hunt  nor  sacrifice 
Nonetheless,  the  annulment  of  the  way  the  world  is  construed,  along  with 
the  subsequent  collapse  of  all  categories  ("friend  :  enemy",  "polls  :  wild", 
"hoplite  :  black  hunter"),  is  not  over  yet.  We  shall  now  proceed  to  see 
how  two  markedly  different  rituals,  namely  hunt  and  sacrifice,  are 
similarly  confused  as  well  as  rendered  impossible.  This  is  but  a 
dedoublement,  on  the  level  of  ritual,  of  Ajax's  failure  either  to  remain  a 
hoplite  or  to  become  a  `black  hunter':  sacrifice  qua  communal  ceremony 
is  fundamental  to  the  structure  of  the  polis,  73  whereas  `black  hunt'  is  a 
markedly  non-domestic  act,  confined  to  the  wild,  where  the  familiar 
structures  of  the  'polls  cease  to  exist  (or,  rather,  are  systematically 
inverted);  74  thus,  Ajax's  inability  either  to  perform  a  proper  sacrifice  or  to 
hunt  properly  is  yet  another  manifestation  of  his  general  and 
fundamental  failure  to  accommodate  himself  either  to  the  world  of  the 
polls  or  to  that  of  the  wild. 
For  our  treatment  of  the  subject  to  be  clearer  and  more  coherent, 
we  shall  be  examining  the  theme  of  hunt  and  sacrifice  in  its  development 
from  the  very  beginning  of  the  play,  thus  necessarily  overlapping  with 
topics  touched  upon  in  the  previous  sections. 
73  Sacrifice  as  an  act  central  to  the  polis:  e.  g.  Pl.  Prot.  322a;  see  also  Gernet 
(1981:  323,325-7,329-31,333)  on  the  public  sacrificial  Hearth  as  a  symbol  of 
civic  collectivity.  The  hoplite,  being  also  a  manifestation  of  the  collectivity  that 
is  the  polis,  is,  not  surprisingly,  often  associated  pictorially  with  scenes  of 
sacrifice:  Lissar  gue  (1990:  55-69;  cf.  51,137,181-3)  examines  depictions  of 
hoplites  donning  their  armour  in  the  context  of  such  activities  as 
empyroskopia,  libation,  etc. 
74  See  again  n.  66. 284 
We  saw  on  p.  265  how  Ajax's  hunt  is  corrupted  in  a  twofold 
manner,  namely  by  his  hunting  of  domestic  animals  and,  then,  by  his 
becoming  a  hunted  animal  himself.  The  corruption  and  final  annulment 
of  his  hunt  is  soon  transformed  into  an  equally  perverted  sacrifice.  This  is 
achieved  by  a  simple  but  ingenious  dramatic  device:  Ajax  kills  some  of 
the  animals  outside  the  camp  (53-56),  thus  performing  his  corrupted 
hunt  of  domestic  animals;  however,  the  rest  he  brings  as  if  they  were 
game  (64,75  93,407)  into  his  hut  (61-65;  233-44,295-300)  where  he 
completes  the  slaughter  by  performing  a  sacrifice  (it  is  explicitly  referred 
to  as  such  at  219:  a4  äyi'  and  220:  Xpncrn  pia;  76  cf.  235  a  ciC',  299 
E  a4  aCE)  77  of  hunted  animals  -  i.  e.  a  sacrifice  which  is  corrupted  by 
definition,  since  it  was  domestic  (not  hunted)  animals  that  were 
normally  sacrificed.  78 
Nonetheless,  this  is  not  the  only  reason  why  the  sacrifice  is  corrupt. 
There  is,  I  believe,  a  whole  series  of  hints  which  would  easily  suggest  to  an 
alert  audience  that  Ajax's  `sacrifice'  of  the  sheep  and  cattle  is  in  fact  a 
totally  anomic  procedure,  amounting  to  a  blatant  violation  of  the  rules 
of  sacrifice  and,  consequently,  to  an  offence  against  the  whole 
community,  since  sacrifice  is  a  communal  act  par  excellence.  79  First  of  all, 
the  `sacrifice'  is  surprisingly  disorderly,  in  contrast  to  the  strict  order 
which  should  normally  be  maintained  at  a  ritual:  Ajax  ties  the  animals 
75  Ajax  of  course  thinks  the  game  are  men,  not  animals;  nonetheless,  animals  or 
men,  the  result  is,  undoubtedly,  an  anomic  and  perverted  hunt. 
76  On  the  Xpr  rn  pta-sacrifice  see  Jebb  (ad  218ff.  ),  Stanford  (ad  219-20)  and 
especially  Kamerbeek  (ad  220). 
77  Cf.  Tyrell  (1985:  162-3). 
78  See  e.  g.  Nilsson  (1967:  145  n.  2):  "nur  gezähmte  Tiere,  fast  nie  wilde  geopfert 
werden".  Cf.  also  Bowie  (1983:  114). 
79  On  the  shock-effect  of  the  perversion  of  sacrifice  see  Poe  (1987:  31  with  n. 
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and  drags  them  to  his  hut  (62,65,71-72,234,240,296-97),  whereas 
ideally  the  sacrificial  animal  should  "go  to  the  sacrifice  complaisantly,  or 
rather  voluntarily"  (Burkert  [1983:  3-4];  [1985a:  56]).  80  Moreover,  it  is 
insistently  stressed  that  he  not  only  slew  the  animals  in  wild  rage  with 
uncontrolled,  successive  blows  (not,  that  is,  in  the  ceremonial  manner  of 
a  proper  sacrifice),  81  but  also  that  he  cleft  them  in  two  (56  paX(Cc,  w,  82 
236,299),  thus  diametrically  deviating  from  the  proper  way  of  killing  an 
animal  which  is  to  slit  its  throat  (see  again  Burkert  [1985a:  56]).  Even 
when  the  sacrificial  rules  seem  to  be  observed,  as  is  the  case  with  the 
cutting  of  the  victims'  tongues  (238-39),  the  illusion  immediately  gives 
way  to  grim  reality:  the  tongue  is  thrown  away  (239  'u  rrE  t  ),  instead  of 
being  offered  separately  to  the  god,  as  was  the  normal  practice.  83  Finally, 
in  an  orderly  sacrifice  the  blood  is  carefully  collected  in  a  vessel  and 
sprayed  over  the  altar  (the  technical  term  for  this  procedure  is 
äLµäacEiv;  see  Burkert  1.  c);  however,  it  is  one  of  the  most  striking  as  well 
as  gruesome  details  of  this  `sacrifice'  that  the  animals'  blood  spreads  all 
over  the  place,  and  indeed  Ajax  lies  in  the  middle  of  the  slaughtered 
animals,  all  but  swimming  in  their  blood  (308-309,324-25).  Moreover,  if 
at  97  we  read  j  iaýas  with  Reiske84  (a  word  undoubtedly  used  at  453  of 
80  Some  ancient  sources:  A.  Ag.  1297-8(with  Fraenkel  [1950:  111.  ad  1297f.  ]);  Ael. 
NA  10.50;  oraculum  apud  Porph.  Abst.  2.9.3;  Plut.  Mor.  729f. 
81  On  the  "senseless  confusion"  of  the  sacrifice  cf.  Rosenmeyer  (1971:  178);  also 
Girard  (1977:  9),  Segal  (1981:  139). 
82  See  Jebb  (ad  56f.  )  and  Stanford  (ad  55-7)  on  the  meaning  of  paXiCwv. 
83  Jebb  (ad  238)  cites  Qi.  3.332  and  Ar.  Pax  1060,  but  doubts  "whether  there  is 
any  reference  here  [i.  e.  at  the  Ajax  passage]  to  the  sacrificial  ritual"! 
84  This  reading  is  supported  by  the  gloss  f  iµ  m  xag  of  codd.  FODZc;  note  that 
jµaýac  itself  appears  as  a  gloss  for  Eßaýac  at  95  in  codd.  DXrXsZc  (teste  Dawe 
[1996]  in  app.  crit  ad  97).  Regrettably,  commentators  do  not  consider  seriously 
this  attractive  alternative;  Jebb  (ad  97),  for  instance,  rejects  it  out  of  hand.  As 
far  as  I  am  aware,  only  Dawe  (1973:  130)  discusses  the  problem  thoroughly  and 286 
the  animals'  'sacrifice'85),  we  gain  an  allusion  to  the  technical  term 
äLµäaOELv,  which  would  create  a  pointed  irony:  Ajax's  dy7ng  his  hands  in 
the  animals'  blood  is  nothing  like  the  proper  a  IIäaaELV,  i.  e.  the  orderly 
spraying  of  blood  over  the  altar.  The  anomic  character  of  this  `sacrifice'  is 
summarized  by  Ajax  himself  in  the  phrase  vEoa4ayiIs  4)ovoc  (546), 
which  paradoxically  combines  the  root  Quay-,  denoting  sacrifice,  and  the 
word  4ovoc,  denoting  unsacrificial  murder.  86 
Moreover,  Ajax's  anomic  `sacrifice'  has  also  important  political 
implications.  Not  only  did  he  intend  to  slaughter  the  whole  army,  as 
Rosivach  (1975:  201)  has  demonstrated,  but  also  the  animals  he  has 
killed  are  constantly  referred  to  as  common  property:  ä8aaTa  (54),  87 
NMI  XoLTrt  (146),  88  Trav8äRouc  E'rrL  (3oüs  äyEXdLas  (175)  etc.  Ajax  has 
destroyed  the  collectivity  that  is  the  sacrifice  by  slaughtering  for  himself 
what  belonged  to  the  community,  what  -was  inviolable  because  it  was 
d8aaTov.  So,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  Argives  want  to  execute  Ajax  by 
stoning  (254,  cf.  728),  89  i.  e.  by  a  typically  communal  .  means  of  killing,  90 
critically,  but  in  the  end  rejects  ij  iaaas. 
85  The  scholion  on  453  (p.  117  Christodoulou)  apparently  read  d  ithvaL,  which 
is  evidently  wrong.  This  might  provide  a  parallel  for  the  corruption  of  'jµaýac 
to  ýjxµaaas  at  97. 
86  I  owe  this  point  to  Tyrell  (1985:  156-7).  On  the  diametrical  difference  between 
sacrifice  and  4övoc  see  Vernant  (1991:  294),  quoted  below  on  p.  304. 
87  See  commentators  ad  loc.  L.  Campbell  (ad  53,4)  perceptively  remarks  that 
ä6aaTa  (=  `undivided  from  spoil')  is  added  "to  show  that  the  act  of  Ajax  would 
provoke  the  whole  army  to  be  enraged  against  him  with  one  consent";  cf. 
Sorum  (1986:  366).  I  will  further  clarify  the  point  in  the  text. 
88  Jebb  (ad  145ff.  )  renders  Aot  rij  by  a8a  rros.  However,  West's  (1978:  109) 
preference  for  the  yp-variant  (in  G)  KOLV71(cf.  the  Homeric  evvij(a)  may  well  be 
justified. 
89  Cf.  also  409,  where  the  reference  is  not  specifically  to  stoning,  but  to  a 
communal  (cf.  Träs  QTpaTÖc)  way  of  execution. 287 
which  bears  striking  similarities  to  the  sacrificial  act  itself.  91  The 
perversion  of  the  communal  act  of  sacrifice,  that  is,  must  be  answered 
with  an  equally  communal  act,  i.  e.  with  another  sacrifice,  for  the  balance 
to  be  redressed  and  normality  to  be  restored. 
This  is  not,  however,  what  is  going  to  happen  eventually.  Ajax  will 
indeed  be  sacrificed,  but  only  by  way  of  suicide.  There  are  hints  implying 
that  Ajax's  suicide  is  clearly  thought  of  as  a  sacrifice:  first  of  all,  as  Sicherl 
(1977:  96)  has  seen,  "Ajax  calls  himself  a  ,  To#ayijs  (841);  the  chorus 
[sic,  he  means:  Tecmessa)  call  him  vEoa  ayijs  (898).  #  is  the 
technical  term  for  slaughtering  a  victim"  92  He  also  remarks  that 
QJayE  üs  at  815  may  hint  at  the  sword's  function  as  a  sacrificial  knife.  93 
A  little  earlier,  the  Chorus  had  supposed  that  their  chief  was  sacrificing  to 
the  gods  (711-13  eE(ZV  8'  ab  TrävOuTa  OO  LL'  EýTjvua'),  while  we  knew 
that  he  was  in  fact  going  to  commit  suicide,  thus,  suicide  and  sacrifice 
are  directly  associated  in  our  minds.  94  Nonetheless,  this  `sacrifice',  far 
from  restoring  normality  and  order  (as  might  appear  from  the  word 
OEQµLa  used  of  it  by  the  Chorus  at  712),  will  turn  out  to  be  yet  another 
perverted  ritual,  as  the  sacrificial  victim  will  be  a  human  being,  Ajax 
himself. 
90  Fraenkel  (1977:  25);  see  further  Rosivach  (1987). 
91  See  Burkert  (1983:  46-47).  Segal  (1981:  140)  sees  here  an  allusion  to  the 
pharmakos-ritual,  which  I  cannot  accept. 
92  841  may  be  interpolated  (cf.  below  n.  143),  but  this  does  not  substantially 
affect  my  point,  because  of  the  occurrence  of  the  root  #ay  -at  the  genuine 
898. 
93  Adams  (1955:  105)  saw  in  the  word  an  allusion  to  the  officiating  priest, 
which,  for  our  purpose,  comes  down  to  the  same  thing;  cf.  Seaford  (1994a:  392 
with  n.  106).  Stevens  (1986:  332)  refuses  to  see  any  allusion  to  sacrificial  ritual. 
94  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  139).  Guepin  (1968:  3-4,39-40)  has  seen  the  associations 
between  Ajax's  suicide  and  his  killing  of  the  animals  with  sacrificial  ritual,  but 
has  failed  to  perceive  their  anomalous  character. 288 
So,  an  important  pattern  which  has  been  permeating  the  play  is 
now  completed:  we  have  seen  how  Ajax  tried  to  become  a  `black  hunter' 
(exceptionally,  in  order  to  restore  his  hoplite  honour:  above,  p.  262ff.  ) 
but  Athena  thwarted  his  purpose  by  leading  him  to  perform  a  perverted 
hunt  of  domestic  animals  and  by  eventually  making  him  a  hunted 
animal  himself  (above,  p.  265);  thus,  Ajax  could  no  longer  be  either  a 
hoplite  or  a  `black  hunter'.  We  now  realize  that  he  can  be  neither  a 
hunter  nor  a  sacrificer  either,  for  his  sacrifice  (like  his  hunt)  has  been 
corrupted  in  a  twofold  manner:  he  has  been  led  to  sacrifice  hunted 
animals,  and  finally  he  became  himself  the  sacrificial  victim.  The  fact 
that  he  is,  characteristically,  likened  to  a  bull  (322,1253)95  may  be  seen 
as  a  reminder  of  the  anomic  sacrifice  of  the  cattle  and  sheep,  as  well  as  of 
the  equally  anomic  sacrifice  of  himself:  the  self-same  person  who 
performed  a  perverted  sacrifice  of  bulls  is  eventually  turned  into  a  bull 
himself  and  submits  to  a  similarly  corrupted  sacrifice.  The  rich 
symbolism  with  which  the  sword  is  laden  also  points  in  the  same 
direction:  the  same  object  that  should  be  used  in  the  battlefield  to 
defend  the  polls  against  its  enemies  is  now  utilized  to  subvert  its  order, 
by  perverting  a  ritual  act,  namely  sacrifice,  which  would  normally  assert 
the  communality  of  the  polis.  So,  the  boundaries  between  two  activities 
(or  ritualized  acts)  which  are  normally  quite  distinct,  namely  hunt  and 
sacrifice,  are  dangerously  confused:  this  terrible  impasse  is  briefly,  but 
unmistakably,  described  by  Ajax  at  405-409:  d  Tä  µEv  4OLvEL,  4LXOL, 
TOtc8'  %LoO  Trag,  µchpats  8'  äypats  1TpOQKEtREea,  Trds  8E  UTpaTÖS 
FLTTaXTOS  QV  gE  XELpL  4OVEÜOL.  96  What  Ajax  seems  to  be  saying  is  that 
95  On  Ajax  as  a  bull  and  on  the  related  yoke-metaphor  see  again  Stanford  (p. 
274).  Rosenmeyer  (1971:  178-79)  offers  a  different  interpretation. 
96  I  give  the  text  of  the  majority  of  MSS.  Since  the  colometry  is  uncertain,  I 
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this  irresolvable  tension,  this  irreconcilable  ambiguity  consisting  in  the 
exorbitant  combination  of  a  corrupted  sacrifice  (-rota6'  bµoü)  and  an 
abnormal  hunt  (µwpaLs  8'  äypaLs)  causes  the  set  standards  of  the  entire 
community  to  collapse  (hence  the  impending  public  execution),  leading 
unavoidably  to  a  mortal  deadlock.  This  deadlock  Ajax  will  try  to  escape 
with  the  final  'sacrifice'/  suicide,  but  all  he  will  manage  to  do  is  become 
all  the  more  entangled  in  this  impasse:  his  suicide  /  `sacrifice',  being  yet 
another  perverted  ritual,  instead  of  liberating  him  from  this  deadlock  will 
only  consolidate  abnormality  and  disorder.  97 
5.3.1  Aiax's  impasse  nut  in  terms  of  locality 
It  has  become  clear  by  now  that  the  impasses  we  have  been  looking  at 
arise  from  the  hero's  failure  to  maintain  fundamental  social  dichotomies, 
from  his  inability  to  belong  to  either  of  the  antithetical  categories 
(`poles')  which  form  these  dichotomies.  Ajax  transcends  both  the  world  of 
the  polis  and  that  of  the  wild;  neither  world  can  accommodate  him  any 
longer;  he  does  not  belong  to  the  human  world,  he  is  excluded  from  it. 
passage  see  Jebb  (ad  405ff.;  also  pp.  224-26),  Stanford  (ad  405-7),  Lloyd  Jones  & 
Wilson  (1990b:  19),  and  especially  Stinton  (1990:  271-73).  In  any  case,  there  is  a 
general  consensus  amongst  scholars  (rightly,  it  seems)  that  El  Ta  µEv  4Oive6 
means  `if  my  previous  glory  is  perishing',  and  that  ToLa8'  öµoü  1TAaa  ,  whether 
left  unaltered  or  not  (Stinton  l.  c.  supplies,  exempli  gratia,  ToL(ß'  6ROO  4övoLc 
6r1pwv>,  4tML),  should  refer  to  the  slaughtered  animals. 
97  It  follows  that  I  cannot  agree  with  those  who  maintain  that  Ajax's  death 
marks  his  salvation.  This  view  has  been  held  by  the  majority  of  scholars,  most 
explicitly  by  Sicherl  (1977:  87-88),  Taplin  (1979:  125-7).  Moreover,  Sicherl  (1977: 
96)  holds  the  untenable  view  that  Ajax's  suicide  is  to  be  understood  as  a 
sacrifice  by  which  he  atones  for  his  offences  against  Athena:  there  is  nothing 
in  the  text  to  suggest  this;  see,  rightly,  "Tyrell  (1985:  170). 290 
Accordingly,  his  impasses  are  also  translated  in  terms  of  geographical 
space:  Ajax,  not  belonging  any  longer  to  this  world,  finds  it  impossible 
either  to  go  anywhere  or  to  stay  anywhere;  as  he  goes  beyond  the 
categories  by  which  human  mind  imposes  order  and  coherence  on  this 
world,  so  does  he  transcend  a  notion  fundamental  to  the  human  way  of 
perceiving  and  organizing  the  world,  namely  locality. 
This  spatial  impasse  is  expressed,  especially  in  terms  of  the  binary 
opposition  "indoors  :  outdoors"  -  an  opposition  which,  along  with  all 
other  categories,  antitheses  and  distinctions  in  this  play,  eventually 
collapses.  Ajax's  permanent  home,  Salamis  (=indoors),  is  impossible  to 
live  in:  if  he  comes  back  without  the  glory  his  father  once  won,  this  will 
mark  a  further  compromise  of  his  heroic-hoplite  honour  (460-65).  98 
Heroism  is  no  longer  possible  away  from  home  (away  from  Salamis,  i.  e.  at 
Troy,  outdoors)  either:  any  attempt  to  gain  a  glorious  death  will 
unavoidably  please  his  enemies,  the  Atreidae  (466-70).  What  is  more, 
thanks  to  Sophocles'  ingenious  dramatic  device  (see  above,  p.  284)  to 
have  Ajax  killing  some  of  the  animals  outdoors  and  the  rest  of  them 
indoors,  the  collapse  of  the  distinction  "indoors  :  outdoors"  is  further 
illustrated  from  another  point  of  view:  Ajax  can  neither  stay  at  his 
temporary  home  (i.  e.  his  hut,  indoors),  because  he  has  to  face  the  results 
of  his  anomic  sacrifice  (218-20  6Kllvijs  Ev8ov 
...  Q4äyL'  äLµoß#ý 
... 
XpTIvTijpLa),  99  nor  go  to  the  space  beyond  the  camp  (30  TrEBLa,  outdoors), 
because  it  has  been  equally  tinged  by  his  abnormal  hunt  (406  µchpaLs  8' 
98  On  Ajax  contrasting  his  own  änµ(a  with  the  c  K?  La  of  his  father  see  Tyrell 
(1985:  179-84),  Cairns  (1993:  231  with  n.  49).  Cf.  also  Gellie  (1972:  10-11),  Seale 
(1982:  155),  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  69-72),  Seidensticker  (1983:  138-39),  Heath  (1987: 
180). 
99  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  126):  "the  inner  space  [i.  e.  the  tent],  befouled  by  the  blood 
and  gore  of  beasts,  becomes  the  place  of  carnage  where  no  civilized  man  could 
dwell".  Cf.  also  Cohen  (1978:  30). 291 
aypaLs):  Troy,  like  Salamis,  has  become  a  place  impossible  to  live  in  (459 
"Troy  hates  me"100).  So,  neither  `indoors'  (Salamis  /  hut)  nor  `outdoors' 
(Troy  /  TrEBLa)  are  possible  places  any  longer.  "[E]r  kann  nicht  gehen,  and 
er  kann  auch  nicht  bleiben  (403f.  )",  as  Seidensticker  (1983:  129)  has  put 
it.  101  This  deadlock  is  neatly  expressed  in  the  conjunction  of  two 
antithetical  passages:  at  193-200  the  Chorus  think  that  Ajax's  coming  out 
of  his  hut  should  mark  the  end  of  his  troubles;  however,  later  in  the  play 
we  learn  that  Calchas  advised  Teucer  not  to  let  Ajax  go  out  of  his  hut 
until  this  day  is  past  (741-42,753-55).  Here,  that  is,  what  we  might  call 
the  `impossibility  of  place'102  is  presented  from  another  angle:  in  the 
former  passage  it  seems  that  Ajax  will  be  saved  if  he  goes  out,,  whereas  in 
the  latter  the  suggestion  is  that,  on  the  contrary,  he  will  be  saved  if  he 
stays  in. 
To  sum  up,  a  more  `palpable',  as  it  were,  expression  of  Ajax's 
impasses  is  the  spatial  /  geographical  deadlock  in  which  he  finds  himself. 
Hence  his  desperate  address  to  the  Trojan  landscape  (412-27):  no  land  is 
able  to  sustain  him  any  longer  (414-15).  It  is  quite  characteristic  that  his 
death  takes  place  in  such  an  ultimately  remote  and  isolated  place  (657 
XcOpov  ... 
äaTißij)  that  no  one  will  be  able  to  spot  it:  the  Chorus  scan 
through  the  whole  area  (both  its  eastern  and  western  ends:  805-6,874, 
877-78)  and  yet  are  unable  to  find  their  chief;  their  repeated  Trä  Trä  Trä 
at  867  marks  the  extraordinary  remoteness  and,  in  a  way,  marginality  of 
this  area  -  an  area  which,  it  might  be  said  with  some  exaggeration, 
amounts  almost  to  a  non-existent  place  (cf.  869  Ko1')6E1Ls  ...  ToiTos).  No 
100  Cf.  420,  where  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson's  (1990a)  KalcÖ4  povE9  misses  .  the  point; 
see  Renehan  (1992:  345). 
101  Cf.  Jones  (1962:  180),  Kott  (1974:  55-57),  Sorum  (1986:  366-67). 
102  Seidensticker  (1983:  128-30),  in  an  interesting  treatment  of  the  topic,  uses 
the  terms  "situative  Einengung"  and  "Ausweglosigkeit". 292 
wonder  that,  in  fact,  Ajax  can  be  an  O  K1ITCOp  only  of  Hades  (393-97): 
Hades,  albeit  conventionally  called  an  `abode'  in  Greek  literature,  is 
nothing  like  the  familiar  reality  of  the  Upperworld;  it  is  commonly  and 
characteristically  described  by  a  vague  EKEt,  in  contrast  to  EvOä8E,  a  term 
undeniably  fraught  with  the  certitude  of  our  common  experience  in  this 
world.  So,  the  typically  Sophoclean  use  of  Ob(1  Tü  p  with  reference  to  the 
`dwellers'  of  Hades,  the  dead,  103  could  nowhere  be  more  appropriate  than 
in  this  play,  in  which  (for  Ajax  at  least)  the  only  space  that  can  be 
habitable  is  Hades,  a  `place'  that  is  no  place  at  all.  104 
5.4.1  Aiax's  second  impasse:  not  being  able  to  avoid  dishonour 
We  saw  on  p.  290  that  Ajax  is  no  longer  able  to  preserve  his  usual  heroic 
honour  either  at  Troy  or  at  home.  This  important  factor,  namely  heroic 
honour  and  avoidance  of  insult  and  humiliation,  of  dishonour  and 
shame,  is  central  to  Ajax's  second  impasse:  his  fatal  inability  to  avoid 
üßpLs,  ios  whether  committed  by  him  or  inflicted  upon  him.  Before  we 
proceed  to  an  examination  of  this  topic,  a  point  of  cardinal  significance 
must  be  clarified:  the  first  instance  of  üßpLc  in  this  play  is  the 
maltreatment  of  the  `Greeks'  (actually  of  the  sheep  and  cattle)  by  Ajax. 
Although  it  has  been  maintainedl06  that  this  act  of  Ajax  is  explicitly 
103  See  Ellendt-Genthe  (1872)  s.  v.,  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  396). 
104  For  more  on  Hades  as  a  `non-place'  -as  the  absolute  `other',  qua  negation  of 
current  categories  -see  Chapter  Four,  section  4.6.1. 
105  It  should  be  made  clear,  once  and  for  all,  that  the  term  üßpLc  signifies  the 
offensive  behaviour  of  a  human  being  towards  another  human  being,  not  an 
offence  against  the  gods:  see  Blundell  (1989:  61  n.  6),  Fisher  (1992:  passim), 
Garvie  (1993:  246). 
106  Most  clearly  by  Cairns  (1993:  235  n.  66). 293 
termed  vßpLs  only  in  the  latter  part  of  the  play,  it  is  indubitably  referred 
to  as  aLK  eaOaL  already  at  the  outset  (65,111,300);  that  üf3piCELV  and 
aLKL(EO'8aL  are  semantically  cognate  is  clear  enough,  and  the  terms 
should  not  be  sharply  divorced  from  each  other.  107  Nonetheless,  should 
someone  quibble  over  the  semantic  difference  of  these  words,  there  is  still 
a  passage  in  which  the  very  word  i  3pLs  is  used  (if  ambivalently)  to 
designate  not  only  Ajax's  humiliation  at  the  Contest  of  Arms  but  also  his 
infliction  of  i'ßpLc  in  return  for  the  insult  suffered.  The  passage  is  303- 
304  (QUVTLOELS  7EA"V  1TOXÜV,  I  ÖoTIV  KaT'  aÜTWV  [sc.  Odysseus  and  the 
Atreidael  vßp  Lv  E  KTLQaLT'  5V).  Certainly,  the  phrasing  is  ambiguous,  as 
Stanford  (ad  304)  rightly  suggests:  108  "Sophocles  is  combining  two  ideas 
here,  the  üßpis  which  the  Atreidae  showed  towards  Ajax  and  the  üßpLs 
which  Ajax  has  inflicted  in  return  on  them  (as  he  thinks)".  At  any  rate, 
Ajax's  indulging  in  üßpLs  against  the  Atreidae  is,  in.  this  passage,  put 
forward  as,  at  least,  a  possibility  to  be  reckoned  with.  After  all,  is  his 
malicious  y0ug  (303)  not  a  typical  sign  of  üßpLc  (cf.  79,367,382,454, 
958,961  and  969  with  971,1042-43  etc.  )?  109  Nonetheless,  Ajax's  attempt 
to  inflict  dishonour  will  recoil  upon  himself:  it  will  in  fact  result  in  graver 
disgrace  for  himself,  when  he  realizes  that  he  has  slaughtered  not  the 
Greeks  but  sheep  and  cattle  (Garvie  [1993:  246]  appositely  remarks  that 
"meme  la  phrase  QuVTLOELs  yE  Lxw  iroXüv  peut  etre  ambigue.  Ajax  donne 
107  For  full  documentation  and  illuminating  discussion  see  Fisher  (1992:  39-40, 
45,51-53,56-57,88);  on  the  connection  between  üßpis  and  ahKELa  in  the  Ajax  see 
idem  314. 
108  Garvie  (1993:  246)  is  in  agreement.  See  also  the  important  remarks  of  Fisher 
(1992:  313-14),  who  is  however  somewhat  more  reserved. 
109  On  mocking  laughter  in  this  play  see  Grossmann  (1968:  80-83),  Burton  (1980: 
15),  Blundell  (1989:  62),  Fisher  (1992:  316-17),  Garvie  (1993:  245,246).  On  this 
theme  in  Sophoclean  tragedy  see  Arnould  (1990:  36-39). 294 
ainsi  ä  ses  ennemis  1'  occasion  de  se  moquer  de  lui").  Ajax  cannot  help 
being  humiliated,  even  when  he  tries  (righteously!  )  to  humiliate  others. 
To  the  above  arguments,  I  should  add  a  somewhat  subtle  detail, 
which,  as  far  as  I  am  aware,  has  escaped  scholars,  but  might  be  significant 
for  the  corroboration  of  the  case  made  here.  In  the  epode  of  the  parodos 
(192-200)  there  is  a  clear  juxtaposition  between,  on  the  one  hand,  Ajax's 
äTa  ovpavka  (195)  set  ablaze  (4)syow)  by  himself,  and,  on  the  other,  his 
enemies'  üßpLs  (196)  which  is  graphically  (if  implicitly)  presented  as  a 
forest  fire  working  its  way  through  the  wooded  glens  helped  by  the 
favourable  winds.  110  Now,  one  should  consider  a)  that  äTa  oüpavta 
('disaster  reaching  the  sky')"  recalls  a  Homeric  formula  closely 
associated  with  üßpLs,  namely  Twv  1U1PLc  TE  ßL11  TE  CTLHIIpEOV  oÜpavov 
LKEL  (Od.  15.329,17.565  ),  112  and  b)  that  it  is  üßpLs,  not  a'Tq,  that  is 
traditionally  likened  to  fire  (cf.  Heracl:  B  43  D.  -K.  üßpLV  Xpýl  a3EVVÜVaL 
µäWv  ýj  TrupKCii1jv;  epigr.  apud  Hdt.  5.77  ECTOECjav  ÜßpLV;  113  Nagy 
110  The  point  has  been  made  already  by  the  scholiast  on  198a  (p.  67 
Christodoulou):  XE(1TEL  T&  We  trop,  <Lv'  ij"  dS  trvp>  Ev  EvavEµoLs  3iaaais.  Cf. 
Kamerbeek  (ad  196,197).  I  take  the  meaning  of  EvavEµots  (197)  to  be  "where 
the  winds  are  favourable"  (cf.  Jebb's  trans.  "breezy  glens").  Davidson  (1976: 
132-35)  disagrees  and  thinks  that  EüavEµoLc  means  `sheltered';  however,  he 
still  recognizes  that  the  fire  imagery  in  this  passage  is  suggestive  of  üßpLc  (ibid. 
134  with  nn.  9,10). 
111  Pace  Rosenmeyer  (1971:  173),  &rav  ovpav(av  ()AEywv  can  only  mean  `setting 
ablaze  an  ate  that  reaches  the  sky',  not  `burning  with  an  ate  sent  from  the  sky': 
(MyELV  at  195  is  transitive  (contr.  673,1278),  and  can  only  mean  `set  ablaze'. 
What  is  more,  Padel  (1995:  253-55)  has  shown  that  d'Trj  in  Sophocles  means 
`disaster',  not  `delusion',  as  Rosenmeyer  thinks;  cf.  also  Holt  (1980:  31  n.  8). 
Contra  Dawe  (1968:  115)  and  Doyle  (1984:  96-122). 
112  Cf.  Stanford  (ad  196-7). 
113  On  "fire  imagery  traditionally  used  for  the  dangers  of  the  rush  of  hybris 
through  a  society  (or  an  army)"  see  Fisher  (1992:  314  n.  105;  315  with  n.  112).  A 
similar  association  of  üßpts,  &nl  and  fire  imagery  occurs  also  in  Sol.  13.11-15 295 
[1979:  122  §5n3]  also  points  out  that,  according  to  Schol.  T  on  Il. 
13.302a-b  [III.  456-7  Erbse],  the  verb  4XEqudv  in  the  dialect  of  Phocis 
means  vßpLCELv);  it  is  not  perhaps  irrelevant  that  both  Ajax  himself  (222) 
and  his  sword  (147)  are  called  `blazing'  (aWo  v)  -  note  that  ä(0wv  defines 
üßpurri  at  1088.114  So,  it  is  obvious  that  Sophocles  has  attributed  to 
Ajax's  a7  characteristics  that  markedly  belong  to  üßpLc,  thus  implicitly 
bringing  out  the  idea  that  Ajax's  iTq  is  not  to  be  dissociated  from  the 
üßpLs  he  tries  to  inflict  upon  his  enemies  in  return  for  the  disgrace  of  the 
"01TXc..  v  Kp'QLs:  in  fact,  his  ä7t1  is  the  immediate  result  of  his  attempted 
üßpLs  against  the  Greeks.  Ajax,  trying  to  avenge  the  üßpLc  he  has  suffered 
from  the  Atreidae  (304),  himself  inflicts  üßpLs  on  what  he  thinks  is  the 
Greek  army,  but  turns  out  eventually  to  be  only  sheep  and  cattle  -a  fact, 
which  inevitably  results  in  Ajax's  suffering  further,  and  worse,  üßpLc  (367 
oLov  üßptaNv  apa),  which  is  ultimately  the  reason  for  his  arr.  115 
So,  Ajax's  second  impasse  seems  to  be  that,  while  he  tries  to  practise 
üßpLs  in  order  to  avenge  previously  committed  üßpLs,  eventually  it  is 
upon  himself  that  the  üßpLs  recoils.  116  The  same  idea  is  also  expressed  in 
West;  see  Davidson  (1989:  96). 
114  Cf.  Fisher  (1992:  3  15).  Cohen  (1978:  27)  sees  the  Fernverbindungen,  without 
associating  them  with  i  3pLS-imagery. 
115  To  attribute  Ajax's  fall  to  his  abortive  attempt  to  inflict  vßpLc  upon  the 
Greeks  is,  of  course,  quite  different  from  saying  that  Ajax  falls  because  he  has 
committed  i  3pLs  against  Athena,  as  a  large  number  of  critics  have  maintained, 
mainly  on  the  basis  of  756-77  (most  recently  Winnington-Ingram  [1980:  11-56 
passim],  Heath  [1987:  170-711).  As  I  stressed  above  (n.  105),  I  share  the  view  of 
Fisher  (1992)  and  Garvie  (1993)  that  i  3pLc  means  offensive  behaviour  against 
human  beings,  not  against  gods.  My  contention  here  is  simply  that  Ajax  is 
trapped  in  a  sort  of  vicious  circle,  in  which  it  is  impossible  for  him  to  avoid 
suffering  vßpL9  (=  humiliation,  dishonour),  even  when  he  tries  to  inflict  It 
upon  others. 
116  Cf.  Bradshaw  (1991:  117-18). 296 
a  different  context,  namely  at  the  part  of  the  play  that  could,  not 
inappropriately,  be  called  ACavToc  Käß  TEKµ1Ja1  %UXIa,  since  it  is  so 
conspicuously  modelled  on  Il.  6.407ff.  117  As  we  have  already  remarked, 
Ajax  realizes  that,  whatever  his  future  course  of  life,  he  is  bound  to 
compromise  his  heroic  honour  in  some  way  or  another.  So,  he  reckons 
that  only  death  could  save  the  few  morsels  of  heroic  honour  that  have 
been  left  to  him  (cf.  esp.  479-80);  continuing  to  lead  such  a  life  would  be 
clearly  aLQXpöv  (473)  and  detrimental  to  his  TLµlj.  However,  as  Tecmessa 
points  out  to  him  from  a  different  viewpoint  (485-524),  his  death  will 
likewise  result  In  diminution  of  his  TLJII  .I  shall  not  insist  too  much  on 
the  details  of  her  argumentation  and  on  how  they  are  related  to  Ajax's 
TLµ1ý,  since  Cairns  (1993:  231-33)  has  brilliantly  illuminated  these 
matters.  It  should  suffice  to  draw  attention  to  important  lines  such  as 
494  (13  ev  äXyELvijv),  500-501  (TrLKpöv  Trpö  $6Eyµa 
... 
I  AöyoLs 
LäTrTwv),  505  (aLQXpä  Tama  TaOTa,  harking  back  to  Ajax's  aLaXpov  at 
473),  all  pointing  to  the  shameful  prospect  of  Ajax's  TL  . L1  being  further 
slighted  as  a  result  of  his  death.  Furthermore,  Tecmessa  in  the  second 
part  of  her  speech  (506-24)  stresses  that,  if  Ajax  puts  an  end  to  his  life, 
then  he  will  have  to  abolish  such  principles  as  respect  for  his  father,  care 
for  his  son,  and  the  obligation  to  reciprocate  his  concubine's  gratitude; 
and  this  will  certainly  be  discreditable  to  a  hero  who  claims  to  be 
EüyEviis  (524;  cf.  480).  118  So,  the  essence  of  her  speech  is  that,  whether 
Ajax  continues  to  live  or  dies,  diminution  of  his  Tlµll  is  unavoidable.  119 
117  See  commentators,  Winnington-Ingrarn  (1980:  16)  and  Easterling  (1984:  1-8). 
The  important  differences  between  the  two  scenes,  on  which  see  Bowra  (1944: 
21-25),  Reinhardt  (1979:  20-22),  Kirkwood  (1965:  56-59),  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  72- 
74),  Sorum  (1986:  369-71),  should  not  be  overstressed:  see  again  Easterling  l.  c. 
Certainly,  one  should  not  go  as  far  as  Poe  (1987:  45-49)  who  suggests  that  the 
Sophoclean  scene  is  a  parody  of  the  Homeric  one. 
118  These  points  are  neatly,  and  in  appropriate  detail,  documented  by  Cairns 297 
It  seems  that  Ajax  cannot  escape  dishonour  precisely  because  he  is 
so  great;  it  is  his  greatness  that  attracts,  as  it  were,  insult  and 
humiliation.  This  feeling  is  clearly  expressed  in  the  parodos,  where  the 
Chorus  still  think  that  the  rumours  about  Ajax's  deeds  -  rumours 
bringing  dishonour  to  Ajax  (143  E7rL  81)GOEL  t,  153  KaOußp((wv,  174 
aLQX1Jva3,120  196  EX6pwv 
... 
üßpLs,  198  TTävTlUV  KaXaCöVTC)v121)  -  are 
mere  slander  (138,148,186,187-88,191),  provoked  ultimately  by  Ajax's 
greatness  (154  Twv  yip  µIVY  OV  ýuX63v  LE  LS  O  1')K  äv  ä  iäpTOL,  157 
7rpös  yip  Töv  EXovO'  ö  48övos  9pTrEL;  cf.  also  the  majestic  `eagle- 
simile'122  at  167-71).  It  is  no  wonder  if,  as  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  22) 
has  remarked,  the  power  of  the  rumour  spread  among  the  people  is 
`great'  (142,173,226),  as  Ajax  himself  is  great.  Finally,  a  similar  idea  Is 
(1993:  232-33),  to  whose  book  the  reader  is  referred;  see  also  the  excellent 
treatments  by  Holt  (1981:  277-79),  Easterling  (1984:  3-4)  and  Sorum  (1986:  367- 
68).  Cf.  also  Reinhardt  (1979:  21-22);  Kirkwood  (1958:  105-106);  Simpson  (1969: 
95-96);  Seidensticker  (1983:  133);  Poe  (1987:  48-49);  Blundell  (1989:  75).  Heath 
(1987:  181-83)  gives  a  good  analysis  of  Tecmessa's  speech  but  (like  Seale  [1982: 
155-6])  he  fails  to  see  that  both  her  and  Ajax's  rheseis  are  meant  to 
counterbalance  each  other,  with  neither  carrying  the  day.  Minadeo  (1987)  is 
wrong  to  see  this  scene  as  unequivocal  proof  of  Ajax's  kakia. 
119  Cf.  Kott  (1974:  62). 
120  Here  Ajax's  dishonour  becomes  also  his  soldiers'  ataXüva.  See  Blundell  (1989: 
73),  Cairns  (1993:  229). 
121  Ferrari  (1983:  24-25),  followed  by  Lloyd--Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  14),  opts  for 
the  v.  l.  ßaKXa.  vTwv. 
122  That  atyvirLös  here  means  `eagle',  not  `vulture'  as  elsewhere,  is  the  view  of 
Stanford  (ad  167-71);  see  also  D'  Arcy  W.  Thompson,  A  Glossary  of  Greek  Birds 
(London  21936),  pp.  25-6,  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  167-171).  On  the  theme  of  Ajax's 
greatness  see  Knox  (1979:  144  with  n.  98),  Burton  (1980:  15-16),  Winnington- 
Ingram  (1980:  22  with  n.  35)  and  especially  March  (1991-1993:  11-18).  On  the 
4)00voc  /  slander  theme  in  the  parodos  see  Burton  (1980:  14-15);  on  its  literary 
background  see  Davidson  (1989:  92-93).  On  the  `loaded  language'  of  the  parodos 
see  Heath  (1987:  175  with  n.  18). 298 
neatly  brought  out  by  the  contrast  between  955-960  and  961-973:  the 
Chorus  deplore  the  dishonour  inflicted  upon  their  dead  chief  (955 
E4  u3pt(Ei,  958  TroXüv  'yEAwTa),  but  Tecmessa  objects  that,  although 
Ajax's  dishonour  is  an  indisputable  fact  (961,971),  123  his  greatness 
remains  unmarred,  for  his  heroic  valour  will  be  all  the  more  conspicuous 
now  that  the  Argives  will  no  longer  have  his  assistance  on  the  battlefield 
(962-63).  So,  the  paradox  of  Ajax's  suffering  dishonour  as  well  as  retaining 
his  heroic  stature  at  the  same  time,  turns  out  to  be  an  unavoidable  state 
of  affairs,  amounting  to  yet  another  impasse:  so  long  as  Ajax  is  great 
(which  he  is  by  nature),  he  is  bound  to  suffer  ignominy  from  the 
46ovEpo(  (cf.  again  157),  thus  being  trapped,  as  it  were,  in  an  ambivalent 
state  between  honour  and  dishonour. 
What  is  more,  this  impasse,  like  all  the  other  impasses  in  this  play, 
seems  to  have  ultimately  originated  in  Athena's  involvement.  The 
goddess  displays  from  the  very  beginning  a  shockingly  hybristic 
behaviour:  she  directly  exhorts  Odysseus  to  laugh  at  his  enemy's  plight 
(79),  a  kind  of  behaviour  which  could  perfectly  well  be  termed  üßpLS124 
123  It  seems  to  me  that  Schneidewin's  deletion  of  969  is  rightly  adopted  by 
Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990a),  (1990b:  31).  For  one  thing,  its  inferential 
meaning  (cf.  Bnra)  in  fact  creates  an  illogicality:  that  Ajax  has  had  the  death  he 
wanted  (966-8)  should  anything  but  diminish  the  Schadenfreude  of  the 
Atreidae.  Moreover,  as  Cairns  (1993:  229-30;  235)  has  remarked,  the  enemies' 
ü(3pLS  at  one's  misfortunes  is  certainly  expected  as  a  natural  reaction,  although 
not  a  laudable  one  (cf.  Blundell  [1989:  62  with  n.  10],  Garvie  [1993:  246-47]):  so, 
Tecmessa  could  hardly  say  that  she  cannot  see  why  Ajax's  enemies  should 
rejoice  at  his  woes  (969)  -indeed,  she  says  quite  the  opposite  at  961,971.  What 
Tecmessa  points  out  is  that  the  malicious  joy  of  Ajax's  enemies  will  be  in  vain 
(971  Ev  KEVOL9),  for  they  will  soon  realize  what  a  great  loss  Ajax's  death  has 
been  (962-63):  see  Cairns  (1993:  235  n.  64).  -Some  would  delete  966-70altogether 
(Reeve  [1973:  160-611,  following  Nauck).  For  a  thorough  discussion  of  this 
problematic  passage  see  Dawe  (1973:  158-61). 
124  See  Garvie  (1993:  248).  Scholars  like  Jebb  (ad  79),  Adams  (1955:  97)  and, 299 
(cf.  again  955  E4ußp(CEL  in  conjunction  with  958  TroXüv  yEawv  and  see 
further  above,  p.  293  with  n.  109).  Moreover  in  the  parodos  Ajax's 
madness,  evidently  a  work  of  the  gods  (185),  is  equated,  in  its  effects,  to 
the  slighting  rumours  spread  by  Odysseus  and  the  Atreidae  (186);  the 
disgracing  BE  La  vöaoc  along  with  the  human  Kath  4  äTLs  are  thus  jointly 
presented  as  producing  the  same  result:  Ajax's  dishonour  and 
humiliation.  This  is  achieved  by  an  impressive  Trapa  Trpoa6oK'Lav:  at  185 
the  Chorus  pray  to  Zeus  and  to  Apollo  to  keep  away  from  their  chief  not 
the  `disease',  the  eE  'La  vöaos  mentioned  immediately  before,  as  one 
should  expect,  but  the  slanderous  rumour,  the  Kath  4  dTls  (186)1125  This 
`shared  responsibility'  of  gods  and  humans  in  the  demeaning  of  Ajax  can 
be  inferred  from  other  passages  too:  Ajax's  dishonour,  caused  by  the 
madness  sent  by  Athena,  is  described  at  217  with  essentially  the  same 
word  (äTrEkof  i  &rl)126  as  the  dishonour  inflicted  upon  him  by  the  Atreidäe 
(cf.  561  )  3ais).  Similarly,  the  disaster  (954  Trrjµ')  Athena  has  visited 
upon  Ajax  is  thought  of  as  being  on  a  par  with  Odysseus'  and  the 
Atreidae's  hybristic  laughter  at  his  misfortunes  (955-60).  127  Implicit 
apparently,  Grossmann  (1968:  77)  have  wrongly  tried  to  `exonerate'  Athena  by 
suggesting  that  she  is  simply  trying  Odysseus"humanism'. 
125  I  owe  the  remark  to  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  22).  The  surprising  effect  is 
stylistically  all  the  more  heightened  by  the  position  of  änE  p1  KOL  at  the 
beginning  of  the  sentence,  with  its  unexpected  object  (4  aTwv  instead  of  vövov) 
being  reserved  for  the  end.  I  do  not  agree  with  Heath's  (1987:  176)  explanation 
of  this  stylistic  effect. 
126  On  "the  use  of  the  strong  term  lobe  for  physical  and  mental  humiliations" 
see  Fisher  (1992:  321  n.  138).  Cf.  Nagy  (1979:  255-58passim). 
127  Cf.  Linforth  (1954:  3).  Knox  (1979:  132)  makes  a  similar  point,  but  stresses 
the  similarity  of  Athena's  hubristic  behaviour  with  that  of  Ajax.  Tycho  von 
Wilamowitz  (1917:  53-54)  has  ingeniously  argued  that  the  content  of  Odysseus' 
rumours,  which  the  Chorus  so  strongly  disparage,  is  not  his  initial  vague 
suspicion  (cf.  28),  but  Athena's  disclosures  about  Ajax's  criminal  attempt  (cf. 
Schlesinger  [1970:  369],  Davidson  [1975:  164],  Burton  [1980:  10];  contra  Guthrie 300 
though  this  last  hint  may  be,  the  audience  will  take  it,  because  they  have 
witnessed  Athena  inviting  Odysseus  to  commit  vßpLc  (79). 
To  sum  up:  all  the  above  passages  could  not,  probably,  have 
constituted  sufficient  evidence,  if  taken  one  by  one;  it  is  their  cumulative 
effect  that  shows,  if  implicitly,  that  Athena  is  as  much  involved  in  Ajax's 
dishonour  as  the  Atreidae.  Ajax  is  greater  than  a  human  being  is  allowed 
to  be  (758  nEpia(:  Fä  QwµaTa,  761  µiß  KaT'  ävOpwnov  #ovlj,  776  ov  KaT' 
ävOpu  rrov  4pov6v),  and  this  is  why  he  stirs  Athena's  wrath  (756  IIf  VIS, 
777  bpyrjv),  exactly  as  he  moves,  with  his  excellence,  the  ý66voS  of  the 
Argives  (cf.  again  154-57).  Both  Athena's  wrath  and  the  Argives'  envy 
result  in  Ajax's  dishonour  (üßpic,  a'I.  KEI.  a,  XL,  PT%  either  because  of  the 
slanderous  rumours  spread  about  by  his  enemies  or  by  Athena's  infliction 
of  madness  upon  him.  So,  Athena's  actions  in  this  play  are  placed  on  a 
level  (i.  e.  have  similar  motives  and  similar  results  on  Ajax)  with  the 
actions  of  the  most  despicable  characters  (for  the  Atreidae  are 
unequivocally  described  as  such  in  the  parodos)  -a  fact  which  seems  to 
corroborate  my  thesis  that  Sophoclean  gods  stand  above  and  beyond 
human  eEUµot,  moral  principles  included.  128  Athena's  causing  Ajax's 
dishonour  is  as  incomprehensible  as  her  causing  the  taxonomies  of  Ajax's 
world  to  collapse;  in  both  cases  the  result  is  deadlock,  havoc,  and  death. 
[1947:  118]);  thus,  the  audience  receive  yet  another  indication  that  the  vßpLs  (cf. 
153)  of  which  the  Chorus  accuse  the  Argives  has  in  fact  originated  in  Athena's 
intervention. 
128  Gellie  (1972:  5)  has  some  very  fine  remarks  on  the  incomprehensible 
character  of  divinity. 301 
5.5.1  Second  Dart:  Ajax's  dualization  into  the  persons  of 
Teucer  the  hunter  and  Eurvsaces  the  hoolite 
The  Chorus'  epiparodos  (866ff.  )  marks  a  new  start.  As  we  shall  see,  the 
second  part  of  the  play  is,  in  many  aspects,  a  mirror-image  (if  not  an 
exact  one)  of  the  first  part,  whose  basic  themes  are  now  picked  up  and 
led,  by  a  reverse  procedure,  to  what  seems  to  be  a  final  resolution. 
Before  we  see  how  these  generalizations  apply  to  the  play,  I  shall 
attempt  to  justify  the  title  of  this  section.  My  contention  is  that  Ajax's 
basic  antinomy  between  hoplite  and  `black  hunter'  (see  sections  5.1.1- 
5.1.2)  is  now  divided,  `dualized',  between  his  brother,  a  typical  hunter, 
and  his  son,  a  typical  hoplite  (a  potential  one,  at  this  stage)  bearing  the 
shield.  Sophocles,  I  suggest,  enacted  theatrically  this  dualization  by 
presenting  both  Eurysaces  and  Teucer  as*  `embodiments'  of  Ajax;  in  other 
words,  to  show  that,  even  after  Ajax's  death,  a  part  of  him  (his  hoplite 
aspect)  still  lives  in  his  son,  whereas  another  part  (his  hunter  aspect)  is 
embodied  in  his  brother.  In  Eurysaces'  case  this  was  not  difficult:  in  Greek 
thought  a  man's  son  ensures  the  continuation  of  his  stock;  he  is  his 
father's  `extension'  into  the  future,  i.  e.  what  remains  of  him  when  he 
dies.  129  As  Stanford  (li)  has  already  remarked,  Eurysaces  "is  [...  ]  an 
emblem  of  survival  after  death  for  Ajax";  the  hero's  extraordinary 
insistence  that  his  son  should  be  brought  up  to  become  like  him  (cf.  545- 
77,  and  esp.  549  KäýouoLoOaOaL  4vQw,  551  Ta  8'  ä)X'  e  ioLos)  suffices 
to  confirm  this  view. 
In  Teucer's  case  things  are  similar.  As  Said  (1993:  300,303-304  with 
n.  32)  reminds  us,  fraternal  couples  are  almost  identical, 
indistinguishable  beings;  one  is  the  other's  `double'.  Furthermore,  Teucer's 
129  See  Lacey  (1968:  15-16),  Golden  (1990:  23-38  passim);  cf.  Heath  (1987:  183  n. 
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close  connection  with  his  brother  is  explicitly  established  when  at  339 
Ajax  cries  U13  Trat  Trat  -  which,  as  Tecmessa  (340)  says,  130  refers  to 
Eurysaces  -  and  proceeds  immediately  to  call  Teucer  by  name  (342). 
Ajax's  mentioning  both  the  son  and  the  brother  in  the  same  breath  is 
indicative:  they  are  both  his  embodiments,  the  emblems  of  the 
continuation  of  his  existence  into  the  future.  Significantly,  Teucer  has  the 
same  anxieties  as  his  brother  about  the  deadlock  in  which  he  has  found 
himself:  his  agonizing  question  Trot  yap  µo)Ety  µoL  BuvaTov;  (1006)  is  a 
clear  reminiscence  of  Ajax's  Troy  TLS  oüv  ýüyf;  Trot  µoXL.  v  µ¬v  ;  (404- 
405).  Like  Ajax  (section  5.3.1),  he  feels  that  neither  Salamis  nor  Troy  can 
sustain  him  any  longer  (1021-22),  and  wonders  how  he  will  face  their 
father  Telamon  (1008-1020  -  434-40,  esp.  462-65).  Finally,  it  is  equally 
significant  that  the  Greeks  abuse  Teucer  verbally,  and  even  threaten  to 
stone  him  and  physically  attack  him  (721-32)  for  crimes  committed  by 
his  brother.  The  analogies  between  the  two  brothers  are  unmistakable: 
Teucer  is  clearly  a  `second  Ajax',  a  `projection'  of  his  dead  brother  (cf. 
Said  [1993:  314-15]).  131  It  is  crucial,  however,  to  realize  that  neither 
Teucer  nor,  of  course,  Eurysaces  should  be  regarded  as  mere  substitutes  for 
Ajax:  they  are  both  his  embodiments,  the  former  of  his  `black  hunter' 
aspect,  the  latter  of  his  hoplite  one. 
130  The  scholiast  (ad  339,  p.  96  Christodoulou),  followed  by  L.  Campbell  (ad  339), 
Fraenkel  (1977:  12-13),  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  17)  and  Said  (1993:  311), 
has  Tecmessa  misunderstanding  Ajax.  This,  as  Mr  Garvie  points  out  to  me,  is 
gratuitous  and  adds  nothing  to  the  understanding  of  the  passage.  See  also 
Renehan's  (1992:  344)  fine  remarks. 
131  On  the  similarities  between  the  two  brothers  see  also  Blundell  (1989:  80-81).  I 
cannot  agree  with  Cresci  (1974:  222-23)  that  Teucer  is  "un'  immagine  deformata 
di  Aiace". 303 
5.5.2  The  themes  of  the  first  Dart  taken  uD:  Teucer  attempts 
to  legitimize  Ajax's  suicide  /  `sacrifice' 
Teucer  is  a  non-hoplite,  an  archer  /  hunter  (1120-22;  564),  and  this 
essential  feature  is  clearly  underlined  when,  having  entered  the  stage,  he 
describes  his  searching  for  his  dead  brother  as  a  hunt  (997  8L'KCIV 
Ka  LXvoaKOnoü  iEVOs).  A  hunter,  almost  by  definition,  represents  the 
space  beyond  the  polis,  the  wild,  where  the  ordered  framework  of  civic 
vöµLµa  that  lends  coherence  to  human  life  ceases  to  exist  (or,  rather,  is 
systematically  inversed).  Moreover,  being  a  voeos  son  (1013)  and  an 
archer  (1120-22),  he  is  a  marginal  figure,  not  fully  integrated  into  the 
political  /  military  community  (cf.  above,  n.  10).  Paradoxically,  however, 
it  is  this  marginal  non-hoplite  who  will  attempt  to  reintegrate  Ajax  to  the 
community  -from  -which  he  has  been  cut  off;  this  is  why  he  makes  every 
effort  to  see  to  it  that  his  brother's  burial  take  place.  The  burial,  qua 
vöµLµov,  is  not  only  a  communal  act  par  excellence,  but  also  a  typical 
manifestation  of  order  and  normality  (by  way  of  its  repetitive, 
predictable  and  accountable  character).  Teucer  stresses  more  than  once 
that  his  brother's  burial  is  in  accordance  with  TO  B&KaLoV  (1110,1125;  cf. 
1126)  and  that  failing  to  bury  him  properly  would  amount  to  a  violation 
of  the  laws  of  the  gods  (1129-31).  Moreover,  contrary  to  the  utter  disarray 
into  which  Ajax  threw  the,  normally  distinct,  categories  `friend'  and 
`enemy'  in  his  deception  and  suicide  speeches,  Teucer  seems  to  be  trying 
to  restore  normality  in  this  matter  too:  he  unequivocally  describes  the 
sword  as  a  hostile  weapon  presented  by  an  unqualified  foe  (1025-27),  132 
132  Moreover,  if  1028-39  are  genuine  (discussion  in  West  [1978:  116-7],  who 
concludes  that  only  1035  is  interpolated),  I  should  endorse  Kitto's  (1956:  193-95) 
very  pertinent  remark:  Teucer  sees  the  sword  as  fulfilling  '  at  last  Ajax's  enmity 
against  Hector,  which  was  left  unslaked  on  the  battlefield  after  the  exchange  of 
gifts;  cf.  Sicherl  (1977:  88-89),  Cohen  (1978:  32);  differently  Kott  (1974:  65-66); 304 
while  he  seems  to  reject  Ajax's  characterization  as  noM  nos  of  the  Greek 
army,  put  forward  by  Menelaus  (1132-33)  -  Teucer's  point  being 
apparently  that  the  appropriate  term  would  be  EXep0s,  133  since  the 
hostility  between  Ajax  and  Menelaus  was  a  strictly  personal  one  (1134 
p.  LQOÜVT  E  JILGEL:  Menelaus'  own  words!  );  and  this  personal  feud  was 
initiated,  according  to  Teucer,  not  by  Ajax,  but  by  Menelaus  (1135,1137). 
Teucer  does  his  best  to  restore  the  status  quo  ante,  so  that  the  Trojans 
can  become  again  Ajax's  enemies  and  the  Greeks  his  friends. 
Furthermore,  Teucer  also  tries  to  legitimize  his  brother's  anomic 
sacrifice  /  suicide.  This  is  implemented  mainly  on  the  visual-theatrical 
level,  in  the  scene  of  Teucer's  uncovering  of  Ajax's  body  (1003ff.  )  which 
Tecmessa  had  shrouded  in  a  robe  (915ff.  ).  Tecmessa  says  clearly  that  she 
will  cover  the  body  completely  (916  KaX  tw...  7r%t  'qv)  because  it  is 
not  to  be  looked  upon  (915  Ol'1TOL  eEaT09);  she  stresses  particularly  that 
what  she  intends  to  conceal  is  the  fatal  wound  (918-19)  -  and  also, 
presumably,  the  sword  that  caused  it.  134  The  meaning  of  these  scenic 
movements  becomes  clear  as  soon  as  one  recalls  the  important  fact  that 
in  Greek  sacrifice  every  effort  was  made  to  gloss  over  anything  related  to 
the  animal's  death;  as  Vernant  (1991:  294)  has  put  it,  "the  sacrificial 
ceremony  might  be  precisely  defined  as  follows:  the  sum  of  procedures 
wrongly  Adams  (1955:  106-107).  Contrast  the  irresolvably  ambiguous  attitude  of 
Ajax  towards  the  sword,  as  analyzed  above,  p.  282  with  n.  72. 
133  Cf.  Stanford  (ad  1132,1133-4),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  64  n.  20),  Fisher 
(1992:  319with  n.  127),  Coray  (1993:  73-4).  I  disagree  with  Blundell  (1989:  39,92- 
93)  who  sees  no  more  than  a  sophistic  quibble  in  this  semantic  distinction. 
134  Note  the  verbal  echoes:  the  robe  will  shroud  (915-6  TrEpLTrruxEc  4dpos) 
Ajax's  body  which  in  turn  `shrouds'  the  sword  (899  Kpuoaiw  4aa-ydvw 
1repL1rrux1  s).  Clearly,  Tecmessa  is  anxious  to  cover  not  only  the  wound  but  also 
the  sword.  Segal  (1981:  117)  sees  a  different  meaning  in  the  repetition  of 
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permitting  the  slaughter  of  an  animal  under  such  conditions  that 
violence  seems  excluded  and  the  slaying  is  unequivocally  imbued  with  a 
characteristic  that  distinguishes  it  from  murder  and  places  it  in  a 
different  category  from  the  blood-crime  that  the  Greeks  call  phonos.  " 
Thus,  for  instance,  the  sacrificial  knife  was  hidden  in  the  Kavoüv  under  a 
heap  of  grain.  135  Moreover,  there  are  no  representations  of  the  very 
moment  of  sacrifice  in  Greek  art;  "la  geste  qui  ouvre  le  passage  de  la  mort 
dans  la  gorge  des  betes  n'  est  jamais  represents"  (Durand  [1979:  138]).  136 
When  sacrificial  knifes  are  depicted,  it  is  only  as  implements  of  skinning, 
never  of  killing;  likewise,  never  is  the  animal's  flowing  blood  depicted  in 
vase  paintings.  137  So,  Tecmessa's  covering  of  the  body,  being  at  the  same 
time  a  covering  of  the  sword,  should  probably  be  seen  as  a  reaffirmation 
of  what  is  already  clear  to  the  audience,  namely  that  Ajax's  suicide  is 
indeed  a  sacrifice  (898  vEOa4ayTjs,  919  OIKELas  (T4ayýs;  cf.  the  Chorus' 
M  L&X6rgs  [909]  138),  albeit  an  anomic  one,  and  must  therefore  be  glossed 
over.  139  Inverting  this  procedure,  Teucer  uncovers  (1003  E  KK6XUtov)  the 
135  E.  g.  Vernant  (1991:  294),  Burkert  (1983:  5). 
136  Cf.  also  Vernant  (1991:  294)  and  Marinatos  (1988:  15,17). 
137  Durand  (1979:  138-39)  and  Vernant  (1991:  295)  remark  that,  when  Greek 
vases  depict  human  sacrifices,  like  the  sacrifice  of  Polyxena,  there  are  no 
longer  inhibitions  as  to  the  representation  of  the  moment  of  death  or  of  the 
victim's  flowing  blood.  However,  as  this  generalization  seems  to  be  based  on  a 
single  piece  of  evidence  (see  van  Straten  [1995:  114]),  it  seems  fair  to  regard  it 
as  an  anomaly  which,  if  anything,  confirms  the  rule  that  the  very  moment  of 
the  sacrifice  is  generally  not  depicted. 
138  On  the  sacrificial  connotations  of  aiµävaELv  see  above  p.  285. 
139  It  follows  that  Ajax's  suicide/  sacrifice  must  take  place  off-stage  or,  at  any 
rate,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  invisible  to  the  audience.  This  is  the  view  taken 
by  e.  g.  Arnott  (1962:  131-33),  Lesky  (1972:  191),  Heath  (1987:  192-93),  Ley  (1988: 
92),  Scullion  (1994:  95-128);  contra  Seale  (1982:  163-65  with  n.  47),  Taplin  (1978: 
86).  For  a  review  of  opinions  on  the  staging  of  Ajax's  suicide  see  Scullion  (1994: 
91-95);  for  an  (independently  ''ued) 
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body  and  insists  on  seeing  it  (1003  diS  'i&i;  1004  8UQeE  arov  0'µµa);  1-O 
what  is  more,  he  explicitly,  as  well  as  graphically,  refers  to  the  sword  (a 
taboo  object  for  Tecmessa)  at  1024-26  (his  considerations  at  1028-39,  if 
the  lines  are  to  be  retained,  draw  attention  to  the  sword  all  the  more 
emphatically).  141  Therefore  Teucer's  act  should  probably  be  viewed  as  a 
symbolic  legitimization  of  his  brother's  suicide:  Ajax  is  no  longer  a 
a$äyLov,  but  merely  a  killed  man.  His  death  is  a  4ovoc,  not  aa  aytj, 
and  is  therefore  no  longer  treated  as  a  sacrifice  (let  alone  an  anomic  one): 
quite  characteristically,  Teucer  calls  the  sword  a  ovEÜ  (1026),  not  a 
Qa  ev  as  Ajax  had  called  it  at  815  (we  recall  that  for  Tecmessa  and  the 
Chorus  too  Ajax's  death  was  clearly  a  sacrificial  act,  a  Q$ayi  :  see  above, 
p.  305).  This  is  why,  for  Teucer,  it  is  no  longer  forbidden  to  look  upon 
Ajax's  body,  and  the  sword  is  no  longer  the  sacrificial  knife  which  must  be 
hidden.  What  is  more,  if  we  assume,  as  is  not  implausible,  that  Teucer  at 
Scullion  (1994:  95-107).  Following  Heath  (l.  c.  ),  I  would  even  be  prepared  to 
doubt  whether  the  sword  was  on  stage  during  the  suicide  speech;  the  deictics 
(828,834)  do  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  sword  is  visible,  as  Arnott  (1962: 
132)  thinks:  on  88c  referring  "to  someone  not  present  on  the  stage  but  clearly 
implied  by  the  context  and  visible  to  the  speaker's  imagination"  see  Garvie 
(1986:  ad  893);  cf.  Gardiner  (1979:  12  with  n.  8).  I  also  agree  with  Scullion  (1994: 
125)  that  the  shrouding  of  the  dummy  representing  Ajax  is  accomplished 
before  it  is  brought  into  view  (however  that  was  effected);  contra  Arnott  (1962: 
132). 
140  On  the  high  concentration  of  visual  terms  in  this  passage  see  Seale  (1982: 
168-69;  cf.  174). 
141  The  connection  between  Tecmessa's  covering  of  the  body  and  Teucer's 
uncovering  of  it  has  been  perceived  by  Cohen  (1978:  33),  who  viewed  however 
the  latter  action  as  a  continuation,  not  an  antithesis,  of  the  former.  Against 
Taplin  (1978:  189  n.  5)  and  Mills  (1980-81:  133)  who  think  that  this  action  might 
be  connected  with  the  replacement  of  the  `dead'  actor  with  a  dummy  see  Seale 
(1982:  179  n.  58)  and  Heath  (1987:  199  n.  70),  whose  own  explanations  are 
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some  point  after  1024ff.  wrenches  the  body  away  from  the  sword,  142  then 
this  action  theatrically  enacts  the  complete  inversion  of  Ajax's  falling 
over  the  sword  (828,833,841,143  9071-14). 
5.5.3  The  aywv  with  Menelaus.  Teucer  attempts  to  legitimize 
Max  as  a  `black  hunter' 
In  his  debate  with  Menelaus  Teucer  tries  to  defend  his  brother  as  a  `black 
hunter',  by  presenting  his  deviation  from  his  characteristic  hoplite  ethos 
as  if  it  were  totally  normal  and  legitimate.  This  deviation  is  succinctly 
phrased  by  Menelaus  at  the  outset  of  the  debate  (1052-54):  Ajax  started 
off  as  an  exemplary  warrior,  but  turned  out  to  be  a  guileful  `black  hunter' 
who  fights  at  night  (1056  v'KTo  p).  This  unexpected  reversal  is,  as  we 
have  already  remarked,  part  of  a  broader  confusion  of  categories  and 
limits:  Ajax  was,  thought  to  be  an  ally  to  the  Greeks  (1053)  but  has  been 
142  Kamerbeek  ad  1028  (following  Masqueray),  Taplin  (1978:  87),  Mills  (1980-81: 
133  with  n.  16);  contra  Gardiner  (1979:  13  with  n.  11).  I  find  Scullion's  (1994:  125- 
26)  staging  of  this  scene  attractive,  the  more  so  as  it  insists  on  the  revelation  of 
the  sword. 
143  841  is  amongst  the  lines  deleted  by  Wesseling,  who  is  followed  by  I1oyd- 
Jones  &  Wilson  (1990a),  (1990b:  28).  Since,  however,  in  this  passage  alii  alia 
secludunt,  the  deletion  of  atTO#ayf  Tr'LTrrOVTa  is  by  no  means  certain. 
144  If  the  MSS.  TrEpLTrETES  is  retained,  then  Ellendt-Genthe's  (1872:  s.  v. 
1TEpLTrET11s)  explanation  is  to  be  adopted:  "Sed  audacissime  novator  verborum 
Sophocles  de  gladio  in  quem  Aiax  incubuerat  quasi  circumdatum  corpore,  igitur 
passive  dicit"  (cf.  Eust.  644.47  w  1TEpLTrETTTWKEV  Aias).  But  perhaps  H.  Lloyd- 
Jones  (CR  n.  s.  2  [1952]  133)  is  right  in  holding  such  a  meaning  as  "not 
probable"  and  accepting  Musgrave's  emendation  into  TTEpLTrETOÜc;  Cf.  Lloyd- 
Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  30).  In  any  case,  the  fundamental  idea  of  Ajax's  falling 
upon  the  sword  is  not  changed. 308 
proved  to  be  an  enemy  worse  than  Phrygians  (1054)145  -  we  remember 
the  confusion  of  the  categories  `friend'  and  `enemy',  so  prominent  in 
Ajax's  deception  and  suicide  speeches.  Later  in  his  speech,  Menelaus' 
accusations  against  Ajax  for  anti-hoplite  behaviour  are  far  more 
downright  (1069ff.  ):  Ajax  was  supposed  to  be  a  8TI  iWT-  qg  (1071)146  and  to 
obey  the  E4EQTwTE9  (1072).  As  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  63)  has  seen, 
"here  Menelaus,  where  it  is  essentially  a  question  of  military  discipline,  is 
made  to  drag  in  the  civil  state"  -  which  is  natural,  since  the  5th  century 
Athenian  hoplite  was  simply  a  citizen  in  arms.  147  The  political  terms 
8rlµöTrls  and  E4EQTC6TEc  are  of  crucial  importance,  because  the  former 
reminds  us  that  Ajax  was  thought  to  be  a  fully  integrated  8TgO-nls  but 
proved  to  have  turned  into  a  `black  hunter'  instead,  i.  e.  into  a  8rß  iöTr)S 
on  probation;  148  the  latter  term  is  probably  meant  to  remind  us  of  the 
145  Probably,  the  fact  that  Tecmessa  is  of  Phrygian  descent  (487-88)  and  that 
Teucer's  name  means  `Trojan'  (cf.  e.  g.  A.  Ag.  112)  are  meant  to  form  a 
background  to  Menelaus'  remarks.  We  owe  to  Lissarague  (1990:  21-34)  the 
important  observation  that  in  Attic  iconography  the  binary  oppositions 
"hoplite  :  non  hoplite"  and  "Greek  :  non  Greek"  are  parallel  and 
complementary:  "en  pareil  contexte,  titre  un  heros  epique,  c'  est  titre  hoplite, 
sur  le  modele  grec,  et  qui  n'  est  pas  grec  ou  assimile  n'  est  pas  davantage 
hoplite.  "  (quotation  from  p.  26);  cf.  also  ibid.,  pp.  103,106,111,121,127.  Cf. 
above,  n.  10,  and  below  n.  149. 
146  Pace  Heath  (1987:  200),  there  is  nothing  inherently  depreciatory  in  the 
term  Sr  pµ  TBc:  in  the  CC,  for  instance,  the  Coloniates  can  be  called  31  IöTaL  (78) 
as  well  as  TfQB'  E4opoL  Xchpac  (145)  and  yfig  baKTES  (831). 
147  Cf.  Meier  (1993:  179).  In  general  see  Ducrey  (1986:  61-2);  Bowden  (1993:  47-9) 
with  bibliography;  cf.  also  Sage  (1996:  33). 
148  After  the  probationary  period  of  the  ephebeia  the  young  man  left  the  state 
of  the  `black  hunter'  and  became  a  hoplite  as  well  as  a  member  of  the  tribe  and 
the  dame  (on  the  probable  equation  between  hoplite  and  stricto  sensu  citizen 
[8rß  iö  nic]  in  classical  Athens  cf.  Vidal-Naquet  [1986b:  88]).  I  think  that  Vidal- 
Naquet  (1986c:  133)  is  wrong  when  he  states  that,  at  the  time  of  Aristotle's  Ath. 
Pol.  (ch.  42),  "the  admission  of  a  young  man  into  the  deme  of  his  father,  i.  e.  into 309 
ephebic  oath  (EÜ71KO11QW  T(3V  CLE  L  KPaLVOVTWV  ),  to  which  all  8%t6TaL 
were  supposed  to  adhere;  Ajax,  however,  has  regressed,  anomalously,  to 
the  status  of  the  ephebe  who  has  not  sworn  to  it  yet.  Thus,  his  indulgence 
in  the  `black  hunter'  practices  which  we  examined  in  sections  S.  1.1  - 
S.  1.2  is  brought  up  yet  again.  Menelaus  ends  his  tirade  with  a  lecture  on 
the  role  of  fear  and  ai8L  /  a'LQXüvTI  in  the  well-being  of  a  polls  or  of  an 
army,  elaborating  upon  his  main  point  that  Ajax  failed  to  be  a  proper 
hoplite. 
Teucer  does  not  try  to  prove  that  the  core  of  Menelaus' 
argumentation  is  wrong,  namely  that  Ajax  did  not  display  anti-hoplite 
behaviour,  on  the  contrary,  he  accepts  this  point  and  tries  to  justify  his 
brother's  ways.  His  diatribe  at  1093-17  is,  in  its  major  part,  committed  to 
theorizing  over  Ajax's  autonomy  and  his  independence  both  from 
Menelaus  and  from  Agamemnon  (a  contention  causing  an  angry  reaction 
on  Agamemnon's  part  at  1232-34).  Ajax,  he  argues,  was  essentially 
autonomous  (1097-98);  he  joined  the  expedition  c  aüTOÜ  KpaTL,  3V 
(1099).  Thus,  what  is  a  fundamental  requirement  for  a  hoplite,  namely 
that  he  should  obey  his  superiors  and  display  solidarity  with  his  fellow- 
citizenship,  precedes  [...  ]  the  `probationary  period'  and  is  definitely  not  its 
consequence":  what  precedes  the  `probationary  period'  (ephebeia)  is  the 
enrollment  in  the  X1  LaPXLK6v  ypaµµaTEtov  (Pelekidis  [1962:  52-53]):  full 
citizenship  is  officially  acquired  only  after  the  two  years  of  liability  for 
ephebic  service  (Reinmuth  [1971:  126-28]).  This  is  in  accord  with  what  seems  to 
have  been  the  original  character  of  ephebeia,  i.  e.  a  probationary  period  before 
the  young  warrior's  definitive  admission  into  the  ranks  of  the  army.  As  such  it 
must  have  been  an  institution  of  ancient  origin;  cf.  Pelekidis  (1962:  71-79), 
according  to  whom  "1'  ephebie  remonte  au  moires  ä  la  premiere  moitie  du  Ve 
siecle  av.  J.  -C.  "  (quotation  from  p.  78);  cf.  Reinmuth  (1952:  34-50)  and  (1971:  133- 
38)  who  argues  for  the  period  after  the  Persian  Wars.  -Cresci  (1974:  223)  misses 
the  point  when  she  holds  that  Menelaus  interprets  "secondo  una  visuale 
omerica  la  legge  de  in  Tr6XLc":  it  is  the  Sth  century  polis  ideology  to  which 
Menelaus  is  appealing. 310 
warriors  (on  the  latter  point  cf.  again  the  ephebic  oath:  odd&  XE[tJJw  Toy 
TrapaaTäTrly  ÖTTOU  äv  QTOLXip  (U),  is  dismissed  by  Teucer  in  the  name  of 
the  autonomy  characterizing  the  `black  hunter'.  This  point  is  pressed 
further  on,  when  Teucer  proudly  defends  bowmanship  at  1120-23;  this 
forceful  altercation,  a  variation  on  the  old  theme  of  the  controversy 
between  the  archer  and  the  hoplite  (cf.  e.  g.  Il.  11.385-95;  E.  HF  157-64 
with  Bond  [1981:  ad  1611),  would  have  been  meaningless  if  the  fact  that 
Teucer  is  Aja)es  embodiment  had  not  been  already  firmly  established 
(section  5.5.1)  .  In  other  words,  here  Teucer  is  actually  speaking  not  so 
much  for  himself,  as  for  Ajax;  and  his  defence  of  his  bowmanship  (i.  e.  of 
his  being  a  marginal,  non-hoplite  warrior)  is  in  fact  a  defence  of  the  anti- 
hoplite  practices  In  which  Ajax  anomalously  indulged.  149  So,  it  seems 
that  Ajax's  deviation  from  his  normal  hoplite  status  -a  deviation  whose 
abnormality  loomed  so  large  in  the  first  part  of  the  play  -  can,  after  äl1, 
be  justified  and  legitimized,  as  was  his  sacrifice. 
This  feeling  is  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  Teucer  clearly  avoids 
becoming  involved  in  the  vicious  circle  of  reciprocating  üßpLS  for  üßpLc  - 
a  procedure  in  which  Ajax  became  entangled  to  his  utter  detriment 
(section  5.4.1).  Teucer,  like  his  brother,  suffers  insults  and  humiliation 
from  the  Greeks:  the  first  substantial  information  we  have  about  him  is 
149  Ajax  of  course  did  not  practise  archery;  he  was,  however,  quasi-assimilated 
to  an  archer  (i.  e.  anon-hoplite),  insofar  as  he  abnormally  relapsed  to  the  status 
of  a'black  hunter',  i.  e.  an  anti-hoplite.  On  the  bowman's  social  inferiority  see 
Adkins  (1972:  66-67),  Sage  (1996:  40-1)  and,  most  importantly,  Lissague  (1990: 
13-34)  with  full  literary  and  iconographic  evidence;  in  Homer:  Sage  (1996:  10); 
cf.  above,  n.  10.  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  64)  thought  that  "the  old  quarrel  of 
the  bowman  and  the  hoplite  is  staggeringly  irrelevant  to  the  tragic  issue",  but 
see  the  right  objections  of  Bowie  (1983:  115).  Untenable  is  also  Bowra's  (1944: 
53-54)  view,  followed  by  Sorum  (1986:  374),  that  in  5th  century  Athens  the 
attitude  towards  archers  was  far  more  sympathetic  than  in  Homeric  society  or 
in  contemporary  Sparta:  see  the  criticism  of  Bond  (1981:  ad  161). 311 
that  he  is  chided  by  the  Argives  (722  KvSäCETaL,  724-25  ÖVELBEQLV  I 
11paaoov,  731  EpLs150).  What  is  more,  in  the  debate  with  Menelaus  we 
realize  that  the  EP  LS  of  the  Greeks  against  him  has  not  abated  yet  (as  the 
Messenger  implied  at  731-32):  Menelaus  uses,  as  his  last  card,  an  äLVOs 
(1142-49),  an  allegory,  that  is,  whose  aim  is  in  this  case  (as  is  often  the 
case  with  aLvoL)151  to  blame  (tEyELV)  and  inflict  disgrace  upon  its 
recipient.  Teucer,  however,  conspicuously  avoids  replying  with  a  similar 
allegory:  as  Stanford  (ad  1150ff.;  cf.  ad  1142)  has  remarked,  Teucer's  story 
is  not  a  proper  dvos:  its  meaning  is  absolutely  clear  and  there  are  no 
allegories.  152  In  fact,  Teucer  explicitly  challenges  the  aLVos  as  a  genre,  153 
he  parodies  it  by  totally  destroying  the  mythopoeic  illusion  at  the  end  of 
his  reply  (1157-58),  which  thus  comes  as  a  punch-line:  µ63v  1vLýäpjv;  154 
The  ironic  use  of  the  verb  a'Maa%i  i,  etymologically  cognate  to  dLvos,  155 
is,  I  think,  an  obvious  indication  of  his  reluctance  to  adopt  a  form  of 
150  On  E  pLs  as  a  key-word  in  the  language  of  blame  see  Nagy  (1979:  222-23;  230- 
31). 
151  Cf.  Bowra  (1944:  55).  I  am  aware  that  this  is  not  the  primary  meaning  of  the 
word;  it  can  be  used  also  to  designate  praise  poetry  as  well  as  an  allusive  tale 
containing  an  ulterior  purpose  (cf.  Verdenius  [1962]);  see  Nagy  (1979:  234-41), 
(1990b:  149,392-3).  However,  its  function  as  blame  poetry  is  quite  common  (e.  g. 
Ar.  Vesp.  1381-6,1401-5,1427-32,1435-40,1446-8;  Hdt.  1.141.1-3;  Call.  Iamb.  I&  II 
[frr.  191,192  Pf.  ]).  Cf.  West  on  Hes.  Cp.  202-12,  who  also  may  be  right  in 
remarking  that  the  Hesiodic  fable  about  the  hawk  and  the  nightingale  is  an 
aLvos  manque,  as  it  fails  to  put  the  hybris  of  the  kings  in  a  ridiculous  light  or 
show  it  to  be  ill-advised  -i.  e.  fails  to  be  ýoyEpog. 
152  Cf.  also  Kamerbeek  (ad  1142). 
153  Although  he  adheres,  as  Fraenkel  (1920)  has  pointed  out,  to  the  external 
form  of  the  aLvoL.  Cf.  Fraenkel  (1977:  35-36).  Poe  (1987:  23-24)  overstresses  the 
comic  function  of  the  aivoL  in  our  passage. 
154  The  same  point  has  been  made  by  Heath  (1987:  200).  Bowra  (1944:  55)  is 
wrong. 
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discourse  often  associated  with  blame  (tS  yos)  and  insult  (üßpis)  and 
appropriately  termed  by  him  4  Xa  ip'  'T  (1162).  156  It  is  Menelaus  who  is 
the  actual  vßpLQTT'Js  (1151  üßpLCE,  cf.  his  own  words  at  1088:  vüv  8'  Eyw 
µEy'  aü  #ov(ý)157),  not  Ajax  (as  Menelaus  alleged:  1061,158  1081,1088). 
He  is  the  one  who  is  trying  to  dishonour  the  dead  Ajax  by  abusive  words 
and  deeds,  hence  Teucer  applies  to  him  the  language  traditionally  used 
to  disparage  the  unjustified  blamer:  he  significantly  calls  him  ävoX(3os 
(1156),  which  implies  that  his  lack  of  öX(3os  makes  him  resort  to  &SÖyos 
and  üßpLs.  159 
156  On  the  use  of  aLvoL  by  low-class  (4aOML)  people  see  also  Fraenkel  on  A.  Ag. 
1629f.  and  Fraenkel  (1977:  36).  Aristotle  (Po.  1448b)  defines  blame  poetry 
(iöyoL)  as  poetry  dealing  with  the  acts  of.  the  4aOXoL.  Is  it  a  coincidence  that 
Teucer  uses  basically  the  same  term  (c  XaDpa  instead  of  4avkc)  to  describe 
Menelaus'  discourse? 
157  Teucer  used  the  same  phrase,  µEya  4povEiv,  at  1125,  but  not  in  a  context  of 
hubristic  behaviour  (on  the  contrary,  he  stressed  that  his  own  µEya  4povety  is 
jvv  To  &Kaiw).  He  is  not  willing  to  requite  vßpLs,  unlike  Menelaus  who  used  his 
own  µEya  4povEty  as  a  justification  for  his  requital  of  i  3pLs  with  üßpLs.  See 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  62),  Cairns  (1993:  236-37  with  n.  73),  (1996:  10-13); 
the  latter  rightly  notes  that,  in  Menelaus'  case,  µEya  4povEty  is  not  to  be 
sharply  divorced  from  üßp(CELv  (differently  Fisher  [1992:  315-16;  323]). 
158  Reeve  (1973:  161-62)  revived  the  deletion  of  the  line  by  Natick.  Even  if  the 
deletion  is  adopted,  the  overall  sense  is  not  severely  affected,  as  Fisher  (1992: 
314)  shows. 
159  On  the  unjustified  blamer's  envy  (406vos)  for  the  6)(3os  of  others,  and  his 
subsequent  indulging  in  blame  (ioyos,  Epis,  vEIKOs)  see  Nagy's  (1979:  228-32) 
illuminating  analysis.  Thgn.  287-92  clearly  associates  46yos  (287  KaKOJöyw 
[0LX46yW  Bergk]),  ävox(3os  (288  ävoA(3öTEpoL)  and  vßpLc  (291),  especially  if  at  288 
we  read,  with  Ahrens,  ov8'  ETös,  CSs  aMEL,  i.  e.  "nec  mirum  (cf.  [Thgn.  ]  25),  cum 
Sint  semper  pauci  fortunati"  (teste  West,  in  app.  crit.  ad  loc.  ).  For  other  views, 
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5.5.4  The  &rychy  with  Agamemnon.  Teucer  attempts  to 
demonstrate  Ajax's  valour  as  a  hoplite.  The 
, 
impasses  arise 
again 
Significantly,  while  Teucer  was  trying  to  justify  Ajax  as  a  `black  hunter'  / 
anti-hoplite,  Eurysaces  (the  embodiment  of  his  father's  hoplite  aspect) 
was  not  present;  he  had  been  taken  into  the  hut  (578-81)  and  had  not 
appeared  on  stage  since.  Now,  he  shows  up  with  his  mother,  EIS'  KaLPOV 
(1168),  to  back  up  visually  Teucer's  defence  of  Ajax's  hoplite  valour  which 
is  going  to  ensue.  It  should  perhaps  be  assumed  that  an  attendant  brings 
along  Ajax's  shield  too,  so  as  to  highlight  all  the  more  strongly  the 
paradoxical  duality  which  Teucer  is  trying  to  establish  (Ajax  must  be 
viewed  as  both  hoplite  and  `black  hunter'  at  the  same  time):  Teucer,  the 
hunter,  is  about  to  defend  Ajax's  hoplite  qualities  (having  already 
defended  his  anti-hoplite  ones),  while  Eurysaces,  accompanied  by  the 
hoplite  shield  (the  Entvuµov  a&oc),  clings  to  his  father's  body  (1171- 
81),  thus  providing  a  visual  confirmation  of  Teucer's  following 
argumentation  (and  recalling  perhaps  Ajax's  wish  that  Eurysaces'  hoplite 
honour  would  be  defended  both  by  the  äßnLYTrjpES  [565]  sailors  and  by 
Teucer  the  hunter  [564]  who  should  prevent  the  boy  from  suffering  üßpLS 
or  k  pil  [560-61]160).  So,  one  must  fully  realize,  and  constantly  bear  in 
mind,  that  it  is  not  only  Ajax's  `abnormalities'  (anomalous  `black  hunt') 
that  must  be  justified;  it  is  also  his,  so  to  speak,  `normal',  usual  aspect 
(that  of  the  exemplary  hoplite)  that  must  be  defended  against  the 
160  We  realize  retrospectively  that  Ajax's  entrusting  of  Eurysaces  both  to  Teucer 
and  to  his  soldiers  (which  seemed  at  the  time  a  confirmation  of  his  impasse 
[being  trapped  betwixt  and  between  hoplite  and  `black  hunter'];  see  p.  268f.  )  is 
now  presented  under  a  different  light:  it  is  no  longer  the  case  that  Ajax  cannot 
be  either  a  hoplite  or  a  `black  hunter';  now  what  is  emphasized  is  that  he  can 
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Atreidae's  slanderous  imputations.  In  other  words,  Teucer's  ensuing 
defence  of  his  brother's  hoplite  valour  should  contribute  -  along  with  the 
preceding  justification  of  him  as  an  anti-hoplite,  a  `black  hunter'  -  to  a 
full  justification  of  Ajax's  duality  (both  a  hoplite  and  a  `black  hunter'), 
thus  liberating  him,  if  posthumously,  from  the  terrible  impasse  between 
hoplite  and  anti-hoplite  in  which  he  was  trapped,  to  his  eventual 
disaster.  Otherwise,  Ajax  will  remain  on  the  borderline  between  hoplite 
and  `black  hunter',  unable  to  be  either. 
Teucer's  argumentation  (1266-89)  is  very  impressive,  and 
suggestively  fraught  with  epic  reminiscences:  161  Ajax  displayed  in  the 
most  difficult  moments  the  most  admirable  bravery  as  well  as  the  most 
laudable  care  for  his  fellow-warriors  (1272-82162).  Once  again,  we  are 
shown  what  a  paragon  of  hoplite  ethos  he  was  -  especially  when  Teucer 
strongly  emphasizes  that  his  brother  did  not  tamper  with  the  lots  (1283- 
87),  i.  e.  did  not  practise  deceit,  in  order  to  avoid  duelling  with  Hector. 
This  detail  may  seem  insignificant  at  first  sight;  however,  it  signals  a 
major  turning  point:  the  fact  that  abstention  from  guile  is  here  presented 
as  a  further  credit  to  Ajax's  hoplite  ethos  means  that  Teucer's 
161  The  fact  that  these  reminiscences  do  not  exactly  correspond  with  anything 
in  the  Iliad  does  not  really  matter.  See  Jebb  (ad  1277f.  ):  "...  it  seems  equally 
possible  that  [Sophocles]  wrote  from  a  general  recollection  of  the  Iliad,  without 
caring  whether  he  reproduced  its  details.  "  Cf.  Kamerbeek  (ad  1276,1277;  1278, 
1279).  Kirkwood  (1965:  63)  has  rightly  remarked  that  Sophocles  offers  a 
judicious  selection  of  incidents  from  the  Iliad,  in  order  to  add  kudos  to  Ajax's 
heroic  image. 
162  The  idea  of  Ajax  defending  all  alone  his  fellow  Greeks  would  be  clearer  if  at 
SiXa;  1282  we  read,  with  Dawe  (1996),  ip'  vVLv  otToc  TaüT'  E8paaEV  i) 
(Musgrave's  äµ'  for  MSS  &p',  and  Reiske's  ii  8&Xa  for  MSS  Ev&Ka).  See  however 
Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson's  (1990b:  38)  objections.  At  any  rate,  one  should  not 
overlook  the  fact  that  even  Ajax's  individual  feats  are  part  of  his  devotion  to 
the  collective  cause:  see  Segal  (1981:  112). 315 
argumentation  intimates  a  wholesale  rejection  of  deceit.  As  a  result,  an 
irresolvable  ambiguity  arises  again:  we  realize  that  Ajax  cannot  be 
justified  in  his  duality  and  that,  inevitably,  the  balance  between  Ajax  the 
hoplite  and  Ajax  the  `black  hunter"  (a  balance  we  thought  Teucer  was 
going  to  redress)  is  irreparably  destroyed:  if  guile  is  on  the  whole 
unacceptable,  then  Ajax  can  be  neither  justified  as  a  `black  hunter',  since 
guile  (typical  of  such  anti-hoplite  modes  of  behaviour  as  `black  hunting') 
is  altogether  indefensible,  nor  as  a  hoplite,  for  his  nightly  attack  against 
the  Greeks  was,  after  all,  an  instance  of  guile  (something  inconceivable  for 
a  hoplite).  Ajax's  two  aspects  (hoplite  and  `black  hunter')  remain  poles 
apart,  in  continuing  unresolved  tension,  instead  of  being  reconciled  into 
unperturbed  symbiosis.  The  anomic  aspects  of  `black  hunting',  made 
prominent  by  Teucer,  forbid  any  legitimization  of  the  fundamental 
duality  "hoplite  :  `black  hunter"',  which  thus  becomes  again  what  it 
initially  was:  an  irresolvable  ambiguity. 
5.5.4.1.  The  inevitability  of  vßpic.  The  anomic  sacrifice 
brought  up  again 
Having  invalidated  his  efforts  to  vindicate  his  brother's  duality, 
Teucer  proceeds,  at  1290-98,  to  a  kind  of  argumentation  which  brings  up 
more  of  the  same  old  impasses  that  led  to  Ajax's  catastrophe.  He  now 
becomes  involved  in  the  vicious  circle  of  reciprocating  vßpLs  for  vßpLS 
(something  he  managed  to  avoid  before,  when  he  challenged  Menelaus' 
resorting  to  insulting  d  vot;  see  above,  p.  311f.  ):  he  returns  Agamemnon's 
mockery  for  his  low  birth  by  coming  up  with  some  unsavoury  details 
about  Agamemnon's  own  pedigree.  Surprisingly,  as  well  as  significantly, 
the  vocabulary  traditionally  used  to  disparage  unjustified  blamers  is  now 316 
applied  by  Agamemnon  to  Teucer,  both  before  and  after  his  reply  (1266- 
1315)  which  is  thus  encircled  by  indications  of  the  abusive  character  of 
his  words:  1226-27,1230,1235,1244  (KaKOts  ßaXEtTE),  163  1258  (note  esp. 
6apaCov  üßptCELs),  1M  1320;  even  the  impartial  Odysseus  allows  for  the 
possibility  that  Teucer's  words  are  indeed  ýAaüpa  [E  n]  (1323,165  a  phrase 
used  by  Teucer  of  Menelaus'  verbal  abuse  at  1162!  ).  That  is  not  to  say 
that  Agamemnon  does  not  indulge  in  verbal  abuse  (he  calls  Teucer  a 
bastard  and  a  slave  [1228-29,1259-63]  and  this  is  rightly  termed 
OVEL8I(E1v  by  Teucer  at  1298),  and  one  is  certainly  tempted  to  see  the 
`bad'  Agamemnon  as  the  principal  abuser.  166  However,  the  surprise  we  feel 
at  the  overwhelmingly  larger  number  of  references  to  Teucer's  verbal 
abuse  is  certainly  intentional:  this  is  Sophocles'  way  to  alert  us  to  the  fact 
that  Teucer,  contrary  to  his  restrained  attitude  in  the  debate  with 
Menelaus,  is  now  only  too  keen  on  reciprocating  {  pis  for  his  enemies' 
üßpLc  against  him. 
163  For  similar  formations  of  phrases  denoting  blame  cf.  501?  s  yoLs  LaTrrwv,  724- 
25  ÖVELBEULV  ijpaaaov  (with  Jebb's  note).  Cf.  also  the  epithet  En¬Ußö)oc  used  of 
the  zjoyEpöc  Thersites  in  the  Iliad  (2.275),  on  which  see  Nagy  (1979:  264). 
164  On  OapaE  iv  used  of  the  `boldness'  of  the  unjustified  blamer  see  Nagy  (1979: 
260-62).  Admittedly,  in  the  above  instances  Agamemnon  refers  to  Teucer's 
debate  with  Menelaus.  But  why  did  Sophodes  not  insert  such  disparaging 
comments  against  Teucer  during  the  earlier  debate,  in  which  they  would  have 
been  immediately  relevant?  My  answer  is  that  in  that  debate  Sophocles  wanted 
Teucer  to  save  face,  whereas  it  is  in  this  one  that  he  will  indulge  in  retorting 
ü(3pLs  for  vßpLc  -a  volte  face  for  which  the  audience  are  forewarned  as  soon  as 
Agamemnon  enters  (1226ff). 
165  1  take  äv8p[  (1322)  to  refer  to  Agamemnon,  not  Teucer.  Odysseus  is  about  to 
ask  the  leader  of  the  army  for  a  personal  favour,  and  his  purpose  is  far  better 
served  if  he  makes  clear  from  the  outset  that  he  considers  Agamemnon  justified 
(1322  UUyyvchittiv  EXw)  in  requiting  E  ni  KaKä  for  Teucer's  o  aüpa  [Erns]. 
166  Cf.  Heath  (1987:  87-88  etc.  )  on  the  antipathy  one  normally  feels  towards  the 
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One  cannot  help  recalling,  however,  that  Ajax's  craving  to 
reciprocate  the  üßpLS  he  had  suffered,  and  to  restore  his  offended  Tlµlj, 
resulted  in  his  suffering  further,  and  worse,  üßpIs  (section  5.4.1).  This  is, 
mu  taxis  mu  Landis,  what  happens  in  this  case  too,  for  the  mythical 
examples  chosen  by  Teucer  to  demean  Agamemnon  are  chiefly  archetypal 
stories  of  anomic  sacrifice,  i.  e  of  the  kind  of  sacrifice  in  which  Ajax  has 
indulged!  The  mention  of  the  ghastly  `Feast  of  Thyestes'  (1293-94),  his 
devouring  of  his  own  children  certainly  does  not  particularly  strengthen 
Teucer's  case,  in  view  of  Ajax's  double  anomic  sacrifice  (of.  the  animals 
and  of  himself).  Nor  is  the  reference  to  Agamemnon's  mother,  Aerope 
(1295-97),  as  harmless  as  it  seems,  since  she  was  also  a  victim  of  an 
anomic  sacrifice  (which  was  never  effected,  according  to  the  myth,  167  but 
is  interestingly  presented  as  such  by  Sophocles,  cf.  1297  E  fr  KEV!  ):  she  was 
thrown  into  the  sea  to  be  devoured  by  fishes.  That  throwing  a  human 
being  to  the  fishes  was  indeed  thought  to  be  a  sacrifice  is  evident  from 
myths  such  as  Andromeda's  and  is  made  clear  by  Burkert  (1983:  204-12); 
the  anomalous  character  of  this  sacrifice  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  it  is 
restricted  to  the  level  of  myth,  i.  e.  to  a  vague,  remote  past  which  was 
entirely  detached  from  contemporary  reality.  Now,  bearing  in  mind  that 
fishes  were  an  altogether  exceptional  sacrificial  victim,  restricted  to 
barbarians  and  to  marginal  areas  of  the  Hellenic  world,  168  the  reverse 
situation,  namely  the  devouring  of  a  human  being  by  fishes  by  way  of 
sacrifice  must  have  seemed  totally  inconceivable,  one  of  the  most  anomic 
kinds  of  sacrifice  possible-169 
167  See  e.  g.  schol.  Al.  1297  a  (p.  246  Christodoulou),  Apollod.  3.2.2. 
168  Burkert  (1983:  208-10). 
169  With  my  interpretation  one  has  no  longer  to  see  Menelaus  and  Agamemnon 
as  mere  `doublets'  (Hester  [1979b:  255])  nor  as  an  example  of  comic  doubling 
(Poe  [1987:  26-27).  The  view  that  the  final  scenes  serve  merely  to  highlight 
Ajax's  greatness  by  contrasting  it  with  his  adversaries'  pettiness  (e.  g.  Kirkwood 318 
5.6.1  TroWi,  vüv 
%10L  KdeL  m  TTLK  :  Odysseus'  Intervention  0 
Teucer  has  made  a  mess  of  things:  instead  of  vindicating  his  brother's 
duality  as  a  `black  hunter'  and  a  hoplite,  he  rendered  it  impossible; 
instead  of  legitimizing  his  sacrifice  (cf.  section  5.5.2),  he  highlighted  its 
anomic  character;  what  is  more,  he  only  managed  to  perpetuate  the 
vicious  circle  of  reciprocating  dishonour  -a  practice  which  has  proved 
detrimental  for  Ajax.  What  Teucer  has  done,  in  effect,  is  bring  up,  instead 
of  resolving,  all  the  old  impasses  which  tormented  and  destroyed  his 
brother,  hence  the  Chorus'  desperate  appeal  to  Odysseus  "to  help  not  in 
tying  but  in  loosening  the  knot"  (1317). 
Indeed,  at  first  it  seems  that  Odysseus  is  the  one  who  will,  at  last, 
sort  things  out  and  restore  for  Ajax  normality  and  order.  In  the  first 
place,  he  shows  a  special  concern  for  the  restitution  of  Ajax's  T4171  (1339, 
1342);  this,  in  effect,  means  restoration  of  normality  and  order,  since  it 
was  Ajax's  desire  to  avenge  the  insult  against  his  TLµrj  at  the  Contest  of 
Arms  (41)  that  brought  about  utter  confusion  and  disarray  (see  again 
section  5.1.1).  This  is  why  Odysseus  freely  recognizes  Ajax's  superiority 
(1338-41),  170  implicitly  admitting  that  the  verdict  did  not  do  justice  to 
Ajax;  in  the  same  vein  is  his  generous  praise  for  his  former  opponent 
(1319  äüuciµcý,  1340  cipLQTOv,  1345  EaOAöv,  1355  yEvvatos,  1357  apET1  ). 
What,  of  course,  would  mean  full  restoration  of  Ajax's  TL  U  is  proper 
burial,  which  would  signal  his  reintegration  to  the  community  and  his 
[1958:  107],  Knox  [1979:  149-50])  does  not  explain  why  we  have  to  witness  this 
pettiness  twice;  see  also  the  criticism  of  this  view  by  Poe  (1987:  21-22).  Holt 
(1981:  281-88)  was  the  first  to  seriously  attempt  to  explain  (with  interesting 
results)  the  doubling  of  the  agora  in  dramatic  terms.  For  doxography  on  this 
doubling  see  Davidson  (1985:  22-23).  For  doxography  on  the  dramatic  function 
of  the  latter  part  of  the  play  see  again  Davidson  (1985:  16-19). 
170  On  this  controversial  point  see  above,  n.  34. 319 
liberation  from  the  abnormality  of  his  impasses,  which  have  subverted 
normal  order.  Significantly,  Odysseus  claims  that  proper  burial  will 
prevent  the  laws  of  the  gods  from  being  offended  (1343-45),  i.  e.  will 
preserve  the  order  warranted  by  divine  laws. 
Nonetheless,  this  is  only  a  delusive  appearance.  Very  soon,  we 
realize  that  Odysseus  will  upset  order  far  more  severely  than  one  could 
fathom.  To  begin  with,  the  boundaries  between  praise  and  blame, 
therefore  between  friends  and  enemies,  171  which  were  so  clearly  distinct 
before  (the  Atreidae  blamed  their  enemy  Ajax  and  his  brother  Teucer; 
Teucer  praised  his  4Loos  Ajax  and  blamed  his  enemies,  the  Atreidae)  are 
now  utterly  obscured.  While  Odysseus  praises  his  friend  Agamemnon 
(1363,1369),  as  is  expected,  he  also  praises  (see  preceding  paragraph)  the 
man  who  was  his  worst  enemy  (1336  EXOLQTO9  QTpaTOÜ),  Ajax.  At  the 
same  time,  he  implicitly  blames  Agamemnon-  (1361  ETraLvEty  ov  4  i?  3) 
for  his  QKAtlpä  tiuxi  ,  while  in  the  self-same  line  he  also  blames,  again 
implicitly,  the  characteristically  QKXT  pös  Ajax,  172  whom  he  now 
proclaims  (in  a  surprising  about-face)  to  be  no  longer  his  enemy  (1347, 
1376-77).  The  same  goes  for  1359,  which  apparently  refers  to  Ajax,  but 
can  also  be  a  covered  rebuke  against  Agamemnon's  reproach  at  1358,  as 
has  been  long  recognized  by  all  commentators.  173  Thus,  Odysseus  both 
blames  and  praises  his  former  enemy,  Ajax,  whom  he  declares  now  to  be 
171  That  blame  is  traditionally  addressed  to  enemies,  whereas  praise  is  reserved 
for  friends,  need  hardly  be  pointed  out;  see  Nagy  (1979:  242  §21n2). 
172  EKXipö  n  s,  while  evidently  referring  to  Agamemnon's  obstinacy,  is  a 
markedly  Ajacian  quality  (Stanford  [xxviii]);  cf.  926  oTEpEÖýpc)v.  That  1361  can 
be  applied  to  both  Agamemnon  and  Ajax  has  been  noticed  by  the  commentators, 
most  notably  by  Kamerbeek  (ad  1361)  and  Stanford  (ad  1360-1);  see  also  Blundell 
(1989:  98-99). 
173  See  also  Blundell  (1989:  98  n.  188).  Contra  Winnington-Ingram  (1979:  3-4), 
(1980:  68  with  n.  33). 320 
his  friend;  he  also  both  blames  and  praises  the  person  who  was  and  still  is 
(1328-29)  his  friend,  namely  Agamemnon.  This  is  a  first  sign  of  the 
subversion  of  order  that  is  to  come:  it  is  no  longer  the  case  that  praise  is 
for  friends  and  blame  for  enemies,  because  Odysseus  can  do  both  to  both 
categories  of  people. 
The  distinction  between  friends  and  enemies  is,  it  seems,  about  to 
collapse.  Odysseus  justifies  his  insistence  on  burying  an  enemy  by  putting 
forward  the  maxim  that  "full  many  are  friends  at  one  time  and  foes 
anon"  (1359;  Jebb's  trans.  )  and  that  he  hated  Ajax  only  as  long  as  it  was 
Ka)«Sv  to  hate  him  (1347);  on  saying  that,  however,  he  counts  on  the 
stability  of  Agamemnon's  friendship  in  order  to  obtain  permission  for  the 
burial  (1328-29,1351,1353)!  174  Evidently,  what  were  once  the  poles  of  a 
strict  distinction,  namely  "ýiXos  :  EX6pog",  have  now  fused  into  an 
irresolvable  paradox:  one  can  appeal  "  to  the  value  of  friendship  as  if  -it 
were  clearly  distinct  from  enmity;  at  the  same  time,  however,  one  can 
just  as  well  herald  the  collapse  of  the  distinction  "friendship  vs.  enmity". 
We  remember,  all  the  same,  that  both  in  the  deception  speech  and  in  the 
suicide  speech  (section  5.1.2)  the  axiom  that  "friends  can  become 
enemies  as  easily  as  enemies  can  become  friends"  signified  a  belief  in  a 
generalized  lack  of  absolutes,  of  clear-cut  distinctions  -a  lack  that  was 
the  very  essence  of  Ajax's  impasses:  not  being  able  to  make  sense  of  the 
distinction  "friend  :  enemy"  was  one  instance  of  Ajax's  wider  failure  to 
comply  with  the  social  categories  by  which  humans  lend  coherence  and 
accountability  to  what  would  be  otherwise  a  chaos  of  innumerable 
possible  forms  of  social  structuralization.  Adopting  a  certain  way  of 
174  Cf.  Goldhill  (1986:  87-8).  Blundell  (1989:  101)  fails  to  perceive  any 
contradiction  in  this.  Sorum  (1986:  375)  appositely  remarks  that  "the  chaos 
created  in  [...  ]  definitions  of  alliance  that  led  to  Ajax's  tragedy  is  now  used 
against  his  foe.  " 321 
conceptualizing  the  world  means,  in  effect,  opting  for  one  of  the 
innumerable  possible  worlds  which  we  could  create  by  using  different 
ways  of  conceptualizing,  different  taxonomies  and  categories.  Therefore, 
refusing  to  adopt  what  is  the  currently  valid  conceptualization  of  the 
world  comes  down  to  being  incapable  of  living  in  this  world.  This  is 
exactly  what  Ajax  was,  hence  he  opted  for  the  only  possible  way  out, 
namely  suicide.  What  is  more,  incapable  of  living  in  this  world  is  what 
Odysseus  helps  him  remain,  by  causing  disarray  where  he  could  have 
restored  order,  i.  e.  by  negating  the  current  conceptualization  of  the  world 
for  the  sake  of  what  lies  beyond  it.  175  And  what  lies  beyond  the  world  as 
we  perceive  and  interpret  it  is  -  in  this  play  as  well  as  in  the  Oedipus  at 
Colonus  -  the  praeterhuman  status  of  the  hero.  176 
Unlike  Oedipus,  however,  Ajax's  passing  to  heroization  is  not 
signalled  by  a  majestic,  if  uncanny,  invitation  by  the  gods  as  is  Oedipus' 
in  OC  1627-28,  but  by  his  being  engaged  in  desperate  deadlocks,  the  only 
way  out  of  which  is  death.  In  other  words,  Ajax's  death  is  not  only  an 
intermediate  stage  before  heroization,  but  also  the  inevitable  end  to 
which  he  is  painfully  led  through  the  utter  confusion  of  boundaries  and 
categories.  At  the  same  time,  however,  death  is  a  prerequisite  of 
heroization;  a  hero,  although  immortal,  is  closely  bound  to  the  place 
where  his  tomb  is  located.  177  As  Henrichs  (1993:  177-8)  has  remarked, 
"what  constitutes  a  cultic  hero,  in  tragedy  even  more  emphatically  than 
175  Kott's  (1974:  76)  reading  of  the  final  scene  seems  to  me  perverse.  Torrance's 
(1965:  276-81)  view  of  it  as  bringing  no  resolution  whatsoever,  as  well  as 
Nielsen's  (1978:  26-7)  remarks  on  "the  fluid  world  of  Odysseus",  are  closer  to  the 
point,  although  they  both  fail  to  take  into  account  Ajax's  status  as  a  cult  hero. 
176  On  the  nature  of  a  cult  hero  cf.  Segal  (1981:  142-43),  Bowie  (1983:  115). 
177  That  death  is  fundamental  to  the  essence  of  the  hero  in  cult  has  been 
demonstrated  by  Brelich  (1958:  80-90,  esp.  87-90)  and  Nagy  (1979:  174-210);  cf. 
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in  real  life,  is  the  ineluctable  experience  of  death,  the  concept  of  the 
tomb,  and  the  prospect  of  cult".  Ajax  falls  not  because  of  a  moral  flaw  in 
his  character  nor  because  he  is  hybristic  to  Athena,  178  but  because  he 
must  die  in  order  to  become  a  hero.  A  god  destroying  a  man  in  order  to 
make  him  a  hero  is  a  standard  motif  in  Greek  mythology.  Burkert's 
(1985a:  202-203)  relevant  remarks  are  worth  quoting:  "In  myth  [...  ]  the 
gods  often  have  a  mortal  double  who  could  almost  be  mistaken  for  the 
god  except  for  the  fact  that  he  is  subject  to  death,  and  indeed  is  killed  by 
the  god  himself:  Hyakinthos  appears  with  Apollo,  Iphigeneia  with 
Artemis,  Erechtheus  with  Poseidon  and  Iodama  with  Athena.  [...  ]  Myth 
has  separated  into  two  figures  what  in  the  sacrificial  ritual  is  present  as  a 
tension.  "179  Athena's  destruction  of  Ajax  seems  to  be  an  expression  of  this 
cultic  symbiosis  which  in  ritual  appears  as  a  tension:  there  is  evidence 
that  the  goddess  and  the  hero  were  worshipped  jointly,  at  least  in  one 
case  (admittedly  not  in  Athens,  but  in  Megara,  where  there  was  a  cult  of 
Athena  A'LavTLs:  Paus.  1.42.4).  180  What  is  more,  our  play  provides 
evidence  for  Ajax's  ritual  character  as  Athena's  mortal  double  who  could 
almost  be  mistaken  for  the  goddess  herself.  we  saw  on  p.  265f.  that  Ajax's 
veering  between  hoplite  and  hunter  was  shared  not  only  by  Artemis  and 
Enyalios  but  also  by  Athena  herself  (she  is  the  goddess  of  the  shield,  but 
she  also  hunts  her  prey,  Ajax).  In  other  words,  Athena's  eerie  similarity 
178  On  the  erroneousness  of  this  view  see  above,  n.  115. 
179  To  this  list  I  should  add  the  Thracian  king  Lycurgus,  enemy  and  persecutor 
of  Dionysus,  who,  after  his  punishment  by  the  god,  was  somehow  amalgamated 
in  ritual  with  Dionysus:  see  West  (1983a:  64  with  n.  6).  For  the  tension  between 
Ajax  and  Athena  see  also  Bradshaw  (1991:  114  with  n.  34),  and  Seaford  (1994a: 
130  n.  121)  with  further  literature.  On  the  possibly  analogous  case  of  Heracles, 
whose  name  seems  to  suggest  an  affinity  with  his  worst  enemy,  Hera,  see 
Loraux  (1995:  133). 
180  Farrell  (1921:  304),  for  no  apparent  reason,  associates  Athena  ALavT(S  With 
Aias  son  of  Oileus. 323 
with  Ajax,  as  well  as  her  wrath  against  him  (133,756ff.,  776-7)  form  a 
paradoxical  combination  which  leads  to  Ajax's  catastrophe,  and  thus 
constitutes  the  prerequisite  for  the  permanent  tension  which  will  define 
her  cultic  symbiosis  with  the  ilpwg  Ajax. 
I  think  that,  despite  the  reservedness  of  some  critics,  our  play 
contains  enough  hints  at  Ajax's  hero  cult.  181  Burian  (1972:  154-55)  has 
suggested  that  Eurysaces'  supplication  at  1171-81  symbolically  enacts  his 
father's  transformation  into  a  sacred  hero.  182  There  a  few  more  hints  at 
Ajax's  heroization  during  the  play,  namely  at  1166-67  (TÖV  äd  WTIGTOv 
Täcov),  where  aE(4IVT1aTOV  may  allude  to  the  perpetuity  of  his  cult;  183 
perhaps  also  Ajax's  thought  that  his  mother  will  extend  her  lament  ýv 
Trämn  TröXE  L  (851)  is  a  further  indication  of  the  TrMIr  toc  character  of  his 
181  The  importance  of  Ajax's  cult  in  this  play  has  been  recognized  by  Welcker 
(1829:  61-66),  Jebb  (xxx-xxxii),  Jones  (1962:  188-89),  Rosenmeyer  (1971:  186-89), 
Sicherl  (1977:  97),  Segal  (1981:  142  with  n.  119),  Bradshaw  (1991:  114-15),  and 
especially  Henrichs  (1993)  and  Seaford  (1994a:  129-30);  cf,  also  Adams  (1955:  93- 
95  and  passim),  Musurillo  (1967:  22-23  and  passim)  and  Poe  (1987:  9-18,74-75  and 
passim),  notwithstanding  their  view  that  heroes  were  thought  to  be  morally 
unblemished.  Ajax's  cult  is  unduly  undervalued  by  Kitto  (1956:  182),  (1961:  121), 
Gellie  (1972:  282  n.  26),  Taplin  (1978:  189  n.  4)  and  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  57 
n.  2).  Adams  (1955:  93-96,109-10),  although  he  suspected  the  importance  of 
Ajax's  cult  in  this  play,  wrongly  saw  Athena  as  an  unequivocally  benevolent 
goddess,  who  ensures  Ajax's  burial  through  her  instrument,  Odysseus,  thus 
preventing  his  body  from  being  outraged  by  the  Atreidae;  cf.  Kirkwood  (1958: 
275  n.  33),  Wigodsky  (1962:  152-58),  Bergson  (1986:  38-40);  contra,  rightly, 
Stanford  (p.  237-8),  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  58  n.  56). 
182  Contra,  unconvincingly,  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  80).  On  the  joint  cult  of  Ajax  and 
Eurysaces  in  Athens  see  Paus.  1.35.3-4.  On  the  cults  of  Ajax's  descendants  see  the 
extensive  bibliography  offered  by  Henrichs  (1993:  175  n.  40). 
183  See  further  the  detailed  analysis  by  Henrichs  (1993). 324 
cult;  184  moreover,  the  funeral  procession  at  the  end  of  the  play,  with  Ajax 
being  carried  to  the  tomb  in  full  panoply  (1408  Töv  ürrraQ1Ti6Lov 
K6apov),  may  recall  the  KXLVT  µETä  navonXias  of  the  Aianteia  festival 
(see  below).  Even  Odysseus'  terror  at  the  prologue  (74,76,80),  when 
Athena  proposes  to  show  to  him  the  results  of  Ajax's  vOaos  (66-70),  may 
be  an  indication  of  the  heroic  status  that  Ajax  is  in  the  process  of 
acquiring:  fear  was  an  Athenian's  typical  reaction  towards  heroes;  a  hero 
was  likely  to  harm  anyone  who  would  pass  by  his  tomb,  and  he  had  to  be 
appeased  regularly  with  offerings.  "If  he  was  in  his  mind",  Odysseus 
explains  (82),  "no  fear  would  have  made  me  shun  him".  Precisely:  his 
madness  is  what  gives  Ajax  his  praeterhuman  status;  it  is  because  of  his 
deranged  mind  that  he  has  been  engaged  in  the  impasses,  the  irresolvable 
ambiguities  (succinctly  expounded  by  Athena  at  39-65),  which  will  lead 
eventually  to  his  death  (cf.  the  equation  of  his  madness  with  death  at 
215!  )  and  heroization.  185  Plato  (Phdr.  265a)  says  that  divine  madness  is 
produced  ÜTTÖ  6E  Las  E  a)A  yfjs  TWV  E  LWe6TWV  voµ(µcov;  and 
transcendence  of  the  E06Ta  v6  nh1a,  disintegration  of  the  world  as 
184  Note  also  the  accumulated  phrases  for  ritual  mourning  in  627-34,  pointed  out 
by  Burton  (1980:  24-25).  As  Seaford  (1994a:  114-20)  points  out,  lamentation  in 
public  was  the  norm  in  hero-cult,  but  was  strongly  disapproved  of  in  the  case 
of  private  grief  (see  esp.  Ant.  1246-50).  For  more  possible  hints  at  Ajax's  cult  see 
Seaford  (1994a:  130  n.  121). 
185  Stanford  (ad  82)  has  put  forward  another  explanation  of  Odysseus'  fear  of 
the  mad  Ajax,  namely  that  "Odysseus  is  thinking  of  the  tremendous  strength 
that  madmen  have  and  the  impossibility  of  controlling  them  by  reasonable 
argument";  cf.  also  Jebb  (xxiii).  Rosenmeyer  (1971:  194)  thinks  that  Odysseus  is 
afraid  of  the  madman's  pollution;  cf.  Padel  (1995:  150).  Surely,  however, 
Sophocles'  extraordinary  emphasis  on  Odysseus'  fear  (its  demonstration  takes 
fifteen  lines:  74-88!  )  must  be  intended  as  something  more  than  a  mere  reminder 
of  the  well-known  fact  that  mad  people  are  dangerous  or  agents  of  pollution.  - 
Poe's  (1987:  29-35)  contention  that  Ajax  in  the  prologue  is  a  comic  figure,  a 
miles  gloriosus,  is  completely  beside  the  mark. 325 
conceptualized  and  categorized  by  the  human  mind,  is  exactly  what 
distinguishes  a  superhuman  being,  such  as  a  hero  is,  from  a  mere 
mortal.  186  After  all,  it  is  not  accidental  that  madness  can  be  a  typical 
feature  of  heroes  (Brelich  [1958:  264-65]187). 
Let  it  be  repeated:  Odysseus'  intervention,  far  from  liberating  Ajax 
from  the  impasses  that  beset  him  and  led  to  his  death,  helps  him 
maintain  his  ambiguous  status;  so,  Ajax  transcends  the  here-and-now  of 
our  conventional  human  perceptions,  thus  being  translated  into  a  kind 
of  existence  that  lies  beyond  the  world  as  we  conceive  it.  His  burial 
reflects  perhaps  this  essential  ambiguity  that  Ajax  retains  even  after  his 
death:  although  it  is  seen  as  a  symbol  of  his  reintegration  into  the 
community,  it  takes  place  at  the  markedly  peripheral  area  of  the 
seashore  (cf.  1064-65),  thus  appearing  as  an  act  peripheral  to  the  life  of 
the  community.  It  is  not  clear  whether  the  burial  is,  as  it  full  well  should 
be,  a  communal  act:  Agamemnon  clearly  presented  it  as  a  business 
concerning  only  Odysseus  and,  presumably,  Ajax's  relatives  (1368).  188 
Teucer,  however,  invites  Odysseus  to  '  fetch  any  Greek  willing  to  help 
(1396-97),  which  may  imply  that  there  is  going  to  be  a  proper  funeral 
with  the  participation  of  the  whole  army;  but  it  is  not  clear  from 
Odysseus'  answer  what  he  is  going  to  do:  1401  Eßµ'  may  mean  `I  am  going 
186  Cf.  Bradshaw  (1991:  99-100). 
187  See  also  Padel  (1995:  242-44),  who  nonetheless  considers  madness  as  a 
characteristic  only  of  tragic  heroes.  Cf.  also  the  stories  about  hero-athletes 
(Cleomedes  of  Astypalaia,  Euthycles  of  Locri,  Oibotas  of  Dyme,  Theagenes  of 
Thasos)  who  are  dishonoured  by  the  community,  retaliate  in  anger  or  in 
madness,  are  punished,  but  then,  as  a  consequence  of  a  calamity  that  befalls  the 
community  (and  on  oracular  advice)  they  are  offered  cult.  See  further  J. 
Fontenrose,  CSCA  1  (1968)  73-104;  R.  A.  S.  Seaford,  JHS  108  (1988)  134;  Seaford 
(1994a:  184). 
188  Cf.,  on  this  point,  Bowie  (1983:  114). 326 
to  fetch  people  to  help  with  the  burial'  or  simply  `I  am  going  away'.  189 
Furthermore,  Odysseus  himself  is  treated  according  to  the  maxim  he  has 
put  forward  at  1359:  Teucer  praises  him  (1381  ETraLvkTaL)  like  a  friend, 
but  would  not  allow  him  to  participate  actively  in  the  burial,  since  he  is 
not  a4  tXos  (cf.  1400)  of  the  dead  Ajax;  still,  he  is  allowed  to  co-operate 
(1396  ýüµTrpa(YQE)  as  Ajax's  friends  will  do  (1413-15).  The  collapse  of 
distinctions,  the  blurring  of  dichotomies,  are  still  there. 
Interestingly,  an  aspect  of  this  confusion  of  limits  may  have  been  a 
characteristic  feature  of  the  festival  of  the  Aianteia,  in  which  It  seems 
that  both  Ajax's  hoplite  and  `black  hunter'  aspect  were  symbolically 
present.  We  are  informed  by  the  schol.  Pi.  N.  2.19  (III,  p.  37  Drachmann) 
that  there  was  a  KXLvTl,  a  couch,  that  was  dedicated  to  him  at  Athens  and 
adorned  with  a  panoply,,  190  epigraphic  evidence191  suggests  that  this 
couch  was  carried  at  a  solemn  procession  (TroµTri)  by,  among  others, 
Athenian  ephebes,  individuals  who  were  not  yet  full  members  of  the 
hoplite  community.  The  ephebes  also  participated  in  the  race  (µaKpös 
8pöµoc)  and  the  Xc  Trä  192  an  important  part  of  the  Salaminian  games 
called  the  Aianteia  -  race  being  a  classic  ephebic  (initiatory)  trial,  which 
marked  the  ephebe's  transition  to  the  male  adult  society  (for  8pöµos  was 
a  typically  adult,  virile  activity;  see  the  interesting  pieces  of  evidence 
assembled  by  Vidal-Naquet  [1986b:  116  with  nn.  53-55]).  193  Thus,  the 
189  Easterling  (1988:  95-96)  rightly  recognizes  the  possibility  of  Odysseus' 
assisting  with  Ajax's  burial.  Segal  (1981:  149),  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  79  with  n.  25), 
Bowie  (1983:  115)  and  Blundell  (1989:  105)  fail  to  perceive  this  ambiguity. 
190  Cf.  Farnell  (1921:  308),  von  der  Mühll  (1930:  23).  On  the  Aianteia  see 
Toepffer,  RE  1(1894)  925-29,  Deubner  (1932:  228). 
191  See  Pelekidis  (1962:  248  n.  6). 
192  For  epigraphical  evidence  see  Toepffer,  RE  1  (1894)  928.  On  the  role  of  the 
ephebes  see  Pelekidis  (1962:  247-49). 
193  Cf.  esp.  the  Cretan  use  of  61r68poµoc  =  `minor'  and  8poµcUT  =  `adult'  (Leg. 
Gort.  VII.  35  and  41  respectively).  Cf.  Aristoph.  Byzant.  apud  Eust.  727.18ff., 327 
combination  of  the  KALvI1  µET  L  TravoTrXtac  (symbol  of  the  hoplite)  and  of 
the  ephebes  who  carried  it  in  procession  and  also  underwent  the  ephebic 
racing  trial  (symbol  of  the  ephebes'  transitional  status,  betwixt  and 
between  adolescence  and  incorporation  into  the  phalanx  /  civic 
community)  in  the  Aianteia  may  have  facilitated  Sophocles'  presentation 
of  Ajax  as  a  man  whose  heroic  essence  is  defined  by  an  irresolvable 
tension  between  opposites.  194 
5.7.1  Excursus  on  knowledge  and  ignorance  in  the  Max 
This  last  section  will  consist  in  a  brief  examination  of  the  issue  of 
knowledge  and  ignorance  in  relation  to  the  human  condition.  Ajax's 
madness  is  deplored  by  Odysseus  -in  the  prologue  with  some  sad 
considerations  on  the  frailty  of  the  human  condition  (121-26).  The 
Chorus  take  a  similar  view.  if  Ajax  has  recovered  from  his  sudden,  fit  of 
1592.55ff.  (Kp1  TEs  8E  frro5pöµovs  [SC.  KCÜ1oZ)QL  TOÜS  EýTj3OVs]  OÜ  8Lä  TÖ 
[...  ],  X  8i*x8il  äzr08poµol  Ev  Kp1  r13  oT  TrETra1Dß6al  TWV  8pöµwv  ?  i)  L  [1117W  wv 
KOLV(Zv  8p6µwv  µETEXoVTEc  Eýr  (3oL).  See  R.  F.  Willets  (ed.  ),  The  Law  Code  of 
Gortyn  [Kadmos  SuppL  1]  (Berlin  1967),  pp.  10-11  and  comm.  on  VII.  35-6,41.  We 
have  no  such  lexilogical  evidence  from  Athens  itself,  but  we  know  that  an 
Athenian  festival  strongly  associated  with  passage  rites,  namely  the 
Oschophoria,  included  an  ephebic  race:  Vidal-Naquet  (1986b:  114-6). 
194  Toepffer,  RE  1  (1894)  928-29  has  plausibly  supposed  that  the  Salaminian 
8pc5µEva,  attested  by  Plutarch  (Solon  9.6),  in  which  an  ävnp  EVoTr>os  IETCI  (3oljs 
EOEL  Trpöc  aKpov  Tö  EKLpä&LOV,  must  have  been  associated  with  the  ephebic 
8pöµos  of  the  Aianteia.  Further,  von  der  Miihll  (1930:  24)  has  put  forward  the 
interesting  hypothesis  that  this  armed  man  could  well  have  been,  supposedly, 
Ajax;  if  this  is  correct,  then  the  ambiguity  inherent  in  Ajax's  character  as  a 
pus  would  have  been  all  the  more  prominent:  the  Evo1TXos  hoplite  hero 
becomes  engaged  in  a  typically  ephebic  contest  such  as  the  8p6µoc. 328 
fury,  then  everything  will  be  much  better  (263-64)  -  sanity  is  evidently 
considered  as  far  preferable  to  madness.  'Still,  it  soon  appears  that 
nothing  could  be  farther  from  the  truth.  Tecmessa  says  that,  now  that 
Ajax  has  become  aware  of  his  dishonour,  his  misery,  far  from  being 
alleviated,  has  grown  unbearable.  Resuming  his  mental  faculties  is  not  an 
unproblematic  procedure  for  Ajax:  not  only  does  he  feel  all  too  painfully 
the  predicament  in  which  he  has  found  himself,  but  also  (and  this  is  yet 
another  paradox)  his  first  reaction  to  the  realization  of  the  dishonour  he 
has  suffered  is  to  break  into  lamentations  (317),  like  the  KaKds  scat 
ßap6/vyoc_dv4p  of  whom  he  used  to  disapprove  (319-22)195  -  one 
recalls  Ajax's  inability  to  avoid  dishonour,  as  analyzed  above  in  section 
5.4.1.  A  little  later,  Ajax  himself  describes  TO"  µr18Ev  4povE  tv  as  ý81aTos 
3Los  (552-555),  implicitly  contrasting  it  with  his  realization  of  his  own 
discreditable  deeds.  196.  (For  the  connection  between  ignorance  and  bliss  cf. 
S.  fr.  583.5  R.:  TEpTTVQ3  'yap  ä¬.  TraL8as  ävoia  TpE4EL).  The  final 
confirmation  of  the  typically  Sophoclean  view  that  human  knowledge  is 
inescapably  limited  and  uncertain  comes  (naturally!  )  from  the  gods:  Ajax 
(as  Athena  herself  made  clear  in  the  prologue)  undisputably  excelled  all 
Greeks  in  foresight  and  skill  in  timely  action  (119-20).  197  Nonetheless,  in 
Sophoclean  tragedy  too  much  intellectual  excellence  is  never 
commendable:  according  to  Calchas  (whom  we  must  accept  as  Athena's 
mouthpiece),  198  when  Ajax's  4povEty  transcended  the  boundaries 
195  Cf.  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  37). 
196  Cf.  Blundell  (1989:  68).  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  33-38)  has  some  fine  remarks  on 
what  he  calls  "la  tragicitä  del  conoscere". 
197  I  paraphrase  Stanford's  (ad  119-20)  rendering.  Rosenmeyer  (1971:  172-73) 
curiously  thinks  that  Athena's  words  are  "a  bare-faced  mockery  of  the  truth". 
198  Linforth  (1954:  21-25)  unduly  depreciates  Calchas'  words,  and  Rosenmeyer 
(1971:  183)  strangely  thinks  of  him  as  "not,  in  this  play  at  any  rate,  an  entirely 
reputable  informant"!  Schlesinger  (1970:  375-84)  thinks  that  Calchas'  words 329 
prescribed  for  man  (761,777),  his  admirable  TrpbvoLa  turned  out  to  be  in 
fact  only  foolishness  (763  ävous,  766  ä#övc,  c;  perhaps  also  758 
avör1Ta199).  Interestingly,  Ajax's  offence  against  the  gods  (i.  e.  rejecting 
their  help,  and  particularly  Athena's  protection)  is  presented  as  a 
shortcoming  in  his  mental  faculties,  as  ävoLa,  not  (say)  as  a  moral  flaw; 
thus  the  contrast  with  Athena's  words  at  119-20  becomes  all  the  more 
pointed,  as  we  realize  how  insufficient  Ajax's  excellent  TrpövoLa  in  fact 
was.  It  may  be  that  no  one  was  TrpovoicTEpos  than  he,  but  it  turns  out 
that  what  is  really  enviable  is  not  his  intellectual  superiority  but  TO' 
µr18ýv  4povEly  of  the  baby  Eurysaces. 
This  view  seems  to  be  confirmed  by  some  further  considerations.  In 
the  prologue,  Ajax  is  certainly  in  a  state  of  utter  debasement  and,  what  is 
more,  utter  derangement  and  ignorance  (interestingly  presented  as 
blindness:  -  51-52,69-70,85200).  However,  as  we  have  already  seen  (p.  265 
and  esp.  p.  322f.  ),  he  is  paradoxically  god-like:  his  ambiguous  status 
between  hoplite  and  hunter  is  shared  by  Athena,  and  it  was  probably  also 
a  conspicuous  feature  of  Ajax's  cult  as  a  hero  (cf.  my  remarks  on  the 
Aianteia  above,  p.  326f.  );  it  is  precisely  this  ambiguous  status  that  leads 
him  to  death  and  heroization  (assumption  of  praeterhuman  status). 
Interestingly,  it  is  the  mad  and,  practically,  blind  Ajax  who  sees  Athena  in 
the  prologue:  Odysseus  insists  very  much  on  the  fact  that  he  can  only 
are  misunderstood  and  /  or  misquoted.  Criticism  of  such  views  in  Heath  (1987: 
191  n.  5  3),  Poe  (1987:  80  n.  15  5). 
199  This  is  the  reading  of  only  one  MS,  Zc,  ante  correctionem.  Pace  Kirkwood 
(1965:  61)  it  does  not  mean  "`rash'  rather  than  `stupid'".  I  find  Davis's  (1986: 
147-48)  attempt  to  `re-interpret'  irpovoüvrcpoc  irritatingly  fanciful. 
200  Cf.  Knox  (1979:  129  with  n.  26),  Buxton  (1980:  22-23),  Seale  (1982:  145-46).  On 
madness  as  blindness  see  again  Buxton  (1980:  33)  and,  most  recently,  Padel 
(1995:  68,74-75).  On  the  association  of  sight  with  knowledge  (as  expressed  by 
the  cognate  stems  IS-  [lL6Ety]  and  ELS-  [EL8EvaL])  see  the  classic  treatment  by 
Snell  (1924:  26-7);  especially  in  Sophocles:  Coray  (1993:  11-18). 330 
hear  the  goddess  (15-17),  201  whereas  Ajax's  silence  on  this  matter  may 
mean  that  he  can  both  hear  and  see  her  (this  is  admittedly  an 
argumentum  e  silentio,  for  what  it  is  worth;  but  Tecmessa's  words  at  301- 
304  seem  to  corroborate  this  view,  since  Ajax  is  there  presented  as 
conversing  with  an  interlocutor  he  can  apparently  see:  cf.  esp.  301-302 
CTKLd  TLvL  I  Xöyous  ävEQ1ra).  202  It  is  not  accidental  that  the  Chorus  use 
the  significant  word  BLaTrE4oLßäaOaL  (332)  with  reference  to  Ajax's 
madness:  their  chiefs  derangement  seems  to  translate  him  to  a  level  of 
superhuman  knowledge,  like  the  knowledge  inspired  by  4otI3os,  who 
sends  his  servants  mad  (Cassandra  in  A.  Ag.  1072ff.;  Sibylla  in  Verg.  Aen. 
6.42ff.,  esp.  46-51,77-80)  whilst  endowing  them,  at  the  same  time,  with 
a  supernatural  kind  of  knowledge.  203  To  sum  up,  only  when  Ajax  is 
201  With  Welcker  (1829:  78  with  n.  95),  Jebb  (ad  15),  Kamerbeek  (ad  15),  Lesky 
(1972:  190),  Buxton  (1980:  22  with  nn.  1-2),  Davis  (1986:  144)  and  Pucci  (1994:  18- 
20)  I  take  ärrosrroc  to  mean  `invisible',  not  `seen  at  a  distance'  or  "visibile  con 
difficoltä",  as  Fraenkel  (1977:  3)  has  it.  I  am  not  convinced  by  Stanford's  (ad  15) 
compromise,  shared  by  Calder  (1965:  114),  namely  that  Athena  is  at  first 
invisible  to  Odysseus,  but  then  gradually  becomes  visible  (cf.  the  objections  of 
Buxton  [1980:  22  n.  3]).  Nor  can  I  agree  with  Taplin  (1978:  185  n.  12)  and  Heath 
(1987:  165-66)  that  Athena  is  visible  to  Odysseus  throughout  the  prologue; 
Grossmann  (1968:  75)  also  implausibly  suggests  that  Odysseus  has  a  much 
clearer  perception  of  the  goddess  than  Ajax,  and  that  this  has  further 
implications  for  the  interpretation  of  the  play.  On  Athena's  invisibility  see 
Seale's  (1982:  145)  very  fine  remarks.  Kitto's  (1961:  153)  view,  endorsed  by 
Gellie  (1972:  5),  that  the  actor  playing  Athena  was  invisible  even  to  the 
audience,  speaking  as  he  did  from  behind  the  scene,  seems  improbable,  as  his 
voice  would  have  been  hardly  audible. 
202  On  this  point,  I  am  fully  in  agreement  with  Jebb  (ad  15);  cf.  Reinhardt  (1979: 
9),  Calder  (1965:  114),  Biggs  (1966:  224),  Davis  (1986:  147),  Ley  (1988:  88)  and, 
above  all,  Seale  (1982:  147-48).  Contra  Welcker  (1829:  77),  Pucci  (1994:  22  n.  16). 
203  Mad  people  seeing  what  the  sane  cannot  see  is  a  fairly  common  motif  in 
tragedy;  cf.  e.  g.  E.  Ba.  299,  and  see  Padel  (1995:  78-81).  Plato  (Phdr.  244a-c) 
derives  µavTUCtj  from  pavuct,  and  gives  as  examples  of  prophetic  madness 331 
deranged  and  blind,  only  when  he  loses  his  intellectual  and  visual 
faculties,  can  he  (paradoxically)  see  the  gods  and  gradually  assimilate 
himself  to  them  by  becoming  a  hero. 
Further  insight  into  the  problem  of  the  limits  of  human  knowledge 
may  be  provided  by  an  examination  of  Calchas'  oracle.  Why  does  this 
oracle  come  so  late  as  to  be  of  no  use?  As  Diller  (1950:  6-7)  rightly 
remarks,  this  is  not  merely  meant  to  create  suspense;  it  is  intended  as  a 
reminder  of  the  ineluctability  of  Ajax's  doom.  True,  the  oracle  is  put  in  a 
disjunctive  form:  this  day  will  signal  either  Ajax's  death  or  his  salvation 
(cf.  801-2),  depending  on  whether  Ajax  goes  outdoors  or  stays  indoors. 
Nonetheless,  we  have  already  seen  (section  5.3.1)  that  this  is  a  pseudo- 
dilemma:  in  the  case  of  Ajax  it  is  meaningless  to  speak  of  "indoors"  and 
"outdoors",  for  this  distinction  has  irretrievably  collapsed;  the  only  way 
out  for  Ajax  is  his  transition  to  a  state  that  transcends  such  distinctions 
-  the  state  of  a  cult  hero  -  and  to  a  locus  which  has  nothing  to  do  with 
locality  -  Hades.  What  the  oracle  really  predicts,  therefore,  is  Ajax's 
inescapable  catastrophe.  As  in  the  Trachiniae,  the  oracle's  disjunctive 
form  turns  out  to  be  a  mere  appearance:  far  from  implying  that  there  is 
scope  for  free  human  choice  and  that,  as  a  consquence,  a  happy  outcome 
may  be,  after  all,  possible,  this  form  turns  out  to  be  only  a  deceptively 
ambiguous  manifestation  of  the  fundamental  monosemy  of  divine  will.  It 
is  because  this  monosemy  is  almost  invariably  beyond  the  reach  of  the 
limited  intellectual  resources  of  human  beings  that  woeful 
misconceptions  about  the  gods  so  often  arise  -  misconceptions  whose 
catastrophic  implications,  highlighting  as  they  do  the  incommensurable 
Pythia,  the  priestesses  at  Dodona,  and  Sibylla. 332 
chasm  separating  divine  from  human  knowledge,  constitute  the  core  of 
every  surviving  Sophoclean  tragedy.  204 
APPENDIX  A 
Ajax  the  hoplite 
It  is  a  well  known  fact  that  in  5th  century  art  Homeric  warriors  are 
represented  as  hoplites,  by  means  of  an  anachronism  which  is  quite 
understandable.  Copious  iconographic  evidence  is  provided  by  e.  g.  Pierre 
Ducrey  (1986):  p.  41  (pl.  23),  47  (pl.  25),  57  (pl.  39),  62  (pi.  43)  -  see 
here  plates  I&  II.  Ajax  is  no  exception:  he  is  systematically  represented  as 
a  5th  century  hoplite  (see  here  plates  III  &  IV).  Even  his  famous  Homeric 
tower-shield  is  replaced,  in  art,  by  either  the  scalloped  or  the  circular 
hoplite  shield.  205  This  is  the  case  in  our  play  too:  Ajax's  shield  is  certainly 
not  the  Homeric  adKOs  TjÜTE  Trvpyov,  as  appears  from  575-76  8Lä 
TroXuppä4  ou  aTpE4XV  TröpTraKOS;  for  as  Ducrey  (1986:  47)  says,  "whereas 
[the  large  Geometric  shield]  had  been  carried  suspended  from  a  shoulder 
204  On  the  affinities  between  the  disjunctively  phrased  oracles  in  the  Ajax  and 
in  the  Trachiniae  see  Diller  (1950:  13).  I  refrain  from  going  into  further  detail, 
since  I  have  given  a  full  treatment  of  the  subject  (i.  e.  the  deceptively 
disjunctive  phrasing  of  monosemous  divine  will)  in  Chapter  Three,  section 
3.4.1. 
205  On  these  two  types  of  hoplite  shield  see  Ducrey  (1986:  47-52).  Snodgrass 
(1967:  55)  does  not  accept  that  the  scalloped,  `Boeotian',  shield  ever  existed  in 
real  life.  However,  this  type  of  shield,  even  if  it  was  a  mere  device  of  Greek 
artists  (a  view  to  which  Ducrey  [1986:  50-52]  has  raised  strong  and  plausible 
objections),  apes  the  hoplite  shield  both  in  overall  shape  (almost  circular, 
much  smaller  than  the  older  Geometric  scalloped  shield)  and  in  that  it  has  a 
porpax  inside,  as  Snodgrass  himself  (l.  c.  )  remarks. 333 
strap,  the  round  shield  [...  ]  (called  a  hoplon,  a  generic  term  whose 
meaning  was  to  be  extended  to  the  weapons  as  a  whole  and  to  the  hoplite 
himself,  since  it  was  his  principal  weapon)206  was  held  by  means  of  an 
armhold  (porpax)  [...  ].  The  fighter  was  thus  free  to  move  his  shield  in 
any  direction".  Snodgrass  (1967:  53)  stresses  that  the  porpax  was  a  new 
invention  and  peculiar  to  the  hoplite  shield.  So,  the  words  Tr6prraKOs 
and,  probably,  OTpE4WV  (alluding  to  the  hoplite's  freedom  to  move  his 
shield  in  all  directions)  in  the  Ajax  passage  quoted  above  leave  no  doubt 
that  in  Sophocles'  play  Ajax's  shield  was  not  the  Homeric  but  the  hoplite 
weapon.  This  view  has  already  been  propounded,  unreservedly,  by  von 
der  Mühll  (1930:  13),  who  saw  that  Ajax  must  have  been  thought  of  as  a 
hoplite  hero,  like  those  whose  epiphanies  are  reported  by  Herodotus  (6. 
117;  8.38-39). 
There  are  also  other  instances  in  which  the  Ajax  text  seems  to 
confirm  this  view.  In  a  striking  passage  in  the  parodos  the  Chorus  refer  to 
their  chief  in  terms  of  the  hoplite  ideology,  stressing  not  only  his  military 
excellence,  but  also  his  cooperative  spirit:  µeTä  yap  µEydXwv  ßaLös 
QpLQT'  äv  I  KQL  I.  I.  E'yas  ÖpOote'  blT6  J1LKQOTEpWV  (160-61).  The  Chorus 
imply  that  Ajax  consciously  espouses  this  view:  he  is  not  like  the  ävoilTOL 
(162;  presumably  Odysseus  and  the  Atreidae),  who  do  not  understand 
it.  207  Ajax,  far  from  being  after  his  personal  KAEos  only,  ensures  his 
dependants'  well-being:  Xi  LEls  ovBEV  Q6Evopev  Trpös  TaUT'  I 
äTraMýaaOaL  aoü  XWp(s,  ävaý  (165-66).  208  Critics,  in  their  anxiety  to 
206  This  view  has  been  recently  challenged  by  J.  F.  Lazenby  &  D.  Whitehead,  tip 
n.  s.  46  (1996)  27-33. 
207  Contra,  wrongly,  Davis  (1986:  150). 
208  Cf.  Adams  (1955:  99).  On  the  solidarity  between  Ajax  and  his  soldiers  see,  pace 
Whitman  (1951:  260  n.  20)  and,  more  recently,  Minadeo  (1987:  20-21),  the 
excellent  remarks  of  Bowra  (1944:  19-21),  Burton  (1980:  11-12)  and  Rose  (1995: 
71).  Bradshaw  (1991:  111-13,115,118)  has  shown  that  solidarity  was  a 334 
stress  Ajax's  individualism,  have  disregarded  or  downplayed  the 
importance  of  two  passages,  namely  349  and  406,  where  the  hero 
addresses  his  soldiers  as  4(Xoc  or,  in  the  former  passage,  as  µövoL  Epc  v 
4  i?  üv  .I  cannot  see  a  better  way  of  expressing  the  bond  of  friendship,  the 
reciprocal  solidarity  between  fellow-warriors.  209  A  similar  feeling  is 
conveyed  by  Ajax's  referring  to  his  soldiers  as  yEvos  vatas  äpct)yöv 
TEXvas  (357):  yEvos  brings  out  their  aspect  as  members  of  the  yEvos  of 
the  Salaminians,  emphasizing  their  fellowship  with  Ajax  (the  Salaminians 
are  addressed  as  avvTpo4ov  yEvos  also  at  861);  210  while  äpu  yöv  refers 
to  the  cooperative  values  uniting  the  chief  and  his  fellow-warriors. 
Furthermore,  Ajax's  `political',  i.  e.  communal,  cooperative,  virtues 
are  reaffirmed  in  the  third  stasimon  too:  the  Chorus  complain  that  the 
negative,  mortal,  communality  of  the  war  (1197  KOLVO'V  "Apfl)  and  of 
death  (1193  TroXvKOLvov  "ALBav)  has  replaced  the  positive  communality, 
the  TE  p&Jcs  (1201,1204)  of  life  in  the  polls  -  which,  in  this  stasimon,  is 
expressed  in  terms  of  a  par  excellence  collective  expression  of  the  polls, 
namely  the  symposion  (1199-1205),  "the  most  social  of  all  institutions", 
as  Segal  (1981:  145)  called  it.  211  Significantly,  the  same  word,  TEpýLS 
characteristic  expression  of  Ajax's  sense  of  al8c,  a  trait  which  he  regards  as 
typical  of  this  hero  both  in  Homer  and  in  Sophocles;  cf.  Sorum  (1986:  363-64).  l 
cannot  agree  with  Lesky  (1972:  182)  that  in  the  lines  quoted  above  in  the  text 
"...  der  Abstand  wird  sichtbar,  der  gerade  bei  Sophokles  den  Chor  als  Gruppe 
von  dem  im  tragischen  Schicksal  Isolierten  trennt.  "  Mr  Garvie  points  out  to  me 
that  e.  g.  467  and  1283,  with  their  emphasis  on  Ajax's  individuality,  suggest  a 
heroic/Homeric  rather  than  hoplite  ethos;  however,  individual  aristeia  or 
andragathia  was  far  from  unusual  in  hoplite  warfare:  W.  K.  Pritchett,  The  Greek 
State  at  War,  Part  II  (Berkeley  1974),  pp.  276-90;  cf.  also  Sage  (1996:  34). 
209  The  significance  of  this  point  Blundell  (1989:  72  n.  62)  regrettably  tries  to 
belittle;  its  importance  is  rightly  stressed  by  Bradshaw  (1991:  118). 
210  Welcker  (1829:  63)  suggested  that  QvvTpo4)OV  -yEvos  means  the  Atav-Lc  4uAf 
(contra  Jebb  xxx  n.  3):  again,  the  idea  of  fellowship  would  be  central. 
211  Schmitt-Pantel  (1990:  17-19,21,24-25)  points  out,  tentatively,  that  the tTI PLATE  IV ýLF-rE  V.  2 335 
(1215),,  is  also  used  of  the  feeling  Ajax  used  to  inspire  in  the  Chorus  when 
still  alive  and  protecting  them  from  hostile  attacks  (1211-13):  he  was 
warding  off  the  negative  communality  of  war  and  Hades,  thus  ensuring 
the  very  existence  of  his  soldiers'  community  and  preserving  the  TE  p  s1s 
of  the  positive,  pleasurable  communality  of  life  in  the  polis,  212  exactly  as 
the  symposion,  qua  collective,  shared,  experience,  reasserts  the  coherence 
of  the  political  body,  providing  an  analogous  kind  of  TE  pýLs.  213  After 
Ajax's  death  there  is  to  be  no  TEp(PLs  for  his  soldiers  (1215);  this  is  why 
they  end  this  stasimon  with  a  wish  to  go  back  to  `holy  Athens'  (1221-22): 
only  the  polls  itself  can  make  up  for  the  loss  of  the  man  who 
reconstructed  for  his  dependants  a  polis-like  environment,  an  agreeable 
KOWv  Tfs,  in  the  midst  of  the  perverted  communality  of  war  and  death. 
It  appears  again  that  Ajax,  far  from  indulging  in  an  exclusive 
individualism,  rendered  important  services  to  the  community;  his  heroic 
deeds  were  not  simply  acts  of  military  prowess,  but  had  also  a  clear  pro- 
polls  function,  as  they  preserved  the  very  existence  of  the  body  of  soldiers 
/  citizens. 
APPENDIX.  B 
Ares  the  hoplite,  Apollo  the  archer 
Ares  was  thought  of  as  a  typical  hoplite.  P.  Bruneau,  LIMC  11.1,488 
says  of  Ares  that  "...  des  monuments  epigraphes  comme  des  textes 
symposion,  the  sacrificial  meal  as  well  as  other  forms  of  commensality 
"function  as  the  machinery  for  defining,  recognizing,  and  expressing 
citizenship"  and  as  models  of  civic  institutions  (the  quotation  is  from  p.  24). 
212  The  army  and  the  polls  are  equated  in  Greek  thought;  the  one  is  a  reflection 
of  the  other.  The  hoplite  warrior  is  simply  a  citizen  in  arms.  Cf.  above,  p.  308 
with  n.  147. 
213  On  the  TEpJLc-theme  in  this  stasimon  see  Burton  (1980:  37). 336 
litteraires  se  degage  1'  image  d'  un  dieu  que  Tien,  dans  son  aspect 
physique  ni  dans  son  equipement,  ne  distingue  d'  un  autre  guerrier. 
hoplite  au  Vie  s.,  puis  plus  denude,  mais  comme  tout  autre  combattant 
dans  1'  imagerie  du  temps  [...  ]"  (emphasis  mine);  cf.  Ibid.,  490:  Ares  "est 
la  seule  divinite  ä  conserver  son  armament  en  dehors  des  scenes  de 
bataille  [...  ].  Il  se  presente  donc  comme  un  homme  dans  le  force  de  1'  age, 
barbu  et  arme  de  pied  en  cap  ä  la  fagon  d'  un  hoplite  du  temps  [...  ].  Les 
hoplites  de  la  societe  archaIque  ne  pouvaient  que  se  reconnaltre  dans  1' 
image  d'  un  Ajres]  toujours  arme  a  leur  maniere  [...  ]"  (emphasis  mine). 
On  the  other  hand,  Apollo  was  the  bow-god  par  excellence:  in  the 
`Homeric'  hymn  to  Apollo  the  bow  as  a  typical  attribute  of  the  god  is 
most  conspicuous  (e.  g.  4,13,140,178).  214  What  is  more,  as  an  archer-god 
he  may  be  viewed  as  an  anti-hoplite,  215  and  therefore  he  is  often 
associated  with  night  and  darkness  (unlike  a  hoplite  who  fights  In  broad 
daylight,  cf.  above  p.  259f.  ):  in  Ii.  1.47,  for  instance,  when  he  descends  to 
the  Greek  encampment  to  wreak  disaster  with  his  shafts,  he  is  vuKTL 
EOLKtc216  (an  interesting  parallel  is  Od.  11.606,  where  the  archer 
Herakles  is  Epgtvý,  VUKT'L  EOLKWs!  );  cf.  also  [E.  ]  Rhes.  226-7  where  Apollo 
is  invoked  to  come  TO  1  P11s  and  EVVÜXLOs,  in  order  to  assist  Dolon's 
guile!  Furthermore,  Apollo's  `canonic'  iconographic  type  is  that  of  an 
archer:  W.  Lambrinudakis,  LIMC  II.  1,314  speaks  of  "Übergang  vom 
geometrischen  Kriegestypus  des  Lanzenschwingers  zum  kanonischen 
nackten  Bogenschützen";  cf.  ibid.  315-17;  also  O.  Palagia,  LIMC  II.  1,318- 
19.  Even  in  the  Hellenistic  era,  when  the  ki  tharöidos--type  prevails  over 
214  Cf.  Burkert  (1985a:  145-46);  P.  Bruneau,  LIMC  II.  1,184:  "C'  est  la  figure  d' 
A.  [pollon]  archer  qui  est  la  plus  frequente  [sc.  in  the  literary  sources]" 
215  On  the  antinomy  "hoplite  :  archer"  see  above  nn.  10,145  and  149. 
216  The  line  was  athetized  by  Zenodotus;  see  Kirk  (1985:  58),  who  thinks  that, 
whatever  the  truth  is,  "`like  night',  at  least,  is  effective". 337 
the  archer-type,  the  bow  is  always  present  in  the  'Bogenschütze'  type  of 
the  god:  see  G.  Kokkorou-Alewras,  LIMC  11.1,323-34. 
There  is  at  least  one  artistic  representation  in  which  the  distinction 
between  Apollo  the  bow-god  and  Ares  the  hoplite  is  drawn  quite  clearly, 
exactly  as  I  suggest  it  is  in  Ajax  703-706:  this  is  the  frieze  of  the  Treasury 
of  the  Siphnians  at  Delphi  (depiction  of  the  Gigantomachy:  see  here 
plates  V.  1  &  V.  2).  Ares  is  there  represented  as  a  hoplite  in  full  armour,  in 
stark  contrast  with  Apollo  (and  Artemis)  who  bears  a  quiver  and  stretches 
out  his  hands,  surely  holding  his  bow  (which  has  not  been  preserved  on 
the  relief).  217  This  is  an  extremely  instructive  example  of  how  5th  century 
Greeks  were  likely  to  perceive  those  two  gods,  especially  when  they  are 
juxtaposed,  as  in  the  Ajax  passage  discussed  above  (p.  274).  A  similar 
juxtaposition  of  the  two  gods  occurs  also  in  another  Sophoclean  passage, 
namely  the  parodos  of  the  OT.  in  the  third  strophe  (190-1)  Ares  is 
exceptionally  visualized  as  iX&\Kog  äaTrL8wv,  which  implies  that  bronze 
shields  are,  normally,  his  standard  attribute;  218  whereas  in  203-5  (in  the 
corresponding  position  in  the  antistrophe!  )  Apollo's  attributes  are  the 
bow  and  the  arrow. 
I  believe  that  the  text  of  Sophocles'  Ajax  further  confirms  this 
contrast  between  Ares  as  the  archetypal  hoplite  and  Apollo  as  the 
archetypal  bowman  /  non-hoplite.  At  706  the  Chorus  say  that  Ares 
f  Xuaev  aLvöv  a'Xoc  aTr'  ö  gIäTwv  and  has  let  plain  daylight  shine  forth: 
XEUKöv  Eü-  Iä  1Epov  .. 
bäoc  (708-9).  The  choice  of  imagery  is 
significant:  Ares  (significantly  devoid,  in  this  passage,  of  the  bloodthirsty 
217  There  are  excellent  photographs  of  the  relief  in  Ducrey  (1986),  p.  255  pl.  170 
(Ares),  p.  258  pl.  174  (Apollo  and  Artemis). 
218  Cf.  Dawe  (1982:  ad  191).  A.  Y.  Campbell,  (Q,  n.  s.  4  (1954)  7-8  fails  to  see  the 
point  of  a'Xc)\coc  äarri&  üv  and  thinks  the  passage  is  corrupt. 338 
cruelty  for  which  he  is  so  often  criticized  in  Greek  literature219)  is  clearly 
visualized  as  "dispersing  a  supernatural  cloud  or  mist"220  and  letting 
Ajax  (or,  less  probably,  the  Chorus)  see  clearly  again  -  the  obvious  reason 
for  this  being  that  the  hoplite  god  is  naturally  associated  with  fighting  in 
broad  daylight  (cf.  [E.  ]  Rhes.,  where  the  hoplite  [305221]  Rhesus  is 
visualized  both  as  Ares  [385-7]  and  as  Zeus  4avato  [355]!  ).  This, 
subsequently,  would  make  the  contrast  with  Apollo  all  the  more  pointed: 
significantly,  Apollo  is  EÜyvwaTo$  (704)  only  in  the  Chorus'  wishful 
thinking  (cf.  the  optative  ývvEILrl  at  705,  and  contrast  it  with  the 
indicative  EAvaEv  at  706):  being  EüyVÜ)OTOS  is  not  a  typical  quality  of  an 
archer  who  is  VVKTL  EOLKWg.  222 
219  The  locus  classicus  is  Il.  S.  31(cf.  890-8);  cf.  A.  Sept.  343-4  with  Hutchinson 
(1985:  ad  loc).  Sophoclean  instances:  Ant.  970ff.;  Of  190-7,215;  even  in  Trach. 
653-4,  where  Ares  is  said  to  have  brought  relief,  the  qualification  o'LvTprj9Eis  (aü 
aTpwOEtc  Musgrave)  is  a  reminder  of  the  god's  darker  side.  Sometimes,  however, 
his  aspect  as  helper  of  the  community  in  war  becomes  prominent,  as  it  does  e.  g. 
in  Ant.  124-6,138-40:  in  this  passage,  as  well  as-in  the  Ajax  passage  in  question, 
the  deviation  from  what  is  almost  a  literary  topos  is  best  explained  if  we  assume 
that  the  poet's  intention  was  to  focus  exclusively  on  the  god  as  an  archetypal 
hoplite,  associated  with  orderly  fighting,  far  from  the  uncontrolled  rage  of 
war. 
220  Stanford  (1978:  194)  -my  emphasis;  see  also  Jebb  ad  706,  Kamerbeek  ad  706, 
Stanford  ad  706. 
221  irEkni  here  must  be  no  different  from  äQnis,  as  appears  from  487  nEXTrly 
E  Ep  twat.  (a  verb  that  could  hardly  be  applied  to  the  small  and  light  shield  that 
was  the  nEkrrl).  It  is  consistent  with  Rhesus'  hoplite  ideology  that  at  510ff.  he 
disparages  Odysseus  for  fighting  stealthily. 
222  I  am  of  course  aware  that  this  reverses  the  usual  image  of  Apollo  as  god  of 
light  -an  association  whose  first  certain  attestations  are  in  A.  Sept.  859  and  E. 
Phaethon  224-6  Diggle  (fr.  781.11-13  W),  as  in  A.  Su.  212-14  this  association  is 
achieved  only  with  by  emendation  (lvty  for  öpvLv  at  212  [Kiehl,  after 
Bamberger];  y'  for  T'  at  214  [Page])  of  a  passage  that  originally  implied  exactly 
the  opposite:  see  Gantz  (1993:  87-8  with  n.  38);  Friis  Johansen  &  Whittle  (1980:  11  . 339 
APPENDIX  C 
The  Trugrede  (646-92) 
The  ambiguities  permeating  the  Trugrede  have  been  stressed  most 
emphatically  by  Fraenkel  (1977:  21):  "e  una  bugia?  No,  a  ambiguo"  (cf. 
also  idem  22-25,37-38).  Eventually,  however,  one  of  the  participants  in 
the  seminar,  Vincenza  Celluprica  (apud  Fraenkel  [1977:  38-39]),  made 
him  change  his  mind!  223  The  systematic  ambiguity  of  the  speech  has  been 
also  stressed  by  Gellie  (1972:  12-13),  Lesky  (1972:  184,190),  Moore  (1977: 
47-48,54-55)  and  Sicherl  (1977:  85-93)  who  has  insisted  that  the  speech 
is  not  an  outright  lie  (on  the  essentially  ambiguous  character  of  the 
speech  cf.  already  Jebb  [xxxii-xxxviii  and  ad  646-692],  Adams  [1955:  103- 
104]);  Seaford  (1994b:  282-88)  sees  this  ambiguity  as  part  of  a  nexus  of 
allusions  to  mystic  ritual.  The  double  entendres  of  this  speech  have  been 
exhaustively  examined  by  Sicherl  (1977:  77-85).  224  Segal  (1981:  114) 
rightly  stressed  that  "[t]his  ambiguity,  in  fact,  may  be  more  important 
than  any  certainty  (remote  in  any  case)  about  Ajax'  actual  aims  here";  cf. 
also  Davis  (1986:  153-54)  and  especially  Goldhill  (1986:  189-92).  These 
ambiguities  are  not  very  well  accounted  for  in  Taplin's  theory  (1979:  128- 
ad  212)  and  West  (in  his  Teubner  text,  1990)  retain  the  MSS  reading;  contra, 
however,  Diggle  (1970:  147).  At  any  rate,  it  is  significant  that  Euripides  himself 
could  just  as  easily  undermine,  with  subtle  irony,  this  bright  `solar'  image  of 
Apollo  in  another  of  his  plays,  namely  Ion,  where  the  god  of  light  indulges  in 
markedly  `dark'  practices:  at  887ff.  the  description  of  his  rape  of  Creusa  clearly 
alludes  to  Plutos  rape  of  Persephone,  as  described  in  h.  Cer.  2ff,  425-32!  After 
all,  Apollo  was  in  some  places  worshipped  as  Cave-Dweller  (caves  being 
entrances  to  the  Underworld):  Farnell  (1907b:  112-13). 
223  See  however  Di  Benedetto's  (1983:  54  n.  47)  reservations  as  to  the  accuracy 
of  this  information. 
224  Cf.  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  54  n.  48). 340 
29)  who  thinks  that  Ajax  can  foresee  a  better  future  for  Tecmessa  and 
Eurysaces,  after  his  enemies'  anger  against  him  will  have  abated  as  a 
result  of  his  death.  225 
On  the  other  hand,  according  to  Reinhardt  (1979:  23-27),  Ajax,  in  a 
mood  of  bitter  irony,  uses  veiled  language  resulting  in  involuntary 
deception.  226  Similarly  Knox  (1979:  136-41)  believes  that  the  speech  is 
not  a  Trugrede  but,  in  its  first  part,  a  soliloquy  (i.  e.  not  meant  to 
deceive),  and  that  Ajax  expresses  his  newly  acquired  perception  of  cosmic 
order  in  ambiguous  and  veiled  language  which  implies  his  rejection  of 
this  order.  227  His  insistence,  however,  that  the  speech  is  not  a  Trugrede, 
because  it  is  simply  inconsistent  with  Ajax's  straightforward  character  (a 
view  shared  also  by  Bowra  [1944:  40],  Taplin  [1979:  129]  and  Hester 
[1979b:  248]),  is  untenable  in  the  light  of  Tycho  von  Wilamowitz's  (1917: 
63-65)  important  remarks,  which  are  endorsed  also  by  Gellie  (1972:  13), 
Bergson  (1986:  44),  228  Heath  (1987:  189)  and  Poe  (1987:  54  with  n.  104). 
Musurillo  (1967:  14-16)  and  Seidensticker  (1983:  136)  believe  that  the 
speech  expresses  an  inner  clash,  whereas  Hester  (1979b:  251-52)  thinks 
that  the  speech  is  delivered  in  a  transitory  fit  of  pique  and  is  not  to  be 
225  Criticism  of  Taplin's  view  in  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  66-67)  and  Stevens  (1986: 
336).  Bergson  (1986:  45  with  n.  37)  unconvincingly  tries  to  belittle  the 
importance  of  these  ambiguities. 
226  For  a  summary  of  Reinhardt's  view  (endorsed  by  Kirkwood  [1958:  161-62]) 
see  Moore  (1977:  51),  Sicherl  (1977:  76-77). 
227  Heath  (1987:  186-88)  is  also  very  close  to  Knox's  interpretation.  For  summary 
and  criticism  of  Knox's  view  see  Sicherl  (1977:  77).  He  too  thinks  (ibid.,  89-90) 
that  the  speech  is  a  soliloquy.  That  this  is  not  the  case  has  been  argued,  rightly 
I  think,  by  Taplin  (1979:  123  with  n.  3),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  47)  and, 
most  convincingly,  Stevens  (1986:  328-29)  and  Poe  (1987:  55-59  with  n.  107).  Di 
Benedetto  (1983:  53-55),  insisting  that  the  speech  is  a  soliloquy,  tries  to  account 
for  its  pervasive  ambiguity,  but  his  interpretation  is  too  fanciful. 
228  Although  Sophocles'  attitude  towards  86  os  is  not  as  unproblematic  as  this 
scholar  thinks,  ibid.  n.  29. 341 
taken  seriously.  According  to  Moore  (1977:  56-66),  Ajax  realizes  that, 
since  everything  in  this  world  is  bound  to  yield  to  its  opposite,  he  must 
yield  too;  however,  in  phrasing  his  decision  he  uses  ambiguous  (not 
deceitful)  terms,  in  order  not  to  hurt  Tecmessa  and  the  Chorus,  while 
avoiding  actual  falsehood  (a  similar  view  had  been  put  forward  by 
Linforth  [1954:  10-20];  cf.  Errandonea's  [1958:  28-38]  curious  suggestion 
that  Ajax  initially  intended  to  die  heroically  by  attacking  the  Atreidae, 
but  then  changes  his  mind  moved  by  Tecmessa's  plea  and  commits 
suicide229).  Simpson  (1969:  92-99)  has  seen  in  the  speech  the 
transformation  of  Ajax  from  a  man  of  deeds  to  a  man  of  words  and 
thought.  Sicherl's  (1977:  95)  view  that  Ajax  does  eventually  practice 
Qw#oaÜVT  towards  the  gods230  is  rightly  criticized  by  Seidensticker 
(1983:  139),  while  his  contention  that  Ajax  will  cease  to  hate  the  Atreidae 
when  he  is  dead231  has  been  adequately  refuted  by  Hester  (1979b:  253) 
and  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  54  n.  131)  who  drew  attention  to  835-44 
(one  might  add  1393-95).  232  For  doxography  on  the  subject  see 
Errandonea  (1958:  24-28),  Moore  (1977:  48-54),  Sicherl  (1977:  71-77), 
Hester  (1979b:  247-50),  Machin  (1981:  482  n.  352),  Segal  (1981:  432  n.  9), 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  46  n.  107). 
229  Criticism  of  this  view  in  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  65-66). 
230  Cf.  also  Bowra  (1944:  40),  Letters  (1953:  139-40),  Stevens  (1986:  331-32). 
231  Cf.  also  Bowra  (1944:  41),  Letters  (1953:  140). 
232  Cf.  Waldock  (1966:  72)  and  Stevens  (1986:  331).  Machin  (1981:  191-98)  also 
insists  on  Ajax's  intractability.  Simpson  (1969:  98),  who  takes  a  line  similar  to 
Sicherl's,  is  aware  of  this  difficulty  but  fails  to  explain  it. CHAPTER  SIX 
POLIS  :  OIKOS,  DIONYSUS  :  HADES, 
AND  SELF-DESTRUCTIVE  FOLLY 
IN  THE  ANTIGONE 
FArDfEP,.  ?  hat  fellow  is  just  looking  for  troubfe.  'There's  dad  Blood  in  his  veins. 
MOVER.  What  blood  do  you  erpect?  Se  has  the  same  dad  blood  everyone  in  his  family 
has.  ?  hat  same  Blood  was  in  his  great-grandfather,  a  killer,  and  it  has  flowed  through  the 
veins  of  the  different  generations  of  men  in  that  family  -  an  evil  freed,  always  with  knives 
on  their  bodies  and  tying  smiles  on  their  faces,  happy  only  when  they  're  kiting  something, 
destroying  what  others  sweat  and  labour  to  create.  'The  devil's  blood  is  in  them. 
Federico  Garcia  Lorca,  Blood  WeiWng 
(tranA  Brendan  X  nnet  ) 
6.0.1  Introduction 
It  seems  that  every  modern  interpretation  of  the  Antigone  must  become 
involved  in  an  Auseinandersetzung  with  G.  W.  F.  Hegel's  reading  of  the  play:  ' 
according  to  him,  the  play  dramatizes  a  clash  not  between  characters  but 
between  moral  forces;  the  rights  of  the  oikos  and  of  the  nether  gods  collide 
with  the  law  of  the  State;  each  of  the  two  central  dramatis  personae  defends 
one,  and  only  one,  of  these  contrasting  claims;  because  of  their  one- 
sidedness  the  two  clashing  powers  are  presented  as  equally  just  and  equally 
unjust  at  the  same  time:  their  validity  is  equalized  (gleichberegtigt);  and 
1  Hegel  has  given  indications  of  his  reading  of  the  play  mainly  in  his  Vorlesungen 
über  die  Philosophie  der  Religion  (Sämtliche  Werke  [Stuttgart  1928]  16.133-34)  as 
well  as  in  his  Ästhetik  (Sämtliche  Werke  13.51-2).  For  reasons  of  convenience 
references  will  be  made  not  to  the  original  editions  of  Hegel's  works,  but  to 
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their  collision  results  in  a  higher  synthesis,  "in  a  reconciliation  of  state  and 
family  in  a  condition  of  absolute  justice".  2  That  the  Antigone  dramatizes 
such  a  clash  can  hardly  be  denied;  nonetheless,  as  I  shall  endeavour  to 
demonstrate,  the  play  provides  no  scope  for  the  assumption  that  a  higher 
harmony  is  achieved  out  of  the  two  antithetical  principles  represented  by 
Antigone  and  Creon:  in  fact,  the  two  clashing  forces,  far  from  producing  a 
new  synthesis,  annihilate  each  other.  3  Nor  do  I  agree  with  Hegel  that  the  two 
colliding  spheres  are  of  equal  (and  equally  valid,  gleichberegtigt) 
importance:  as  I  am  going  to  argue,  the  clashing  spheres  are  not  equally 
valid;  for,  at  least  in  terms  of  5th  century  (Athenian)  political  ideology,  the 
primacy  of  the  polis  over  the  genos  was  a  value  to  be  ardently  defended, 
since  it  constituted  the  foundation  of  democratic  ideology  (as  opposed  to 
the  aristocratic  prevalence  of  the  genos).  4  The  irony  of  the  play  lies 
precisely  in  that  Antigone,  who  champions  the  cause  of  a  traitorous  blood- 
relative  as  against  the  common  cause,  seems  at  the  end  to  prevail  over  the 
statesman  Creon,  the  champion  of  the  polls  values,  who  (as  it  will  be  shown 
in  the  course  of  this  chapter)  gradually  deteriorates  into  a  tyrant  (an  anti- 
polls  element  by  definition)  and  is  eventually  shattered  in  a  fashion 
alarmingly  recalling  the  downfall  of  the  accursed  genos  of  the  Labdacids. 
6.1.1  The  self-destructive  oikos  vs.  the  polls  (1):  Antigone  the 
Labdacid 
As  a  prerequisite  for  the  understanding  of  the  Antigone  I  prefix,  by  way  of 
2  Quotation  from  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  116).  See  further  Paolucci  &  Paolucci 
(1962:  325);  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  110-17);  Steiner  (1984:  19-42);  Nussbaum 
(1986:  51-82passim).  Cf.  also  Bröcker  (1971:  17-28passim). 
3  For  some  compelling  objections  against  Hegel's  harmonizing  view  see  A.  C. 
Bradley  as  quoted  in  Paolucci  &  Paolucci  (1962:  378-9).  Cf.  also  Goldhill  (1986:  88-106 
passim). 
4  See  further  Cerri  (1979). 344 
introduction,  a  brief  discussion  of  the  problematic  relation  of  the  Labdacid 
family  to  the  polls  of  Thebes.  On  the  whole,  in  the  Theban  legend,  the 
survival  of  the  Labdacid  family  seems  incompatible  with  the  survival  of  the 
city:  the  cohesion  and  continuation  of  the  royal  oikos  of  Thebes  constitutes 
a  menace  to  the  very  cohesion  and  continuation  of  the  polls  itself  -  quite 
paradoxically,  no  doubt,  since  in  a  monarchy  it  is  normally  the  ruler  who 
ensures  the  well-being  of  the  city.  5  Thus,  e.  g.,  Laius  was  told  by  Apollo's 
oracle  that  by  dying  with  no  offspring  he  will  save  the  city  (A.  Sept  748-9).  6 
Oedipus'  homecoming  is  another  instance  of  this  pattern:  for,  although  in 
his  case  the  family  reunion  coincides  with  the  salvation  of  the  polls  from 
the  Sphinx,  it  soon  turns  out  that  this  homecoming  was  preceded  by 
parricide  and  leads  to  incest:  both  are  acts  of  excessive,  unhealthy  family 
introversion,  as  in  the  former  the  son  comes  so  close  to  the  father  that  he 
even  takes  his  place  by  annihilating  him,  while  in  the  latter  the  son,  instead 
of  continuing  the  line  by  marriage,  returns  to  the  womb  from  which  he  was 
issued  and  fertilizes  it.  This  abomination  of  family  `cohesion'  becomes  a 
source  of  pollution  and  danger  for  Thebes;  the  royal  family  is  again  at  odds 
with  the  polls.  Ruin  can  be  avoided  only  by  the  dissolution  of  the  family 
(death  of  Jocasta,  exile  of  Oedipus);  the  pattern  is  now  presented  in  its 
converse  form:  "oikos  (self-)destroyed  -  polls  saved".  Similar  is  also  the 
case  of  the  sons  of  Oedipus:  in  some  versions  Polyneices  fled  willingly  into 
exile  to  avoid  the  prophesied  mutual  fratricide  and  thus  preserve  the 
family,?  however,  there  followed  his  military  assault  against  Thebes,  and  the 
S  This  is  a  common  Greek  idea:  cf.  e.  g.  Qi.  19.106-14.  On  this  incompatibility  (as 
manifested  epsecially  in  the  CA)  see  Benardete  (1966:  109  and  passim). 
6  Seaford  (1993:  139),  (1994a:  347).  Hutchinson  (1985:  xxviii-xxix)  seems  to 
underestimate  the  significance  of  the  city  in  the  oracle;  Gantz  (1993:  490-1)  is 
baffled. 
7  Stesichorus  PMGF222b  (Davies),  Hellanicus  FGrHist  4  F98  Jacoby:  see  Gantz  (1993: 
503).  In  E.  Pho.  67-74  we  have  a  (presumably)  Euripidean  variation:  Polyneices 
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city  was  saved  only  by  the  mutual  destruction  of  the  two  brothers. 
With  this  accursed  family,  however,  Antigone  associates  herself  all  too 
willingly.  At  the  very  first  line  of  the  play  she  identifies  her  sister  (and,  by 
implication,  herself  too)  by  stressing  that  they  both  are  the  common 
(KOLvöv)8  offspring  of  the  same  womb  (a1  T(18EX4ov).  9  It  is  by  her  blood- 
relations  with  the  other  members  of  her  family  that  Antigone  defines  her 
identity.  Immediately  afterwards  the  theme  of  the  accursed  oikos  is  brought 
up:  pain,  shame,  dishonour  and  (if  this  is  the  correct  reading  at  4)  aTT110  is 
what  the  daughters  of  Oedipus  have  inherited  from  their  father.  ii  Antigone 
goes  on  to  explain  that  the  last  in  this  long  series  of  evils  is  some  recent 
decree  by  the  state  authority,  the  GTpa7yös  (8);  12  it  is  a  decree  with  a 
patently  public  character  (7  TravS4µw  Trö)EL),  which  seems  to  be  aimed 
specifically  against  the  family  of  Oedipus.  By  treating  the  4LXOL  in  a  manner 
appropriate  to  EXBpo[  (10),  13  this  public  decree  pinpoints  a  fundamental 
contradiction  by  means  of  which  the  whole  network  of  blood  ties  and  of  the 
relevant  ritual  norms  is  subverted:  Polyneices  is  an  enemy  of  his  native  city, 
8  On  the  implications  of  the  word  see  Steiner  (1984:  208-9). 
9  On  the  word  see  Loraux  (1986:  172-3).  Cf.  also  Segal  (1981:  186),  Porter  (1987:  67). 
10  I  should  tend  to  agree  with  Kamerbeek  (ad  4-6),  who  points  out  that  emendations 
should  not  do  away  with  äTTI,  because  of  the  thematic  importance  of  äTTI  both  in  the 
prologue  (cf.  17)  and  in  the  whole  play.  In  the  same  vein,  Else  (1976:  31)  proposed 
I/ 
QTijUl.  ROV. 
11  Cf.  Kamerbeek  (ad  1),  Brown  (ad  2-3);  Bryson  Bongie  (1974:  239-40,243-4). 
12  For  a  criticism  of  Ehrenberg's  (1954:  105-112,173-7)  doubts  as  to  whether  Creon 
can  be  called  a  strategos  proper  see  Calder  (1968:  393  n.  25);  cf.  also  Goheen  (1951:  9- 
10),  Bryson  Bongie  (1974:  240-1),  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989a:  138). 
13  I  take  line  10  to  mean  "that  evils  belonging  to  (proper  for)  our  enemies  are 
coming  upon  our  friends",  as  e.  g.  Jebb  (ad  10)  and  Brown  (ad  10)  do;  see  further 
Knox  (1964:  80-1),  Kells  (1963:  48-52)-  most  eloquently  -and  Blundell  (1989:  107 
n.  5).  Contra  Müller  (p.  30),  Kamerbeek  (ad  9,10),  Benardete  (1975a:  150  n.  5), 
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a  traitor,  and  must,  therefore,  suffer  the  appropriate  punishment  by  being 
thrown  out  of  the  city's  borders,  there  to  lie  unburied.  At  the  same  time, 
however,  Polyneices  is,  for  Antigone,  a  4isos  (10,73,81),  a  blood-relative 
who  must  receive  proper  burial  by  his  family,  according  to  the  norms  of 
Greek  ritual  practice.  The  dynastic  oikos  of  the  Labdacids  is,  once  again,  at 
odds  with  the  polls  of  Thebes:  as  the  end  of  Antigone's  speech  (34-6) 
reminds  us,  the  burial  of  Polyneices  is  no  longer  considered  by  the  state  a 
private  (and  so  relatively  unimportant,  cf.  35  Trap'  oiu8Ev)  business,  but  a 
grave  public  offence  to  be  punished  by  stoning,  a  characteristically  public 
mode  of  execution  (36  4ovov 
... 
63  OXEuaTOV  Ev  1r6XEL).  14 
This  incompatibility  of  her  family  with  the  city  Antigone  is 
determined  to  maintain.  15  What  matters  for  her  Is  whether  one  proves 
worthy  of  one's  lineage  or  not  (37-8).  16  Ismene,  however,  takes  a  different 
approach:  one's  own  dead  do  certainly  matter  (cf.  65-6,9917),  but  one  has 
to  yield  to  the  political  constraint  (66  3LkoµaL)  of  the  v6µos  (59),  of  the 
14  See  further  Rosivach  (1987). 
15  On  Antigone's  devotion  to  blood-kin  as  a  profoundly  anti-polis  kind  of  behaviour 
cf.  Knox's  (1964:  79-86)  excellent  treatment;  see  also  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989a: 
passim).  I  cannot  agree  with  Blundell  (1989:  146-8)  and  Meier  (1993:  201)  who  try  to 
justify  her  stance  (cf.  also  Rohdich  [1980:  77-8]),  nor  with  Wiltshire  (1976)  who 
denies  this  stance  any  political  import  whatsoever.  Foley  (1996:  passim)  is  far 
subtler,  but  I  cannot  see  Antigone  as  pitting  a  viable  alternative  reasoning  against 
that  of  Creon;  see  also  Trapp's  (1996:  79-80)  reservations.  Likewise,  I  disagree  with 
Nussbaum  (1986:  63-7)  who  does  see  how  one-sided  and  reductive  is  Antigone's 
reasoning,  but  still  deems  it  superior  to  that  of  Creon.  The  extreme  manifestation  of 
such  views  turn  Antigone  into  a  politically  conscious  activist,  who  appears  to 
comprehend  civic  principles  better  than  Creon:  so,  in  effect,  Lane  &  Lane  (1986)  - 
a  view  whose  seeds  are  already  to  be  found  in  Whitman  (1951:  87-9). 
16  Cf.  Bryson  Bongie  (1974:  249),  Benardete  (1975a:  154-5),  Oudemans  &  Lardinois 
(1987:  171). 
17  With  L.  Campbell  (1907:  6),  Kamerbeek  (ad  98,9)  and  Müller  (pp.  40-1)  I  take  4ikq 
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monarchic  t  os  or  KpäTOS  (60),  or  finally  to  the  whole  of  the  iroXtTaL  (79); 
this  is,  after  all,  what  the  rest  of  the  polls  does  (44).  18  As  Kamerbeek  (ad  58- 
60)  rightly  remarks,  Ismene  does  not  care  to  draw  subtle  distinctions 
between  the  body  of  citizens  and  the  monarch  (or  even  the  impersonal 
vöµos)  as  political  agents:  what  matters  is  that  all  of  them  represent  the 
will  and  the  power  of  state  authority  (63  äpX%iE  aO'  EK  KpE  Laabvwv,  67 
Tots  Ev  TEAEL  13E  3L3aL)  as  opposed  to  the  family.  19  That  Creon's  decree 
seems  here  to  be  viewed  as  a  state  law  should  come  as  no  surprise  to  the 
modern  reader:  for  the  Greeks  vöµos  was  mostly  the  work  of  one  man,  who 
was  then  honoured  as  a  benefactor  of  the  community:  Solon  in  Athens, 
Lycurgus  in  Sparta,  Zaleucus  in  Locri  Epizephyrioi,  Charondas  in  Catane. 
Heraclitus  probably  echoes  a  broadly  accepted  idea  when  he  says  (22B  33 
D.  -K.  ):  vöµos  Kai  ßouXl  TTEtOEaOaL  EVÖs.  20  Ismene,  therefore,  makes  a  not 
entirely  exorbitant  assumption  when  she  implicitly  equates  the  violation  of 
Creon's  vöµos  (59-60  v%tov  ßLa 
...  )  with  the  violation  of  the  will  of  the 
citizens  (79  ß'Lct  TroXLTwv);  that,  after  all,  Antigone  concedes,  if  belatedly,  at 
18  Cf.  Podlecki  (1966a:  360),  Knox  (1983:  13).  With  Kamerbeek  (ad  44)  I  should  take 
Trö)rL  as  dative  of  interest  rather  than  dativus  auctoris:  the  decree  is  regarded  as 
having  been  issued  by  the  monarch  and  not  by  a  body  of  citizens;  however,  there 
might  be  here  a  significant  ambiguity:  see  Podlecki  (1966a:  363  n.  14)  and 
especially  Blundell  (1989:  111  n.  24).  Calder's  (1968:  392  n.  20)  view  is  too  limiting. 
19  Cf.  Calder  (1968:  392  n.  20),  Knox  (1964:  63,82-3). 
20  See  further  Jaeger  (1947:  126-7  with  n.  63),  Kahn  (1979:  179-81),  T.  M.  Robinson 
(1987:  ad  loc.  );  contra  Kamerbeek  (1948:  94).  Marcovich  (1967:  537)  prefers  to 
translate  vöµoc  as  `conformable  to  custom  and  tradition'  here,  thus  mitigating  the 
`totalitarian'  tone  of  the  fragment;  but  this  is  no  more  than  one  of  many 
possibilities:  see  T.  M.  Robinson  (1987:  103). 348 
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Ismene  seems  to  understand  that  the  source  of  her,  and  her  sister's, 
misfortunes  is  actually  their  own  family's  excessive  introversion.  22  In  her 
overview  of  the  mishaps  that  have  beset  the  house  of  Oedipus  so  far  (49ff.  ), 
she  stresses  this  excessive  inwardness,  which  is  expressed  either  as  incest  or 
as  kin-killing.  This  is  obvious  especially  in  the  case  of  Eteocles  and 
Polyneices:  the  two  brothers,  united  by  common  origin  in  the  same  womb 
(cf.  the  repeated  duals  at  13,21,55-7),  23  turn  against  one  another  and  thus 
pervert  their  community  of  birth  into  the  community  of  their  mutual 
death  (56-7  µ6pov  I  KoLV6v).  24  This  mutual  killing  is  described  by 
aÜTOKTOVOÜVTE  (56),  on  which  Jebb's  note  (ad  55f.  )  is  singularly 
illuminating:  "aV'TOKTOVOÜVTE  is  not  literally,  `slaying  themselves,  '  or 
`slaying  each  other,  '  but,  `slaying  with  their  own  hands'  [...  ]  So  either  (1) 
suicide,  or  (2)  slaying  of  kinsfolk,  can  be  expressed  by  aü6EvTflc, 
a1  TOKT6vos,  aiT0Q4ayijs,  aüTO46vos,  etc.  [_]".  25  This  brings  us  to  an 
important  stylistic  feature  of  this  play,  namely  the  abundance  of 
compounds  whose  first  component  is  the  pronoun  aüT6s:  Oedipus' 
intrafamilial  crimes  that  he  himself  brought  to  light  are  called  aiT64wpa 
äµ1TAaKjµaTa  (51);  his  self-blinding  he  performs  av'  röc  a  rroupy4S  XEpi 
(52).  26  The  use  of  such  compounds  to  designate,  as  Jebb  explains,  both  an 
offence  against  one's  own  kin  and  an  offence  against  oneself  brings  out  with 
21  Kirkwood  (1958:  239  n.  21),  Rohdich  (1980:  171),  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989x:  139- 
40);  less  convincingly  Blundell  (1989:  147)  and  Meier  (1993:  198).  R6sler  (1993:  91- 
2),  perversely  insisting  that  904-20are  spurious,  dismisses  907. 
22  Cf.  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  171). 
23  Cf.  Knox  (1964:  79-80);  Porter  (1987:  69). 
24  Cf.  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  132  with  n.  48)  for  comparison  with  A.  Sept.;  also 
Else  (1976:  passim),  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  2),  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  138-9). 
25  On  a1  TOKTOVOVVTE  see  also  Loraux  (1986:  173-4). 349 
remarkable  clarity  the  theme  of  the  Labdacids'  disastrous  introversion.  27 
Closely  related  to  this  theme  is  that  of  the  blurring  of  family  Identities  and 
roles,  the  subversion  of  family  hierarchy:  instead  of  being  only  `one'  in 
relation  to  his  parents,  Oedipus  becomes  `two',  i.  e.  he  takes  also  the  place  of 
(his  own)  father  and  (his  mother's)  husband;  accordingly,  Jocasta  too 
turned  out  to  be  `double'  (53  86TTXOÜV  Enos),  i.  e.  Oedipus'  mother  and  wife 
at  the  same  time.  28  Thus,  what  Ismene  seems  to  have  realized  is  that  her 
sister,  with  her  unbalanced  adherence  to  her  own  kin,  only  reiterates  the 
destructive  patterns  that  have  led  her  family  to  almost  complete  extinction 
(as  µöva  8iß  vw  XE?  Lp4i  va  at  58  clearly  indicates).  Significantly, 
Antigone,  far  from  denying  the  self-destructive  character  of  her  excessive 
adherence  to  her  family,  confirms  it  in  various  passages:  see  e.  g.  72,96-7 
and  especially  73-76,  where  her  extreme  enclosure  within  her  natal  family 
(cf.  ýLoou  µETa)  is  explicitly  put  in  terms  of  the  eternal  enclosure  in  the 
Underworld.  29  That  burial  of  a  brother  may  be  seen  as  a  matter  of  moral 
26  Cf.  Loraux  (1986:  174,176). 
27  On  aüTO-compounds  in  the  play  see  the  exhaustive  treatment  of  Loraux  (1986); 
also  Knox  (1964:  79),  Else  (1976:  27-8),  Segal  (1981:  186  with  n.  103),  Rehm  (1994:  65- 
6). 
28  Muller  (p.  36),  albeit  offering  a  not  unattractive  comment  on  8LTr?  OÜv  Eiros,  fails 
to  perceive  its  full  significance.  On  the  blurring  of  identities  in  the  Theban  myth 
see  Zeitlin  (1990:  139-41). 
29  Cf.  Benardete  (1975a:  155-6);  Goldhill  (1986:  102-3,105).  Some  have  also  detected 
incestuous  innuendos  in  the  use  of  KELUOµm  at  73;  this  would  enhance  the 
impression  of  unhealthy  family  introversion:  see  Benardete  (1975a:  159), 
Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  130),  Steiner  (1984:  88,158-60),  Oudemans  &  Lardinois 
(1987:  172)  with  bibliography,  Blundell  (1989:  108  n.  12)  and,  most  importantly, 
Seaford  (1990:  78  with  n.  9)  for  documentation;  for  a  comparison  with  similar  quasi- 
erotic  language  in  E.  Pho.  see  Seaford  (1994a:  350  n.  74);  for  further  possible  erotic 
undertones  see  Rehm  (1994:  59);  a  schoL  on  Stat.  Theb.  11.371  explicitly  mentions 
an  incestuous  relationship  between  Antigone  and  Polyneices.  Moreover,  at  423-8 
Antigone's  lament  over  her  brother's  body  is  likened  to  that  of  a  bird  over  the  loss 350 
and  religious-ritual  order  should  not  conceal  from  us  a  fact  of  crucial 
importance:  that  Antigone's  devotion  to  her  dead  stems  from  her  very 
belonging  to  a  doomed  family,  where  procreation  is  overwhelmed  by  self- 
annihilating  introversion.  As  Benardete  (1975a:  157)  puts  it,  "[Antigone]  as 
fully  acknowledges  consanguinity  as  she  denies  generation.  " 
Such  behaviour,  Ismene  says,  can  only  be  described  as  folly:  e.  g.  49 
#0viaov,  61  EVVOEtV,  68  OÜK  ýXE1  VOÜV  OÜBEVa,  99  ävous.  30  As  we  shall 
see  later,  folly  is  seen  (especially  in  the  second  stasimon)  as  a  typical  trait 
of  the  Labdacids,  and  indeed  as  the  agent  of  their  catastrophe.  So,  in  this 
aspect  too,  Antigone  proves  again  to  be  a  true  Labdacid. 
Much  as  she  stands  up  for  the  rights  of  her  dead  kin,  however, 
Antigone's  attitude  towards  her  genos  in  general  appears,  on  close 
inspection,  ambivalent.  Her  extreme  closeness  to  her  brother  is 
counterbalanced  by  an  extreme  (and  equally  self-willed)  alienation  from 
her  sister.  she  explicitly  declares  that  her  sister  will  be  EXOpa  to  her  (86,93) 
as  well  as  to  their  dead  brother  (94);  the  bonds  of  consanguinity  between 
the  two  sisters  are  irreparably  severed.  31  This  kind  of  ambiguous  behaviour 
towards  her  kin  is  perfectly  along  the  lines  of  the  Labdacid  family:  Oedipus 
was  at  the  same  time  too  close  to  his  kin  (incest)  and  too  far  from  it 
(negation  of  the  father-son  bond  through  parricide).  32  The  same  extreme 
adherence  to  her  blood  relations  that  makes  Antigone  an  enemy  of  the  city 
of  her  fledglings:  Antigone,  that  is,  is  both  a  sister  and  a  mother  to  Polyneices,  just 
as  Oedipus  (we  may  recall)  was  both  father  and  brother  to  his  children.  At  El.  1143- 
48  Electra  is  also  said  to  have  been  a  mother  to  Orestes,  and  in  this  case  too  the 
substitution  of  a  sister  for  a  mother  evinces  an  anomaly  (although  not  an 
incestuous  one)  in  family  relations:  Clytaemestra,  the  physical  mother,  is  ViITTIp 
äµnnTwp  (1154). 
30  On  the  keywords  avow  and  ävoLa  see  Coray  (1993:  191-2). 
31  Bryson  Bongie  (1974:  252),  Sorum  (1981-81:  206),  Winnington-Ingram  (1983:  245- 
6),  Scodel  (1984:  49). 351 
also  makes  her  an  ýXOpä  of  her  own  ýiXoL,  or  at  least  of  those  of  her  4tXoL 
who  do  not  wish  to  perpetuate  her  `Oedipal'  enclosure  within  the  family.  33 
6.1.2  The  self-destructive  oikos  vs.  the  polls  (2):  Polyneices  the 
Labdacid 
The  parodos  presents  us  with  a  very  different  world.  Its  theme  is  the  victory 
of  the  polls  over  the  self-destructive  royal  family.  34  This  perverted  family 
cohesion  is  brought  out  in  this  song  in  an  allusive,  yet  very  graphic  manner: 
the  mortal  and  irreconcilable  military  opposition  between  Thebes  and  the 
Seven  is,  surprisingly,  obscured  at  the  level  of  poetic  diction,  since  they  are 
referred  to  by  similar,  even  sometimes  identical,  imagery.  Thus,  for  instance, 
already  at  the  outset  of  the  parodos,  the  light  of  the  rising  sun  is  a  symbol 
of  the  salvation  of  Thebes  (100-5);  35  however,  in  the  same  strophic  system, 
images  of  brightness  or  whiteness  are  used  to  describe  the  Argive  enemy  (106 
AEÜKaaTrLV,  114  ÄEUKi1s  XLÖVog  1TTEpU'YL;  perhaps  also  130)36  who  came  to 
32  Cf.  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  171-2),  Zeitlin  (1990:  132). 
33  Blundell  (1989:  113-5)  has  some  excellent  remarks  on  Antigone's  ambiguous 
stance  towards  kinship-philia.  Her  conclusion,  if  not  her  viewpoint,  is  similar  to 
mine:  "  ... 
despite  [Antigone's]  firm  devotion  to  a  brother  who  made  war  on  his  own 
brother  and  their  native  city,  she  rejects  her  sister  for  a  perceived  disloyalty  of  a 
much  more  venial  kind.  "  (p.  113).  See  also,  on  the  emerging  rift  between  the 
sisters,  the  detailed  examination  of  Porter  (1987:  47-9). 
34  Gardiner's  (1987:  84)  view  that  the  tone  in  the  parodos  is  personal,  not  civic,  is 
untenable.  Unconvincing  is  also  the  attempt  of  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  155-8) 
to  underplay  the  triumphant  tone  of  the  ode. 
35  On  light  as  poetic  symbol  of  salvation  see  Fraenkel  (1950)  on  A.  Ag.  522,  Davidson 
(1983:  42  with  n.  6),  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989a:  141). 
36  Commentators  have  not  failed  to  note  the  word-play  between  "Apyos  and  äpyös: 
Jebb  (ad  106),  Brown  (ad  106-7).  On  the  white  shields  of  Argive  warriors  see  Craik's 
(1986:  104-5)  original  intepretation. 352 
set  fire  to  the  Theban  towers  (122-3).  37  Moreover,  the  warrior  (presumably 
Capaneus  [cf.  A.  Th.  432-4,  S.  OC  1318-9],  although  his  name  is  not 
mentioned,  thus  allowing  Polyneices'  name,  uttered  at  110,  still  to  resound 
in  the  audience's  ears)38  who  threatened  to  burn  Thebes  down,  appeared 
like  a  Maenad  celebrating  the  rites  of  Bacchus  (135  µ=voµEVa  ýüv  öpp..  1 
(3aKXEVwv)  and  brandishing  torches  (135  1Tup46pos).  39  It  is  certainly 
surprising  that  the  war-frenzy  of  the  enemies  of  Thebes  should  be  visualized 
as  a  celebration  of  the  native  god  of  Thebes,  who  is  indeed  invoked  in  this 
very  song  to  lead  the  dances  of  celebration  (153-4);  Jebb  (ad  135ff.  )  remarks 
that  "this  is  the  only  place  where  Soph.  connects  evil  frenzy  with  the  name 
of  a  god  whom  this  same  Ode  invokes".  What  is  more,  as  has  been  recently 
demonstrated,  40  Dionysus  is  especially  associated  with  civic  order, 
solidarity,  and  concord  amongst  the  citizens;  the  temporary  disorder  that 
37  On  the  imagistic  correspondence  see  also  Segal  (1981:  197). 
38  Several  scholars,  most  eloquently  Bierl  (1989:  47  with  n.  22),  (1991:  63  with  n.  55) 
have  argued  that  it  is  Polyneices  who  is  actually  meant  here;  see  also  Zeitlin  (1993: 
156  n.  20). 
39  In  A.  Sept  498  a  warrior  attacking  Thebes  is  similarly  compared  to  a  Maenad: 
Seaford's  (1993:  133)  explanation  is  only  partly  satisfactory.  Davidson  (1983:  48) 
perversely  denies  any  allusion  to  Dionysus  here,  while  Oudemans  &  Lardinois 
(1987:  156)  see  an  unlikely  allusion  to  Prometheus  on  the  basis  of  CL  55.  On  the 
conflation  of  Martial  and  Bacchic  imagery  see  in  general  Lonnoy  (1985). 
40  Bierl  (1991:  47-54);  Seaford  (1994a:  235-3  27);  cf.  also  (very  succinctly)  R.  Seaford 
in  Silk  (1996:  289).  These  two  scholars  offer  the  most  up-to-date,  detailed  and 
persuasive  discussion  of  the  matter,  together  with  extensive  bibliography. 
Recently,  F.  Kolb,  Agora  and  Theater,  Volks-  and  Festversammlung  (Berlin  1981, 
esp.  chs.  2&  3)  has  argued,  combining  literary  and  archaeological  evidence,  that 
the  orchestra  (originally  situated  in  the  Lenaion  in  the  NW  comer  of  the  agora), 
as  well  as  being  a  centre  of  dramatic  performances,  was  in  the  period  before  the 
early  5th  cent.  BC  also  the  centre  of  juridical  activity  and  of  political  assemblies. 
This  would  lend  further  support  to  Dionysus'  political  function  put  forward  here; 
see  however  the  criticism  of  R.  Seaford,  CR  as.  33  (1983)  288-9. 353 
his  cult  creates  serves  only  as  a  means  of  reaffirming  and  reestablishing 
order,  the  temporary  negation  of  civic  rules  ends  in  a  fresh  realization  of 
the  order  created  by  these  rules.  41  It  is  therefore  all  the  more  remarkable 
that  the  disruption  of  collectivity  that  has  been  brought  about  by  the 
"quarrels"  (111)  of  the  native  Polynices  is  described  almost  as  a  celebration 
of  Bacchic  rites:  the  disorder  that  Polyneices  attempted  to  create  would  be, 
unlike  the  `order-creating'42  Dionysiac  disorder,  permanent  and 
catastrophic.  To  conclude:  the  paradox  that  Polyneices,  a  native  Theban, 
should  attempt  to  destroy  his  own  land  is  ironically  highlighted  through 
the  use  of  poetic  imagery  (brightness-imagery,  Bacchic  imagery)  that  is 
similar  (or  even  identical)  with  that  used  of  Thebes  -a  stylistic  feature 
which  pinpoints  the  identity  of  both  the  attacker  and  the  attacked,  an 
identity  eventually  negated. 
The  second  function  of  this  use  of  kindred  imagery  is  to  show  that  the 
essential  identity  of  attacker  and  attacked  has  not  only  been  negated,  but 
also  perverted*  into  an  excessive  and  perilous  `closeness'.  This  is  best 
illustrated  by  an  unmistakable  image  used  by  the  Chorus  at  112-23:  the 
usurper  Polyneices  came  all  too  close  to  his  native  city,  for  he  actually 
sought  to  devour  it,  to  make  it  into  a  prey  of  his  own  greediness  and  lust  for 
power.  The  image  of  the  vulture  gaping  around  all  seven  gates  of  Thebes 
(118-9  äµ4LXav(v 
... 
ETrTä1TuXov  aTbµa),  ready  to  swallow  the  city,  is  a 
powerful  expression  of  Polyneices'  dangerous  `closeness'  to  his  land  43  The 
41  See  further  Seaford  (1993:  137-8),  (1994a:  301).  Differently  Rohdich  (1980:  51). 
42  I  borrow  the  term  from  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989a:  141);  cf.  also  Oudemans  & 
Lardinois  (1987:  92). 
43  Though  this  image  may  strictly  refer  to  the  Argive  enemies  as  a  whole,  it  is 
Polyneices  that  is  brought  out  as  the  primary  cause  of  the  expedition:  cf.  Burton 
(1980:  93)  and  especially  Craik  (1986:  103-4)  who  further  shows  how  Polyneices 
comes  to  be  identified  with  the  Argive  army  by  means  of  poetic  ambiguity  (contra 
Davidson  [1986:  108  with  n.  7]).  On  possible  literary  precedents  for  the  eagle-simile 
see  Davidson  (1983:  44);  the  eagle  and  snake  omen  in  IL  12.200-29  (cf.  Burton  [1980: 354 
usurper  Polyneices  has  attempted  to  pervert  the  common  UWTnIpLa  of  the 
whole  polls,  for  which  a  king  is  supposed  to  care,  Into  a  gruesome 
`communality'  of  mass  destruction  and  death.  This  combination  of 
excessive  distancing  from  and  excessive  closeness  to  the  native  city  may  also 
be  seen  as  typical  of  the  Labdacids:  Oedipus  too  was  too  far  from  his  native 
polls  when  he  was  exposed  on  Cithaeron;  but  he  also  came  too  close  to  it 
when  he  proved  to  be  its  potential  destroyer.  -" 
The  all-important  theme  of  the  Labdacids'  welfare  being  incompatible 
with  that  of  their  native  city  recurs  at  the  end  of  the  Chorus'  narrative  of 
the  past  night's  battle  (141-7):  fortunately  the  Seven  have  been  defeated, 
and  the  polls  has  been  saved.  This  collective  salvation  is  starkly  contrasted 
with  the  internecine  end  of  the  last  male  members  of  the  Labdacid  house: 
on  the  one  hand,  the  community  of  the  two  brothers'  descent  (144-5 
zraTpös  EVÖS  1111ITP69  TE  udc  4OVTE)  is  perverted  into  Its  exact  opposite, 
namely  `community'  and  `unison'  through  mutual  death;  having  "set 
against  each  other  [KaO'  w  ToZv,  another  atTo-word!  ]45  their  twain 
conquering  spears"  [8LKpaTEtS  XöyXas],  -6  the  two  brothers  "are  sharers  in  a 
common  death"  (146-7  EXETOV  I  KO1VO1D  OaVQTOU  µEpoc  ä1w  47  It  is 
thus  that  the  threatened  destruction  of  Thebes  is  avoided:  this  is  markedly 
93  n.  8])  is  particularly  relevant,  since  it  is  Ares'  serpent  that  is  in  this  song  a 
symbol  of  the  Theban  defence  (124-6). 
44  Cf.  also  Segal  (1993:  55). 
45  Cf.  Loraux  (1986:  182-3). 
46  Jebb's  translation;  emphasis  mine.  On  6LKPQTEtS  see  Jebb's  (ad  144ff.  )  fine 
comment:  "two  spears,  each  of  which  was  victorious  over  the  wielder  of  the  other". 
47  Jebb's  translation.  Cf.  Segal's  (1981:  185)  excellent  remarks.  Complementing  the 
transgression  of  their  mother  and  father,  who  were  `two'  (mother/wife  and 
son/husband)  where  they  should  have  been  only  one,  Eteocles  and  Polyneices  are, 
conversely,  `one'  (in  their  common  death)  where  they  should  have  been  `two':  see 
Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  156-7)  -although  their  arithmetic  goes,  bizarrely,  the 
other  way  around  -and  cf.  above  p.  349  with  n.  28. 355 
indicated  by  the  ämä,  yap  by  which  the  last  antistrophe  of  the  whole  song 
is  introduced.  48  We  are  again  presented  with  the  ubiquitous  pattern 
"Labdacid  family  destroyed  -  Thebes  saved". 
6.2.1  The  case  for  the  QcoTrlpLa  of  the  oohs  (1):  Creon 
rrUEos,  äa4aAws,  c  p6waav:  the  image  of  the  Ship  of  State  with  which 
Creon  begins  his  speech  from  the  throne  (162-3)  aptly  illustrates  his  main 
preoccupation,  which  is  with  the  safety  and  well-being  of  the  polis.  49  The 
Ship  of  the  polls  has  just  escaped  a  tremendous  storm  (the  Chorus  have 
called  it  "gusts  of  hostile  winds",  '  Lnats  EXOLQTuV  ävEµwv  [137],  Creon 
calls  it  aä)os  [163]).  The  new  ruler's  fundamentally  political  frame  of  mind 
is  most  notably  expressed  at  165-74,  where  he  significantly  plays  down  the 
fact  that  the  recent  woes  of  Thebes  were  largely  due  to  its  royal  family:  he 
takes  care  to  stress  that  Laius  and  Oedipus  were  successful  governors, 
discreetly  passing  over  the  unsavoury  events  related  to  the  succession  of  the 
former  by  the  latter  (165-7);  even  Oedipus'  wretched  demise  (cf.  Ismene's 
words  at  49-52)  is  reduced  in  this  speech  to  a  neutral  8Lu  XET'  (168).  As  for 
the  fratricidal  conflict  of  the  two  last  members  of  the  royal  family,  Creon 
again  is  careful  to  highlight  not  the  narrow  family  context  of  their 
internecine  conflict,  but  its  being  part  of  the  wider  conflict  between  the  city 
48  Cf.  Coleman  (1972:  6). 
49  For  the  use  of  this  image  in  the  play  see  Goheen  (1951:  46-7);  in  ancient 
literature:  Nussbaum  (1986:  438  n.  25);  for  the  older  bibliography  on  this  subject 
see  V.  Pöschl,  H.  Gärtner  &  W.  Heyke,  Bibliographie  zur  antiken  Bildersprache 
(Heidelberg  1964),  pp.  561-2  (s.  v.  'Staatsschiff).  On  the  use  of  6p@o0v  etc.  to 
indicate  civic  order  cf.  Kirkwood  (1991:  passim).  On  the  centrality  of  this  concept 
in  Creon's  thought  cf.  Easterling  (1973:  22-3). 356 
of  Thebes  and  its  enemies.  50  This  is  clearly,  expressed  at  194-206,  where  it  is 
the  civic  /  military  aspect  of  the  brother's  conflict  that  is  stressed:  Eteocles 
"fought  for  the  polls"  (194)  and  was  distinguished  as  a  most  valiant  warrior 
(195  äpLQTEÜQas,  cf.  197  äp(QTOLc);  the  semantics  of  the  name'  ETEOKXi  g 
('truly  glorious')  certainly  accord  with  Creon's  short  encomium.  His  brother, 
on  the  other  hand,  whose  name  recalls  his  VELKEa  (111)  that  engineered  the 
military  conflict  between  Thebes  and  Argos,  51  turned  against  his  native  land 
(199  yf  v  naTpwaV)  and  wished  to  destroy  its  gods  (199  eEoüs  Tons 
EyyEVEts).  52  Being  an  exile  (200  4vyäs),  he  returned  to  his  land  of  his  own 
volition,  without  the  consent  of  the  polis,  53  and  sought  to  drink  the  blood 
of  his  fellow-Thebans  (possibly  a  deliberate  reminiscence`  of  the  eagle-simile 
in  the  parodos,  112-26)  and  lead  the  rest  of  them  into  slavery  (201-2),  54  as 
50  See  also  Benardete  (1975a:  170),  Demont  (1993:  115).  There  is,  admittedly,  one 
allusion  at  the  familial  character  of  the  conflict:  arTÖXELpL  vüv  LLauvaTL  (172);  cf. 
Rosivach  (1979:  21-2),  Brown  (ad  173-4),  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  164).  This, 
however,  is  no  more  than  a  hint:  that  Creon  should  devote  so  few  words  to  a  matter 
that,  say,  Ismene  emphasized  so  much  (55-7)  only  indicates  his  politically  oriented 
frame  of  mind. 
51  On  the  semantics  of  the  names'ETEOKXfiS  and  lloXuvE("S  see  Nagy  (1979:  130 
§  16n3,262  §  12n3);  Hutchinson  (1985:  ad  830). 
52  As  Jebb  (ad  199ff.  )  explains,  these  are  the  gods  of  the  race,  i.  e.  of  the  Theban 
stock  on  the  whole,  as  opposed  to  6E0L  TraTp4SoL,  "gods  of  one's  own  family".  For  a 
(perhaps  strained)  ambiguous  reading  of  these  lines  see  Oudemans  &  Lardinois 
(1987:  163) 
53  As  Jebb  (ad  199ff.  )  again  explains,  Polyneices  was  KaTEXOthV  (200),  not  KaTaXOEiS 
ÜTro  TýS  TTÖ?  E  WS. 
54  All  comentators  take  d(µaTOS  KoLVOÜ  at  201-2  to  mean  `kindred  blood',  i.  e.  the 
blood  of  his  brother  Eteocles;  see  esp.  Müller  (p.  67).  Nonetheless,  the  political 
colouring  of  Creon's  speech  (cf.  especially  his  emphatic  mention  of  OEoi.  Ey'yevEtS 
as  distinguished  from  6EOL  TraTp4SoL)  should  make  clear  that  the  word  KoLVÖS  is  used 
here  in  a  wider  sense,  to  indicate  one's  fellow  countrymen.  A  look  at  LSJ  confirms 357 
a  hostile  foreign  army  would  do.  The  much-quoted  Athenian  law  that 
forbade  burial  of  traitors  and  sacrileges  in  Attic  soil  (Xen.  Hell.  1.7.22  Eäv 
TLS  11  TTIv  TröXLv  Trpo8L8(Z  T"J  Tä  '1Epä  K  Tr7  ...  µiß  Ta#vaL  Ev  Trj 
'  ATTL")55  may  well  have  contributed  to  the  favourable  perception  of 
Creon's  words  by  an  Athenian  audience;  we  know  for  instance  that  burial  in 
Attica  was  prohibited  for  Themistocles  (Thuc.  1.138.6),  for  Antiphon  the 
orator  and  Archeptolemus  (Plut.  Mor.  833a,  834a),  for  Phocion  (Plut.  Phoc. 
37.2),  and  others.  The  old  objection  that  Creon  erred  in  that  he  should 
have  simply  thrown  Polyneices'  body  beyond  the  borders  instead  of 
completely  forbidding  its  burial  can  no  longer  stand,  as  many  scholars56 
have  pointed  out  that  there  seems  to  have  been  no  particular  concern  for 
the  cast-out  bodies:  Indeed,  Plato  in  his  Laws  specifically  prescribes  for  the 
that  the  uses  of  the  word  in  political  contexts  are  overwhelmingly  more  numerous 
than  its  uses  in  family  contexts. 
55  For  extensive  lists  of  relevant  ancient  sources  see  Hester  (1971:  55),  Rosivach 
(1983:  193-4),  Diggle  apudRehm  (1994:  181n.  9);  discussion  in  Rösler  (1993:  85-7).  Cf. 
also  Ostwald  (1986:  151),  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989a:  137-8  with  n.  20)  with  recent 
bibliography.  Surely  this  important  clause  of  Athenian  funerary  legislation 
should  not  be  ignored  (see  Knox  [1979:  1671),  although  Mette  (1956:  131,134),  who 
first  (I  think)  drew  attention  to  it,  wrongly  concluded  that  in  this  play  Sophodes  is 
proclaiming  a  new  `law'  to  replace  such  legislation  -  see  the  right  criticism  by 
Müller  (p.  14)  and  Cerri  (1979:  46  n.  7).  On  Polyneices  as  a  traitor  see  in  general 
Bowra  (1944:  63-4),  Rosivach  (1983:  207-8),  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989a:  139  with 
n.  25);  wrongly  Blundell  (1989:  115).  Foley  (1995:  139-42)  fails  to  account  for  the  fact 
that  the  burial  of  the  Seven,  on  which  the  Athenians  prided  themselves,  was  not 
an  internal,  Athenian  affair;  burying  one's  enemies  is  one  thing,  and  burying  a 
traitor  is  another.  cf.  Nussbaum  (1986:  437  n.  14),  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  162). 
56  Cerri  (1979:  17-32,43-4)  and  Rosivach  (1983:  194  with  nn.  3,4,208  n.  49)  with 
overwhelming  ancient  evidence  and  compelling  arguments;  cf.  also  Hester  (1971: 
20-1)  and  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  101,162).  The  opposite  view  has  recently 
been  repeated  by  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989a:  146-7),  Kirkwood  (1991:  108-9)  and 
Rösler  (1993:  87). 358 
bodies  of  kin-killers  (Leg.  873b-c)  and  committers  of  sacrilegious  deeds  (Leg. 
909c;  cf.  also  960b)  not  only  to  be  thrown  out  of  the  city's  borders,  but  to  be 
left  there  uninhumed  and  unmourned.  Plato's  prescriptions  may  not  be  too 
far  away  from  actual  Greek  practice:  we  learn  (Plut.  Phoc.  37.2)  that  after 
Phocion's  execution  it  was  ordered  that  he  be  cast  out  of  the  borders  of 
Attica  and  that  no  Athenian  (µ  i8  i.  'a  ... 
'  A6rIvaLwv)  cremate  his  body, 
"wherefore",  continues  Plutarch,  "no  ýLXos  of  his  dared  to  touch  the  body" 
(8Lö  4LAos  µEV  oi8ELs  ET0  4nlaEV  äýaaOai  Toü  QwµaTos);  so  a  certain 
Konopion,  who  used  to  provide  such  services  for  money,  was  hired  to  carry 
the  body  outside  Attica  and  cremate  it.  What  really  matters,  therefore,  in 
our  play  is  hardly  that  Creon  did  not  observe  some  trivial  niceties,  but  that 
a  traitor's  body  has  received  funeral  honours  by  a  Theban  citizen,  quite 
contrary  to  what,  as  we  have  seen,  must  have  been  a  common  Greek  way  of 
treating  traitors  (and  also,  perhaps,  kin-killers  and  hierosyloi).  Polyneices, 
who  is  most  graphically  presented  both  as  one  who  wished  to  taste  of 
kindred  blood  (201-2)  and  as  having  attempted  not  simply  to  rob,  but  also 
to  destroy  the  temples  with  their  votive  offerings  (199-201,286;  cf.  p.  361), 
should  be  left  unburied  and  unmourned  (26-30,198-206),  exactly  like 
Plato's  kin-slayers  and  hierosyloi,  or  real-life  traitors  such  as  Phocion  was 
alleged  to  be.  57 
57  See  further  Rosivach  (1983:  206  n.  43,208).  However,  he  (1983:  208-11)  and  Kells 
(1963:  63  n.  21)  have  argued  that  Creon's  cruelty  in  specifically  prescribing  the 
mutilation  of  the  body  by  dogs  and  scavenger  birds  (29-30,205-6)  is  unparalleled. 
But  is  this  more  cruel  than  e.  g.  Plato's  (Leg.  873b-c)  provision  that  the  magistrates 
should  all  throw  a  stone  at  a  kin-killer's  body?  That  the  issue  of  Ajax's  burial  in  S. 
A  j.  is  resolved  in  favour  of  the  dead  hero  does  not  in  any  way  prove  that  such  was 
the  common  practice:  in  order  to  meet  Agamemnon's  very  strong  objection  (Ajax 
was  a  traitor),  Odysseus  has  to  make  an  elaborately  argued  case  (which  would  have 
been  unnecessary  if  it  was  commonly  held  at  the  time  that  even  traitors  are 
entitled  to  burial).  Ironically,  however,  Odysseus  eventually  achieves  his  purpose 359 
Carefully  distancing  himself  from  the  disastrous  introversion  of  the 
Labdacid  family  (cf.  174:  he  is  but  an  äyXLQTEÜS  to  them),  58  Creon  lays  the 
strongest  emphasis  possible  on  the  opposite  pole,  namely  the  au  to  of 
the  whole  polis.  59  As  I  stressed  on  p.  355f.,  Creon's  speech  is  replete  with 
words  signifying,  or  related  to,  the  safe  leading  of  the  Ship  of  the  State 
through  adversities:  see  further  162-3,167,178,185-6  (with  the  strong 
contrast  between  äTrl  and  QWTljpia  as  mutually  exclusive  alternatives  for 
the  äaTo(),  191.  And  what  ensures  Individual  ac,  rn  pia  is  the  safety  of  the 
polis  as  a  whole:  182-3,187-8,189-90.  The  approving  quotation  of  175-90 
by  Demosthenes  (19.247)  shows  that  Creon's  principles  would  be  perfectly 
in  accordance  with  the  Athenian  ideal  of  civic  behaviour;  60  similar  ideas  are 
also  expressed  in  the  last  of  the  Periclean  speeches  reported  by  Thucydides 
(2.60),  where  the  key  idea  recurs  that  only  in  a  polls  that  fares  safely 
not  by  the  force  of  his  ethico-religious  arguments,  but  by  special  pleading  (he 
appeals  to  his  friendship  with  Agamemnon)! 
58  See  further  Coleman  (1972:  6-7).  Rosivach  (1979:  21,26)  and  Neuburg  (1990:  71) 
go  strangely  astray  here. 
59  According  to  Protagoras'  myth  in  Pl.  Prot.  322b,  ßwT7Ipia  is  the  ultimate  purpose 
of  an  organized  community  like  the  polls:  primitive  men  lived  scattered  and  had  no 
poleis;  defenceless  as  they  were,  they  made  easy  prey  for  beasts;  EC1  Tovv  Sid 
&0po[LCEUeaL  Kal,  ai  EaOaL  KTI.  ZOVTES  TT6XELS. 
60  Cf.  Bowra  (1944:  68),  Calder  (1968:  404-7),  De  Romilly  (1971:  118-9),  Ostwald  (1986: 
150).  Knox  (1983:  14,28)  also  offers  an  instructive  comparison  with  Plato's  Crito 
(but  cf.  Connor  [1971:  47-9]).  I  should  also  addArist.  Pol.  1253a:  KaL  1rp6TEpov  Sid  Tr 
OÜQEL  trbXls  OLKIa  Kal  KaQToS  T1I1lJV  EOTIV.  TÖ  7äp  Öýov  lTp6TEpov  QVayKaLOV 
ETVaL  TOO  thpovc.  It  is  interesting,  however,  that  the  Chorus'  non-committal  reply 
(211-14)  may,  despite  Burton's  (1980:  86-7)  sensible  objections,  imply  a  hint  of 
reservation  about  the  rightness  of  Creon's  decree  (see  esp.  Gellie  [19]).  This  slight 
hint  foreshadows,  perhaps,  Creon's  deterioration  into  a  tyrant  in  the  latter  part  of 
the  play. 360 
(0,  pOovµEvi  v)  can  the  individual  be  saved  (8LaCTC  CETaL).  61  Being  favourable 
to  the  polls  (209)  is,  according  to  Creon,  synonymous  with  being  Ev8LKOs 
(208)62  and  constitutes  the  sole  criterion  for  the  apportioning  of  TLýtf'l  (208, 
210).  By  contrast,  it  is  significant  that,  for  Antigone,  acting  in  accordance 
with  8&KT1  means  adherence  to  one's  own  family,  regardless  of  the  polls  (cf. 
23-4  where,  despite  the  textual  corruption,  the  words  8LK11  and  8LKaLOS,  in 
whatever  form,  seem  certain;  also  94  8LK1);  accordingly,  it  is  not  the  citizen- 
warrior  defending  the  polls,  but  the  dead  relative  that  Antigone  deems 
worthy  of  Tqn  (25).  63  O'KT  and  TLµnj  are  political  categories  for  Creon, 
familial  for  Antigone.  It  is  not  accidental  that,  in  Creon's  speech  from  the 
throne,  the  terms  4  iXos  (183,187)  and  ývvaLµos  (198),  when  denoting 
actual  blood-relationship  (or  even  simple  friendship),  are  used  as  terms  of 
disparagement:  the  former  is  used  in  the  context  of  disruptive  behaviour 
against  the  state  (preference  for  one's  4[XoL  as  an  instance  of  disregard  for 
the  safety  of  the  polls),  while  the  latter  refers  to  the  traitor  Polyneices.  The 
only  use  of  such  terms  that  Creon  vouchsafes  is  the  metaphorical  use  of 
ä6EX4d  at  192  to  signify  the  consistency  of  his  present  edict  with  his  general 
61  The  same  idea  also  in  Democritus  68  B  252  D.  -K.:  Tr6XLs  yap  E$  äyopEvr  VcykrTTJ 
Ös  EcTTL  [...  ]  KaL  TOÜTOU  UCJZOt1EVOU  1T61VTa  VO  ETQL  Kc[L  TOVTOU  8La4AELpoµEVOU 
TrävTa  6La4AEIpETaL;  see  Knox  (1964:  86),  Nussbaum  (439  n.  26).  On  Creon's  pro-polis 
mentality  see  further  Knox  (1964:  86-90),  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  161-3)  and, 
for  an  extreme  position,  MacKay  (1962:  169);  less  enthusiastic  but  well  argued  is 
Crane's  (1989:  111-5)  exposition;  less  convincing  are  Winnington-Ingram  (1980: 
123-4)  and  Blundell  (1989:  115-30);  on  Creon's  single-sidedness  see  Nussbaum's 
(1986:  55-8)  outstanding  analysis.  Creon's  principles  are  democratic  topoi  (see 
further  Blundell  [1989:  116  n.  43,117-8])  rather  than  "political  platitudes",  as 
Podlecki  (1966a:  362)  calls  them  (so  also  Segal  [1981:  162]). 
62  Cf.  Nussbaum  (1986:  56).  On  Creon's  perception  of  8'LKT1  see  Santirocco  (1980:  183- 
6). 
63  On  Antigone's  preoccupation  with  T411  see  esp.  Hester  (1971:  21-2). 361 
principles.  64 
Last  but  not  least,  Creoiq  also  insists  on  the  importance  of  sound- 
s  uCCCSS  fkt 
mindedness  for  the  wEeemhrýt  steering  of  the  Ship  of  the  polls:  at  175-7  he 
states  that  political  authority  is  the  touchstone  of  a  man's  counsels;  and  at 
179  he  insists  on  the  importance  of  äplaTa  ßovXEvt  aa  for  the  avoidance 
of  i  rrl  and  the  achievement  of  au  n  pia  (185-6).  These  are  not  mere 
platitudes:  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  Antigone's  wholehearted  embrace 
of  Hades  and  her  indifference  towards  her  own  ar  ]pia  have  been  said 
(and  surely  there  is  more  than  a  grain  of  truth  in  these  statements,  even  if 
they  are  partial  or  sarcastic)  to  be  a  result  of  6uaßouXla  (95)  and  ävoLa  / 
ä#oaVvrr  (68,99;  see  p.  350).  The  contrast  between  sound-mindedness  and 
folly65  reflects  therefore  two  opposite  attitudes  towards  the  polls:  on  the  one 
hand  the  extreme  devotion  to  a  self-destructive  family  whose  very  existence 
threatens  the  polls;  on  the  other  hand  the  struggle  for  collective  welfare.  66 
This  contrast  will  become  clearer  in  the  process  of  examining  the  rest  of  the 
play. 
The  gap  separating  Creon's  devotion  to  the  (Turn  pLa  of  the  polls  on 
the  one  hand  and  Antigone's  obsession  with  her  dead  relatives  on  the  other 
becomes  even  more  apparent  after  the  Watchman  has  announced  that 
funeral  rites  have  been  mysteriously  performed  for  the  traitor  Polyneices 
(249-58).  Angered  at  the  Coryphaeus'  suggestion  that  this  may  be  the  work 
of  the  gods  (278-9),  67  Creon  refuses  to  recognize  that  the  gods  may  bestow 
64  Knox  (1964:  87);  Nussbaum  (1986:  57);  Blundell  (1989:  118). 
65  For  its  importance  cf.  already  Knapp  (1916);  also  Goheen  (1951:  83-4),  Kirkwood 
(1958:  234-5),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  121),  Nussbaum  (1986:  51-2  with  n.  6), 
Segal  (1986:  141-2),  Blundell  (1989:  136-45). 
66  Nussbaum  (1986:  54)  rightly  remarks  that  "for  Creon  the  healthy  mind  just  is 
the  mind  completely  devoted  to  civic  safety  and  civic  well-being". 
67  This  and  other  relevant  passages  have  been  over-interpreted  by  Adams  (1957: 
49-50),  Kitto  (1956:  153-6),  Knox  (1964:  68-9  with  n.  14),  Jordan  (1979:  92-3),  Segal 362 
TL  fl  on  the  very  man  who  attempted  to  burn  down  their  temples  along 
with  the  votive  offerings  (285-6;  cf.  199-201),  to  level  the  land  sacred  to 
them  and  break  up  the  laws  sanctioned  by  them  (287).  In  accordance  with 
his  general  political  principles,  he  is  not  prepared  to  take  into  account  the 
existence  and  claims  of  transcendental  values  which  may  run  counter  to 
the  interests  of  the  polis;  for  him,  the  vöµoL  of  the  polis  are  the  vöµoL  of  the 
gods,  and  vice  versa:  he  thinks  it  inconceivable  that  anything  other  than 
the  polls  and  its  interests  might  be  the  measure  by  which  to  judge  what  is, 
and  what  is  not,  proper  political  and  religious  behaviour.  Dover  (1974:  252, 
253)  points  out  that  in  classical  Athens  there  was  a  "tendency  towards 
identification  of  the  patriotic,  the  law-abiding  and  the  pious",  as  well  as  a 
"convergence  of  social  and  political  morality  with  religion".  68  As  a  result, 
Creon  sees  TLpI  as  an  exclusive  prerogative  of  the  loyal  citizens  who  prove 
in  deed  their  devotion  to  the  polls  (cf.  again  207-10),  and  cannot  therefore 
allow  that  a  traitor  like  Polyneices  could  be  the  recipient  of  Tl.  µ11  by  the 
gods,  who  by  definition  express  and  sanction  the  spirit  of  the  polis  (284, 
288).  69 
(1981:  159-60)  and,  most  infuriatingly,  Minadeo  (1985:  143-6)  as  indications  that  it  is 
the  gods  who  are  at  work  behind  Antigone:  for  criticism  see  Hester  (1971:  25), 
Burton  (1980:  95-6),  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989a:  142  with  n.  31). 
68  See  also  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989:  144  n.  33)  and,  in  greater  detail,  Yunis  (1988: 
19-28)  with  further  bibliography. 
69  On  the  equivalence  of  divine  and  civic  laws  in  Creon's  political  theology,  as  well 
as  on  his  views  on  TLµll  see  Müller  (pp.  75-6);  cf.  Goldhill  (1986:  95-6).  Many 
scholars  have  failed  to  see  that  this  is  legitimate  political  discourse:  Gellie  (1972: 
35),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  125-6),  Segal  (1981:  169),  Scodel  (1984:  52), 
Nussbaum  (1986:  58),  Blundell  (1989:  129),  Bennett  &  Tyrell  (1990:  444),  etc.  It  is 
true  that  inherent  in  Creon's  (and,  I  repeat,  classical  Greece's)  equation  of  gods 
with  the  polis  is  a  danger  of  secularization:  see  below  p.  435  with  n.  294.  At  any 
rate,  it  seems  certain  that,  at  least  at  the  end  of  the  fifth  century,  the  Athenian 
polls  had  full  control  over  all  things  religious  (cf.  Ostwald  [1986:  161-9]);  the  most 363 
Having  denied  the  possibility  that  Polyneices  received  TLµtj  from  the 
gods,  Creon,  quite  consistently  with  his  politically  oriented  view  of  affairs, 
spells  out  what  he  thinks  is  the  true  motive  behind  the  mysterious  burial: 
not  some  transcendental  power,  but  his  all  too  real  political  opponents, 
always  intent  on  undermining  the  rightful  monarch,  have  bribed  the  guards 
into  defying  his  orders  (289-94,302-14).  His  diatribe  on  the  disastrous 
effects  of  avarice  on  the  well-being  of  a  polls,  albeit  based  on  false 
assumptions,  is  entirely  along  the  lines  of  a  typically  Greek  tradition  of 
thought,  which  most  clearly  manifests  itself  in  the  prominently  political 
poetry  of  the  Theognidea.  At  Theogn.  44-6  and  50  excessive  pursuit  of 
personal  gain  is  associated  with  üßpLc  (cf.  also  Theogn.  835)  and  entails  the 
ruin  of  the  6f  p.  os.  7°  Furthermore,  at  Theogn.  667-80  the  Ship  of  State  is 
visualized  as  being  in  the  middle  of  a  seastorm  that  threatens  to  engulf  it 
(671-4);  the  Ship's  commander  has  been  deposed  in  a  mutiny  caused  by 
people  who  are  after  personal  KEp8O9  (675-77);  as  things  are,  cm  rrIpLa  is 
extremely  difficult:  ij  µäaa  Tls  Xa  rrCos  I  o«ETa6  (674-5).  71  The 
similarities  with  Creon's  rhesis  are  indeed  impressive.  He  too  views  avarice 
not  as  an  instance  of  individual  misconduct,  but  in  its  wider  political 
dimension  as  a  potential  factor  of  disorder.  Excessive  lust  for  money  is 
incompatible  with  sound  political  order  or  (TU)  qp(a:  money  sacks  cities, 
destroys  houses  (297  Eýav(QTr1QLv,  a  term  which,  like  äväaTaTOs,  is  usually 
associated  with  the  destruction  of  cities)  and,  what  is  more,  deprives  men  of 
notable  exception  to  this  rule,  namely  Plutarch's  (Aic.  22.5)  story  about  the 
priestess  Theano  who  refused  to  curse  Alcibiades,  appears  to  be  mere  fiction  based 
probably  on  the  Antigone:  see  C.  Sourvinou-Inwood,  G&R  35  (1988)  29-39.  Very 
notable  are  also  the  remarks  of  Kirkwood  (1958:  123),  Knox  (1964:  101-2),  Oudemans 
&  Lardinois  (1987:  160-1)  and  Ostwald  (1986:  151)  with  the  latter's  sound  criticism  of 
De  Romilly  (1971:  29-34). 
70  See  the  commentary  by  Nagy  (1985:  42-6). 
71  See  again  Nagy  (1985:  66-7);  (1990b:  428-9). 364 
that  sound-mindedness  that,  as  we  saw  (p.  361f.  ),  is  essential  to  the  good 
administration  of  public"  affairs  (298-9).  Rapacious  greediness  (cf.  311 
äpTT6CITTE)  and  the  exclusive  pursuit  of  personal  KE  p8oc  (310,312,  cf.  313) 
lead  to  acts  of  vßpLS  (309)  which  inescapably  result  in  iTfl  instead  of 
ao  n  p(a.  Quite  appropriately,  then,  money  is  called  a  KaKöv  vöµLQµa 
(296),  which  can  mean  `bad  currency',  but  also  `bad  institution',  72  inasmuch 
as  it  is  nothing  like  the  sound  vöµoL  which  safeguard  the  awT]Ip(a  of  a  polls, 
but  leads  instead  to  its  ruin,  6Tri.  Thus,  the  speech  is  rounded  off  on  a 
clearly  political  note,  namely  the  antithesis  aurnIp(a  :  d7,  whose  meaning 
has  been  already  expounded  by  Creon  in  175-91.73 
6.2.2  The  case  for  the  c  TTipta  of  the  Dolls  (2):  the  first  stasimon 
The  first  stasimon,  sung  immediately  after  the  revelation  of  the  miraculous 
burial  of  Polyneices  and  Creon's  diatribe  on  the  disruptive  surreptitious 
activities  of  the  enemies  of  the  polls,  centres  on  two  main  points,  namely 
the  subjugation  by  Man  of  the  elemental  forces  of  Nature  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  possible  effects  of  Man's  admirable  achievements  on  the  well-being 
72  For  the  word-play  hidden  in  this  use  of  vöµLQµa  cf.  Ar.  Nub.  248  with  Dover 
(1968:  ad  248).  Benardete  (1975a:  184  n.  40)  also  cites  Dem.  24.212-14,  esp.  213:  Elzrcty 
[EökoVa  V'YETaL]  O'TL  a  )TÖC  ffl'EtTaL  [hyOLTO?  l  apyvpLOV  µhV  vöp  of  CIVaL  TWV  I8LWV 
ßUVaýlayµhTWV  ELVEKa  TOLL  i8LWTaLC  EUPlIg  VOV,  TO  )C  8E  VÖIOUc  vö  iLaRa  Trjc 
it  A>  WS  EIVaL. 
73  See  also  Ar.  Thesm.  356-67(esp.  the  LeitmotivKEpb(Zv  OU'VEK  IT'  ßk43-9  at  360  and 
365)  cited  by  Reinhardt  (1979:  250  n.  9)  and  MacKay  (1962:  170-1),  two  of  the  few 
scholars  who  have  grasped  the  political  meaning  of  the  theme  of  KEp3oc  here  - 
something  that  e.  g.  Adams  (1957:  46),  Gellie  (1972:  35),  and  Winnington-Ingram 
(1980:  126)  have  failed  to  do.  Bennett  &  Tyrell's  (1990:  448)  remarks  are  beside  the 
point.  On  the  money  theme  see  in  general  Goheen  (1951:  14-9),  Else  (1976:  90). 365 
of  the  polis.  The  idea  of  Man's  miraculously  working  his  way  through  the 
apparently  impenetrable  obstacles  raised  against  him  by  Nature  is  mainly 
expressed  by  means  of  words  belonging  to  the  semantic  field  of  TTEpdv  (i.  e. 
Tiöpos  etc.  )  which  imply  penetrating  through  the  natural  barriers  and 
enclosures.  Thus,  Man  proceeds  TToXLoü  TrEpav  I  TrOVTOU  (334-5),  making  a 
path  through  (337  TrEp6v)  the  waves  that  tower  all  around  him  (336-7 
1E  pUXIOLQLV  ... 
&1r'  ot8µaaLV).  74  Later  in  the  song  we  hear  that  the  only 
enclosure  Man  cannot  escape  is  that  of  Hades;  but  even  in  this  case,  as 
Crane  (1989:  107)  has  most  clearly  pointed  out,  the  emphasis  is  on  the 
`only'  rather  than  on  the  ineluctability  of  death.  75 
Conversely,  in  the  first  antistrophe  Man's  admirable  ability  to 
overcome  natural  barriers  is  highlighted  from  a  different  viewpoint,  namely 
by  the  praise  of  his  ability  to  capture  (343  äypEt),  to  enclose  by  means  of 
his  TEXva  (cf.  366),  the  wilderness,  which  seems  by  definition  indomitable, 
uncontainable,  uncontrollable.  Man  manages  to  ensnare,  to  enclose  within 
"the  coils  of  his  woven  nets"  (346),  76  creatures  that  conspicuously  belong  to 
the  freedom  of  the  wild:  the  birds  (342),  the  äypLOL  0f  pEs  (344),  and  the 
fishes  (345).  The  same  idea  of  domination  and  control  is  expressed  in  the 
rest  of  this  antistrophe:  by  means  of  his  devices  (349  n1Xavai)  Man  exerts 
control  (348  KpaTEt)  over  the  beast  (350  &gpös)  that  has  its  abode  in  the 
wild  (349  aypaiXou),  77  in  the  mountains  (350  opEQQLPaTa),  and  subdues 
(351  O'X[IdCETaL)78  by  means  of  the  yoke  (351  Cvyo)  the  horse  and  the 
74  To  Jebb's  (ad  336f.  )  rather  complicated  explanation,  adopted  also  by  Brown  (ad 
336),  I  prefer  Miller's  (p.  90).  On  the  traversing  of  sea  see  further  Oudemans  & 
Lardinois  (1987:  126). 
75  Cf.  also  Bona  (1971:  141-2). 
76  Jebb's  (ad  345f.  )  rendering. 
77  For  a  different  view  see  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  122). 
78  SchÖne's  generally  accepted  emendation  of  the  MSS  EýETaL,  äýETaL  vel  sim. 366 
It  I  OÜpELOV79  äS  I11Ta80  TaüpOV  (352).  This  imagery  of  traversing  and 
subduing,  81  with  its  emphasis  on  the  overcoming  of  barriers,  is,  I  suggest, 
implicitly  contrasted  with  the  imagery  of  enclosure  and  confinement  that 
we  have  associated  with  Antigone.  Survival,  civilization  and,  ultimately,  the 
polis  are  grounded  on  Man's  ability  to  break  through  barriers;  Antigone  is 
essentially  anti-polis  in  that  she  consciously  chooses  to  die  by  remaining 
within  the  confines  of  her  self-destructive  family.  82 
The  list  of  Man's  achievements  culminates  appropriately  in  the 
political  field:  Man  has  taught  himself  language,  83  thought  and  the  desire 
for  political  organization  (354-5  äaTuvÖ  sous  o'pyag);  84  these  are  the 
essential  preconditions  of  human  communication  and,  consequently,  of  the 
constitution  of  the  polls,  the  apex  of  human  achievements,  which  is  starkly 
to  be  opposed  to  the  inhabitable  (356  8uaat?  uw)  wilderness  (355-7).  In  this 
79  On  the  repetition  after  öpEaaLpaTa  see  Müller  (p.  93). 
80  True,  a8Vf  Ta  (thus  the  majority  of  the  codd.  )  has  to  be  unmetrical  if  we  scan  352 
as  aeolo-choriambic  enneasyllable  (Dale,  Analyses  24)  or  as  spond.  +ithyph.  (Dawe 
[1996]  in  his  Conspectus  Metrorum  to  the  Antigone).  I  wonder  however  whether 
we  can  scan  the  line  as  2troch.,  with  the  second  syllable  of  the  first  trochee 
shortened  by  `correptio  epica'  (on  which  see  e.  g.  West,  GM  11-12;  Descroix, 
Trimetre  21-5,  both  with  many  examples).  68R  Ta  is  "das  typische  Wort  für  '  das 
nicht  domestizierte  Tier"  (Müller  p.  92),  and  would  nicely  square  with  ovpELov;  for 
parallels  see  LSJ  s.  vv.  ä6i  njc  and  äSµBTOc.  each  Ta  (LZc)  is  the  error  a  scribe  would 
be,  perhaps,  more  likely  to  make  after  &ap  cTav  at  339. 
81  For  the  terminology  as  well  as  for  further  analysis  see  Oudemans  &  Lardinois 
(1987:  122,125-6). 
82I  disagree  here  with  McDevitt  (1972a:  163). 
83  For  the  connection  of  language  and  civilization  in  Greek  thought  see  Segal 
(1981:  443  n.  3  1),  Buxton  (1982:  55  with  n.  104);  cf.  Steiner  (1984:  254). 
84  Gardiner's  (1987:  87-8)  underplaying  of  the  political  tone  of  this  song  is 
inexplicable;  for  afar  more  balanced  view  see  Burton  (1980:  98-101).  1  should  also 367 
respect,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  antithetical  pair  TravTOTr6pos 
äTropos  (360),  which  is  dominant  in  this  song,  is  made  to  correspond  to  the 
polarity  5  SLTroXLs  :  iiroXic  in  the  second  antistrophe  (370)  by  means  of  a 
series  of  formal  correspondences,  which  have  been  well  demonstrated  by 
Irigoin  apud  Knox  (1983:  31)  and  need  not,  therefore,  be  repeated  here.  This 
correspondence  in  form  should  indicate  also  a  correspondence  in  meaning, 
which  I  shall  now  try  to  explore. 
Man  is  generally  1ravTolT6pos,  which,  as  we  saw,  provides  the  means 
for  his  taming  of  the  inhabitable  wilderness  (cf.  356-8)  and  his  creating  of 
well-ordered  communities;  thus,  T6  µaXav6EV  TEXvas  (365-6)  is  the 
essential  presupposition  for  Man's  becoming  UO'LTroXt  s,  i.  e.  citizen  of  a  city 
that  stands  aloft.  85  This,  however,  is  subject  to  reversal,  for  T6  µaXavöEv 
TEXvas,  and  therefore  Man's  1ravTO1r6pos  nature,  can  cut  both  ways:  it  can 
lead  him  either  to  KaK6v  or  to  EQOX6v  (367).  86  Respect  for  the  v6  oL  X6ov6s 
disagree  with  the  sinister  ambiguities  which  Rohdich  (1980:  65-6)  and  Oudemans  & 
Lardinois  (1987:  127)  discern  here. 
85  Thus  Irigoin  apud  Knox  (1983:  31).  Knox  (1964:  185  n.  47),  rightly  perhaps, 
detects  also  a  second  meaning  in  this  word  ("high  in  his  city")  -a  meaning  which, 
in  fact,  has  been  proclaimed  the  only  one  possible  by  Ehrenberg  (1954:  64  n.  1). 
Bona's  (1971:  144  n.  2)  paraphrase  is  a  successful  restatement  of  Knox's  view: 
"vtttroks  allude  a  colui  the  a  cittadino  eccelso,  in  quanto  coll'  opera  sua  rafforza 
la  cittä.  " 
86  This  ambiguous  nature  of  T6  µaXavöEV  TEXvac  corresponds  to  the  ambiguity  of 
Man's  central  quality,  i.  e.  his  being  5ELvöv  (332-3);  see  further  Goheen  (1951:  53-4 
with  n.  1),  Segal  (1981:  153  with  n.  4),  Nussbaum  (1986:  52-3,73),  Oudemans  & 
Lardinois  (1987:  87,129);  contra  Linforth  (1961:  196),  Hester  (1971:  26),  Judet  de  la 
Combe  (1993:  136-7)  who  favour  exclusively  (and  one-sidedly)  the  meaning 
"terrible",  "effrayant";  but  see  the  right  criticism  of  this  view  by  Gellie  (1972:  283 
n.  11).  Bona  (1971:  132-3)  opts  for  the  neutral  rendering  "abile",  "possente". 368 
(368),  the  laws  of  the  motherland  (=polis),  87  and  for  the  O¬c3ii  8&Kn  (369) 
means  positive,  constructive  exploitation  of  Ta  µaXavOEv  TEXvas  that 
makes  Man  TravToTropos  and,  ultimately,  üýLTroXLc.  On  the  other  hand, 
disregard  for  the  laws  and  the  gods  of  the  polls  -  which  is  succinctly 
expressed  with  TO  µrl  KaX6v  (370)  -  amounts  to  being  aTroks-,  "a  person  of 
no  city".  88  This  is  the  negative  aspect  of  TO  µaXav6EV  TEXvas,  which 
cancels  the  benefits  conferred  upon  Man  by  his  lTavTOTr6pos  struggle  against 
Nature;  Man  is  thereby  reduced  to  a  state  of  being  äTropos  and,  therefore, 
&TroXic.  89  Especially  notable  here  is  the  fact  that  the  Chorus  attach  equal 
momentum  both  to  the  v6uoi  X8ov6s  and  to  the  OECov  8LK  as 
indispensable  presuppositions  for  the  well-being  of  a  polls;  divine  and 
human  laws  are  here  assumed  to  reflect  each  other:  90  one  can  hardly  help 
recalling  Creon's  (280-8)  implicit  identification  of  EüaEßELa  with  loyalty 
and  good  offices  to  the  polls  (cf.  p.  361f.  ).  The  contrast  with  Antigone's 
principles  should  be  obvious:  the  V6µOL  and  the  8LKT1  of  the  gods  that  she 
upholds  are  utterly  unpolitical  and  belong  to  the  realm  of  Hades;  they  even 
entail  the  bestowal  of  funerary  TL  fl  upon  the  traitor  who  threatened  to 
87  Not  the  laws  of  the  dead,  as  Müller  (pp.  86-7)  and  Knox  (1964:  112),  (1983:  31) 
think.  That  the  `laws  of  the  land'  are  primarily  political  has  been  shown  by 
Ostwald  (1986:  157with  n.  62);  cf.  Ehrenberg  (1954:  63  n.  1),  Bona  (1971:  144n.  4). 
88  I  see  no  reason  why  iTroXLc  should  be  taken  to  refer  to  a  specific  individual  who 
violates  the  laws  of  the  city,  as  it  has  been  by  e.  g.  Knox  (1964:  185  n.  47)  and 
Winnington-Ingram  (apud  Knox  [1983:  32]).  Despite  ÖTw 
...  µi]  tINEQTL  at  370  and 
L1  T  ELOL  TraPEUTLOS  ... 
es  Tä8'  Ep8OL  at  373-5,  the  generalizing  tone  of  the  passage 
is  unmistakable:  the  Chorus  describe  the  process  whereby  Man  (in  general)  can 
become  "citizen  of  a  high  city"  or,  alternatively,  "a  person  of  no  city",  i.  e.  a 
person  outside  the  boundaries  of  human  civilization,  whose  loftiest  achievement  is 
the  polis. 
89  Cf.  Kells  (1963:  58). 369 
annihilate  Thebes,  to  make  its  population  cITroXLS  instead  of  vtJitTroXS.  9i  On 
the  contrary,  the  v6µ0L  X6ovoT  and  the  6E(zv  B'LKa  that  the  Chorus  praise 
are  all-important  elements  in  Man's  strugg  le  to  control  the  Indomitable  -  40 
the  ultimate  manifestation  of  which  is  the  ineluctable  Hades  (361-2)  -  by 
the  only  means  available  to  him,  namely  by  trying  to  become  vtjshTroX,  S.  All 
in  all,  this  song  celebrates  the  prevalence  of  the  polls  and  its  laws  over  the 
state  of  being  i1ToXts  -  which  is  also  the  cornerstone  of  Creon's  political 
thought.  The  complex  lyrical  restating  and  re-asserting  of  Creon's  credo 
helps  to  hammer  it  home  and  emphasizes  its  central  importance  in  the 
thematic  structure  of  the  play.  92 
90  Cf.  Brown  (ad  454-5). 
91  See  further  Burton  (1980:  95-6,98);  I  completely  disagree  here  with  Kirkwood 
(1958:  206). 
92  I  was  glad  to  find  that  Kells'  (1963:  58)  and  Hester's  (1971:  27)  careful  analyses  of 
the  passage  have  led  them  to  the  same  view;  so  also  Coleman  (1972:  9-10),  McDevitt 
(1972a:  154-7,161)  and  Santirocco  (1980:  182,183).  The  latter,  however,  goes  on  to 
identify  a  second,  ironic,  level  of  meaning;  thus  he  essentially  concurs  with 
Ostwald  (1986:  157-61,170-1)  who,  on  the  basis  of  Pl.  Leg.  8.843a  and  [Dem.  ]  25.11, 
thinks  that  the  Chorus  are  arguing  for  a  (quasi-Hegelian)  balance  between  two 
distinct  kind  of  laws,  the  divine  and  the  human  (political)  ones,  which  do  not 
necessarily  reflect  one  another;  the  same  view  is  shared  by  e.  g.  Ehrenberg  (1954: 
63),  Burton  (1980:  101-2),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  148  n.  87),  Segal  (1981:  168-9), 
Meier  (1993:  200),  Foley  (1996:  67-8);  the  extreme  position  is  represented  by  Bona 
(1971:  144-8)  who  argues  that  6Ewv  8iica  is  in  fact  not  only  distinct  from  but  also 
superior  to  the  vöµoL  X6ovös.  With  such  an  interpretation  the  Chorus  would 
(unwittingly?  )  anticipate  the  last  scenes  of  the  play,  where  Creon  will  recognize 
the  existence  and  importance  of  a  transcendental  order  of  laws  (1113).  Such  an 
anticipation  is  misleading,  not  so  much  because  it  involves  reading  the  play 
backwards,  but  mainly  because  (as  I  shall  argue  later)  the  end  of  the  play  (despite 
1113)  does  not  dramatize  an  unambiguous  triumph  of  transcendental  laws  over 
human  (political)  ones.  In  other  words,  it  would  be  pointless  for  the  Chorus  to 
anticipate  here  a  development  that  will  never  be. 370 
6.3.1  The  vcuot.  of  Hades 
The  first  stasimon  having  ended  on  such-  a  note  of  strong  approval  of 
Creon's  political  principles,  Antigone's  passionate  advocation  of  chthonic 
v%tm  in  the  second  episode  is  all  the  more  striking.  At  the  very  beginning 
of  her  rhesis  she  justifies  her  act  by  appealing  to  Zeus  and  to  the  Dike  of  the 
nether  gods.  As  Knox  (1964:  99  with  n.  33)  has  seen,  Zeus  here  is  not  the 
Olympian  god,  but  the  ZEÜs  KaTaXOöVLos  of  Ii.  9.457  or  the  ZEius  s 
Ev  KaµoOQLv  of  A.  Su.  231;  93  as  MacKay  (1962:  167)  points  out,  Antigone 
otherwise  refers  to  Zeus  only  as  a  persecutor  of  her  family  (2-3),  and 
generally  professes  no  allegiance  to  Zeus  or  any  other  Olympian  (contrast 
Creon:  184,304,758!  ).  Antigone  places  herself  at  the  extreme  opposite  of  the 
laws  of  the  polls  and  the  QwTnp(a  that  their  observance  guarantees:  her 
loyalties  are  with  what  constitutes  the  utter  negation  of  a  polls,  namely 
Hades;  94  instead  of  caring  for  QwTnpia,  she  is  determined  to  join  in  death 
the  rest  of  her  4  tXoL  (see  p.  349).  Above  the  V6µOL  of  the  polis  she  clearly 
sets  the  v6µoL  of  Hades  (452,454-5).  To  the  collectivity  of  the  polls,  to  its 
collective  effort  for  awTrIpta,  she  is  simply  alien:  her  life  has  been  confined 
to  the  privacy  of  her  family  Kath  (463),  95  so  that  death  is  for  her  the  only 
93  Cf.  Ostwald  (1986:  153).  Contra  Reinhardt  (1979:  76  with  n.  14). 
94  Bultmann  (1967:  313-4);  this  view  seems  to  have  been  originally  propounded  by 
Hegel:  see  Paolucci  &  Paolucci  (1962:  68,178). 
95  That  this  is  the  meaning  of  463  has  been  demonstrated  by  Kamerbeek  (ad  463,4), 
and  Brown  (ad  463)  who  see  here  a  reference  to  the  prologue,  1-6. 371 
conceivable  benefit  (463,464  KEp609).  96  Not  the  collective  auTggpta  but  the 
private  self-destruction  is  for  her  truly  profitable,  whereas  what  is  truly 
painful  (468  "Xyouv,  &XyüvoµaL;  perhaps  also  466  äXyos)  is  not  the 
politically  perilous  defiance  of  state  laws,  but  the  disregard  for  the  funerary 
rites  (cf.  467  ä6aTrTov)  due  to  a  dead  blood-relative  (466-7  TOY  Eý  E  tfs 
µ11TpOS  6avövT').  97  She  uses  the  phrase  8LKTIV  MövaL  (459)  with  reference 
to  her  punishment,  by  the  gods  below,  should  she  fail  to  comply  with  the 
vöµoL  of  Hades  -a  striking  antithesis  to  the  use  of  this  phrase  by  Creon 
(303  6oOvat  81.  "y)  to  designate  the  punishment,  by  the  state  authority,  of 
those  who  have  observed  the  laws  of  Hades,  and  thus  disobeyed  the  state 
laws!  Creon  regards  his  niece's  transgression  of  the  TTpOKELµEVOL  vöµoL  (481) 
as  a  crime  that  outweighs  all  blood  ties  (485-6):  even  if  Antigone  were  a 
closer  blood-relative  than  Creon's  own  ä8EXX1  or  his  closest  family  (487 
ZTvös  `  EpKE  'LOU  ),  98  she  would  still  not  escape  punishment  for  having 
undermined  the  legislative  framework  of  the  polls  for  the  sake  of  her 
68EXXöc.  The  gulf  separating  oikos  and  polls  is  definitely  unbridgeable,  as 
Antigone  observes  (499-501):  99  to  Creon's  insistence  on  the  collective 
96  Although  the  KEpSos  Antigone  is  after  is  nothing  like  the  KEpSOs  Creon 
suspected  (289-314),  her  attitude  is  still  as  profoundly  anti-polis  as  that  of  the 
bribed  enemies  of  the  city. 
97  Padel  (1992:  99-102)  makes  the  interesting  point  that,  in  ancient  Greek  male 
perceptions  of  the  female,  women's  physical  inwardness  (they  are  closely 
associated  with  invisible  parts  of  the  body,  the  innards  and  especially  the  womb)  is 
on  a  level  with  their  enclosure  within  the  inner  world  of  the  oikos,  as  well  as  with 
Hades,  unseen  recess  of  the  world  outside  human  beings;  cf.  also  Segal  (1978:  1180- 
81).  OnAntigone's  death-drive  see  Steiner  (1984:  264-66). 
98  The  hybristic  mention  of  Zeus'  name  is  certainly  a  blasphemy:  Creon's  initial 
image  of  the  high-principled  leader  is,  slowly  but  steadily,  being  denigrated.  Cf. 
also  his  even  worse  blasphemy  at  1040-4,  and  see  further  p.  435. 
99  See  on  this  point  the  detailed  treatment  of  Rosivach  (1979). 372 
interest  as  the  sole  criterion  for  bestowing  TLµti  (514,516),  she  opposes  the 
criterion  of  consanguinity  (511,517);  to  his  sharp  vöµw  distinction  between 
ýLXOL  and  EX6po(  on  the  basis  of  loyalty  to  the  polis  (518,522)  she  responds 
with  her  adherence  to  the  natural,  4VGE  L,  bonds  of  4  iXLa  created  by 
common  birth  (523:  note  the  E4uv)100  and  (once  again!  )  with  her  loyalty  to 
the  V%1OL  of  Hades  (519,  cf.  521).  Interestingly,  the  semantics  of  the  names 
Eteocles  and  Polyneices  are  now  used  by  Antigone  in  a  way  that  implicitly 
opposes  Creon's  and  the  Chorus'  use  thereof  at  192-206  and  111 
respectively  (see  p.  356):  at  502-4  she  claims  that  no  KVEOS  could  be 
EVKXEEQTEpov  to  her  than  to  give  funeral  rites  to  her  brother  Polyneices.  As 
Antigone  reverses  the  whole  value  system  of  the  polls  which  Creon 
advocates,  so  here  she  associates  KAEOS  EV'KXEEQTEpOV  (502)  not  with 
Eteocles  (whose  name  is  inevitably  conjured  up  by  the  repetitive 
formulation),  but  with  the  traitor  Polyneices,  whose  name,  as  we  have  seen, 
is  connected  with  the  opposite  of  KAEos,  namely  vEtKOs  (111).  101 
As  we  have  already  noted,  Antigone's  defiance  of  the  laws  of  the  polls 
places  her  at  the  opposite  pole  of  civilization  as  manifested  in  the 
organized  communities  that  are  the  cities.  When  her  stern  opposition  to 
Creon's  pro-polis  principles  is  first  demonstrated,  the  Coryphaeus 
comments  that  Antigone  is  patently  the  savage  (4ibv)  offspring  of  a  savage 
father  (471-2).  102  Her  savagery  is  described  as  üßpL9  -a  theme  that  receives 
100  Santirocco  (1980:  189);  Winning  ton-Ingram  (1980:  133);  Steiner  (1984:  250-1). 
On  possible  sophistic  echoes  in  this  passage  (the  nomos  vs.  phusis  debate)  see 
Podlecki  (1966a:  370);  cf.  also  Goheen  (1951:  86-93). 
101  See  again  Nagy  (1979:  222-42)  on  the  fundamental  opposition  between  K)tos  and 
vEtKOS,  EpLc  etc.  in  archaic  poetry. 
102  On  the  use  of  W  tös  here  to  denote  anomic  savagery  see  Linforth  (1931:  196)  and 
Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  90-1,166);  cf.  also  Benardete  (1975b:  13).  To  think  that 373 
special  emphasis  (480,482)  -  while  she  and  her  sister  are  viewed  as 
personified  d'Ta  (533),  qua  potential  overthrowers  of  the  legitimate  king 
(533  KäTravaaTäaELS  Opovow).  Again,  Creon's  discourse  is  perfectly  along 
the  lines  of  Greek  political  thought;  cf.  e.  g.  the  association  between  üßpis, 
w  töTrls,  and  the  destruction  of  the  polis  in  Theogn.  541-2:  8E  gia(vW  µiß 
v8E  TröXLv  ü  Ls  I  ilTrEp  KEvTaü  ous  woa  ous  ö  103  Again 
Antigone's  incompatibility  with  the  very  notion  of  the  polls  is  clearly 
demonstrated. 
6.3.2  Hades  and  kinship 
We  noted  on  p.  350  that  Antigone's  stance  towards  her  kin  is  highly 
ambivalent.  Whereas  on  the  one  hand  she  consciously  chooses  to  enclose 
herself  within  the  confines  of  her  blood-family,  on  the  other  she  renounces 
her  own  sister,  thus  perpetuating  the  same  kind  of  ambivalence  that  has 
been  typical  of  the  Labdacids:  to  be  at  the  same  time  too  `close'  to,  and  too 
`far'  from,  one's  kin.  At  526  Ismene  appears  again  on  stage  and  now  she  too 
is  all  too  willing  to  preserve  the  coherence  of  her  family  -  to  such  an  extent 
that  she  is  even  prepared  to  join  her  sister  in  death.  Her  lines  are  replete 
with  words  denoting  community,  sharing  or  (of  course)  consanguinity:  536- 
7  öµoppoe 
, 
1°  euµµET'LGXL;  541  ýüµnAouv;  545  abv  aoL;  558  art.  Antigone, 
on  the  other  hand,  uses  such  words  only  in  negative  contexts,  indicating  a 
complete  negation  of  community  with  her  own  sister  (a  negation  that 
the  word  denotes  untamed  heroism,  as  Bryson  Bongie  (1974:  257-8)  does,  is  a 
distorting  understatement. 
103  Cf.  Nagy  (1985:  51-2);  (1990b:  184,267). 
104  Nauck's  emendation  for  the  MSS.  -8E  L.  It  is  accepted  by,  among  others,  E. 
Fraenkel  ad  A.  Ag.  830  (who  also  reports  Wilamowitz's  agreement  on  the  matter), 
Müller  (pp.  129-30)  and  Dawe  (1996). 374 
Ismene,  quite  significantly,  terms  aTL  IMCELV  [544],  thus  bringing  out  the 
stark  contrast  with  Antigone's  preoccupation  with  the  TL,  Lll  of  her  other 
ýüvaLµoc,  Polyneices):  539  O1T'  ...  'KOLvwaäµTJv;  at  543  ov  GTEpyuJ  4tXr  v  is 
sharply  contrasted  to  the  mention,  at  the  previous  line,  of  Hades  and  oL 
KäTu,  where  she  is  going  to  meet  her  dead  4tXoL;  546  µiß  ...  KOLvä.  A  strong 
sense  of  separation  is  also  conveyed  by  such  lines  as  555,557,  and  559-60; 
the  strong  µEv-8E  antitheses  underline,  on  the  formal  plane,  the 
irreconcilable  difference  between  the  two  sisters.  105  Antigone's  contention  at 
895  and  941  that  she  is  the  only  surviving  Labdacid  simply  pushes  to 
extremes  the  idea  of  her  separation  from  her  sister.  106 
In  her  determination  to  separate  herself  from  as  close  a  blood  relative 
as  her  sister,  Antigone  resembles  her  opponent  Creon  who,  we  remember  (p. 
371),  explicitly  rejected  his  blood  tie  with  the  offspring  of  his  own  sister,  in 
order  to  be  consistent  with  his  edict  (486-9).  In  his  altercation  with  Ismene 
(568-8  1)  Creon  voices  again  his  belief  in  the  supremacy  of  the  polls  over  the 
oikos,  but  now  his  discourse;  albeit  absolutely  consistent  with  his  expressed 
principles,  sounds  almost  like  an  exact  replica  of  the  discourse  used  by 
Antigone  in  her  own  altercation  with  Ismene  (536-60).  This  parallelism 
between  Creon  (the  opponent  of  the  oikos  par  excellence)  and  Antigone 
brings  out  all  the  more  emphatically  the  latter's  fundamentally  ambiguous 
stance  towards  the  oikos.  To  take  a  few  examples,  Ismene's  words  denoting 
105  Bennett  &  Tyrell  (1990:  447-8)  are  unconvincing. 
106  See  above  all  Kirkwood  (1958:  228),  with  whom  I  am  here  in  total  agreement; 
also  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  134-5),  Steiner  (1983:  102),  Porter  (1987:  53).  Even 
at  551  c  Xyoüva  may  not  connote  personal  feeling,  if  one  accepts  Kells'  (1963:  52-5) 
ingenious  interpretation  (it  is  Antigone's  family  pride  that  is  hurt,  ckyovaa;  cL 
yEW  y"  [Heath]  would  mean  `if  I  bother  to  triumph  in  mockery  over  you,  to  score 
off  you').  The  idea,  favoured  by  Knox  (1964:  65)  after  Adams  (1957:  51,52),  that  it  is 
in  order  to  save  Ismene  from  Creon  that  Antigone  denies  her  any  role  in  the 
burial,  has  no  support  from  the  text. 375 
community  (570  f  pµoap.  va)  are  again  rejected  (571),  while  Creon's 
treatment  of  his  4LXTaTOs  son  (572)107  is  described  with  the  word  äT4th  E  Uv 
(572),  which  was  used  also  of  Antigone's  treatment  of  Ismene  (544).  More 
importantly,  Hades,  says  Creon,  will  cancel  the  forthcoming  marital  union 
of  his  son  and  Antigone  (575),  just  as  Antigone,  by  her  utter  devotion  to 
Hades  and  OL  KQTQ)  (542),  has  cancelled  her  blood-tie  with  Ismene.  This 
surprising  concurrence  of  the  champion  of  the  oikos  with  her  opponent,  the 
champion  of  the  polis,  has,  nonetheless,  more  far-reaching  implications 
than  it  seems  at  first  sight:  it  not  only  highlights  Antigone's  ambivalence 
towards  her  blood  relatives,  but  also,  by  means  of  a  slight  hint  at  575, 
foreshadows  a  major  reversal  that  is  to  take  place  later  in  the  play.  For  it  is 
the  first  time  that  Creon  uses  the  dread  name  of  Hades  not  only  to  indicate 
the  place  to  which  Antigone  should  be  consigned,  but  also  to  present  him 
almost  as  an  ally  (the  ethic  dative  EµoL  [L  :  E4w  rell.  1108  is  important),  who 
rids  him  of  an  undesirable  marriage.  The  defender  of  the  actiTrlpia  of  the 
polls  is  now  making  alliances  with  its  exact  negation,  Hades:  might  it  be  the 
case  that  Hades  has  started  to  enter  surreptitiously  the  realm  of  the  polls? 
6.4.1  The  second  stasimon 
This  choral  song  is  in  striking  contrast  with  the  preceding  first  stasimon, 
107  4LXTaTOs  is  certainly  striking  in  the  mouth  of  Ismene;  therefore,  apart  from 
making  even  more  remarkable  Creon's  debasing  treatment  of  his  own  4  iXoL,  it  also 
highlights  Antigone's  distancing  from  the  people  she  should  be  addressing  as 
4'LXTaTOL.  Attributing  572  to  Antigone,  as  some  editors  and  commentators  have  done, 
disrupts  the  continuity  of  the  stichomythia:  for  the  right  view  see,  most 
importantly,  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  127-8)  with  extensive  bibliography. 
108  Most  commentators  and  Lloyd  Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  128)  prefer  Eµo'L.  Contra 
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with  its  TrE  pdv-words  and  its  pervading  imagery  related  to  the  overcoming 
of  barriers  and  of  seemingly  impenetrable  enclosures.  In  that  stasimon,  as 
we  saw  (p.  365),  the  image  of  the  adverse  wind  (335)  and  of  the  towering- 
around  waves  (336-7)  was  there  only  to  extoll  Man's  ability  to  "make  a 
path  through"  all  those  adversities  (334,337).  Now,  however,  similar  images 
(wind:  588  8uQTrvöoL9,589  ©p  ao-r  aiv  ...  TrvoaLS,  591  8uaQVEµoL;  109 
stormy  sea:  586-92)  are  there  to  underline  exactly  the  opposite,  namely  the 
uncontrollable  elemental  forces  from  which  there  is  no  escape;  this  becomes 
an  unmistakable  illustration  of  the  entrapment  of  the  Labdacid  oikos  in  the 
vicious  circle  of  successive  misfortunes,  of  the  ä'ra  (584)  that  extends  its 
pernicious  effects  over  a  multitude  of  succeeding  generations  (cf.  Jebb  [ad 
583ff.  ]).  There  is  no  hope  of  ever  finding  a  way  out  (598  oü8'  EXEC  XÜGLV): 
the  repetition  of  the  same  self-destructive  pattern,  the  perpetuation  of  the 
Labdacids'  excessive  introversion,  seems  never  to  be  going  to  release  this 
accursed  race.  (596  ov8'  äTra)J  aaEL  yEVEäV  yEvoS).  110  The  full  poetic 
effectiveness  of  the  vocabulary  used  here  will  be  fully  appreciated  if 
contrasted  also  with  the  rhetoric  used  by  Creon  in  his  entrance  speech  to 
designate  the  polls'  successful  fencing  off  of  a  hostile  assault:  "the  gods,  after 
having  tossed  (163  aE  1LQavTES)  [the  vessel  of]  our  polls  in  a  stormy  sea  (163 
109  Hartung  for  the  MSS  -ov;  others  prefer  Jacobs'  -co. 
110  With  Müller  (p.  142),  Easterling  (1978b:  146)  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  596-98),  as 
against  Jebb  (ad  596f.  )  and  Brown  (ad  596),  I  take  the  meaning  of  these  words  to  be: 
"a  single  generation  (yEvoc)  has  taken  hold  of  the  whole  race  (y¬vEd)",  and  not: 
"one  generation  does  not  release  the  next"  (although,  as  Easterling  writes,  in  the 
end  this  does  not  matter  too  much).  The  evils  of  the  whole  race  are  to  be  traced 
back  to  a  single  generation  -probably  Oedipus',  as  the  Chorus'  very  first  remark 
in  relation  to  Antigone  shows  (379-80);  cf.  Easterling  (1978b:  156).  A.  Sept  742ff. 
presents  us  with  another  possibility:  the  evils  are  there  traced  even  further  back, 
to  Laius.  At  any  rate,  what  matters  here  is  that  the  evils  of  the  Labdacids  are  seen 
as  of  a  hereditary  nature. 377 
TroXXui3  aä)ip),  have  raised  it  back  to  a  state  of  safety  (162-3  ä#ak 
... 
c  pOwaav  rräkv)  ".  111  In  the  present  stasimon,  however,  both  the  G&\Og- 
imagery  in  general112  and  specific  words  used  by  Creon  to  designate  the 
polls'  salvation  by  the  gods  now  refer  to  exactly  the  opposite  situation:  the 
gods  (5  84  OE  ME  V,  597  OE  (Zv  TLS)  are  shaking  (5  84  GE  LQOYj  )113  the  house  of 
the  Labdacids,  but  now  there  is  no  ca4)o)ij  3s  6pQof)v  1T6kv  after  the 
storm;  ll4  the  polls  has  been  saved,  but  (as  one  should  expect)  the  oikos  of 
the  Labdacids  has  been  entangled  by  the  gods  in  an  endless  succession  of 
woes  falling  upon  other  woes  (595  Tr'[iaTa  ... 
ETrL  Trljµaa1  TrLTrTOVTa;  note 
the  emphatic  alliteration)  and  are  in  the  process  of  gradually  striking  it 
down  (597  E  Ep  iTrE  L).  115  The  last  root  of  the  Labdacid  tree  that  had  been  left 
intact,  embodying  the  light  of  hope  for  the  continuation  of  the  race,  has 
been  now  chopped  off  by  the  "blood-stained  scimitar  of  the  gods  below" 
(599-602).  116  We  see  once  again  that  Antigone's  obstinate  adherence  to  her 
kin  -  regardless  of  her  express  appeal  to  moral-religious  principles  -  has 
only  been  part  of  the  family's  abnormal  introversion  (incest,  kin-killing), 
their  enclosure  and  entrapment  in  the  storm  of  a'7,  which  was  to  end, 
appropriately,  in  the  ultimate  introversion,  namely  the  confinement  of  the 
111  Cf.  further  p.  355  ff. 
112  On  which  see  Goheen  (1951:  59). 
113  On  the  sea-imagery  cf.  Müller  (p.  140-1);  contra  Easterling  (1978b:  143). 
114  Cf.  on  this  point  Segal  (1978:  1182). 
115  In  A.  Sept  758-7lsimilar  storm-imagery  is  used  of  the  accursed  Labdacids. 
116  Jebb  (ad  599)  gives  a  fine  explanation  of  this  passage;  nonetheless,  I  am 
inclined  to  disagree  with  his  preference  (ad  601f.  )  for  the  MSS.  KöviS  to  Jortin's 
KO1TL$  -a  preference  shared  also  by  Booth  (1959),  Hoey  (1970a:  342-4)  and 
Easterling  (1978b:  148-9).  For  arguments  in  favour  of  the  emendation  see  I1oyd- 
Jones  (1957:  17),  Müller  (pp.  142-3),  I1oyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  129). 378 
whole  family  in  the  enclosed  space  of  Hades.  117 
We  remember  from  the  prologue  that  Antigone's  excessive  enclosure 
within  her  family  -  which  evidently  meant  a  prospective  enclosure  within 
Hades,  as  all  her  relatives  are  dead  (e.  g.  59,72-6)  -  was  repudiated  by 
Ismene  as  an  act  of  folly  (see  p.  350).  The  theme  of  folly  has  been  brought 
up  again  at  the  beginning  of  the  second  episode,  when  the  Chorus  suspected 
that  Antigone  was  caught  Ev  ä  poQVVrj  (383),  and  especially  at  the  end  of 
the  same  episode  (ring-composition),  when  Creon  remarked  (561-2)  that 
Ismene  has  just  shown  herself  ävous,  whereas  Antigone  has  been  so  all  her 
life118  -a  remark  confirmed  forthwith  by  Ismene  (563-4)  to  the  effect  that 
"even  what  inborn  sense  [voüs]  one  has,  goes  astray  [EýLQTaTa1]  in 
misfortunes".  This  important  theme  is  explored  in  the  second  stasimon, 
where  the  crucial  parameter  of  hereditary  d'Tq  (in  both  its  aspects  as 
infatuation  and  ruin;  cf.  p.  380  with  n.  127)  is  given  exceptional 
prominence.  The  "scimitar  of  the  nether  gods"  that  strikes  down  the  last 
surviving  members  of  the  Labdacid  family  operates  through  "folly  of 
reasoning119  and  an  Erinys  afflicting  the  mind"  (603  Xöyou  T'  ävoLa  Kai 
4pEv6v  '  EpLVÜc).  With  the  second  strophe  we  are  presented  with  a 
treatment  of  the  consequences  of  transgression  (vTrEpßaaia)  against  the 
117  Bowra  (1944:  89-90)  and  Winning  ton-Ingram  (1980:  167-9,172)  fail  to  see  this, 
and  dismiss  the  stasimon  as  an  unsuccessful  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Chorus  to 
explain  Antigone's  fate;  cf.  also  Müller's  (135-40)  view  that  the  Chorus' 
`Fehlurteil'  regarding  Antigone  is  really  applicable  to  Creon.  I  cannot  accept  this. 
118  Cf.  Burton  (1980:  108). 
119  Not  "of  speech",  as  is  commonly  translated:  for  kSyos  as  `reckoning', 
`reasoning'  etc.  see  LSJ  s.  v.,  I  and  III;  cf.  Else  (1976:  27),  Blundell  (1989:  144  n.  154). 
As  Lloyd-Jones  (1957:  18)  has  shown,  kiyou 
... 
'  Epuvüs  stands  in  apposition  to  Konis, 
and  denotes  the  agents  of  the  nether  gods'  destructive  action  (differently 
Winnington-Ingram  [1979:  7-8]).  See  also  Müller  (p.  143),  Brown  (ad  603).  Contra  T. 
Long,  RhM  117  (1974)  213-4;  Easterling  (1978b:  147). 379 
unfailing  (606)  power  of  Zeus:  his  eternal  Olympian  glory  is  contrasted  to 
the  doom  (5  )  that  is  incurred  when  vast  abundance  (613-4)  comes  to  CLTq 
human  beings.  120  This  sudden  turn  of  phrase,  although  its  connection  with 
what  precedes  may  seem  tenuous  or,  at  least,  not  easy  to  grasp 
immediately,  may  be  illuminated  if  placed  in  the  context  of  the  preceding 
lyric  treatment  of  the  fate  of  the  Labdacids:  for  what  has  been  the  history  of 
the  Labdacids,  if  not  a  series  of  transgressions,  of  violations  (in  most  cases 
unwilling  and  /  or  unknowing)  of  the  limits  set  to  human  beings  (cf.  e.  g. 
the  emphasis  on  Trapßaaia  at  A.  Sept.  743121)?  In  the  majority  of  tragic 
versions  of  the  myth,  Laius  is  warned  by  Apollo's  oracle  that,  if  he  has  a 
child,  he  will  perish  (S.  OT  711-4,853-4;  E.  Pho.  19-20)122  and  set  the  city 
120I  accept  I1oyd-Jones's  (1957:  20)  ot6Ev'  ... 
(3ioTOs  TräµrroXvs  for  the  MSS.  oi8Ev 
... 
11ÖTw  Träµnroks  (or  -Lv).  For  the  idea  cf.  Pi.  P.  3.105-6  (in  Sol.  6  West  it  is  put  in 
conditional  form).  Differently  Jebb  (ad  613f.  )  and  Müller  (p.  145),  who  accept 
Heath's  TräµrroXii  y'  but  interpret  it  differently  from  each  other.  For  a  detailed 
treatment  see  Easterling  (1978b:  151-2).  Kitto  (1956:  165),  Coleman  (1972:  13-14), 
Gellie  (1972:  42),  and  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  169-71)  thought  they  could  detect 
allusions  to  Creon  here,  but  these  can  be  only  anticipatory  (i.  e.  looking  forward  to 
passages  like  1155-71),  and  therefore  of  doubtful  effect  upon  the  audience;  see 
rightly  Burton  (1980:  110-11).  On  the  imagery  associated  with  nTrEp(3aaia  see 
Goheen  (1951:  10-11). 
121  Cf.  on  this  point  Else  (1976:  16-7). 
122  Contrary  to  the  communis  opinio  (most  eloquently  expressed  by  Dodds  [1966: 
41])  I  believe  that  the  terms  in  which  the  oracle  is  couched  in  the  OF  are  not 
unambiguously  unconditional:  cf.  esp.  714,  where  there  is  undoubtedly  room  to 
construe  the  &rrLc-clause  conditionally  ("in  case  a  son  was  born"):  see  also  I1oyd- 
Jones  (1983:  119-20)  who  follows  G.  PerroI  (Sofocle  [Milano  1935]),  203;  Moorhouse 
(1982:  233,235)  -pace  Bollack  (1990:  II,  ad  714)  -takes  &YTLS  yEVOLT'  as  oblique 
optative  (with  potential  force)  standing  for  what  would  be  in  direct  speech 
subjunctive  +  äv:  öaTL,  äv  ycvilTaL.  At  E.  Pho.  17-20  and  1597-9  the  oracle  is  also 
conditional  (the  phrasing  in  the  latter  passage  is  slightly  vague,  but  need  not 
imply  that  the  oracle  was  unconditional).  It  is  only  in  the  CC  that  the  oracle 380 
in  danger  (cf.  A.  Sept  748-9),  but  he  invariably  fails  to  obey,  no  matter 
whether  willingly  or  not.  123  Oedipus'  patricide  and  incest,  albeit  unwilling, 
are  also  both  acts  of  transgression  and  instances  of  human  illusion  which  is 
revealed  only  too  late;  124  and  so  is  Eteocles'  and  Polyneices'  internecine 
frenzy.  125  Delusion  leading  to  disaster  is  exactly  the  subject  matter  of  the 
second  antistrophe:  hope  is  a  fickle  thing,  as  it  can  benefit  some  people,  but 
prove  a  delusion  for  others  (615-7);  126  true  knowledge  comes  always  too  late 
and  is  invariably  painful  (618-9);  he  whose  mind  a  god  leads  to  d"Ta  (624) 
sees  evil  things  as  good,  and  as  a  result  is  soon  afflicted  by  äTa  (620-5)  - 
the  meanings  `infatuation'  and  `ruin'  being  inextricably  interconnected  in 
both  instances  of  a'Ta.  127  Both  infatuation  /  folly  and  the  resulting  disaster 
are  in  this  stasimon  viewed  as  being  an  inherent  trait  of  the  accursed  family 
of  the  Labdacids;  the  chain  reaction  "infatuation  -  transgression  -  disaster" 
is  identified  as  the  common  denominator  of  the  whole  race's  career  from 
becomes  clearly  unconditional  (969-70);  for  possible  reasons  for  this  change  see 
Chapter  Four  (section  4.4.1)  . 
123  In  A.  Sept.  750,802,842  it  is  Laius'  folly  that  is  put  forth  as  a  reason;  in  E.  Pho. 
21-2  it  is  his-  drunkenness.  In  both  cases  the  cause  of  the  misfortunes  of  the  race  is 
put  down  to  a  temporary  loss  of  mental  faculties. 
124  Cf.  (on  incest)  A.  Sept.  756-7irapävoia  QvvdyE  vvµ4LOVs  OpEVtXric;  778  ETrEL  S' 
I  pT(4ptov 
EyEVETO.  See  Else  (1976:  17-8),  Burton  (1980:  106). 
125  In  A.  Sept  Eteocles  understands  that  he  is  doomedonly  at  the  end  (653ff.  ),  when 
he  realizes  that  he  has  to  duel  with  his  brother,  thus  bringing  their  father's  curse 
to  pass.  For  crucial  (and  eventually  fateful)  realizations  in  the  Labdacid  history  cf. 
also  E.  Pho.  23,33,59  with  Mastronarde  (1994:  139). 
126  The  word  used  for  `delusion'  is  tTräTa  which  is,  together  with  '  Eplv6S  (603),  the 
concept  most  often  used  as  a  replacement  for  &  rj  in  fifth  century:  Padel  (1995:  188- 
90). 
127  Bremer  (1969:  141-5);  Easterling  (1978b:  153);  Padel  (1995:  255)  sees  this  as  an 
exceptional  instance,  for  in  Sophodes  &Tlj  (pace  Doyle  [1984:  96-122])  usually 
means  simply  `disaster'.  Wrongly  Burton  (1980:  106). 381 
generation  to  generation.  128  The  point  of  explicitly  mentioning  the  name 
Aaß8aKL8dv  at  594  (i.  e.  at  the  beginning  of  the  first  antistrophe  which 
presents  us  with  the  specific  reference  of  the  generalizations  offered  in  the 
corresponding  strophe)  is,  I  think,  significant  in  this  respect:  Labdacus  is  a 
shadowy  figure,  and  his  mention  here  (as  well  as  at  862)  can  only  be  meant 
to  emphasize  the  hereditary  nature  of  the  evils  of  the  race.  129  The  themes  of 
extreme  family  introversion,  of  self-destruction  and  enclosure  in  Hades,  and 
of  folly  are  thus  intertwined  and  established  as  typical  of  the  Labdacids.  130 
6.5.1  The  Haemon  scene 
Despite  the  qualms  expressed  by  Creon  at  631-4,  the  beginning  of  Haemon's 
speech  seems  to  be  entirely  along  the  lines  of  his  father's  pro-polis  ideology. 
He  takes  care  immediately  to  praise  his  father's  yv4lac  XPTaTäs  (635-6) 
and  their  salutary,  constructive  effect  on  his  life  (the  use  of  the  word 
128  In  the  light  of  these  remarks,  the  few  passages  in  which  Antigone  attempts  to 
defend  her  position  by  appealing  to  `good  sense'  (e.  g.  469-70,557,904)  must  surely 
be  meant  not  to  present  her  acts  as  `reasonable',  but  rather  to  underscore,  as  a  foil, 
her  self-destructive  folly. 
129  Cf.  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  166).  Contra  Brown  (ad  593),  who  misses  the 
point;  more  subtly  Easterling  (1978b:  142,152,155-8).  It  may  be  significant  that 
"Labdakos  is  not  [...  ]  mentioned  as  an  ancestor  of  the  house  (or  anything  else) 
before  Sophokles'  Antigone  (593)":  Gantz  (1993:  488).  For  a  modem  instance  of  the 
idea  that  a  person  is  liable  to  misdeed  only  by  virtue  of  his  /  her  belonging  to  an 
accursed,  polluted  family  cf.  the  motto  to  this  chapter. 
130  Kirkwood  (1958:  275)  and  Easterling  (1978b:  156-8)  seem  to  underestimate  the 
importance  of  the  family  factor  in  this  stasimon;  see  contra  Lloyd-Jones  (1957:  16) 
and  (1983:  113-7);  also  Santirocco  (1980:  187),  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  136).  For 
a  sober  and  balanced  discussion  of  fate,  as  manifested  in  Antigone's  family  past,  in 
its  relation  to  freedom  of  personal  choice  see  Mogyorödi  (1996). 382 
ä'tropOots  [636]  131  is  intended  to  recall  Creon's  own  preoccupation  with  the 
safe  faring  of  the  polls:  cf.  162-3  äa4a  sc  ... 
I  wpOwaav,  and  see  again 
section  6.2.1).  He  stresses  (637-8)  that  he  prefers  his  father's  good  guidance 
(here  Creon's  aspect  as  political  leader  is  given  special  prominence)  to  any 
marriage;  that  is  to  say  that  the  wider  interests  of  the  polls,  safeguarded  by 
Creon's  wise  (638  KCU'VZs)  leadership,  are  not  to  be  jeopardized  by  a  family 
affair  like  marriage.  The  oikos  is  made  again  subsidiary  to  the  polis. 
In  his  reply  Creon  underlines  again  the  importance  of  obedience  to 
yv4ul  TraTpcýa  (640),  not  simply  for  the  sake  of  the  house  per  se,  but  (and 
this  should  be  emphasized)  for  the  house  (642  Ev  86µoL9)  to  be  able  to 
maintain  its  relations  of  amicable  or  hostile  reciprocity  with  friends  and 
enemies  respectively  (643-4).  As  Jebb  (ad  643f.  )  has  remarked,  Creon's 
phrasing  here  is  strongly  reminiscent  of  the  definition  of  a  ývµµaX(a  (Toils 
a1TOÜ3  E  XOpovs  KaL  ývs  vopI  ¬  Lv;  cf.  Thuc.  1.44.1).  In  other  words, 
what  Creon  expounds  as  his  ideal  of  a  good  family,  is  in  fact  politically 
nuanced,  as  it  is  couched  in  terms  of  a  political  alliance  between  city- 
states.  A  (Xo  KaKÖc  (652),  he  continues,  is  to  be  treated  as  a  8vaueiis 
(653):  the  family  relations  (4(Xos)  must  conform  with  the  friendships  and 
enmities  of  the  polis;  it  is  the  latter  that  should  regulate  the  former,  not 
vice-versa.  132  He  stresses  again,  at  655-62,  that  his  duty  towards  the  whole 
polls  overrides  his  4(X09-relationship  with  Antigone  (cf.  659-60),  while  661- 
2  reveal  how  he  views  the  oikos  as  "a  sort  of  training  ground  for  the  exercise 
131  If  µoß  is  kept  at  635,  then  µE  should  be  mentally  supplied  (or  inserted  in  the 
text,  as  Dawe  [1978:  108]  tentatively  suggests)  as  the  object  of  äiropOots.  This  is  L. 
Campbell's  (ad  635)  view,  accepted  also  by  Kamerbeek  (ad  635,6),  but  rejected  by 
Jebb  (ad  635f.  );  see  discussion  in  Kirkwood  (1991:  105).  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson 
(1990b:  131)  pronounce  Blaydes'  µE  (for  MSS  poL  at  635)  "unnecessary",  but  print  it 
in  their  text  (1990a)! 
132  Cf.  Knox  (1964:  89). 383 
of  political  virtue"  (Knox  [1964:  89]).  133  Creon's  speech  soon  shifts  from  the 
familial  to  the  political  /  military:  134  obedience  to  the  laws  (663)  or  to  the 
leader  appointed  by  the  city  (664,666-7),  steadfastness  and  loyalty  in 
s  battle  (670-1)135  are  necesýäry  preconditions  for  the  awrp[a  of  the  majority 
(cf.  675-6;  note  esp.  öpOoup  vwv,  and  the  alliteration  a  CEL 
...  athpa6').  On 
the  contrary,  disobedience  to  any  form  of  political  authority  (672  ävapX[a, 
opposed  to  676  nELOapXLa)  is  the  cause  of  all  evils  to  the  polls  (673,674-5) 
and,  consequently,  to  the  oikos  (673-4).  136  Even  what  seems  to  be  an 
authoritarian  principle,  namely  that  the  ruler  appointed  by  the  polis  must 
be  obeyed  in  all  matters  alike  (666-7)  is  in  fact  an  echo  of  Solon  fr.  30  West: 
133  See  also  Rohdich  (1980:  124-6),  Murnaghan  (1987:  200-1),  with  the  important 
caveat  offered  by  Foley  (1995:  139).  This  point  is  missed  by  Segal  (1981:  193).  In  this 
respect,  it  is  useful  to  bear  in  mind  Osborne's  (1996:  267-77)  recent  argument  that, 
in  5th  century  Athens  at  least,  far  from  the  government  of  larger  political  units 
(demos,  polis)  being  organized  on  lines  derived  from  the  government  of  the  pre- 
existing  sub-groups  (family,  phratry,  etc.  ),  it  is  the  latter  goups  that  modelled  their 
organization  on  that  of  the  polis.  Cf.  also  Strauss  (1990:  104-7)  with  a  slightly 
different  emphasis.  Contra  C.  Patterson  CA  9  (1990)  61,  who  cites  Pericles'  law  TTEp  . 
voOwv  as  an  instance  of  the  appropriation  by  the  polis  of  the  language  of  family 
inheritance  and  property;  Seaford  (1994a:  214). 
134  The  political  and  the  military  aspect  should  not  be  seen  as  distinct:  the  soldiers 
of  the  hoplite  phalanx,  equal  and  interdependent  parts  of  a  solid  whole,  were  but 
citizens  in  arms  (something  that  Goheen  [1951:  19-26]has  failed  to  see):  see  Ducrey 
(1986:  61-2);  Bowden  (1993:  47-9)  with  bibliography;  on  Antigone  in  particular  see 
Podlecki  (1986:  98),  notwithstanding  his  unacceptable  conclusions  about  Creon. 
135  On  possible  echoes  of  the  ephebic  oath  in  671  see  Jebb  (ad  670f.  )  and,  in  greater 
detail,  Siewert  (1977:  105-7),  notwithstanding  the  latter's  unacceptable 
interpretation  of  them.  Cf.  also  most  recently  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989a:  144  with 
n.  37). 
136  See  further  Calder  (1968:  399). 384 
äPX(V  äKOUE  Kai  8LKaiu  S  Kä&Kü  c.  137  The  frequency  of  words  belonging  to 
the  semantic  field  of  KöQµos  (660  ('IKOQµa,  677  TOts  Koaµouµ.  EVOLc,  730 
Toils  äKO  Y  IO  1VTas)  adds  to  the  political  load  of  Creon's  speech,  for  KöQµos 
is  the  standard  word  for  `political  order',  138  or  `government'  in  general;  139 
ironically,  Antigone  uses  KOO  LEtV  to  describe  her  burial  of  Polyneices  (901; 
cf.  396),  1-  i.  e.  the  very  act  that  has  undermined  the  KöQµos  of  the  polis! 
Creon's  diatribe  ends  in  an  interesting  twist:  defending  the  regulations 
made  by  the  rulers  (677  Tots  KOQp.  O  4L  VOls)141  means  never  to  yield  to  a 
woman  (678-80;  cf.  also  484-5,525,578-9).  Whoever  has  grasped  the 
fundamental  polarity  "oikos  vs.  polis"  has  no  problem  in  seeing  the  point 
of  this  concluding  remark  on  women:  what  Creon  means  is  that  the  male- 
dominated  and  male-oriented  polis  would  negate  its  own  nature,  if  it  were 
to  yield  to  the  subversive  forces  embodied  by  women  who  (acting, 
137  D.  L.  Page's  view,  as  reported  by  Bremer  (1969:  139  n.  1);  cf.  Kamerbeek  (ad 
666,7),  Rohdich  (1980:  125),  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  182),  Meier  (1993:  191). 
This  fragment  has  understandably  given  trouble  to  those  who  tend  to  see  Creon  as 
an  unqualified  tyrant  from  start  to  end:  Siewert  (1977:  106  n.  25);  Blundell  (1986: 
124  n.  73).  That  it  was  also  a  slave's  duty  to  obey  his  master  in  matters  "both  just  and 
unjust"  (e.  g.  A.  Cho.  78-81;  E.  fr.  419)  only  indicates  how  different  from  ours  was 
the  Athenian  conception  of  democracy. 
138  Theogn.  677,  Solon  13.11W  with  the  commentary  of  Levine  (1985:  181-2,184, 
186).  For  Kövµoc  as  the  Spartan  word  for  `social  order'  see  Nagy  (1985:  32,41 
§25n2);  for  KövµoL  as  an  official  designation  of  magistrates  in  Crete  see  LSJ  s.  v. 
Kövµoc  III,  Nagy  (1990b:  180  n.  141). 
139  Thuc.  4.76.2;  8.48.4,67.3,72.2;  Hdt.  1.65.4;  Pl.  Prt.  322c.  See  LSJ  S.  V.  Kößµoc  1.4. 
140  I  owe  this  last  point  to  Segal  (1981:  188). 
141  This  is  Jebb's  (ad  677)  interpretation  of  Tots  Kovµou  thvols  (neutr.  ).  Contra 
Kamerbeek  (ad  677-79),  who  construes  the  word  as  masculine  and  takes  it  to  mean 
"the  orderly  subjects". 385 
abnormally,  like  men  [61-2])142  seek  to  impose  the  interests  of  the  oikos  - 
the  female  domain  par  excellence  -  on  those  of  the  polis.  '43 
Creon's  extreme  opposition  to  the  subversive  values  (oikos,  Hades, 
femaleness)  embodied  by  Antigone  may  be  also  highlighted  by  his  insistence 
on  soundness  of  mind  -  presumably  to  be  contrasted  with  Antigone's  (and 
Ismene's)  folly  (cf.  above,  pp.  350,378):  he  advises  his  son  not  to  lose  his 
mind  for  the  sake  of  sexual  pleasure  (648-9),  and  the  Chorus  praise  his 
sound  opinion  (682).  It  is  therefore  all  the  more  surprising  (and  this  is 
indicated  by  Creon's  outburst  of  anger  at  726ff.  )  that  Haemon  goes  to  great 
lengths  to  make  as  subtle  a  case  as  possible  against  his  father's  soundness  of 
opinion.  The  remarkable  frequency,  in  his  speech,  of  words  belonging  to  the 
semantic  field  of  4poVEtV  (or  sim.  )  is  an  indication,  on  the  formal  level,  of 
the  new  important  theme  of  Creon's  misjudgement  that  is  being  now 
introduced:  683  4pEvas,  707  #ovEty,  710  ao4ös,  µavOävE  Lv,  719  yvchpj, 
721  EnLQTrlh11s  1T?  uw,  723  µavOävELv;  cf.  also  the  Chorus'  µa6Ety  (725)  and 
Creon's  angered  818aý6µEQ@a  (726),  4PEVChaELs 
... 
4pEVC3v  KEV09  (754).  144 
Haemon's  point  (however  one  treats  lines  687-8)145  is  that  his  father,  quite 
142  Cf.  Bryson  Bongie  (1974:  250),  Sorum  (1981-82:  205-6);  Segal  (1986:  145,151) 
curiously  insists  on  Antigone's  femininity. 
143  See  Segal  (1981:  183-6,192),  Steiner  (1984:  185-6,238-41),  Goldhill  (1986:  98), 
Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989a:  140);  on  the  `female  vs.  male'  polarity  see  Knox  (1964: 
78-9),  Segal  (1978:  1179),  Steiner  (1983:  87-8).  H.  P.  Foley  (Reflections  of  Women  in 
Antiquity  [New  York  1981]  148-63)  warns  us  that  real  life  might  belie  such  too 
clear-cut  distinctions;  this  is  of  course  correct  in  principle,  but  what  I  am 
concerned  here  with  is  the  ideology  of  the  polis,  not  real  life.  The  political  load  of 
Creon's  opposition  to  the  female  is  not  understood  by  Winnington-Ingram  (1980: 
124-5)  and  Rehm  (1994:  60).  Bennett  &  Tyrell  (1990:  454)  distort  the  meaning  of 
these  passages. 
144  Cf.  Else  (1976:  51-2). 
145  Dawe  (1996)  prints  aoü  6'  o$v  TTE4uKa  at  688,  whereas  I1oyd  Jones  &  Wilson 
(1990a)  delete  687.  Either  way,  the  point  is  that  Creon  should  be  informed  (by 386 
understandably,  may  not  be  aware  of  the  growing  discontent  amongst 
citizens  (688-91),  and  so  his  rigorous  pro-polls  attitude  may  actually  run 
counter  to  public  opinion.  For,  as  Haemon  reveals,  the  citizens,  who 
(especially  in  Creon's  rhetoric)  have  been  occupying,  until  now,  the'  positive 
pole  in  the  polarity  "polls  vs.  oikos  /  Hades",  are  now  on  Antigone's  side,  i.  e. 
on  the  side  of  the  oikos  and  Hades.  '-  Significantly,  lines  693-9,  in  which 
Haemon  claims  to  quote  secret  rumours  circulating  amongst  the  citizens, 
repeat  almost  verbatim  the  rhetoric  used  by  Antigone  in  her  defence  of  her 
actions  before  Creon.  Especially  the  juxtaposition  of  E)KAEEQTäT)V  (695),  in 
which  resounds  the  name  Eteocles,  and  a1')Tä8EX4  oV  (696),  referring  of 
course  to  Polyneices,  is  a  reiteration  of  Antigone's  similar  association  (at 
502-3)  of  KAE0S  (properly  belonging  to  the  bearer  of  the  name  Eteocles,  the 
glorious  defender  of  the  polls)  with  the  traitor  Polyneices,  the  "man  of  many 
VELKEa".  147  Moreover,  lines  697-8,  by  quoting  those  terms  of  Creon's  decree 
that  are  related  to  the  burial  of  Polyneices  (205-6),  register  the  people's 
protest  thereat,  thus  siding  with  Antigone,  whose  similar  protest  was  voiced 
at  29-30  (and  perhaps  again  at  467,  if  Semitelos'  ingenious  ijaXuvav  [-vov 
Blaydes]  KVVES  is  correct).  148  The  TLµý  which  Creon  sought  to  deny 
Polyneices,  on  the  grounds  of  his  anti-polis  stance,  is  now  bestowed  by  the 
whole  polls  to  the  traitor's  sister  (699  Xpuoijc  äýLa  TLP.  f1S  XaXEtv),  whereas 
it  is  Creon  himself  who  is  at  risk  of  losing  his  own  EüKXELa  (703-4;  an 
indirect,  but  clear  insinuation).  149  More  alarmingly  still,  Haemon  exploits 
Haemon)  on  the  feelings  of  the  Theban  citizens,  of  which  he  is  unaware. 
146  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989a:  144,146)  unduly  discredits  Haemon's  report;  see 
rightly  Foley  (1995:  135-6),  Van  Erp  Taalman  Kip  (1996:  521-4). 
147  Cf.  p.  372. 
148  On  these  echoings  of  Antigone's  discourse  see  Else  (1976:  55),  Brown  (ad  745), 
Blundell  (1989:  147)  and  Foley  (1996:  62). 
149  Cf.  Rohdich  (1980:  128),  Blundell  (1989:  147). 387 
Creon's  favourite  image  of  the  Ship  of  State  in  order  to  point  out  that  this 
ship  is  now  about  to  founder  because  of  Creon's  obstinacy  (715-7).  150 
Indeed,  Creon  reacts  like  an  unqualified  tyrant:  as  if  to  confirm  the  hints  at 
his  tyrannical  disposition  that  such  lines  as  211-14  may  have  put  across  to 
some  members  of  the  audience,  he  says  he  will  not  take  account  of  the  polls 
in  his  government  of  Thebes  (734),  for  the  ruler  himself  is  the  polls  (736-8) 
-  even  if  that  means  that  there  is  no  longer  a  polls  for  him  to  rule  (739)! 
The  state  of  affairs  that  we  have  been  accustomed  to  regard  as  typical  of  a 
well-ordered  polls  is  now  suddenly  reversed:  the  male  ruler,  instead  of 
embodying  and  expressing  the  entire  polls,  turns  out  to  be  worlds  apart 
from  it,  to  the  point  of  becoming  an  autocratic  ruler  of  an  inexistent 
polis.  151  On  the  other  hand,  the  demands  of  the  oikos  and  the  female  realm 
turn  out  to  be  far  from  detrimental  to,  or  even  simply  incompatible  with, 
the  polls:  Creon  may  repeatedly  accuse  his  son  of  allying  with  women  (740, 
748)  and  of  being  inferior  to  women  (746,756),  but  Haemon  persistently 
claims  that  he  advocates  Antigone's  cause  only  out  of  concern  for  his  father 
the  ruler  of  the  polls  (741,743,749).  What  is  more,  Haemon's  claim  to  be 
caring  both  for  the  interests  of  his  father  and  for  the  prerogatives  of  the 
nether  gods  (749;  cf.  745)  is  quite  remarkable,  as  the  audience  has  been 
until  now  conditioned  to  regard  polls  and  Hades  as  poles  apart.  152  So,  a 
most  extraordinary  paradox  emerges:  the  defender  of  the  auirr1pLa  of  the 
polls  turns  out  to  be  the  one  who  reduces  it  to  the  point  of  extinction,  for, 
as  Haemon  puts  it,  Creon  treats  the  city  as  if  it  were  a  desert  (739,  to  be 
read  in  the  context  of  734-9),  whereas  the  advocate  of  the  oikos  and  Hades 
150  Cf.  Musurillo  (1967:  47). 
151  Cf.  Segal  (1978:  1176):  "Supposing  himself  the  champion  of  the  polis,  defending 
its  inner  space  from  attack  from  the  outside,  Creon  actually  is  negating  this 
civilized  space.  " 
152  Cf.  Bultmann  (1967:  322). 388 
is  the  one  who  truly  expresses  the  feelings  of  the  polis  in  its  entirety.  153 
Besides,  folly  has  been  so  far  typical  only  of  the  Labdacids  (see  esp.  the 
second  stasimon);  nonetheless,  it  is  Creon  who  now  stands  accused  not 
merely  of  having  unwise  counsels  (755  OüK  EL  #ovEtv),  but  indeed  of 
being  nothing  short  of  a  `madman'  (765  µa(v1  )! 
The  paradoxical  reversals,  however,  do  not  end  here.  We  have  noted 
(p.  375)  Creon's  disturbing  (as  well  as  unexpected)  reliance  on  Hades,  in 
order  to  maintain  order  in  the  polls:  Hades,  he  said,  will  prevent  his  son 
from  marrying  a  subversive  female  (575).  The  aKOQµoc  Antigone,  must,  be 
treated  as  the  enemy  of  the  state  that  she  is  (653  BuaµEvtj),  if  the  salutary 
civic  nELOapXLa  (676)  is  to  be  preserved.  In  this  case,  marriage,  normally  a 
function  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  the  city,  runs  counter  to  the  city's 
interests.  154  Haemon,  therefore,  the  royal  scion,  has  to  forego  his  personal 
T18ovil  (648)  for  the  sake  of  the  whole  polls.  Antigone,  the  advocate  of  the 
laws  of  Hades,  must,  appropriately,  marry  in  Hades  (654),  for  otherwise  the 
marriage  will  become  subversive  to  the  polls;  Haemon  will  no  doubt  find 
other  fields  to  plough  (569).  Soon,  however,  the  alarming  suspicion  is 
artfully  intimated  that  Antigone's  marriage  in  Hades  may  not  leave  Creon's 
oikos  unaffected,  and  that  despite  his  best  efforts  his  oikos  may  soon,  like 
the  Labdacids,  work  its  own  self-destruction.  At  750  Creon  declares  to  his 
son  that  he  stands  no  chance  of  marrying  Antigone  while  she  is  alive:  does 
this  mean  that  he  may  marry  her  when  she  will  be  dead,  thus  joining  her  in 
her  `marriage  in  Hades'?  This  is  very  poignantly  suggested  by  Haemon's 
153  As  Knox  (1964:  107-8)  remarks,  it  is  in  this  scene  that  Creon's  aspect  as  a  tyrant 
becomes  glaringly  evident  for  the  first  time. 
154  On  the  antinomy  between  the  civic  and  the  familial  aspect  of  marriage  in 
general  see  Murnaghan  (1987:  201-5). 389 
reply  at  the  next  line:  "her  death  will  signal  someone  else's  death  too".  155 
Creon's  ensuing  command  (760-1)  that  Antigone  should  be  brought  there, 
so  that  she  may  die  "in  the  presence  of  her  bridegroom  [761  vuµ4iw],  before 
his  very  eyes,  at  his  side"  has  certainly  an  ominous  ring  (is  Antigone  to  die 
simply  "at  her  bridegroom's  side"  or  along  with  him?  ),  and  so  does 
Haemon's  response  (763-4)  that  his  father  will  never  again  see  him  eye  to 
eye  (does  this  mean  that,  when  his  father  sees  him  again,  he  will  be  dead?  ). 
Creon  had  hoped  that  his  son  would  cut  himself  off  from  the  81)(7p.  EM19 
Antigone  (65  3-4),  `letting  go  of  her'  (65  3  µE  OE  9),  so  that  she  would  marry 
someone  else  in  Hades;  now,  however,  it  is  the  same  Creon  who  causes  his 
son  to  be  all  too  closely  involved  in  an  act  ('marriage  in  Hades')  that  was 
initially  meant  not  to  affect  Creon's  oikos  but,  on  the  contrary,  to  save  it, 
along  with  the  rest  of  the  polis.  With  this  new  turn  of  events,  the  effects  of 
Antigone's  marriage  in  Hades,  which  seals  the  fate  of  the  accursed 
Labdacids,  seem  to  be  encroaching  on  Creon's  oikos  too. 
6  .  5.2  The  third  stasimon:  Eros  and  madness,  oikos  and  Dolis 
What  is  the  reason  for  this  unexpected  turn  of  events,  namely  the  strife 
between  a  father  who  used  to  guide  his  son  "along  the  right  path"  (635-6) 
and  a  son  who  used  to  belong  entirely  to  his  father  (635,640)?  It  is  Eros, 
answer  the  Chorus.  156  Despite  Creon's  attempts  to  persuade  his  son  to 
155  See  Rehm  (1994:  65).  Creon  misunderstands  this  (752)  as  threatened  patricide: 
see  Jebb  (ad  751),  Blundell  (1989:  137).  This  foreshadows  1231-4  (see  p.  426),  but  for 
the  time  being  it  is  Haemon's  intention  to  commit  suicide  that  matters. 
156  K.  von  Fritz's  (Antike  and  Moderne  Tragödie  [Berlin'  1962]  227-40)  attempt  to 
strip  Haemon's  defence  of  his  fiancee  from  all  personal  motivation  has  fortunately 
not  gained  ground.  See  now  H.  Erbse's  (RhM  n.  F.  134  [1991]  253-61)  powerful 
exposition. 390 
sacrifice  his  personal  118ovij  for  the  sake  of  the  common  good,  it  is  exactly 
this  very  f  8ový,  the  sexual  passion  inspired  by  the  universal  and 
inescapable  power  of  Eros,  that  dooms  Creon's  cause  to  failure.  This  choral 
song,  with  its  account  of  Eros'  effects  on  human  lives,  provides  a  key  for  us 
to  assess  to  what  extent  the  cause  of  the  polis  and  its  main  advocate  have 
been  undermined  by  the  forces  that  Creon  has  been  fighting:  the  female, 
folly,  and  Hades. 
Eros  is  presented  as  a  warrior.  he  is  aViKaTOs  µäXav  (781);  like  a 
hostile  army,  he  is  the  "despoiler  of  possessions"  (782);  157  he  "keeps  his 
vigil",  like  a  soldier  on  night-watch  (784  EvvuXEVEts).  158  We  are  obviously 
meant  to  recall  that  Creon  has  repeatedly  used  military  vocabulary  to 
illuminate  his  ideal  of  an  orderly  polls  (the  most  striking  instance  is  668- 
77);  now,  however,  Eros  defeats  the  QTpaTl1y09  (8)  Creon  on  his  own  field, 
the  battlefield.  With  the  mention  of  mental  derangement  as  an  effect  of  Eros 
at  787-90  the  important  theme  of  ävoLa  recurs;  the  emphasis  however  now 
falls  no  longer  on  the  inherent  ävoLa  of  the  Labdacids  (see  again  the  second 
stasimon),  but  on  the  sudden  onslaught,  upon  the  oikos  of  Creon,  of  the 
madness  instigated  by  Eros.  Interestingly,  this  madness  is  not  seen  as 
afflicting  only  Haemon,  for  the  phrasing  of  793-4  is  suitably  vague,  and 
suggests  that  Creon  also  has  had  his  mind  led  astray  (791-2)  and  has, 
therefore,  his  share  of  responsibility  in  the  mutual  VE  tKOS  with  his  son 
157  Cf.  Brown's  (p.  87)  "despoiler  of  wealth".  This  is  the  most  widely  accepted 
intepretation  of  Ev  KTTjµaQL  TTLTrTELs:  see  Jebb  (ad  782),  fully  endorsed  by  loyd- 
Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  135-6),  who  also  give  a  list  of  other  views.  Jebb  (1.  c.  ) 
compares  the  military  use  of  E  LrrtTrTELV  in  Qi.  24.526&  8'  ETTEUOV 
Trp%LaXoLs. 
158  Again,  this  is  the  interpretation  favoured,  with  more  or  less  enthusiasm,  by  the 
majority  of  the  scholars:  see  especially  Jebb  (ad  783f.  ).  On  Eros  as  a  warrior  see  also 
Knox  (1979:  179). 391 
(793-4).  159  We  have  just  seen  how  Haemon  directed  imputations  of 
madness  against  his  father  (765  µaivi);  but  such  accusations  coming  from 
the  mouth  of  the  loyal  senior  citizens  of  Thebes  are  indeed  surprising  and 
can  only  verify,  from  a  different  point  of  view,  our  observation  that  the  folly 
/  madness  that  has  been  thus  far  an  exclusive  attribute  of  the  accursed 
Labdacids  or  of  the  enemies  of  Thebes  (Capaneus'  `Bacchic'  frenzy  at  134-6) 
is  indeed  making  its  way  into  the  oikos  of  the  man  who  should  be  least 
susceptible  to  its  effects. 
With  the  mention  of  ýüvalµov  VEtKOS  at  793  the  process  that  is 
gradually  leading  to  Creon's  assimilation  to  the  anti-polis  elements  he  has 
been  fighting  becomes  even  clearer.  Creon  prided  himself  on  having  yoväs  I 
Ka7K0ous  (641-2),  but  it  now  transpires  that  his  oikos  has  been  afflicted 
by  the  same  spirit  of  ýi  vagiov  vE  l.  KOS  which  led  Polyneices  to  betray  his 
country  and  to  end  the  male  line  of  the  Labdacid  oikos,  thus  dooming  it  to 
extinction.  A  detail  of  the  Labdacid  legend  that  is  not  mentioned  in  our 
play,  but  may  have  informed  the  original  audience's  perception  of  it  (with 
some  help,  perhaps,  from  such  reminders  as  the  one  at  line  2),  is  that  the 
üvaLp  ov  vE  l,  KOs  between  Eteocles  and  Polyneices  was  part  of  their  father's 
curse  against  them;  160  in  such  a  case  the  strife  between  father  (Creon)  and 
son  (Haemon)  that  we  have  witnessed  in  the  previous  episode  has  a 
disturbing  parallel  in  the  hostility  between  father  (Oedipus)  and  sons 
(Eteocles  and  Polyneices)  that  has  resulted  in  the  extinction  of  their 
oikos.  161  Most  striking,  however,  are  lines  795-800  where  the  outcome  of  the 
battle  between  Eros  and  the  QTpaTrlyös  Creon  is  announced:  the  winner  is 
the`LµEpos  (not  to  be  distinguished  from  Eros),  162  the  desire  that  had  been 
159  Cf.  Kirkwood  (1958:  208),  Goldhill  (1986:  177),  Zeitlin  (1993:  156). 
160  A.  Sept  785-91;  S.  CC  420-30,1370-6,1383-92;  E.  Pho.  66-8,351,1611. 
161  Cf.  Loraux  (1986:  178,179),  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  144). 
162  See  Kamerbeek  (ad  795,6). 392 
keeping  its  vigil  on  the  cheeks  of  a  girl  (784)  and  that  is  now  presented  as 
seated  in  the  eyes  of  the  bride  (796-7).  The  female,  of  whose  subversive 
power  Creon  has  been  always  afraid,  finally  carries  the  day,  defeats  the  male 
ruler  on  the  battlefield,  drives  him  mad  like  his  anti-polis  adversaries,  and 
on  the  whole  assimilates  his  oikos  to  that  of  the  Labdacids,  the  race  that, 
before  working  its  own  self-destruction,  puts  the  whole  polls  in  danger.  Eros 
plays  a  most  important  part  in  the  Labdacid  legend:  Laius,  failing  to  obey 
Apollo's  oracle,  has  sex  with  his  wife,  with  catastrophic  results  for  himself 
and  the  city;  one  of  Oedipus'  %LTrAaK1  LaTa  (51)  was  his  sexual  relationship 
with  his  mother,  and  Polyneices'  yäµoL  to  Adrastus'  daughter  have  turned 
out  to  be  BüaTroTµoL,  as  they  sealed  his  own  wretched  fate  as  well  as  that  of 
his  race  (869-70).  163  It  is  certainly  striking,  but  highly  significant,  that  Eros, 
despite  his  catastrophic  results,  is  at  797-8  called  Twv  µ¬yä)wv  TräpE8pos 
Ev  äpxaL  I  OEa  L  v.  Many  a  scholar  has  been  confused  by  such  a  blatant 
incongruity:  how,  asks  Jebb  (ad  797f.  ),  can  a  power  that  is  actually  in 
conflict  with  the  OEQµoL  be  described  as  their  assessor,  or  peer?  An 
intelligent  answer  to  this  question  has  recently  been  given  by  Brown  (ad 
797-9):  he  argues  that  OEQµo[  are  the  universal,  cosmic  powers,  which  "need 
have  no  moral  implications".  164  That  this  approach  is  immensely  more 
163  The  crucial  role  of  marriage  in  the  Labdacid  family  is  also  indicated  in  E.  Pho. 
13ff,  53ff,  77ff;  see  Mastronarde  (1994:  139).  Rehm  (1994:  63)  rightly  adds  that  the 
marriages  of  Oedipus  and  Polyneices  are,  respectively,  "hyper-endogamous"  and 
"hyper-exogamous";  cf.  Benardete  (1975b:  53),  Zeitlin  (1990:  148).  The  inability  to 
maintain  a  healthy  balance  between  those  two  extremes  is  typical  of  the  Labdacids. 
For  both  exogamy  and  endogamy  have,  in  their  social  contexts,  certain  limits  that 
cannot  be  crossed:  even  in  endogamous  societies  incest  is  still  taboo;  while  in 
exogamous  societies  marriage  is  a  means  of  forging  or  reinforcing  bonds  between 
families,  not  of  destroying  one's  own  community,  as  Polyneices  attempted  to  do. 
164  Ostwald  (1969:  14)  argues  that  our  passage  alludes  to  the  institution  (BEQµös)  of 
marriage,  but  this  is  unnecessarily  limiting. 393 
sensitive  than  earlier  ones,  some  of  which  had  even  to  assume  textual 
corruption,  165  is  evident.  I  suggest,  however,  that  it  should  be  pressed  a  little 
further,  in  order  to  take  also  into  account  the  paradox  that  surprised  Jebb: 
for  it  is  undoubtedly  paradoxical  that  Eros,  on  the  one  hand,  represents  the 
negation  of  the  constituents  of  a  well-ordered  polls  (it  defeats  the  military 
and  political  leader  on  his  own  field;  it  leads  people's  wits  astray;  it  brings 
about  the  female's  supremacy  over  the  male),  but  is  on  the  other  hand 
pronounced  an  assessor  or  peer  of  the  µEyäXo.  6EQµoL;  Eros  appears  to  be 
at  the  same  time  both  an  ordering  principle  (OEQµös)  and  an 
uncontrollable  force  that  disrupts  order.  As  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987: 
180)  have  put  it,  "Eros  is  not  only  a  category,  he  is  also  the  power 
undermining  all  categorical  order.  "  Creon's  defeat  by  the  subversive  powers 
he  has  been  fighting  could  not  have  been  put  in  more  striking  terms:  now 
the  institutions  and  the  vöµoL  of  the  polls  he  has  been  upholding  have 
their  authority  as  µEy6XOL  6EQµo(  usurped  by  the  very  embodiment  of  all 
anti-polis  elements,  namely  Eros.  166 
The  Chorus'  announcement  of  Antigone's  entrance  at  801ff.  is 
165  The  (mainly  metrical)  problems  of  the  passage  are  soberly  and  judiciously 
discussed  by  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  136),  who  eventually  prefer  to  keep  the 
lines  as  they  stand. 
166  Cf.  Bultmann  (1967:  319-20),  Burton  (1980:  115-6),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980: 
95),  Segal  (1981:  198);  for  a  different,  philosophical  interpretation  see  Else  (1976: 
54-7);  wrongly  Pearson  (1928:  185).  Rohdich  (1980:  138-44)  takes  a  diametrically 
opposite  view,  namely  that  Eros  is  here  integrated  into  the  norms  of  civilized 
society!  -The  political  connotations  of  TräpE6poc  (a  word  that  could  be  used  as  a 
technical  term  designating  either  the  assistants  or  advisers  of  kings  and  men  of 
power,  or,  more  specifically,  the  assistants  of  the  archons,  the  generals,  the 
Euthynoi,  and  the  Hellenotamiai)  and  Ev  äpXais  (797)  help  drive  the  point  home. 
Special  thanks  are  due  to  Dr  K.  Kapparis,  who  kindly  let  me  see  the  manuscript  of 
his  article  "Assessors  of  Magistrates  (rräpE6poL)  in  Classical  Athens"  (forthcoming 
in  Historia). 394 
prefaced  by  a  statement  that  calls  for  comment:  vüv  8'  fj8rj  'yc)  KW  TOS 
eeaµwv  I  EýW  4EpoµaL  (801-2).  Ostwald  (1969:  14),  following  Jebb  (ad 
801f.  ),  has  suggested  that  what  is  meant  by  6EQµot  here  is  the  Chorus' 
allegiance  to  constituted  authority:  at  this  emotional  moment  (cf.  802-3) 
even  the  loyal  Old  Men  cannot  help  sympathizing  with  the  enemy  of  the 
state.  167  It  is  significant  that  this  abandonment  of  the  eEapoi  by  the  very 
men  who  should  obey  them  most,  the  representatives  of  the  Theban 
citizens,  should  occur  when  Antigone  embarks  on  her  descent  to  the  realm 
of  Hades,  whose  `vöµoL'  have  been  in  unrelenting  conflict  with  the  v6µ0  L  Of 
the  polls.  Eros  and  Hades:  these  two  elements  that  represent  the  negation  of 
the  OEapoi  and  the  polis  reveal  their  dread  power  through  a  dying, 
defenceless  female. 
6.6.1  Kommos:  Antitzone's  ambiguous  state 
So  far,  we  have  seen  Creon's  cause  being  gradually  undermined:  the  name 
OEQµot  is  now  given  to  their  very  negation;  Hades  is  intruding  into  the 
house.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  what  we  have  here  is  a  plain  and 
unambiguous  justification  of  Antigone's  ways:  we  shall  now  see  how  her 
cause  is  also  vitiated. 
To  begin  with,  the  theme  of  `marriage  in  Hades',  which  was  introduced 
in  a  rather  oblique  way  by  Creon  (654,  cf.  750,760-1;  see  p.  388),  is  now 
fully  elaborated  upon  in  the  mouth  of  Antigone.  She  is  being  led,  she  wails, 
not  to  the  bridal  Ko'lll  (implied  by  813  vµEVato  v,  814-5  irrt  vuµ4ELoL9),  168 
167  Cf.  also  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  138). 
168  Bergk's  emendation  for  the  MSS  ETrL  vvµ41&oc  (or  ETTLVVµ4-).  On  the  meaning 
Müller  (p.  201)  is  particularly  illuminating:  "Man  wird  ETrt  vvµ4ELoL9  von  der 
räumlichen  Nähe  zur  Hochzeitskammer  verstehen,  bei  der  abends  ein  Preislied 395 
but  to  the  TrayKO'LTfls  O  Xaµos  (bridal  chamber)  of  Hades  (804;  cf.  810- 
11):  169  she  will  marry  Acheron.  This  theme  is  recapitulated  in  the  epode  of 
the  kommos  (876-82):  she  is  being  led  to  Hades  äK\a.  uTOs  and  ävuµ4vaLOs 
(876),  i.  e.  without  either  receiving  a  proper  funeral  or  enjoying  a  proper 
wedding,  since  her  funeral  and  wedding  are  conflated  into  one  and  the 
same  act,  namely  her  entombment.  170  This  is  brought  out  very  poignantly 
when  Antigone  addresses  her  subterranean  dwelling  (cf.  774,885)  as  both 
n  43os  and  vuµýEtov  (891).  The  telescoping  of  Antigone's  marriage  and 
death  into  the  single  act  of  entombment  simply  reiterates,  in  as  condensed 
a  form  as  possible,  a  sequence  of  events  that  has  been  typical  of  her  family: 
marriage  (and  sex)  in  the  house  of  Labdacids  is  always  a  taboo,  whose 
defiance  ends  invariably  in  death  and  catastrophe  (see  again  p.  391  with  n. 
163).  The  Chorus  explicitly  place  Antigone's  fate  in  the  perspective  of  her 
accursed  family:  1TaTp(ýOV  8'  E  KTLVE  LS  TLV'  b.  6Aov  (856);  171  this  is  met  with 
a  concise  account,  by  Antigone,  of  her  family  misfortunes  (857-71),  which 
(as  in  the  second  stasimon)  are  traced  back  to  the  beginnings  of  the  race 
(860-2  TOD  TE  TTpölTaVTOs  I 
...  TTöTµov  I 
... 
AaßsaKLBaLQLV).  She  is  the 
accursed  (867  apatos)  offspring  of  LTCLL  (863-4),  i.  e.  the  incestuous  marriage 
vorgetragen  wird.  "  Jebb  (ad  568)  recognizes  only  the  meaning  `marriage' 
("vuµ4Eta,  sc.  IEpa,  `nuptials'"),  but  Muller  (l.  c.  )  is  quite  right  in  pointing  out  that 
"die  beiden  Bedeutungen  von  vuµ4Eta  sind  Tra.  [chiniael  920  and  7  klar  belegt". 
The  singular  vvµ4Etov  clearly  means  `bridal  chamber'  in  Ant  891. 
169  On  the  ambiguity  of  86aaµos  (bridal  chamber  as  well  as  tomb)  see  Seaford  (1985: 
318-9);  cf.  also  Jebb  (ad  804f.  ),  Goheen  (1951:  137  n.  3),  Brown  (ad  804). 
170  For  an  exhaustive  examination  of  the  `marriage  in  Hades'  theme  in  the  play  see 
Seaford  (1987:  107-8),  Rehm  (1994:  63-5);  cf.  also  Goheen  (1951:  37-41);  Kirkwood 
(1958:  221);  Segal  (1981:  180  with  n.  86)  with  short  bibliography.  On  the 
interpenetration  of  wedding  and  funeral  ritual  in  general  see  Seaford  (1987:  106-7, 
112  and  passim),  Rehm  (1994:  11-42). 
171  This  is  deplorably  misinterpreted  by  Bennett  &  Tyrell  (1990:  45  2). 396 
of  her  parents  (863-6);  the  recurrence  here  of  another  avTO-word,  namely 
aüTOyEVVIT'  (864-5),  helps  hammer  home  the  theme  of  the  self-destructive 
family  introversion. 
Verses  853-6  would  seem  to  be  along  similar  lines:  the  Chorus, 
immediately  before  declaring  that  Antigone's  plight  is  actually  the  payment 
of  a  debt  inherited  from  her  father  (856),  remark  that  she  went  to  the 
farthest  extreme,  in  terms  of  boldness,  and  so  stumbled  upon  the  throne  of 
ALKTI  (853-5).  172  This  may  be  seen  as  intended  to  recall  the  Labdacids' 
hereditary  üTrEpßaaLa  (cf.  605,  and  see  again  p.  379),  173  especially  if  one 
bears  in  mind  the  fundamental  antithesis  between  IIKTI  and  iTrEpßaaia  as 
expressed  in  a  famous  fragment  of  Heraclitus  (22  B  94  D.  -K.  ):  "HXios  oüX 
ÜTTEP131  aETQL  µETpa'  EL  8E  pl,  'EpLvixg  µLV  ALKnS  ETTLKOUpOL 
EýEUpi  aouaLV.  After  all,  her  transgression  against  the  vöµoL  of  the  polls  was 
twice  described  by  Creon  as'  an  act  of  vlTEpßaLVELV  (449,481).  174 
Nonetheless,  to  assume  that  Antigone  is  punished  because  of  her 
transgression  against  Dike,  and  pronounce  the  case  closed  would  be  an 
over-simplification:  for  all,  these  references  to  Antigone's  attempted 
transgression  against  Dike  must  be  seen  in  the  light  of  the  very  significant 
premises  set  at  the  beginning  of  the  kommos,  and  esp.  at  the  choral 
responses  of  817-22  and  834-8,  which  inevitably  qualify  our  perception  of 
the  rest  of  this  lyric  piece.  In  their  very  first  address  to  Antigone,  the  Chorus 
172  This  seems  to  be  the  most  plausible  interpretation  of  854-5;  for  other  views  see 
commentators;  also  Benardete  (1975b:  53-4)  and  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  141 
n.  68).  I  am  not  convinced  by  D.  Pozzi's  (Hermes  117  [1989]  500-5)  suggestion  that 
Antigone  is  here  envisaged  as  a  willing  victim  at  the  altar  of  Dike,  and  thus  as  an 
instrument  thereof.  Bennett  &  Tyrell  (1990:  450-1),  on  the  basis  of  a  perverse 
scholion  on  853  (p.  257  Papageorgius),  misconstrue  the  passage. 
173  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  191);  cf.  also  Lloyd-Jones  (1983:  115)  and  Burton 
(1980:  123),  albeit  with  no  specific  reference  toinrEpf3ac(a. 397 
make  it  clear  that  she  is  KXE1V  Käß  ETral.  VOy  EXovQa  (817):  175  she  who 
honoured  by  burial  the  mortal  enemy  of  '  ETEOKXf  c  is  to  receive  K)aos;  -  the 
ETraLVOc  of  the  whole  polis  (whose  representatives  are  the  Chorus,  cf.  806, 
842-3)176  goes  fully  to  Antigone,  whereas  for  Creon,  as  Haemon  has  reported, 
the  polis  has  only'Oyos  (cf.  689,700).  177  For  the  paradox  to  be  rounded 
off,  at  821-2  we  hear  that  the  person  who  receives  the  whole-hearted  praise 
of  the  polis  is  the  very  person  who  has  actually  flouted  the  polis'  vöµoL  and 
has  shown  herself  to  be  w  TOvop  os  (821)  -  yet  another  of  the  numerous 
avTO-words  that  indicate  Antigone's  self-sufficiency,  her  anti-polis 
enclosure  within  the  restricted  framework  of  her  native  family.  178 
Immediately  upon  this  last  remark  of  the  Chorus  Antigone  offers  a 
mythical  paradigm  to  illustrate  her  own  condition,  namely  the  paradigm  of 
Niobe.  At  first  sight,  the  parallels  between  her  and  Niobe  seem  rather 
restricted:  "the  stone  into  which  Niobe  was  changed  may  be  likened  to 
Antigone's  rocky  tomb",  writes  Jebb  (ad  833);  Müller  (p.  186)  adds  that 
Niobe  was  also  guilty  of  transgression  against  the  gods  -  and,  although 
174  Cf.  Bremer  (1969:  141  with  n.  12). 
175  Knox  (1964:  176  n.  8)  reads  Oi  KOuv  at  817  and  treats  the  whole  passage  as  a 
negative  statement;  but  see  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  139  n.  63),  Di  Benedetto 
(1983:  30n.  75). 
176  Pace  Kirkwood  (1991:  104). 
177  In  the  latter  passage  EpEµvi)  4  äTLs  must  certainly  mean  the  toyEpoi  rumours  of 
the  citizens,  as  is  made  clear  by  the  ring-composition  (700  ToL68'  harks  back  to  691 
kiyoLS  ToLOÜTOLc)  as  well  as  by  passages  like  Pi.  N.  7.61  yKOTELV6V  äTrEXWv  ö  ov. 
178  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  29-32)  fails  to  notice  the  ambiguous  treatment  of  Antigone 
by  the  Chorus;  Bennett  &  Tyrell  (1990:  449)  do  notice  it,  but  they  give  it  an  entirely 
different  meaning.  Foley's  (1995:  135,142-4)  remarks  are  much  more  to  the  point. 
On  the  use  of  a&rövoµos  here  cf.  Burton  (1980:  119),  Knox  (1983:  33),  Goldhill  (1986: 
103),  Loraux  (1986:  171),  Ostwald  (1986:  152);  also  Bultmann  (1967:  311  with  n.  2) 
with  different  emphasis. 398 
admittedly  no  specific  mention  is  made  of  her  own  sinful  boast,  179  Niobe  is 
actually  referred  to  as  daughter  of  the  great  transgressor  Tantalus  (825),  as 
Antigone  is  daughter  of  Oedipus  and  belongs  to  the  Labdacids,  race  of 
WTEpßaaia.  180  What  these  views  fail  to  account  for,  however,  is  the  emphasis 
that  Niobe's  marginality  receives:  she  is  called  a  Phrygian  Eva  (824),  whose 
residence  in  Thebes  was  only  temporary;  she  is  now  at  the  remotest  heights 
of  Sipylus  (825-6),  where  she  lies  exposed  to  the  rage  of  the  natural 
elements  (828-32).  Evidently,  the  locus  of  Niobe's  permanent  abode  is  tinted 
by  a  marked  absence  of  human  activity,  of  organized  communities,  of 
civilization181  -  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  188)  appositely  remind  us  of 
Man's  civilizing  struggle  against  the  elements  in  the  first  stasimon.  It  is  to 
such  a  person  that  Antigone  sees  herself  as  %tOLOTäTaV  (833).  Indeed, 
Antigone,  like  the  Eva  Niobe,  is  later  seen  as  not  fully  belonging  to  the 
body  of  Theban  citizens:  as  we  shall  later  see  in  fuller  detail,  her  life  in  the 
Upperworld  is  described  as  µEToLK'La  by  Creon  (890),  and  she  maintains  her 
marginal  status  as  1  TOLKOs  even  as  she  goes  to  her  death  (850-2,868).  The 
location  of  her  tomb,  like  that  of  Niobe's,  is  also  characteristically  maginal: 
it  is  at  a  place  where  no  mortal  sets  his  foot  (773),  182  beyond  the  boundaries 
179  Cf.  e.  g.  Knox  (1979:  174-5),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  139  n.  64)  -a  point  that  is 
missed  by  Coleman  (1972:  17).  Niobe's  exoneration,  however,  has  been  pushed  too 
far  by  Whitman  (1951:  93-4,96)  as  an  argument  for  the  exoneration  of  Antigone;  I 
see  a  similar  tendency  in  Hester  (1971:  34)  too. 
180  For  other,  less  plausible,  views  see  Brown  (ad  832-33).  Notable  is  Seaford's  (1990: 
87)  very  interesting  analysis. 
181  Jebb's  (ad  825)  note  on  the  actual  topography  of  the  place  only  confirms  its 
wild  character. 
182  Following  Kamerbeek's  suggestion  (ad  773,4)  I  read  QTIßou  and  take  E  prjµoc  to 
refer  to  Antigone  (cf.  919):  "taking  her  to  such  a  place  that  there  she  will  be 
destitute  of  the  steps  of  men"  (cf.  Phil.  487EpýVov  O  Tw  XWpLc  äv6pthrruw  QT'Lßov). 399 
of  the  polis.  183 
The  Chorus  in  their  reply  (834-7)  push  to  extremes  the  theme  of 
Antigone's  similarity  with  Niobe:  Niobe  was  a  goddess,  they  say;  and 
although  Antigone  is  mortal,  it  is  undoubtedly  p  Aya  (836)  for  her'  to  hear 
that  she  has  shared  the  lot  of  those  who  are  LaÖOEOL  (837)!  184  The  remark 
may  appear  exaggerated,  and  Antigone  indignantly  dismisses  it  as  derisive 
(839-41),  perhaps  because  she  does  not  think  that  anyone  can  seriously 
compare  a  human  to  a  god;  however,  the  Chorus  have  made  their  point, 
however  obliquely,  and  we  should  take  it  into  account.  Antigone  has 
defended  the  transcendental  laws  of  Hades  and  the  gods,  the  laws  which 
may  not  always  coincide  with  (in  fact,  they  may  actually  run  counter  to) 
the  human-made,  ephemeral  laws  of  the  polis,  the  laws  that  are  but  a 
reflection  of  the  world  as  conceptualized  and  categorized  by  humans185(we 
remember  that  the  champion  of  the  polis,  Creon,  refused  to  acknowledge 
the  existence  of  transcendental  values;  see  p.  361).  Antigone,  in  embracing 
such  values,  places  herself  above  and  beyond  current  human  concepts, 
above  and  beyond  the  framework  of  the  polis;  and  in  this  respect  she  may 
be  thought  of  as  partaking  in  the  divinity  of  her  %ioLOTäTa  Niobe.  To  her 
case  Aristotle's  (Pol.  1253a)  aphorism  may  be  applied:  o  SE  µiß  8uväµEVOs 
KOLVC)VEI.  V  1l  µ01&V  8E%tEV0S  SL  aÜTQpKELaV  Oi)8EV  i  pOS  1T&ECOS, 
WCrTE  6rlp(ov  f  6EÖs.  Antigone  in  fact  is  both  81jp'Lov  and.  6EÖS:  for  much 
183  Cf.  Reinhardt  (1979:  81):  "...  the  rock-chamber  grave  in  which  Antigone  is 
buried  alive  [...  ]  becomes  an  image  of  her  halfway  position,  her  rootless 
hovering.  ";  cf.  also  Segal  (1978:  1177),  (1981:  168),  Sorum  (1981-82:  207),  Oudemans 
&  Lardinois  (1987:  188). 
184  Contra  Rohdich  (1980:  147-8)  who  feels  that  the  Chorus  rather  correct 
Antigone's  comparison  of  her  situation  with  Niobe's. 
185  In  this  respect,  Sourvinou-Inwood's  (1990:  301-2)  statement  on  polis  religion  is 
particularly  instructive:  it  is,  she  argues,  "above  all,  a  way  of  articulating  the 
world,  of  structuring  chaos  and  making  it  intelligible". as  she  resembles  the  LQÖBE  og  Niobe,  nonetheless  the  word  wµös  that  is  used 
of  her  at  471-2  is  otherwise  in  this  play  reserved  only  for  the  dogs  (697 
th  1  TQT(ýv)  that  devoured  her  brother.  186 
In  the  third  strophe  Antigone's  marginality  as  well  as  her  ambivalent 
position  towards  the  vöµoL  of  the  polis  is  highlighted  even  more 
unmistakably.  In  a  long  invocation  she  addresses  the  whole  TröXLs  and  its 
representatives  (842-3),  along  with  important  landmarks  of  Thebes  (844 
OLpKaI,  aL  Kpf  val)  187  as  well  as  the  sacred  precinct  of  Thebes  itself,  and  calls 
on  them  to  witness  the  outrage  she  suffers  by  the  vöµoL  (847  öL'oLs  vöµoLs, 
said  in  indignation)  that  the  polis  itself  has  set!  She,  the  arTovoµoc,  who 
has  set  her  own  devotion  to  the  vöµoL  of  Hades  above  the  vöµoL  of  the  polis, 
now  protests  to  this  very  polis  against  the  injustice  done  to  her.  188  The 
Chorus'  words  at  872-5  are  a  further  confirmation  of  Antigone's  marginal 
and  ambiguous  position:  her  act  was  certainly  one  of  Ex9E1ELa  (872);  still, 
whoever  has  authority  in  his  keeping  cannot  afford  to  allow  any  offence 
(872-4).  189  This  Is  why,  as  Antigone  herself  says,  her  E1QE1ELa  won  her  a 
reputation  for  BuaaEßELa  (924)  -a  formulation  recalling  the  famous-  öaLa 
186  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  191),  Steiner  (1984:  244-5)  and  note  the  use  of  wµös  (vel  sim.  )  to 
designate  Ajax's  alienation  from  the  civilized  space  of  the  city  (e.  g.  Aj.  205,548;  see 
further  Chapter  Five,  section  5.1.2). 
187  On  KptjvaL  as  representative  landmarks  cf.  Aj.  862,  CL  1333,  quoted  by  Jebb  (ad 
844f.  ).  Dirce  is  the  river  that  most  closely  identifies  Thebes:  Jebb  (ad  103f.  ), 
Davidson  (1983:  43).  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  188)  miss  the  point. 
188  Cf.  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  189).  For  different  treatments  of  this  passage 
see  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  140-1),  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  31-2),  Bushnell  (1988:  64- 
5  )" 
189  Cf.  Jebb's  (ad  873f.  )  rendering  of  the  passage.  Foley  (1996:  57)  fails  to  see  that 
the  Chorus  are  not  unreservedly  on  Antigone's  side;  see,  rightly,  Burton  (1980: 
123). 401 
iravoupyiiaaoa  (74):  190  in  both  cases  what  is  stressed  is  Antigone's 
ambiguous  position  betwixt  and  between  two  conflicting  demands.  What  is 
more,  clearly  this  position,  and  the  resulting  catastrophe,  has  been  entirely 
her  own  reponsibility,  as  the  Chorus  explicitly  remark  (875  aÜTÖyvGTo  , 
191 
stressing  again  Antigone's  anti-polls  introversion).  A  similar  answer  could  be 
given  to  Antigone's  protests  that  the  vöµoL  of  the  state  have  made  her  into 
a  (metaphorical)  µETOLKOS,  a  person  that  is  permanently  in  an  interstitial 
condition,  living  neither  amongst  the  quick  nor  amongst  the  dead  (850-2; 
cf.  868):  for  her  marginality  (`µETOLKLa')  in  death  is  only  a  continuation  of 
her  marginality  in  life,  her  a'vcu  µETOLKI.  a,  as  Creon  calls  it  at  890.192 
Most  importantly,  all  these  points  are  illuminated  by  Antigone  herself 
in  a  long  iambic  passage  (891-928).  Before  any  discussion  of  this  passage  I 
should  make  it  clear  that  I  consider  the  authenticity  of  904-20  conclusively 
proved  by  Neuburg  (1990:  esp.  66-76).  It  was  with  relief  that  I  saw  the 
problem  finally  settled  not  by  subjective,  culturally  conditioned 
assumptions,  but  by  a  sober  and  systematic  consideration  of  the  play's 
thematic  axes  and  structural  patterns  -a  consideration  that  has  much  in 
common  with  my  own  view  of  the  play,  It  is,  therefore,  imperative  that  this 
chapter  be  read  in  conjunction  with  Neuburg's  masterly  article,  which  not 
only  offers  a  detailed  account  of  the  history  of  the  problem  but  also 
expounds  some  basic  methodological  presuppositions  for  its  solution,  which 
I  fully  endorse. 
190  For  this  paradoxical  phrase  see  Knox  (1964:  93),  Cademans  &  Lardinois  (1987: 
173). 
191  The  word,  as  Coray  (1993:  257)  remarks,  "bezeichnet  eine  Leidenschaft,  die  man 
in  voller  Kenntnis  selbst  angenommen  hat.  " 
192  See  Knox's  (1964:  114)  most  excellent  remarks;  cf.  also  Segal  (1978:  1177). 
Seaford  (1990:  79)  has  some  very  notable  remarks,  albeit  along  rather  different 
lines.  On  the  marginality  of  the  metics  see  Whitehead  (1977:  69-72)  and,  more 
reservedly,  Parker  (1983:  261-2). 402 
Antigone  repeats  her  complaint  that  she  dies  unmarried  at  916-20, 
where  to  the  usual  6EKTP09,  ävuII  VaLos  etc.,  with  which  we  are  by  now 
familiar,  an  important  addition  is  made:  "I  have  not  had  a  share  in  the 
upbringing  of  children"  (918).  All  these  would  have  sounded  very  much  like 
a  further  confirmation  of  Antigone's  devotion  to  the  oikos,  had  it  not  been 
for  the  preceding  part  of  her  speech  (esp.  905-12),  which  throws  a  much 
more  ambiguous  light  on  her  later  claims.  For,  as  it  appears,  it  is  not 
unequivocally  clear  that,  had  Creon  spared  her  life,  Antigone  would  have 
followed  the  only  course  that  was  conceivable  for  Greek  women,  namely 
marriage.  "Even  if  the  very  children  that  I  had  born,  or  if  my  own  husband 
were  lying  dead,  I  would  never  have  buried  them  against  the  will  of  the  city 
(907).  For  my  husband  would  be  replaceable,  and  so  would  be  my  children, 
whereas  I  could  never  have  another  brother,  since  both  my  parents  are 
dead":  this  is,  in  effect,  what  she  says  at  905-12.193  As  I  have  already 
implied,  these  lines  severely  vitiate  Antigone's  claim  that  it  is  Creon  who 
has  deprived  her  of  what  all  women  must  enjoy,  namely  marriage.  For  we 
realize  that  marriage  and  childbirth  clearly  cannot  counterbalance  her 
morbid  obsession  with  the  dead  members  of  her  natal  family:  it  is  only  for 
the  funeral  prerogatives  of  the  latter  (not  of  her  supposed  husband  or 
children)  that  she  is  prepared  to  sacrifice  her  life.  The  reason  for  that  is 
clear  enough:  Greek  marriage  normally  entailed  the  involvement  of 
outsiders,  of  people  who  were  not  immediate  blood-relatives.  Since, 
however,  blood-relatives  are  at  the  top  of  Antigone's  system  of  values,  it 
follows  that  marriage  has  to  be  deemed  inferior  to  them.  Quite  significantly, 
Antigone's  `marriage'  will  take  place  in  the  tomb  /  bridal  chamber  where  she 
will  at  last  join  not  some  outsider  (as  in  normal  marriage),  but  her  dead  kin 
193  It  has  been  remarked  that  the  `irreplaceability  argument'  is,  strictly  speaking, 
illogical,  since  Polyneices  is  dead  (contr.  the  situation  in  Hdt.  3.119).  Reinhardt 
(1979:  83)  however  has  rightly  replied  that  "it  is  not  this  one  particular  action  of 
Antigone,  but  the  nomos  of  her  action  that  is  based  on  the  fact  that  husband  and 
child  can  be  replaced,  a  brother  not.  " 403 
(892-4)!  In  a  family  beset  by  abnormal  introversion  like  the  Labdacids, 
marriage  ceases  to  be  a  means  of  perpetuation  of  the  race  through 
involvement  of  outsiders  it  becomes  instead  a  symbol  of  the  race's  eternal 
return  to  itself,  of  its  abnormal  introversion  that  inescapably  leads  to  the 
extinction  of  the  family-194  The  anaphora  of  4  tXog-words  at  898-9  (ý(Xr 
, 
Trpocr41Xi  c,  4(Xr1),  as  well  as  the  timely  insertion  of  yet  another  aüTO-word, 
namely  avTOXELp,  at  900,195  are  a  further  indication  of  Antigone's 
persistence  in  the  excessive  and  self-destructive  family  introversion  of  her 
race.  I  do  not  mean  to  deny  the  importance  of  marriage  in  Antigone's 
system  of  values:  it  is  clear  that  she  does  desire  marriage  and  childbirth, 
and  she  does  sincerely  lament  that  she  will  never  enjoy  them.  The  point, 
however,  is  that  her  failure  to  marry  is  primarily  a  corollary  of  her  own 
excessive  enclosure  within  the  confines  of  her  blood  family,  and  the 
consequent  rejection  of  prospective  bonds  with  outsiders  through  marriage. 
What  I  am  arguing  for  is  Antigone's  ambiguous  position  towards  marriage, 
not  her  complete  denial  thereof.  196  It  is  the  same  ambiguous  position  that 
she  adopts  towards  the  polls  too,  when,  for  instance,  she  says  that  she 
would  acknowledge  the  rights  of  the  Tro?  iTaL  (907)  in  the  case  of  a  dead 
194  Segal  (1981:  189),  Sorum  (1981-82:  207),  Jost  (1983:  135),  Murnaghan  (1987:  207), 
Zeitlin  (1990:  148),  Seaford  (1990:  78),  (1993:  141);  cf.  also  Minadeo  (1985:  138-9), 
Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  112-3). 
195  Cf.  Loraux  (1986:  168,187). 
196  Murnaghan  (1987:  198-206),  by  stressing  exclusively  Antigone's  belonging  to 
nature  (ties  of  blood)  rather  than  to  culture  and  human  institutions  (marriage), 
overlooks  this  all-important  ambiguity  (so  also  Seaford  [1994a:  216-7]);  a  similar 
failure,  albeit  from  a  fundamentally  different  point  of  view,  is  to  be  seen  also  in 
Foley  (1995:  138),  (1996:  53).  Bennett  &  Tyrell  (1990:  452-3)  are  even  more 
restrictive. husband  or  child,  but  insists  on  placing  her  own  vöµoL  (908,914)197  above 
those  of  the  polls  in  the  case  of  a  dead  brother.  It  is  the  same  ambiguity 
that  she  also  displays  towards  the  gods:  she  has  argued  in  front  of  Creon  for 
the  divine  approval  of  her  actions;  she  has  appealed  to  divine  vöµ.  os  (452, 
519  etc.  )  and  8LKTI  (94,451,538  etc.  );  she  has  been  even  compared  by  the 
Chorus  to  the  laoeEos  Niobe  (834-8);  now,  however,  she  protests  that, 
without  having  offended  against  the  8LKT  of  the  gods  (921  8aLµövwv 
8LKTIv),  198  she  has  been  abandoned  by  her  divine  allies:  "why  should  I  look 
to  the  gods  (for  help)  any  more?  Which  of  them  should  I  claim  to  be  my 
ally?  199  All  that  my  piety  has  won  me  is  a  repute  for  impiety"  (922-4;  cf. 
also  943  T?  ýv  E1QEßl,  av  QE1LQacct).  200  Most  surprisingly,  she  even  seems 
now  to  have  doubts  about  the  rightness  of  the  cause  she  stood  up  for.  "if 
the  gods  approve  of  the  suffering  that  has  been  inflicted  upon  me,  then 
through  this  suffering  I  would  realize  the  error  of  my  ways.  But  if  the  wrong 
is  with  Creon  etc.  "  (925-8).  201  Clearly,  in  the  end  of  this  first  part  of  the 
play  it  is  not  only  Creon  who  emerges  sooty  from  his  battle  with  Antigone: 
197  Santirocco  (1980:  186-90)  and  Ostwald  (1986:  154  n.  49)  undervalue  the 
significance  of  the  use  of  the  word  vöµoc  in  these  passages;  see  rightly  Connor 
(1971:  51-2),  Neuburg  (1990:  72). 
198  See  further  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  192). 
199  At  923  read  TLV'  ... 
ýuµµaXEiv  with  Winckelmann  and  Bruhn  (accepted  by 
Müller  [p.  210]  and  Dawe  [1996]),  so  that  TLva  =  sc.  OEwv.  Cf.  Linforth  (1961:  230). 
200  Dalfen  (1977:  19-20)  thinks  that  Antigone  remains  unswervingly  certain  of  the 
piety  of  her  act;  but  see  the  right  objections  of  Hester  (1980b:  6-7),  and  cf.  further 
Torrance  (1965:  300),  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  189). 
201  Cf.  Bowra  (1944:  104),  Diller  (1950:  10),  Steiner  (1984:  282),  Porter  (1987:  47,63- 
4).  Minadeo  (1985:  136-7,151-2)  and  Bennett  &  Tyrell  (1990:  446)  miss  the  point.  It 
may,  of  course,  be  objected  that  the  conditional  clauses  need  not  imply  that 
Antigone  wavers,  since  Et+indic.  can  be  used  as  a  causal  clause  with  assertive 
force;  cf.  Moorhouse  (1982:  279-80).  There  are,  however,  instances  in  which  this 
syntagm  may  express  an  open  condition:  see  Introduction,  section  0.4.2. 405 
we  realize  that  also  the  defender  of  the  oikos  and  the  transcendent  v6µoL  is 
any 
vexed  by  ambiguities  that  surely  forbid  any  kind  of  clear-cut,  `Manichaez 
dichotomies  that  many  have  wished  to  impose  on  the  play.  What  is  more, 
this  uncertainty  is  perfectly  in  accordance  with  the  pervading  Sophoclean 
(and  Greek)  conception  of  the  gods  as  essentially  unknowable:  as  it  turns 
out,  Antigone  does  not  possess  (nor  does  she  claim  insight  into)  any  kind  of 
`esoteric'  knowledge  about  the  gods  or  their  laws  or  the  Beyond,  that  is 
inaccessible  to  other  people;  the  V6  LOL  she  believes  in  are  sanctioned  by 
tradition  and  known  to  everyone  (they  are  suitably  called  KaOe  QT6  TE  s 
v%tm  by  Creon  at  1113).  All  that  can  be  known  about  these  divine,  jenseitig 
ordinances  is  not  their  origin  (cf.  456-7  Koü8E1S  0I6EV),  nor  even  their 
universal  validity  (cf.  the  `apophatic',  qua  interrogatively  phrased,  tone  of 
her  objection  to  Creon's  edict:  521  TES  oLBEV;  ),  but  simply  that  they 
exist.  202 
6  .  7.1  Second  part:  Prelude.  The  fourth  stasimon 
The  fourth  stasimon  marks  the  conclusion  of  the  first  part  of  the  play, 
which  has  dealt  mainly  with  the  fate  of  the  last  surviving  member  of  the 
Labdacids.  It  is  also  a  prelude  to  the  second  part  of  the  play,  where  the 
hints  (offered  in  the  first  part)  of  the  future  fate  of  the  house  of  Creon  - 
assimilation  to  the  Labdacids  -  will  be  fully  developed.  It  would  seem, 
therefore,  appropriate,  that  the  mythological  examples  with  which  this  song 
is  replete203  should  be  equally  applicable  not  only  to  the  departing 
Antigone,  who  has  dominated  the  first  part  and  to  whom  the  lyrics  are 
202  I  therefore  take  issue  with  Bowra's  (1944:  88)  assertion  that  Antigone  acts 
"from  a  clear  knowledge  of  the  divine  will". 
203  Indeed,  as  Burton  (1980:  129)  and  Brown  [p.  202]  remind  us,  this  is  the  only  song 
in  surviving  Sophoclean  tragedy  to  consist  solely  of  mythical  examples. 406 
expressly  addressed,  but  also  to  the  oikos  of  Creon,  which  is  going  to 
dominate  the  second  part. 
The  applicability  of  the  first  mythical  exemplum,  that  of  Danae,  to 
Antigone  seems  to  extend  over  several  levels.  Danae  too  was  enclosed  in  a 
tomb  that  was  also  her  bridal  chamber  (947  Tuµ43ipEL  6atµw);  204  the  verb 
KaTECEÜX6rl  on  the  one  hand,  which  may  be  taken  to  allude  to  her  sexual 
union  with  Zeus,  205  and  the  phrase  Xa)KOBETOLs  I  aiAatc  (945-6)  on  the 
other,  which  could  conjure  up  the  Xä)KEOs  ov8ös  of  Hades  (cf.  e.  g.  Il.  8.15, 
Hes.  Th.  811),  both  illustrate  the  eerie  combination  of  Eros  and  Hades  in  the 
case  of  Danae  -a  combination  that  is  also  prominent  in  Antigone's  case.  206 
Moreover,  the  Chorus  stress,  rather  vaguely,  that  the  dread  power  of  fate 
(951  µoLpL&a  8vvaaLs)  cannot  be  escaped.  What  could  Danae  not  escape? 
Her  entombment,  perhaps.  But  the  rest  of  the  strophe  does  not  seem  to 
favour  such  a  view:  for  how  is  the  mention  of  wealth,  military  power  (952 
öAßos,  "Aprls),  towers  and  ships  (954-5)  to  be  seen  as  applying  to  a  young 
girl  like  Danae?  It  is  rather  of  her  father,  the  king  Acrisius,  that  one  should 
think:  he  was  the  one  whose  royal  power  (now  952-4  do  make  sense)  proved 
inadequate  to  provide  him  with  a  means  of  escape  from  what  was  fated,  i.  e. 
his  being  killed  by  his  grandson.  207  This  mythic  schema  (murder  of 
ascendant  by  descendant)  is  a  further  point  of  contact  between  Danae  and 
Antigone:  as  Acrisius  was  killed  by  Perseus,  so  Laius  was  killed  by  Oedipus;  208 
204  For  the  conflation  of  marital  and  funeral  connotations  here  see  Sourvinou- 
Inwood  (1989b:  143);  on  the  ambiguity  of  6&alLoc  see  n.  169. 
205  See  Seaford  (1987:  111),  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b:  143). 
206  Cf.  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  101),  Seaford  (1990:  77).  Sourvinou-Inwood 
(1989b:  145-6)  would  rather  emphasize  the  differences  between  Danae  and 
Antigone. 
207  Cf.  Goheen  (1951:  69),  Rohdich  (1980:  196),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  101), 
although  the  latter  applies  the  implied  paradigm  of  Acrisius  exclusively  to  Creon. 
208  See  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b:  144,146-7). 407 
in  the  case  of  Antigone,  this  has  much  more  poignancy,  given  the 
incessantly  repeated  pattern,  in  her  oikos,  of  excessive  family  introversion 
that  results  in  death.  The  parallels  do  not  seem  to  end  here,  for  there  is  also 
a  parallel  between  Acrisius  and  Creon:  as  Acrisius  incarcerated  his  daughter 
in  the  hope  that  he  should  ecape  his  fate,  so  Creon  confines  Antigone 
thinking  that  by  enforcing  discipline  he  provides  for  the  common  a  rn  pLa. 
Acrisius  failed,  and  this  certainly  does  not  bode  well  for  Creon,  the  more  so 
since  we  have  already  detected  premonitions  of  his  imminent  sharing  of  the 
fate  of  the  Labdacids  (see  esp.  p.  389  and  section  6.5.2). 
The  hints  of  Creon's  forthcoming  catastrophe  are  multiplied  in  the 
antistrophe:  as  has  been  remarked,  209  this  is  the  only  one  of  this  stasimon's 
mythical  exempla  to  deal  entirely  with  a  male  person,  Lycurgus,  and  this 
must  certainly  evoke  associations  with  Creon.  I  propose,  however,  to 
postpone  until  p.  419ff.  the  examination  of  this  exemplum,  and  look  at  the 
third  and  last  one,  that  of  the  Phineidae  and  their  mother  Cleopatra.  The 
second  strophe  deals  with  the  blinding  of  the  Phineidae  by  their  father's 
wife  (unnamed;  other  sources  call  her  Idaea  or  Eidothea);  210  clearly,  the  act 
is  meant  to  be  perceived  as  a  case  of  intrafamilial  violence,  for  the  fact  that 
Idaea  /  Eidothea  was  only  the  Phineids'  stepmother  is  suitably  obscured:  all 
we  hear  of  her  is  that  she  was  married  to  their  father  (973).  211  The  phrase 
used,  however,  namely  äypLa  8äpap,  is,  as  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b:  154) 
has  seen,  a  contradiction  in  terms,  for  aypioc  is  by  definition  the  opposite 
of  8ap6(EaOai  (whence  8%tap).  Paradoxical  is  also  the  nature  of  the  crime 
she  commits,  namely  the  blinding  of  her  (step)children:  it  is  a  deed  of  utter 
horror  and  cruelty,  evidently  dear  to  the  savage  god  of  bloodshed,  Ares,  who 
209  E.  g.  by  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  100),  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b:  151  with 
n.  52). 
210  See  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  105  n.  43).  For  an  ov 
r 
iew  of  the  available 
material  on  this  myth  see  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b:  153  n.  62). 
211  See  further  Seaford's  (1990:  86)  interesting  remarks. 408 
watched  it  (972  EL8EV);  212  at  the  same  time,  however,  it  Is  performed  by 
means  of  a  markedly  domestic  utensil,  namely  the  shuttle  (976):  oikos  and 
wilderness,  civilization  and  cruel  bloodshed  are  here  intricately  mixed.  213 
Intrafamilial  violence  and  an  ambiguous  position  betwixt  and  between 
civilization  and  savagery:  the  parallelism  with  Antigone  is,  I  think,  evident. 
For  she  too,  on  the  one  hand,  belongs  to  the  royal  race,  i.  e.  to  the  heart  of 
the  civilized  community,  but  on  the  other  hand  the  first  significant 
comment  we  hear  about  her  by  the  Chorus  is  that  she  is  the  chuöv  offspring 
of  an  chuös  father  (471-2)1214  Moreover,  intrafamilial  violence,  in  the  form 
of  parricide  and  fratricide,  has  been  a  notorious  feature  of  the  house  of 
Labdacus.  215 
In  the  second  antistrophe  we  have  the  positive  counterpart  of  the 
cruel  stepmother  Idaea  /  Eidothea:  it  is  the  suffering  Cleopatra.  The  first 
thing  we  hear  of  her  is  that  her  children  were  "the  offspring  of  an  unwedded 
mother",  µaTpöS  EXOVTES  QVU  t  ¬1  TOU  yovav  (980).  216  Why  should 
Cleopatra  be  called  `unwedded'  when  she  was  married  to  Phineus?  Clearly, 
Jebb's  rendering  "hapless  in  her  marriage",  accepted  also  by  Winnington- 
Ingram  (1980:  106),  cannot  stand:  all  the  parallels  he  gives  for  the  use  of 
ävü  L  EUTOS  tout  court  in  the  sense  of  KaKOVVµcoc  are  bogus.  217  The 
212  See  Jebb  (ad  970),  Müller  (p.  224)  and  Kamerbeek  (ad  971-73).  For  Ares'  savage 
nature  cf.  esp.  Il.  5.31  ßpoTOXOLyE,  tLaL4övE. 
213  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  199),  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b:  154-5). 
214  Cf.  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b:  160).  Cf.  above,  p.  372  with  n.  102;  p.  400  with  n. 
186. 
215  Winnin  ton-Ingram  (1980:  107-8)  is  again  all  too  keen  on  detecting  here 
exclusive  alý  sions  to  Creon. 
216  For  the  text  see  below  n.  220. 
217  Eur.  Tr.  144(8üavuµýoL)  and  Hipp.  757  (KaKOVUµ4oTäTav)  are  plainly  irrelevant, 
since  the  word  in  question  is  not  a  compound  with  a-privative;  while  in  S.  CF  1214 
ayaµov  yäµov  the  former  term  belongs  with  the  latter,  whose  meaning  it  cancels, function  of  ävvµ4EVTOs  here  becomes  clear  when  we  take  into  account  that 
immediately  afterwards  the  poet  devotes  six  whole  verses  to  a  strikingly 
emphatic  description  of  Cleopatra's  pre-marital  state*  she  is  referred  to  only 
with  her  patronymic  BopEäs,  as  is  appropriate  for  an  unmarried  girl,  whose 
kyrios  is  still  her  father;  moreover,  we  are  given  a  rather  elaborate  picture  of 
her  upbringing  (984  Tpä411)  amidst  her  father's  children  the  storm-winds 
(984  BvEXX:  qQLv  Ev  naTpcaLS),  in  the  distant  caves  (983)  which  were 
presumably  her  father's  abode.  What  we  are  presented  with  here  is  basically 
a  paradoxical  regression  to  Cleopatra's  pre-marital  life,  and  therefore  a 
cancellation  of  her  marriage.  218  Now,  Antigone  too  has  been  an  `unwedded 
bride',  for,  although  there  has  been  much  talk  about  her  prospective 
marriage  to  Haemon  (see  esp.  568-76),  she  is  finally  wedded  to  Hades,  thus 
becoming,  like  the  ävvµýEVTOs  Cleopatra,  6,  XEKTpos  and  ävvµEvaLos  (917). 
Her  enclosure  within  her  rocky  tomb  via  which  she  is  going  to  join  at  last 
and  so  this  is  not  a  case  of  ciyap.  oc  tout  court  being  used  instead  of  Kaicöyaµoc.  Cf. 
Seaford  (1990:  87).  For  a  diametrically  different  treatment  see  D.  Fehling,  Hermes 
96  (1968)  142-55,  according  to  whom  (p.  155)  "die  Form  vöµov  ävoµov  ist 
ursprünglich  Gemination  des  Typs  µfjTep  60aInTrep,  in  der  das  Präfix  a-  synonym 
zu  8vv-,  alvo-,  KaKO-  ist.  "  However,  apart  from  the  fact  that  Fehling  himself  is 
compelled  to  admit  that  in  some  passages  the  prefix  ä-  does  have  a  negating  force 
(p.  153),  he  also  has  to  make  use  of  extensive  hair-splitting,  in  order  to  make  some 
obvious  instances  of  the  negating  prefix  ä-  fit  his  interpretation.  When,  for 
instance,  he  claims  (p.  148)  that  "noch  eindeutiger  ist  wohl  äyaµov  yäµov  S.  O.  R. 
1214,  denn  hier  schlägt  die  Deutung  `eheliche  Verbindung,  die  keine  ist'  dem  Sinn 
der  Stelle  geradezu  ins  Gesicht,  da  die  Verbindung  doch  nur  allzusehr  grausame 
Wirklichkeit  ist",  he  chooses  to  ignore  that  the  passage  acquires  its  full  poetic 
effectiveness  only  if  äyaµov  yäµov  is  taken  to  mean  not  KaKbyaµov  y.,  but  `a 
marriage  that  negates,  cancels  itself. 
218  For  different  interpretations  see  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b:  155),  Winnington- 
Ingram  (1980:  106-7).  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b:  156-61)  argues  at  length  for  an 
ambivalent  presentation  of  Cleopatra  here. 410 
her  natal  family  is  parallel  to  Cleopatra's  enclosure  in  the  rocky  cave  that 
was  her  father's  abode  (983  aVTpOLS,  985  näyou);  in  both  cases  confinement 
within  the  natal  family  is  closely  associated  with  a  negation  of  marriage 
and  maternity.  Especially  in  the  case  of  the  Labdacids,  the  negation  of 
marriage  is  equivalent  to  self-destruction:  the  family,  instead  of 
perpetuating  itself  by  means  of  marriage,  perpetually  returns  to  itself  and 
eventually  destroys  itself  by  means  of  either  incest  or  kin-killing.  This 
parallel  with  the  Labdacids'  self-destructive  negation  of  marriage  would 
become  more  poignant  with  Seaford's  (1990:  87)  interpretation  of  the 
traditional  reading  ävvµ4EUTOV  yovav  at  980:  yovä  can  mean  both  `birth' 
and  'offspring',  219  and  so  äVVµI  )EVTOV  yoväv  associates  the  absence  of 
marriage  both  with  the  mother  Cleopatra  and  with  her  children,  the 
Phineids  (who,  being  blind,  cannot  marry);  220  so,  the  negation  of  marriage 
would  extend  over  the  last  two  generations  of  the  line  (Cleopatra  and  her 
sons),  thus  exactly  paralleling  the  case  of  Oedipus  and  Antigone.  221 
219  Cf.  also  Kamerbeek  (ad  980),  to  the  effect  that  yovä  can  be  associated  both  with 
the  generator  (mother)  and  with  the  generated  (child). 
220  On  the  `en*a3ge'  of  ävvµ4EVTOV  cf.  Kamerbeek;  contra  H.  Lloyd  Jones,  CR  n.  s. 
31(1981)  174.  There  is,  however,  a  difficulty  here:  whereas  µaTpöc  EXOVTES  yoväV 
can  certainly  mean  `having  their  origin  (lit.  `birth')  from  a  mother'  (see  Jebb  ad 
loc.  ),  it  cannot  possibly  bear  the  second  meaning  `being  the  offspring  of  a 
mother'.  Read  6CXEOVTES  (with  synizesis)  instead  of  EXovTES:  true,  äXEw  is  an  almost 
exclusively  epic  verb;  still,  it  may  be  significant  that  the  only  tragic  instance  of  its 
collateral  form  äXvvµaL  is  at  line  627  of  our  play!  The  ambiguity  of  the  passage  is 
now  fully  restored:  "bewailing  their  mother's  (giving  them)  unwedded  birth" 
(yovä  `birth'  referring  to  Cleopatra's  motherhood)  and  "bewailing  their  (being 
the)  unwedded  offspring  of  (their)  mother"  (yovä  `offspring'  referring  to  the 
Phineids).  The  `pleonasm'  Kk  tov 
... 
äXEOVTES  is  no  less  tolerable  than  the  Homeric 
KXatOv  68upÖp.  EVOL. 
221  Cf.  also  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b:  155)  for  a  defence  of  the  lectio  tradita;  Segal 
(1981:  182),  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  149)  and,  especially,  Rohdich  (1980:  192) 411 
6.7.2  Antigone  and  Dionysus 
What  I  am  going  to  argue  in  this  section  is  that  Antigone's  anti-polis 
attitude  is  implicitly  expressed  as  a  perversion  of  Dionysiac  ritual  and 
ideology.  We  have  noted  (p.  352)  that  one  of  the  most  prominent  enemies 
of  Thebes  (Capaneus,  but  also  implicitly  Polyneices,  whose  name  was  the 
only  one  to  be  explicitly  mentioned  in  the  parodos  and  who,  after  all,  was 
the  one  to  motivate  the  assault)  was  compared,  by  the  Chorus  of  Theban 
citizens,  to  a  Maenad  (135-6).  Antigone  has  associated  herself  with  this 
perverse,  anti-polis  Maenadism,  since  she  has  flouted  the  vbµoL  of  the  polis 
by  honouring  the  ringleader  of  the  assault,  who  sought  to  destroy  his  native 
polls.  As  I  indicated  on  p.  352,  Capaneus'  (and  probably  Polyneices') 
`Maenadism'  is  an  ironic  symbol  of  their  perversion  of  the  values  of  the 
polis.  The  temporary  reversal  of  order  and  all  vöpoL  is  the  typical  feature  of 
Dionysiac  cult.  To  be  sure,  Dionysiac  disorder  is  "order-creating":  the 
orderly  state  of  affairs  is  temporarily  subverted,  only  to  be  established 
afresh;  the  experience  of  a  short  and  controlled  period  of  civic  disorder 
helps  the  citizens  acquire  a  renewed  awareness  of  its  opposite,  namely  order 
and  law.  Antigone,  however,  erred  in  that  she  attempted  permanently  to 
subvert  the  vöµoL  of  the  polis:  by  championing  Polyneices  she  has 
championed  the  eagle  that  almost  devoured  Thebes  (110-26).  Against 
Creon's  struggle  for  collective  cmrnlp(a,  achieved  only  by  collective 
observance  of  the  laws,  she  pitted  her  defiance  of  all  laws  save  those  of 
Hades,  and  most  importantly  her  desire  to  die:  72-6,95-7,460-8,555,  and 
especially  559-60  where  her  devotion  to  Hades  is  put  in  the  extremest  terms 
possible:  "my  soul  has  long  been  dead".  222  To  use  the  terminology  of  the 
are  also  noteworthy.  This  reading  of  the  Phineids  exemplum  has  been,  to  a  large 
extent,  suggested  to  me  by  Seaford  (1990)  and  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b). 
222  Cf.  Benardete  (1975b:  22). 412 
first  stasimon,  she  has  chosen  to  be  äTroXLs  instead  of  ü  SiiroXls.  Her 
excessive  `Maenadism'  leads  not  to  a  reassertion  of  the  structures  of  the 
polis,  but  to  their  utter  negation;  it  is  therefore  essentially  anti-Dionysiac. 
This  might  in  fact  be  another  reason  why  words  related  to  mental  disorder 
are  frequently  used  of  Antigone  (cf.  especially  Creon's  use  of  Dionysiac 
vocabulary  to  describe  Ismene's  bewilderment  when  the  latter  decides  to 
join  Antigone:  492  Xuaawaav223 
...  01)82  ETnjßoAov  4pEv(3v):  her  madness, 
quite  unlike  the  healthy,  salutary,  pro-polis  p.  av'La  of  Dionysiac  cult,  is  an 
unhealthy,  self-destructive  and,  of  course,  anti-polis  derangement. 
As  a  corroboration  of  the  above  contentions  I  should  adduce 
Heraclitus'  famous  fragment  22  B  15  D.  -K.:  ... 
wuTÖs  8E  "AL8rS  Kai 
ALövuaOs,  O'TEq)  µa'LvovTaL  KäL  Xrrva  CouaLv.  Despite  the  grave  problems 
that  beset  the  interpretation  of  this  fragment,  it  seems  that  it  is  now 
generally  agreed  that  what  we  are  presented  with  here  is  not  a  personal 
conception,  a  novelty  as  it  were,  of  Heraclitus,  but  a  generally  acknowledged 
truth.  224  I  suggest  that  the  common  denominator  underlying  the 
assimilation  of  Hades  and  Dionysus  in  the  Heraclitean  formulation  is  the 
reversal,  in  both  cases,  of  vöµoL  (in  the  widest  sense  of  the  word),  i.  e.  of 
conventional  logical  taxonomies  by  which  Man  conceptualizes  and 
categorizes  the  world;  vöµoL  give  our  world  a  concrete,  palpable  shape,  they 
impose  on  it  an  intelligible  order,  a  certain  way  of  perceiving  it  and  making 
sense  of  it.  Dionysiac  religion  inverses  this  order,  but  in  a  strictly  logical  and 
systematic  fashion:  civic  order  is  temporarily  replaced  by  its  exact  opposite, 
223  For  Xiiaaa  denoting  madness  instigated  by  Dionysus  cf.  e.  g.  E.  Ba.  851,977;  Bierl 
(1991:  66  n.  68,84-87). 
224  Marcovich  (1967:  254),  Seaford  (1994a:  321-2),  as  against  A.  Lesky,  "Dionysos 
and  Hades",  WS  54  (1936)  24-32.  I  disagree  with  the  approaches  of  Conche  (1986: 
158-60)  and  T.  M.  Robinson  (1987:  86-7). 413 
its  mirror-image  as  it  were.  225  Hades,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  realm  where 
the  orderly  principles  that  underlie  the  organization  of  a  polls  cease 
completely  to  exist,  not  to  be  superseded  by  other  taxonomic  forms,  other 
principles  of  categorization,  but  by  a  state  of  affairs  that  is  '  hardly 
conceivable  or  describable:  the  locus  of  Hades  can  at  best  be  defined  by  a 
vague  E  KE  t,  as  opposed  to  the  E  vOä8E  ,  to  the  specificity  and  palpability  of 
the  Upperworld.  226  Dionysus  and  Hades  are  the  same  in  that  they  both 
challenge  human  rationality:  the  former  subverts  -  in  a  systematic  and 
`orderly',  i.  e.  order-creating,  way  -  the  categories  by  which  the  human 
mind  (and,  concomitantly,  the  polls)  operates;  whereas  the  latter  challenges 
these  categories  in  an  immensely  more  drastic  way,  as  it  causes  order  not  to 
be  replaced  by  another  kind  of  `negative'  order,  but  to  disintegrate  into 
utter  chaos  and  ruin.  This  lack  of  any  discernible  principle  of  organization 
in  Hades  is,  I  suggest,  the  extreme  and  permanent  form  of  the  systematic 
reversal  of  current  categories,  polarities  and  distinctions  imposed 
temporarily  by  Dionysiac  cult.  And  this  is  a  kind  of  coincidentia 
oppositorum,  of  essential  similarity  between  two  seeming  opposites,  that 
may  have  inspired  the  above  quoted  Heraclitean  dictum.  227 
225  Zeitlin's  (1993:  15  1-3)  remarks  on  the  reversal  of  perceptual  modes  in  Dionysiac 
cult  are  as  far  as  one  should  go  in  the  way  of  stressing  Dionysus'  "otherness";  see 
the  caveat  of  Henrichs  (1990:  269). 
226  For  more  on  Hades  as  a  `non-place'  -  as  the  absolute  `other'  qua  complete 
negation  of  current  categories  -see  Chapter  Four,  section  4.6.1. 
227  On  the  principle  of  coincidentia  oppositorum  as  expressed  in  this  fragment  see 
Kirk  (1954:  121,144).  On  Dionysus'  chthonic  aspects  see  C.  Metzger  (BCH  68/69 
[1944/45],  296-339);  Bierl  (1989:  53  with  n.  54),  (1991:  130  with  n.  56).  Add  now  two 
extremely  important  pieces  of  evidence:  a)  the  bone  tablet  from  Olbia  (SEG  28 
[1978]  659)  that  reads,  inter  alia,  ßlos  OävaTos  ßi0!  9  [...  ]  AL6(vuvoS  or  -vüvw);  see  in 
general  M.  L.  West,  ZPE  45  (1982)  17-29  and  West  (1983b:  17-8),  albeit  with  no 
mention  of  Dionysus'  chthonic  associations.  b)  the  Thessalian  golden  leaves 
published  by  K.  Tsantsanoglou  &  G.  M.  Parässoglou,  Hellenika  37  (1987)  3-16,  where 
Dionysus  has  clear  eschatological  /  chthonic  associations:  illuminating  discussion 414 
I  trust  that  the  cumulative  effect  of  the  above  evidence  suffices  to 
show  that  Antigone,  in  her  devotion  to  Hades  and  her  defiance  of  the  polls, 
is  a  Maenad  sui  generis,  a  `hyper-Maenad':  she  has  sought  to  transform  the 
temporary  and  salutary  reversal  of  civic  order  in  Dionysiac  cult  into  an 
absolute  and  permanent  suspension  of  the  polls'  institutions;  instead  of 
effecting  the  salvation  of  the  polls,  she  has  almost  doomed  it  to  destruction. 
As  far  as  she  is  concerned,  Dionysus  has  been  completely  identified  with 
Hades.  228  It  would  be  interesting  now  to  explore  the  ambiguity  of  this 
peculiar  `hyper-Maenadism'.  We  have  already  seen  in  detail  on  p.  398ff. 
that  Antigone's  position  is  ambiguous,  interstitial,  since  she  has  both  the 
approval  and  the  condemnation  of  the  polls.  Interestingly,  her  anti-polls 
behaviour,  that  alienates  her  from  the  rest  of  the  citizens  (656  n6Acüs  ... 
µövr  v)  229  is  described  by  Creon  as  voaos  (732)  -  and  it  is  indicative  that 
excessive  (therefore  potentially  detrimental  to  the  polls)  maenadic  frenzy 
in  C.  Segal,  GRBS  31  (1990)  411-9,  and  F.  Graf  in  Carpenter  &  Faraone  (1993:  239-58). 
Under  the  light  of  the  new  evidence  the  views  of  those  who  have  denied  Dionysus 
any  chthonic  associations  whatsoever  should  be  thoroughly  reconsidered:  e.  g. 
Zuntz  (1971:  407-11);  M.  S.  Silk  &  J.  P.  Stem  (Nietzsche  on  Tragedy  [Cambridge  1981] 
182-3). 
228  On  Antigone  as  a  Maenad  see  also  Bierl  (1989:  48-9),  (1991:  65-7)  and  Sourvinou- 
-RV  Inwood  (1989a:  141,146),  (1989b:  151-3),  although  my  treatment  differs  f  theirs 
in  essential  points.  Antigone  is  explicitly  called  PaKXa  VEKÜC)V  at  E.  Pho.  1489  [on 
which  see  Bierl  [1991:  160]):  whether  the  passage  is  interpolated  or  not,  the  fact  is 
that  the  idea  of  Antigone  as  a  Maenad  is  not  as  outlandish  as  it  may  seem  at  first. 
Indeed,  as  Seaford  (1990:  89)  suggests,  in  Euripides'  lost  Antigone  the  heroine 
appeared  at  some  point  as  a  captive  Maenad.  For  the  not  uncommon  tragic  phrase 
`Maenad  of  Hades'  see  Seaford  (1994a:  323  with  n.  178). 
229  Even  Antigone  herself  has  to  compromise  the  confidence  she  expresses  at  509, 
and  admit  that  she  has  been  utterly  abandoned  (839-52,876-82).  Bennett  &  Tyrell 
(1990:  445-7passim)  offer  an  entirely  different  interpretation. 415 
can  also  be  described  as  a  vöaos.  230  On  the  other  hand,  according  to 
Haemon's  report  (693-700)  Antigone  seems  to  have  the  polls'  full  support; 
the  Chorus  of  Theban  senior  citizens  similarly  praise  her  for  her  overall 
stance  (817,836-8).  This  characteristic  ambivalence  of  Antigone's  position 
in  relation  to  the  polls,  along  with  Creon's  description  of  her  anti-polls 
behaviour  as  vöcos,  may  be  intended  to  evoke  the  pattern  of  the 
pharmakos:  231  For  the  pharmakos  is  precisely  the  person  sacrificed  to  save 
the  whole  community  from  an  actual  or  metaphorical  disease  (plague, 
etc.  ).  We  remember  that  the  punishment  initially  prescribed  for  anyone 
who  should  violate  Creon's  edict  was  public  stoning  (36):  and  pelting  (with 
stones  or  not)  is,  in  myth,  especially  associated  with  pharmakoi.  Even  the 
mode  of  execution  that  is  eventually  imposed  on  Antigone  may  be  seen  as 
recalling  the  pharmakos-ritual:  for  Antigone  is  led  out  of  the  borders  (773) 
there  to  be  left  to  die,  exactly  as  the  pharmakos  was.  232  At  the  same  time,  of 
course,  being  a  member  of  the  royal  elite,  she  is  an  integral  part  of  the  polls, 
230  Seaford  (1994a:  317-8),  (1995:  214).  On  the  disease  imagery  of  the  play  see 
Goheen  (1951:  41-4),  Musurillo  (1967:  54-5). 
231  On  the  pharmakos  ritual  see  Vernant  (1972:  117-31),  Girard  (1977:  9,94-8,293-4), 
Bremmer  (1983),  Parker  (1983:  24-5,257-80),  Burkert  (1985a:  82-4),  Kearns  (1990: 
335-6).  That  the  pharmakos-principle  operates  in  the  Antigone  has  also  been 
perceived  by  Segal  (1981:  175),  Seaford  (1994a:  349). 
232  This  change  in  the  mode  of  punishment  also  serves,  of  course,  obvious  dramatic 
purposes,  and  especially  the  `marriage-in-Hades'  of  Antigone  and  Haemon.  It  is 
also  a  symbol  of  Antigone's  excessive  family  introversion,  as  Seaford  (1990)  shows 
in  detail.  Moreover,  as  Loraux  (1996:  193-4with  n.  95)  argues,  the  phrase  Ka-rqpE4Et  I 
Tvµßcý  TTEpLTrr'aVTES  (885-6)  used  of  Antigone's  imprisonment  in  the  rocky  tomb 
may  recall  the  epic  metaphor  "cloak  of  stones"  used  of  stoning  (cf.  Il.  3.57  XdLVOv 
ga(TO  XtTwva;  also  Lycophr.  333  Kpv(IJEL  KÜTraUULT  XEpµä&wv  ETroµßpiq,  with  the 
explanatory  scholion  ad  loc.  [I.  31  Scheer]  KaX  i4JEL  XLT()V  TLS  TTY  ETTo43pLQl  T(.  t)V 
XELpoTrhj6(Zv  XiOwv).  Kitto's  (1956:  166),  Knox's  (1964:  72-3)  and  Rosivach's  (1979:  23) 
interpretation  of  the  commutation  of  penalty  is  highly  speculative. 416 
and  this  is  yet  another  similarity  with  the  pharmakos  who,  being  an 
integral  part  of  the  city  (indeed  a  king  in  some  mythic  versions),  was 
expelled  (or,  in  myth,  put  to  death)  by  the  entirety  of  the  citizens,  for  the 
rest  of  the  polis  to  escape  destruction  and  find  ao  rgpLa.  In  other  words, 
Antigone,  in  her  excessive,  and  ultimately  anti-polis,  `hyper-Maenadism', 
has  incurred  the  punishment  that  in  myth  is  often  imposed  on,  among 
others,  the  enemies  of  Dionysus  (e.  g.  Pentheus,  or  Lycurgus):  233  her  `hyper- 
Maenadism'  is  in  fact  `anti-Maenadism'. 
6.7.2.1.  Creon  the  destroyer  of  the  polls 
As  we  are  soon  to  discover,  however,  Creon's  progressive  assimilation  to  the 
Labdacids  makes  him  also  an  enemy  of  the  polis.  Teiresias  reveals  that  the 
champion  of  the  polis,  who  has  been  steering  the  Ship  of  State  through  to 
QwTqpLa  (cf.  994,1058),  has  in  fact  ended  up  being  himself  the  cause  of  a 
vöa  os  that  threatens  to  doom  the  polls  to  destruction:  pollution  has 
befallen  the  whole  city,  as  the  body  of  Polyneices  still  lies  unburied,  and  the 
altars  are  being  befouled  by  the  carrion  dropped  on  them  by  birds  and 
dogs.  The  ominous  shrieks  of  the  birds  and  the  failure  of  the  sacrifices,  both 
described  in  strikingly  graphic  detail  (999-1011),  leave  no  doubt  about  the 
utter  disarray  into  which  the  religious  order  of  the  polls  has  been  thrown. 
As  the  seer  goes  on  to  explain,  Creon's  folly  has  subverted  cosmic  order, 
effecting  a  complete  reversal  of  Upderworld  and  Underworld:  he  has  sent  a 
living  person  down  to  the  Underworld,  whereas  he  has  dishonouringly  kept 
a  dead  man  in  the  Upperworld  (1068-73).  234  The  ultimate  source  of  the 
vöaos  that  has  afflicted  the  polls  is  Creon's  own  4ptjv  (1015),  in  other 
233  See  further  Seaford  (1994a  311-8). 
234  See  Brown's  (ad  1068-71)  excellent  comments.  Also  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989a: 
146-7). 417 
words  his  misdjudgement,  his  mental  error  (cf.  also  the  further  imputations 
of  folly  directed  against  him  by  the  seer:  1048-52,1089-90).  235  The  parallel 
with  Antigone's  case  cannot  go  unnoticed:  she  too  has  attempted  to  reverse 
the  cosmic  boundaries  by  trying  to  impose  the  Vö  IOL  of  Hades  'on  the 
Upperworld;  her  actions  too  have  been  described  as  `folly';  Creon  is  indeed 
becoming  Antigone.  For  good  measure  we  also  hear  from  Teiresias  that  the 
implications  of  the  voaos  caused  by  Creon  are  not  only  religious  but  also 
political:  we  have  already  heard  from  Haemon  about  the  burgeoning  civic 
discontentment  (692-700),  and  his  report  is  now  confirmed  by  an 
undisputable  authority:  "all  cities  are  subject  to  a  tumult  of  hatred  [gXOpa 
&  lrdaaL  auvTapäaaOVTaL  nö)sE  Ls]  when  mangled  bodies  are  `hallowed' 
[in  receiving  `burial  rites']  by  birds,  wild  beasts  or  dogs,  which  pollute  the 
hearths  (altars)  of  the  city"  (1080-3).  236  Now,  as  Levine  (1985:  181  §9n1) 
argues  ä  propos  of  Theogn.  219-20,237  "the  verb  [Tapäaaw]  carries  with  it  a 
sense  of  the  citizens  in  turmoil  in  the  manner  of  a  turbulent  sea,  an  image 
appropriate  in  the  light  of  the  `Ship  of  State'  metaphor.  238  The  poet  is 
portrayed  as  keeping  to  a  straight  path  when  the  citizens  are  stirred  up". 
235  Cf.  Goldhill  (1986:  177-8). 
236  That  these  words  are  a  formulation  of  a  general  truth  has  been  perceived  by 
Boeckh,  whose  interpretation  won  the  agreement  of  Schneidewin  and  Semitelos 
(teste  Jebb  [p.  2641);  unlike  most  commentators,  I  do  not  see  here  any  allusion  to 
the  future  expedition  of  the  Epigoni.  Accepting  Reiske's  EXOpa  for  the  MSS  EXOpai 
at  1080  greatly  smooths  the  syntax  and  adds  to  the  generalizing  tone  of  the  passage: 
cf.  Benardete  (1975b:  169  with  n.  128).  As  for  EaTLovXOV  Es  rroXiv  at  1083,  I  am  not 
convinced  that  this  cannot  be  a  bold  way  of  saying  "to  the  hearths  (altars)  of  the 
polis  that  contains  them";  cf.,  somewhat  differently,  Benardete  (1975b:  161  n.  12  1). 
237  nr)8Ev  &yav  iaXa)1)1E  TapaaCT0jiEVWV  1TOA  T1TEWV,  I  KvpvE,  tEVrgv  8'  EpXEV  TijV 
68O'V  6Q1TE  p  E'YW. 
238  On  the  use  of  TapäacW  for  a  troubled  sea  Levine  (ibid)  gives  the  following 
instances:  Qi.  5.291;  Archil.  105.1W;  Solon  12.1W;  E.  Tro.  88,692;  Ar.  Eq.  431. 418 
Creon,  who  has  been  constantly  seeing  himself  as  the  wise  pilot  of  the  Ship 
of  State,  is  now  in  fact  himself  causing  the  political  storm  (1080 
auvTapäaaoVTaL)  that  threatens  to  sink  the  Ship.  This  association  of  ritual 
pollution  with  political  agitation  is  fully  in  accordance  with  the  results  of 
recent  research  on  the  notion  of  miasma;  as  especially  Girard  (1977:  28-3  1) 
and  Parker  (1983:  120-1,125-6,132)  have  demonstrated,  miasma  is  but  the 
metaphysical  projection  of  the  social  tumult  and  disruption  caused  by 
internal  strife.  239  In  our  play  Creon's  failure  on  the  religious  plane 
(Polynices  lies  unburied),  indicated  by  the  disturbance  of  religious  order 
(bad  omens,  failure  of  sacrifices),  is  also  manifested  on  the  political  plane  as 
civil  disruption  (mutual  hatred  and  internal  strife:  1080)  caused  by  Creon's 
policies. 
With  Creon's  failure  on  the  political  plane  is  connected  the  theme  of 
tyranny.  We  have  seen  how  in  his  debate  with  Haemon  he  showed  clear 
signs  of  tyrannical  disposition  (734-9;  p.  386)  -a  feature  that  was 
fleetingly  hinted  at  as  early  as  211  and  506.  Now,  however,  it  is  the 
mouthpiece  of  the  gods  who  confirms  beyond  doubt  that  Creon,  far  from 
promoting  the  cause  of  the  polis,  has  turned  out  to  be  an  unqualified 
tyrant  (1056).  240  Significantly,  to'  the  accusation  of  tyrannical  practices 
Teiresias  adds  an  imputation  of  a  aXPOKE  p8E  La:  ironically,  Creon  is  the 
man  who  once  vented  his  anger  against  his  political  opponents'  lust  for 
illegitimate  KEp80s  (310,312)  and  for  a'LQXpa  Xi  }t  Lt  a  (313).  The 
association  of  tyrants  with  lust  for  personal  gain,  which  entails  public 
detriment  (especially  since  it  leads  to  stasis),  is  a  topos  of  Greek  political 
239  Seaford  (1994a:  92-105)  has  applied  Parker's  and  Girard's  conclusions  to  a 
concrete  historical  example,  namely  the  Kylonian  pollution:  there,  ritual  pollution 
(hoc)  and  political  agitation  in  the  form  of  civil  strife  are  parallel  expressions  of 
social  disruption. 
240  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  18  with  n.  51)  is  wrong  in  denying  this  line  any  importance 
whatsoever. 419 
thought,  as  is  demonstrated  in  detail  by  Nagy  (1985:  36,43-6,52-3), 
(1990b:  181-2,263-7). 
The  reversal  is  now  complete:  the  conscientious  ruler  of  the  polls 
turns  out  to  be  its  potential  destroyer,  whereas  the  subversive  female;  whom 
Creon  has  branded  the  ultimate  menace  to  the  well-being  of  the  polls,  wins, 
we  may  assume,  divine  approval.  It  is  at  this  point  that  the  relevance  of  the 
mythological  exemplum  of  Lycurgus  in  the  fourth  stasimon  (955-65) 
becomes  evident:  Lycurgus  was  persecuting  the  Maenads  and  preventing 
them  from  performing  the  rites  of  Dionysus.  241  It  would  be  fair  to  assume 
that  Lycurgus,  as  his  name  also  implies,  242  is  to  be  seen  as  a  defender  of  the 
social  order  and  the  well-being  of  the  polls;  so,  his  opposition  even  to  the 
temporary  disorder  that  Dionysiac  cult  entails  should  be  seen  as  a  corollary 
of  his  excessive  adherence  to  the  idea  of  an  orderly  polls.  Lycurgus' 
opposition  to  the  temporary  suspension  of  normal  order  in  Dionysiac  cult, 
as  expressed  especially  in  the  liberation  of  women,  must  also  be  the  point  of 
the  special  emphasis  that  is  placed  on  the*  fact  that  he  taunted  the  god 
(956  KEPT%LLOLS  Öpya  s',  or  961  &(3aVwv 
... 
EV  KEpTOILOLc  TkX  GGaic):  243  as 
West  (1983a:  63-4)  points  out,  2'  it  seems  plausible  that  in  Aeschylus' 
Lykourgeia  Lycurgus  (as  Pentheus  in  E.  Ba)  taunted  Dionysus  for  his 
241  On4Lkcv)wL  MoOaai.  (965)  =Maenads  see  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b:  149). 
242  "He  who  fends  off  the  wolf",  the  wolf  symbolizing  the  outlaw,  a  threat  to  social 
order  (Buxton  [1987:  63-4]):  this  is  one  of  the  proposed  etymologies  of  the  Spartan 
lawgiver  Lycurgus'  name:  Nagy  (1990a:  272  n.  13). 
243  ssatELV  belongs  to  the  vocabulary  of  blame.  Jebb  (ad  960ff.  )  aptly  compares  01. 
18.41SKaeaiTTT  pi.  Evoc  G[VTLI'LOL9  ETTEEQQL;  cf.  Nagy  (1979:  225-6).  As  for  KEPTo  LELV  see 
Garvie  (1994:  ad  01.7.17). 
244  On  the  basis,  at  this  point,  of  the  reconstruction  of  Aeschylus'  Lykougeia 
trilogy  by  K.  Deichgräber,  G6tt.  Nachr.  1938/9,  I(3),  231-309,  which  I  have  not  seen. 420 
effeminacy,  245  and  I  cannot  think  what  else  Sophocles'  cryptic  emphasis  on 
Lycurgus'  taunts  might  mean.  If  this  is  correct,  then  we  have  here  yet 
another  parallelism  with  Creon,  who  also  directs  his  derisive  remarks 
against  his  son's  supposed  effeminacy,  his  being  Inferior  to  women:  742,746, 
756.246  And  we  have  already  seen  how  Creon,  like  Lycurgus,  envisages  the 
female  as  a  subversive  anti-polis  power  that  should  by  no  means  be 
indulged  (p.  384):  this  attitude  leads  him  to  the  extreme  point  of  not 
allowing  even  for  the  temporary  and  reversible  liberation  of  women,  even 
for  that  healthy  Dionysiac  disorder  that  serves  only  to  reaffirm,  as  a  foil, 
civic  order,  and  thus  contributes  to  the  welfare  and  safety  of  the  polls.  In 
this  respect  the  anti-Dionysiac  madness  both  of  Lycurgus  (959  µav(ac,  960 
µav(ais)  and  of  Creon  (765  µa(VU)  is  detrimental  to  the  polls,  inasmuch  as 
the  pro-Dionysiac  madness  of  the  Maenads  is  salutary  to  it.  247 
To  recapitulate:  Creon,  despite  his  pro-polls  ideology,  is  anti- 
Dionysiac,  therefore  anti-polis,  because  of  his  excessive  `anti-Maenadism'; 
whereas  Antigone  is  equally  anti-Dionysiac  and  anti-polis,  but  by  reason  of 
245  See  A.  fr.  61  Radt:  tro8arrös  o'  y6VVL9;  and  cf.  e.  g.  Bierl  (1991:  15  n.  35).  That  the 
Lycurgus  stanza  must  be  based  on  Aeschylus'  lost  Lycurgeia  is  plausiby  suggested 
by  West  (1983:  64). 
246  Cf.  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  103).  For  a  list  of  ancient  sources  and  modem 
bibliography  on  the  Lycurgus  myth  see  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b:  147  n.  26); 
especially  on  the  ancient  tradition  on  Lycurgus'  death  see  K.  I.  Merentites,  Platon 
16(1957)  88ff. 
247  Cf.  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b:  150-1).  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  104)  sees  in 
the  parallelism  between  Lycurgus  and  Creon  only  an  allusion  to  Creon's  resistance 
to  the  maddening  power  of  Eros.  Unlike  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  102  n.  37,103) 
and  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b:  149)  I  should  not  press  the  parallelism  so  far  as  to 
suggest  that  the  emphasis  on  Lycurgus'  madness  is  meant  to  recall  his  killing  of 
his  son  Dryas,  and  that  this  foreshadows  Creon's  own  responsibility  in  the  death  of 
Haemon. 421 
her  perverse  `hyper-Maenadism'.  248 
6.7.2.2.  Dionysus  and  the  salvation  of  the  polls 
The  central  importance  of  the  Dionysiac  dimension  in  the  transgressions 
both  of  Creon  and  of  Antigone  can  be  inferred  also  from  the  fifth 
stasimon.  249  We  recall  that  the  first  choral  song  of  the  play  ended  in  a 
mood  of  Bacchic  celebration  (148-54):  the  perverse  `Maenadism'  of  the 
enemies  of  Thebes  (134-6)  has  been  averted,  and  the  polis  has  been  saved. 
Quite  symmetrically,  the  present  stasimon,  the  last  choral  song  of  the  play 
is  also  a  hymn  to  Dionysus  who  is  now  expected  to  restore  the  civic  order, 
which  has  been  doubly  disrupted,  this  time  from  within,  i.  e.  by  Antigone 
and  Creon,  through  their  perversions  of  Dionysiac  ideology:  the  entire  polls 
(1141  Träv8aµoc  TroXLs),  say  the  Chorus,  is  suffering  from  a  violent  voaog 
(1140-41),  and  the  god  must  come  as  a  healer  (1142  Ka6apa(c)  Tro&L).  Quite 
fittingly,  it  is  Dionysus'  pro-polis  aspect  that  is  stressed  throughout  the 
song.  He  is  first  invoked  as  the  president  (in  his  hypostasis  as  Iacchus)  of 
the  Eleusinian  mysteries  whose  public  character  (1120  TrayKOLvoLc)  is 
significantly  brought  up,  and  also  as  the  inhabitant  of  his  native  Thebes 
(1122-25).  Thus,  in  the  first  strophe,  this  hymn  establishes  Dionysus' 
identity  as  the  god  of  the  community,  of  the  polis,  the  god  who  unites 
everyone  in  his  worship.  250  One  may  see  here  a  healthy  response  to 
Antigone's  `hyper-Maenadic'  adherence  to  the  mortal  communality  of  the 
TrayKOLTac  (810-11)  Hades:  the  communality  of  Dionysus  and  the 
248  On  the  catastrophic  polarity  between  excessive  Dionysiac  liberation  and 
excessive  confinement  of  the  female  see  Seaford  (1990:  84-86),  (1994a:  301-11). 
249  Cf.  Seaford  (1995:  207). 
250  Cf.  e.  g.  Rohdich  (1980:  209-14passim),  Seaford  (1994a:  246). 422 
Eleusinian  mysteries  grants  salvation  and  liberation  from  Hades.  251  By 
contrast,  the  emphasis  in  the  second  strophe  (esp.  1126-35)  is  on  Dionysus' 
aspect  as  god  of  the  wilderness,  who  grants  women  temporary  autonomy 
from  male  control  and  has  them  roaming  in  the  vast,  untamed  space 
beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  polis.  252  Here  we  may  detect,  conversely,  an 
answer  to  Creon's  `anti-Maenadism',  i.  e.  his  excessive  control  over  women 
and  the  wild  element  they  embody  (cf.  again  577-9);  especially  the 
reference  to  the  Maenads'  ritually  proper  madness  (1151  µalvöµEVal)  may 
recall  Creon's  repeated  imputations  of  derangement  against  Antigone,  and 
also  his  own  eventual  affliction  by  madness  (765).  Thus,  the  behaviour  of 
both  Antigone  and  Creon  proves  to  be  ultimately  anti-Dionysiac,  and 
therefore  anti-polis,  in  that  it  fails  to  incorporate  important  elements  of 
Dionysiac  cult  that  are  necessary  for  the  au7pLa  of  the  polls:  the  former 
does  not  see  that  the  order  of  the  polls  must  be  reversed  only  in  order  to  be 
reaffirmed,  and  not  in  order  to  become  a  permanent  state  of  affairs;  whereas 
what  the  latter  does  not  understand  is  that  the  women's  temporary  release 
to  the  wild  is  (let  it  be  repeated)  a  means  not  of  negating,  but  of  reaffirming 
political  order  (significantly,  the  first  antistrophe,  after  the  description  of 
the  Maenads'  wild  revelry,  ends  in  a  reference  to  the  polls  of  Thebes:  1135- 
6).  253 
251  See  Henrichs  (1990:  265-6).  Differently  Segal  (1981:  179-83,203-4)  and  Zeitlin 
(1993:  155),  who  see  the  mention  of  the  Mysteries  in  a  more  sinister  light.  It  would 
be  too  far-fetched,  however,  to  assume  with  Henrichs  (1990:  266-8)  and  Bierl  (1991: 
130-2)  that  the  reference  to  the  mysteries  here  implies  that  a  bright  afterlife,  like 
that  of  the  initiates,  is  to  be  expected  for  Antigone,  in  contrast  with  the  complete 
catastrophe  that  awaits  Creon  (similarly  also  Bierl  [1989:  54]). 
252  See  e.  g.  Segal  (1981:  202-3),  Seaford  (1994a:  257-62,301-11). 
253  See  on  this  last  point  Henrichs  (1990:  266).  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  110-6) 
sees  the  whole  stasimon  in  too  sinister  a  light;  so  also  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987: 
158-9);  for  criticism  see  Seaford  (1990:  88  with  n.  82). 423 
6.8.1  Creon  the  Labdacid 
Creon's  assimilation  with  the  Labdacids  is  now  proceeding  rapidly;  254  the 
themes  that  we  have  identified  as  typical  of  that  accursed  oikos  are  now 
associated  with  Creon  and  his  own  oikos.  To  begin  with,  aTrl  which  has  been 
such  a  conspicuous  trait  of  the  self-destructive  Labdacids  (see  esp.  the 
second  stasimon;  cf.  section  6.4.1),  now  gets  the  better  of  Creon,  despite  his 
earnest  efforts  to  avert  it  (cf.  esp.  his  speech  from  the  throne,  184-91):  at 
1095-7  the  man  thanks  to  whom  Thebes  has  found  rn  rn]p(a  (1058,1162) 
finds  himself  dangerously  close  to"ATfI  -a  suspicion  that  is  eventually 
confirmed  a  few  lines  later  (1260  äTrly).  255  What  is  more,  he  is  now 
compelled  to  pay  reverence  to  the  infernal  gods,  Hecate  and  Plouton  (1199- 
1200),  like  the  self-destructive  Antigone  whom  he  himself  once  mocked  for 
revering  only  Hades  of  all  gods  (777-80).  256  He  even  abandons  his  last 
stronghold,  namely  his  devotion  to  the  vöµoL  of  the  polls  as  a  precondition 
forGWTrIp(a:  at  1113-4  he  surprisingly  utters  the  keyword  ac(  ELv  not  with 
reference  to  the  collective  QcrTrlp(a  of  the  polls  ensured  by  the  observance  of 
its  v%  im,  but  to  the  KaOEaT(ZTES  vöµoL,  i.  e.  Antigone's  äypairTa  vöp  t  ia.  257 
The  devotee  of  Hades  finally  manages  to  establish  her  defiance  of  the  polls 
as  the  supreme  v%Loc,  thus  causing  the  erstwhile  secure  legislative 
framework  of  the  polis  to  collapse.  At  the  end  of  the  play,  Creon  even  prays 
254  Cf.  on  this  point  the  preliminary  remarks  of  Segal  (1981:  190). 
255  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  189-90). 
256  Cf.  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  195). 
257  Cf.  Knox  (1964:  113),  Dalfen  (1977:  14).  Pace  Calder  (1968:  401-2  with  n.  57)  this, 
far  from  redeeming  Creon,  only  rounds  off  his  tragic  surrendering  to  his 
adversary.  I  also  disagree  with  Ostwald  (1986:  152)  who  thinks  that  this 
surrendering  does  not  damage  the  cause  of  the  polis'  vöµoL. 424 
(like  Antigone!  )  for  death  to  come  (1307-8,1330-3);  the  safe  harbour  into 
which  he  once  managed  to  lead  the  Ship  of  Thebes  has  now  become  an 
"AL8Ov  Xi4n  v  (1284);  258  and  the  accumulation  of  words  meaning  `striking', 
`shaking',  `trampling  underfoot',  and  `overturning'  at  1272-6,  as  well  as 
Creon's  lament,  in  his  last  lines,  that  everything  in  his  hands  is  askew 
(1344-5  XXpLa)259  underline  the  fact  that  the  pilot  of  the  Ship  of  State  is 
no  longer  navigating  it  8L'  öpQfic  (contr.  163,167,178,190,63G,  994  etc.  ). 
What  seals  Creon's  fate,  however,  and  completes  the  process  of  his 
assimilation  to  the  Labdacids  is  another,  even  more  striking  fact:  the  fatal 
introversion  that  has  destroyed  the  Labdacids  now  becomes  also  a  trait  of 
his  own  oikos.  The  aüTO-words,  that  have  been  repeatedly  used  to  indicate 
the  Labdacids'  self  destructive  introversion,  are  now  used  to  signal  the 
operation  of  a  similar  process  in  Creon's  house  too:  Haemon's  suicide,  the 
first  fatal  blow  dealt  to  Creon's  family,  is  described  with  the  phrase 
gLIOXELp  aýIäcGETaL  (1175),  emphasized  by  the  polyptoton  a1  TÖS  Trpbs  . 
avTou  7).  260  Not  surprisingly,  a  similar  phrase,  namely  a  rrÖxELp  airn  v 
(1315)  is  also  used  of  Eurydice's  suicide,  which  completes  the  collapse  of 
Creon's  oikos.  261 
Significantly,  the  fact  that  these  two  deaths  are  instances  of 
intrafamilial  killing  is  repeatedly  emphasized:  the  responsibility  for  them  is 
put  down  to  Creon.  His  first  address  to  the  Chorus,  when  he  reappears  on 
stage  carrying  the  body  of  Haemon,  makes  this  clear:  both  the  KTavövTEs 
and  the  OavövTES  are  Eµn  XioL,  members  of  the  same  family  (1263-4).  262 
258  Cf.  e.  g.  Goheen  (1951:  48-9),  Musurillo  (1967:  59). 
259  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  179  with  n.  85),  (1995:  128,130);  in  greater  detail  Kirkwood  (1991: 
101-3). 
260  Cf.  Loraux  (1986:  176-77). 
261  On  these  two  occuffnces  of  the  word  see  Segal  (1981:  189  with  n.  107). 
262  On  the  implications  of  the  use  of  Et  ioL  here  see  Loraux  (1986:  178ff.  ). 425 
He  similarly  pronounces  himself  culpable  for  Eurydice's  death  too:  Eyw  yap 
a',  EyCh  Cr  EKavov 
... 
Eyck  (1319-20).  The  emphatic  designation  of 
Eurydice  as  Haemon's  Trauu1jTC)p  (1282)  only  underlines  the  disintegration 
of  blood  ties  into  the  mayhem  of  intrafamilial  killing  that  is  ruining  Creon's 
oikos,  as  it  has  destroyed  the  Labdacids'.  263  A  significant  detail,  fleetingly 
introduced  by  the  Messenger  in  his  report  of  Eurydice's  suicide,  completes 
the  picture  of  the  internecine  disorder  perpetrated  by  the  man  who  was 
once  the  kyrios  of  an  exemplary  oikos  (1161-4):  moments  before  her  death 
Eurydice  cursed  her  husband  calling  him  a  lTaLBoKTOVOs  (1305)  -  not  only 
because  he  has  been  responsible  for  Haemon's  death,  but  also  because,  it  is 
now  revealed,  he  had  also  consented  to  the  sacrifice  of  his  other  son, 
Megareus  (1303)1264  Creon's  house  has,  therefore,  no  hope  of  survival: 
Haemon's  prospective  marriage  has  been  replaced  by  a  `marriage  in  Hades' 
(1240-1),  while  Megareus'  KEVÖV  AEXos  (1303),  265  signifying  his  cancelled 
marriage,  only  confirms  that  the  house  is  doomed  to  extinction,  as  its  male 
263  For  further  possible  connotations  of  the  word  see  Segal  (1981:  194).  Moreover,  if 
the  altar  at  which  Eurydice  committed  suicide  belonged  to  Zeus  Herkeios  (thus  Jebb 
[ad  1301])  -to  the'  very  god,  that  is,  against  whom  Creon  had  blasphemed  at  487  - 
then  the  pollution  of  this  locus  of  domestic  cult  would  be  a  powerful  indication,  on 
the  symbolic  level,  of  the  collapse  of  Creon's  oikos:  see  Rehm  (1994:  66  with  n.  25). 
264  Cf.  Rehm  (1994:  67-8);  somewhat  differently  Steiner  (1984:  245-7).  Whatever  the 
version  of  the  myth  that  Sophodes  had  in  mind  when  he  wrote  the  extremely 
concise,  and  cryptic,  line  1303  (i.  e.  whether  he  was  thinking  of  the  heroic  death 
foreshadowed  at  A.  Sept.  477  or  the  self-sacrifice  desribed  in  E.  Pho.  930-1018  [the 
name  here  is  Menoeceus]),  what  matters  for  our  case  is  that  Megareus'  death  is 
Creon's  own  responsibility  (contr.  the  Euripidean  version  in  the  Phoenissae).  The 
identification  of  Megareus  and  Menoeceus  has  been  argued  most  fully  by  Vian 
(1963:  208-14);  doubts  have  been  expressed  by  Robert  (1915:  I.  356-9)  and,  more 
recently,  Mastronarde  (1994:  29). 
265  Seyffert's  emendation,  accepted  also  by  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  149)  after 
Pearson  (1928:  190).  Segal's  (1995:  135)  attempt  to  make  sense  of  the  lectio  tradita 
should  be  committed  to  oblivion. 426 
line  has  been  virtually  obliterated.  266  Hades  has  indeed  stayed  his  sons' 
weddings,  as  Creon  had  grimly  foretold  at  575.267 
Nonetheless,  not  only  has  Creon  been  twice  a  TTa18oKTÖV0S,  but  also 
Haemon,  as  we  hear  with  surprise  from  the  Messenger,  has  attempted  to  be 
a  1TaTpoKTÖvos:  before  committing  suicide,  he  drew  the  sword  and 
attempted  to  kill  his  father,  who  escaped  at  the  last  moment  (1231-4).  268 
Even  so,  however,  Creon  does  not  escape  (virtual)  death:  at  1325  he  calls 
himself  "nothing  more  than  a  nobody"  (cf.  1167  where  the  Messenger 
insinuated  that  Creon  is  a  "living  dead"),  while  at  1288  he  says  to  the 
Exangelos:  "you  have  killed  a  man  already  dead".  The  last  time  we  heard 
this  kind  of  phrase  was  at  1030,  when  Teiresias  described  Creon's 
prohibition  of  the  burial  of  Polyneices  as  "killing  a  man  already  dead": 
finally,  that  is,  the  dead  Polyneices,  far  from  being  `rekilled'  by  Creon,  causes 
the  latter's  death  by  means  of  a  complex  chain  of  events:  Antigone  is  `killed' 
by  her  dead  brother  (871);  she  in  her  turn  `kills'  Haemon  (751);  and 
266  As  Else  (1976:  50)  points  out,  Sophocles,  in  order  to  achieve  the  parallelism 
between  Creon  and  the  Labdacids  had  to  pass  over  a  good  deal  of  traditional 
material:  in  the  Oidipodeia  (fr.  1  Bernabe  =F1  Davies;  also  Argum.,  p.  18.6  Bernabe 
=  Peisandros  [FGrHist  16  F  10  Jacoby]  apud  schol.  E.  Pho.  1760  [I,  414  Schwartz]) 
Haemon  had  been  killed  by  the  Sphinx,  whereas  in  Ii.  4.394  (a  text  whose  version 
of  the  story  conceivably  had  the  ring  of  authority  for  an  Athenian  audience) 
there  is  a  mention  of  a  son  of  Haemon,  namely  Maeon.  So,  the  objection  that  Creon 
could  remarry  and  have  other  children  (Sourvinou-Inwood  [1989b:  163])  is  but  a 
jejune  rationalization:  if  Sophocles  took  the  trouble  first  to  present  Eurydice  on 
stage  (which  was  dramatically  unnecessary  and  unprepared  for)  and  then  to  have 
her  suicide  reported  in  a  markedly  emotional  tone,  certainly  it  was  not  to  suggest 
that  her  loss  was  not,  after  all,  irreparable. 
267  Cf.  Segal  (1995:  128),  Rehm  (1994:  69). 
268  On  the  "father-son  hostility"  schema  in  the  play  cf.  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989a: 
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Haemon,  with  his  death,  eventually  `kills'  his  father  (1167,1288,1325)!  269 
Thus,  the  Labdacids  finally  get  the  better  of  Creon's  oikos  in  a  twofold 
manner:  first,  Creon's  oikos  collapses  under  the  burden  of  multiple 
intrafamilial  killings,  exactly  like  the  house  of  Labdacus.  Secondly,  the  very 
act  by  which  Creon  tried  to  `rekill'  Polyneices,  namely  the  prohibition  of 
burial,  in  fact  recoils  and  results  in  the  destruction  of  his  own  house  as  well 
as  in  his  own  (symbolic)  death.  270 
6.8.2  The  perpetuation  of  ritual  disorder 
Still,  it  might  be  argued  that  such  an  interpretation  is  too  bleak.  Surely  the 
very  destruction  of  Creon's  oikos  must  be  the  means  for  the  restoration  of 
the  perturbed  order.  This  is,  after  all,  what  Teiresias  prophesied:  Creon  had 
to  pay  for  having  violated  ritual  order  by  leaving  Polyneices  unburied,  thus 
inflicting  a  vöQos  (1015)  on  the  '  entire  polis  and  jeopardizing  its  safety;  so 
he  must  sacrifice  a  member  of  his  family  in  return  for  the  dead  he  has  been 
keeping  in  the  Upperworld  as  well  as  for  the.  living  he  has  abnormally  sent 
to  Hades.  Evidently  we  are  here  presented  again  with  the  theme  of  the 
pharmakos,  which,  in  conjunction  with  the  invocation  of  Dionysus  to  purify 
the  polis  from  the  vöQos  that  is  besetting  her  (1140-5),  may  be  taken  to 
mean  that  the  play  has  finally  come  to  a  closure.  Order  will  be  restored,  if 
at  the  expense  of  the  royal  oikos. 
269  On  Creon's  symbolic  death  see  Hoey  (1970a:  337-8),  Rosivach  (1979:  26  n.  31), 
Segal  (1981:  178),  Loraux  (1986:  183-4),  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  198),  Blundell 
(1989:  142);  wrongly  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989b:  152  n.  57).  On  the  peculiarly 
Sophoclean  theme  of  the  dead  (Polyneices)  killing  the  living  (Antigone,  Creon)  cf. 
e.  g.  A  j.  1026-7,  Tr.  1163,  El.  1420-1;  Kitto  (1956:  193-5),  (1966:  180-8). 
270  On  Creon's  eventual  assimilation  to  the  Labdacids  see  the  preliminary  remarks 
of  Steiner  (1983:  78),  Loraux  (1986:  183-4),  Segal  (1995:  131-2);  more  fully  Zeitlin 
(1990:  150-5). 428 
Nothing,  however,  could  be  farther  from  the  truth.  For,  although 
Creon  may  well  make  amends  for  his  violation  of  ritual  order  in  the  case  of 
Polyneices  (1196-1204),  271  nonetheless  the  sacrifices  of  Haemon  and 
Eurydice,  which  are  supposed  to  be  the  price  Creon  has  to  pay  for  his 
trangression,  are  themselves  a  new  perversion  of  ritual  that  requires  to  be 
remedied!  Haemon's  death,  to  begin  with,  is  a  perversion  both  of  wedding 
and  of  funerary  ritual.  The  key  phrase  here  is  äKTEpLQ-rov  äµ4L  1raaTä8a 
(1207),  which  Brown  (ad  1207)  paraphrases:  "bridal-chamber  that  was  no 
ordinary  bridal-chamber  and  tomb  that  was  no  ordinary  tomb.  "272  For  the 
conflation  of  marital  and  funerary  motifs  in  Haemon's  death,  as  in 
Antigone's  (cf.  also  1205  vuµ4E  iov"ALBou,  1240-41),  is  an  ironic  indication 
that  this  is  neither  a  wedding  nor  a  funeral,  but  simply  a  perversion  of  both 
rituals.  273  Eurydice's  suicide  now,  for  which  Creon  is  again  responsible 
(1319-20,1340-1),  is  a  perversion  of  another  ritual,  namely  sacrifice:  It  is 
explicitly  said  that  it  took  place  on  an  altar  (1301;  the  text  is  corrupt,  but 
there  is  no  reason  why  13u  ita  should  be  suspected),  274  while  notable  is  also 
the  use  of  Q4äyLov  at  1291.  To  repeat:  the  deaths  of  Haemon  and  Eurydice, 
far  from  atoning  for  Creon's  failure  to  perform  the  necessary  (funeral)  ritual 
for  Polyneices,  constitute  themselves  a  perversion  of  ritual  order.  275  The 
purification  that  Dionysus  has  been  invited  to  perform  (1143)  never 
actually  comes,  since  Creon's  oikos  seems  to  be  entrapped  in  a  perpetuity  of 
271  Attempts,  like  that  of  Bennett  &  Tyrell  (1990:  455-6),  to  detect  ritual  impropriety 
in  the  burial  are  perverse:  see  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  197),  Foley  (1995:  136). 
272  See  also  the  excellent  comments  of  Jebb  (ad  1207)  and  Goheen  (1951:  138  n.  8)  . 
273  Cf.  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  183-4),  Seaford  (1987:  120-1). 
274  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  175  with  n.  75)  who  draws  attention  to  the  ancient  scholion  ad 
loc.  (p.  275  Papageorgius):  wS  lcpEtov  1TEpl.  Töv  (3u  xµ  v  Ea4  äyii. 
275  Cf.  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  9-10),  Rehm  (1994:  70-1).  For  a  different  view  of  the 
absence  of  ritual  closure  in  the  play  see  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  116-7,159, 
200-1),  as  against,  especially,  Rohdich  (1980:  225-33  and  passim). 429 
ritual  perversions  that  are  impossible  to  remedy. 
6.9.1  Conclusion:  the  impasse  of  the  play  in  its  political  and 
epistemological  aspects 
We  may  attempt  to  define  the  central  theme  of  the  Antigone  as  the  defeat 
of  the  polis  and  its  institutions  by  the  individual,  self-contained  oikos.  276 
As  I  have  endeavoured  to  show,  despite  some  early  hints  (e.  g.  211-14,509) 
that  may  function  as  warnings  for  an  alert  audience,  Creon  is  not  to  be  seen 
as  a  tyrant  from  start  to  end,  277  but  as  an  embodiment  of  the  essential 
principle  on  which  a  polis  is  grounded,  namely  v%ioc.  His  prohibition  of 
the  burial  of  Polyneices  is  directed  both  against  a  man  who  nearly  destroyed 
his  own  homeland,  and  against  the  excessive  autonomy  of  the  individual 
household  which  may  undermine  the  fundamentally  collective  nature  of 
the  polis.  As  Alexiou  (1974:  19-22)  and  Seaford  (1994a:  74-105),  among 
others,  have  demonstrated,  funerary  ritual  provided  a  perfect  opportunity 
for  the  public  display  of  the  power  and  solidarity  of  great  families;  this  was 
not  only  expressed  in  excessive  lamentation  or  elaborate  funerary 
monuments,  but  also  in  acts  of  (symbolic  or  actual)  aggression,  especially  in 
persistent  and  emotionally  loaded  demands  for  violent  revenge,  which 
could  easily  lead  to  vendetta  practices  and  so  to  the  disruption  of  that 
concord  which  is  indispensable  for  the  very  existence  of  the  collectivity  that 
is  the  polis.  It  was  therefore  imperative  for  the  emergent  city-state  to 
276  This  has  been  seen  most  clearly  by  MacKay  (1962:  166  and  passim). 
277  As  he  is  e.  g.  by  Reinhardt  (1979:  68-9),  Whitman  (1951:  89-90),  Kitto  (1956:  138-78 
passim),  Gellie  (1972:  34),  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  125).  More  perceptively 
Podlecki  (1966a:  359)  remarks  that  "the  poet  captures  [Creon's]  character  in  the 
very  act  of  becoming  a  tyrant";  cf.  also  Goldhill  (1986:  94-106  passim),  Crane  (1989: 
111);  notable  are  also  Jordan's  (1979:  85  with  n.  133)  and  Di  Benedetto's  (1983:  17-20) 
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deprive  the  individual  oikoi  of  such  opportunities,  so  as  to  restrict  their 
autonomy  to  the  benefit  of  the  community.  278  In  Athens  such  a  tendency 
can  be  demonstrated  to  underlie  the  Solonian  funerary  legislation,  which 
strictly  prohibited  excessive  expressions  of  mourning  in  private  funerals.  279 
It  is  in  this  context  that  Creon's  prohibition  of  the  burial  should  be  seen: 
the  interest  of  the  community  matters  for  the  leader  more  than  the 
prerogatives  of  the  individual  oikos.  280  Nonetheless,  in  our  play  the  polls, 
attempt  to  exert  control  on  the  autonomous  house,  by  placing  the  collective 
acArn]pLa  above  anything  else,  is  deplorably  vitiated:  the  oikos'  adherence  to 
the  KaOEQT(CJTEs  vöµoL,  as  opposed  to  the  legislative  framework  of  the  city- 
state,  is  eventually  justified  by  the  gods  themselves,  whose  äypairTa  v6µLµa 
Antigone  obstinately  claimed  to  obey.  281  We  have  been  repeatedly  reminded 
278  On  the  antagonism  between  the  old  yEvB  and  the  polis  see  also  Knox  (1964:  76); 
Sorum  (1981-82:  201-4);  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  98)  with  important  further 
bibliography. 
279  See  Alexiou  (1974:  14-5,18-2),  Bennett  &  Tyrell  (1990:  444-5,455),  Foley  (1993: 
103-7),  Seaford  (1994a:  74-5,78-92).  Certainly,  as  Alexiou  (1974:  19-21)  and  Seaford 
(1994a:  100-1)  show,  Solonian  legislation  privileged  the  family  (oikos)  at  the 
expense  of  the  larger  family  group,  the  genos  or  clan.  However,  in  our  play,  as 
also  in  Aeschylus'  Oresteia,  such  nice  distinctions  are  not  maintained:  what 
matters  is  the  antinomy  "family  vs.  city-state",  which  in  the  Oresteia  seems  to  be 
resolved  by  the  foundation  of  a  polis-institution,  the  Areopagus  (cf.  e.  g.  Knox 
[1964:  77-8],  Seaford  [1994a:  74-105]),  whereas  in  our  play  the  antinomy  leads  to 
mutual  destruction  and  therefore  remains  irresolvable. 
280  The  comparative  material  Foley  (1996:  54-8)  adduces  in  order  to  exonerate 
Antigone  (to  the  effect  that  a  girl  is  allowed  to  act  as  an  honorary  male  when  all 
her  male  relatives  are  dead),  in  fact  weakens  her  case.  For  it  seems  that  the  female 
has  such  a  right  mainly  in  cases  of  vendetta,  i.  e.  precisely  of  that  civically 
disruptive  practice  that  Solonian  legislation  sought  to  eliminate. 
281  Cerri  (1979:  passim,  esp.  11-15,33-49)  indeed  sees  the  opposition  between 
written  and  unwritten  laws  (especially  those  concerning  burial)  as  the  most 431 
that  the  Thucydidean  Pericles  (2.37.3),  2282  Plato  (Leg.  793a-d),  Isocrates 
(12.169),  Xenophon  (Mem.  4.4.19-25)283  and  Aristotle  (Rhet.  1373b  and 
1375a)284  all  emphasize  the  importance  of  äypaTrTa  Vö  igia  in  civic  life.  285 
Yet,  although  no  one  can  deny  the  importance  of  such  theoretical 
principles,  the  situation  with  which  we  are  presented  in  our  play  is  far  more 
complex:  for  it  is  clear  that  Antigone's  championing  of  these  unwritten  laws 
involved  defending  the  eagle  that  almost  devoured  Thebes  (110-26),  while 
she  herself,  the  last  member  of  a  doomed  oikos,  expressedly  preferred  Hades 
to  the  ac  -n  pLa  which  by  definition  is  the  raison  d'  etre  of  a  polls  (see  again 
Pl.  Prot.  322b,  quoted  in  n.  59).  On  the  other  hand  Creon,  consistently 
faithful  to  the  cause  of  the  polis  and  its  VIOL,  has  transgressed  against 
cosmic  order,  caused  collective  pollution  and  set  the  whole  polls  at 
ultimate  risk.  What  is  more,  his  oikos  has  been  finally  destroyed,  as  we  saw, 
characteristic  manifestation  of  the  opposition  between  the  old  yEVB  and  the  newly- 
established  polis. 
282  Cf.  also  the  testimony  of  [Lys.  ]  6.10,  whose  remarkable  similarities  with  Ant 
453-7  have  been  demonstrated  in  detail  by  Cerri  (1979:  36-7);  see  in  general 
Ehrenberg  (1954:  37-47).  Cerri  (1979:  65-74),  however,  gives  Pericles'  defence  of 
unwritten  laws  a  meaning  that  radically  differentiates  it  from  the  spirit  of  the 
Antigone. 
283  It  is  an  irony,  however,  that  the  unwritten  and  inviolable  law  defended  by 
Socrates  in  this  passage  is  the  incest-taboo,  i.  e.  precisely  the  law  to  whose  violation 
Antigone,  the  champion  of  such  unwritten  laws,  owes  her  own  existence! 
284  See  Jebb  (ad  454f.  ),  Podlecki  (1966a:  370),  Bennett  &  Tyrell  (1990:  446-7),  Foley 
(1995:  141). 
285  On  this  concept  see  the  convenient  overview  by  De  Romilly  (1971:  26-38)  and,  in 
greater  detail,  by  Ostwald  (1973).  Knox's  (1964:  94-9)  view  (espoused  also  by  Di 
Benedetto  [1983:  19  n.  55]  and  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  [1987:  168])  that  in  our  play  the 
term  &ypazrTa  vöµLµa  refers  specifically  to  the  ritual  obligations  to  the  dead  is 
unnecessarily  restrictive:  one  should  not  split  hairs  by  insisting  that,  since 
Creon's  decree  was  not  written,  Antigone's  unwritten  laws  cannot  be  seen  as 
generally  opposed  to  the  written  laws  of  the  polis  (see  Podlecki  [1966a:  362-3]). 432 
in  a  fashion  disturbingly  similar  to  that  of  the  Labdacids.  So,  in  our  play  it 
is  not  the  anomic,  unhealthy  oikos  that  submits  to  the  general  interest  of 
the  polls,  but  the  polis  (as  represented  by  the  defender  of  its  Qw-pia, 
Creon)  that  is  reduced  to  the  status  of  the  anomic  and  unhealthy  oikos.  286 
Still,  we  saw  that  Antigone  is  not  free  from  ambiguities  either.  She 
declares  herself  the  champion  of  oikos  values  and  she  sacrifices  herself  for 
her  dead  brother,  but  on  the  other  hand  she  is  all  too  ready  to  sever  her 
blood-ties  with  her  only  living  sibling.  Being  a  true  daughter  of  Oedipus 
(379-80,471-2),  she  cannot  maintain  a  healthy  relation  to  her  blood  kin: 
she  will  be  either  excessively  close  to  them  (Polyneices)  or  excessively  far 
from  them  (Ismene);  either  way,  all  she  achieves  with  her  excesses  is  to  seal 
the  fate  of  her  whole  race  by  dying  a  miserable  death  (895-6).  The 
hereditary  self-destructive  folly  of  the  Labdacids  brings  ruin  upon  their  last 
member  with  the  same  inexorability  as  upon  the  previous  generations  (594- 
603).  What  is  more,  the  same  Theban  citizens  who  praise  her  (692-700,817- 
22)  also  berate  her  for  her  anti-polis  action  (853-6,872-5),  and  Antigone 
herself  is  finally  compelled  to  recognize  that  she  has  acted  against  the  will 
of  the  citizens  (907)  and  even  to  doubt  whether  her  cause  was  approved  by 
the  gods  (925). 
The  play  clearly  ends  in  an  atmosphere  of  uncertainty  and  anxiety. 
Creon's  seeming  #övIjQQs  proves  to  be  disastrous  to  the  polis  and  contrary 
to  the  divine  law;  whereas  Antigone's  folly,  albeit  reflecting  a  blatantly  anti- 
polls  attitude,  is  finally  sanctioned  by  the  gods,  although  on  the  human 
level  it  is  the  agent  of  her  catastrophe.  287  What  is  more,  Creon's  4pövrjQLs, 
as  his  assimilation  to  the  Labdacids  proceeds,  deteriorates  into  delusion  and 
286  Segal  (1995:  120-1,126-7,129,135-7)  sees  the  final  outpouring  of  ritual  lament  as 
signalling  the  male-oriented  polis'  defeat  by  the  female  and  the  oikos. 
287  Blundell's  (1989:  110)  view  that  Antigone  displays  true  (if  unconventional) 
sense  is  untenable.  That  neither  Creon's  nor  Antigone's  ways  are  viable  is  stressed 
by  Hester  (1980b:  7-8). 433 
folly  (ä  nl).  That  this  is  the  work  of  the  gods,  whose  inscrutability 
underlines  the  limitedness  of  human  knowledge,  is  admitted  by  Creon 
himself  (127  1-6),  but  is  also  demonstrated  in  a  far  subtler  fashion.  Teiresias 
prefaces  his  revelations  by  indicating  that  he  is  going  to  report  the  arlµE  to 
sent  by  the  gods  (998).  As  the  famous  Heraclitean  fragment  22  B  93  D.  -K. 
shows,  arlµaLvE  Lv  is  par  excellence  the  function  of  oracular  responses,  288  and 
this  is  made  clear  further  in  the  seer's  words:  the  noise  of  the  birds'  wings  is 
O  VK  äarlµos  (1004),  and  it  is  characteristic  of  the  seer's  ability  to  interpret 
the  gods'  obscure  signs  that  he  is  able  to  perceive  the  meaning  of  what 
would  be  for  common  people  äyvths'  and  ß¬  ßapßapu  tµ  voc  (1001-2),  or 
äarlµos  (1013),  or  not  Eüarllos  (1021).  289  By  contrast,  Creon,  who  is  in  the 
grip  of  &n  (1260)  like  the  Labdacids  (584,614,625),  is  unable  not  only  to 
understand  the  divine  QrjµaTa,  but  also  to  grasp  the  meaning  of  quite 
simple,  human  ail  LaTa:  his  follower  perceives  the  shrill  cries  coming  from 
Antigone's  tomb  and  then  QrlµaLvEL  (1208)  to  Creon;  however  these  same 
cries  are  for  the  deluded  king  äarlµa 
... 
ßorjs  (1209)!  Only  when  the 
disaster  is  irrevocable,  and  Creon  holds  his  son's  body  in  his  hands,  does 
everything  become  clear:  it  is  only  moments  before  the  catastrophe  that 
Creon,  suddenly  realizing  what  is  happening,  almost  becomes  a  µävTLS 
288  6  C[Vaý,  oÜ  TO  [L(IVTEtOV  EO'TL  TO  EV  ACXOOZc,  O6TE  MyEL  OÜTE  KPÜ1TTEL  &X 
G%LaivEL.  Heraclitus  speaks  specifically  of  Apollo's  oracle,  but  the  words  can  be 
taken  as  having  a  more  general  application.  On  the  use  of  o`-  LaivELV  for  oracular 
responses  see  Nagy  (1990b:  234-5). 
289  Cf.  Burkert's  (1985b:  19)  and  Bushnell's  (1988:  57)  similar,  but  not  identical, 
remarks.  Even  with  Dawe's  (1978:  112-3)  deletion  of  1013  and  Reeve's  (1973:  170)  of 
1021,  my  point  remains  unaffected:  Teiresias'  ability  to  make  sense  even  of 
seemingly  unmeaning  signs  is  already  implied  in  the  antithesis  of  1001-2and  1004. 
For  a  defence  of  1013  see  Müller  (p.  236),  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  140);  of  1021: 
Müller  (p.  237),  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1.  c.  ). 434 
(1212);  290  and  the  first  aT1i¬tov  that  is  clear  to  him  is  the  µvfµ'  E1TLQ  ov 
(1258)  of  Haemon's  corpse  -  the  funerary  undertones  of  µvf  is  cannot  fail 
to  impress  upon  the  audience's  minds  how  tragically  late  has  the  situation 
become  clear,  E1TLa'qµov,  for  Creon,  and  how  appropriate  was  the 
Messenger's  generalization  that  no  one  can  be  a  µävTLs  even  for  things  that 
are  `firmly  settled',  KaOECTCOTa  (1160).  7291  The  extreme  emphasis  on  his  folly 
-  by  Teiresias  (1048-52,1090),  by  the  Messenger  (1242-3),  292  by  the  Chorus 
(1098,1103-4,1259-60,1347,1353)  and  finally  by  Creon  himself  (1261-69) 
-  show  how  Creon's  sometime  exemplary  #öv-q0Lc  has  been  now  reduced 
to  the  folly  that  has  ruined  the  Labdacids  (603).  293 
So,  both  Antigone,  with  her  adherence  to  transcendent  laws,  and 
Creon,  with  his  defence  of  polls  legislation,  are  victims  of  self-destructive 
folly.  The  rationally  organized  polis  has  finally  yielded  to  the  dangerous 
inscrutability  of  the  Beyond.  What  must  be  stressed  with  all  possible 
emphasis  is  that  the  problem  presented  by  the  play  was  a  very  real  problem 
in  Sth  century  Athens.  As  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1990)  demonstrates  in  detail, 
religion  was  normally  regulated  and  mediated  by  the  polis;  I  have  argued 
(p.  361)  that  Creon's  identification  of  divinity  with  the  polis  must  have 
been  legitimate  religious  discourse  in  the  Athens  of  Sophocles'  time. 
Antigone's  act  was  outwith  the  limits  imposed  on  religious  practices  by  the 
polls,  and  was  therefore  rightly  regarded  as  disruptive  and  punishable.  In 
other  words,  this  appropriation  of  religion  by  the  polls  should  be 
considered,  in  principle,  a  legitimate  attempt  to  contain  within  the 
framework  of  the  state,  and  to  subsume  under  its  authority,  any  practice 
that,  emanating  from  devotion  to  traditional  authorities  (cult,  prerogatives 
290  Differently  Bushnell  (1988:  62-3). 
291  Cf.  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  112);  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  199). 
292  Pace  Meier  (1993:  194)  the  apouXta  here  must  be  Creon's,  not  Haemon's:  thus, 
correctly,  Kamerbeek  (ad  1242,3)  and  Brown  (ad  1242-3). 435 
of  the  genos  etc.  ),  could  put  into  jeopardy  the  cohesion  of  the  polls.  At  the 
same  time,  however,  this  is  a  dangerous  secularization  of  beliefs  and 
practices  that  are  by  definition  transcendental:  294  it  is  a  fundamental 
premise  of  Sophoclean  tragedy  that  human  intellect  (and,  consequently, 
legal  and  moral  codes)  do  not  necessarily  coincide  with  divine  voOs. 
Granted,  it  is  the  gods  of  the  polls  who  have  saved  Thebes  from  the 
traitorous  assault  of  Polyneices,  and  who  might  therefore  be  identified  with 
the  interests  of  the  polls  (280-9);  still,  it  is  those  same  gods  who  demand 
the  burial  of  the  traitor,  i.  e.  of  the  man  who  least  of  all  deserved  such  a 
T1,  µ1  from  the  polls  he  almost  ruined.  295  It  is  ironica1296  that  the  same 
Creon  who  invoked  Zeus  (304)  to  affirm  his  belief  that  the  gods  are  the 
polls,  should  later  blaspheme  against  Zeus  Herkeios  (487);  it  is  precisely  his 
confidence  that  all  things  divine  can  be  clearly  and  fully  known  (cf.  1043 
Eü  yap  oL8')  that  leads  him  to  a  second,  graver  blasphemy  against  Zeus  at 
1039-44.297  Divinity,  however,  extends  beyond  human  rationality  and 
human  institutions:  it  is,  as  we  said,  transcendental,  and  therefore 
inscrutable  and  unknowable.  Human  beings,  and  their  loftiest  achievement, 
the  polls  (see  again  the  first  stasimon),  are  bound  to  live  by  that  OECOv  8'LKa 
(369)  which  they  cannot  understand.  Incompatible  as  they  are  with  the 
polls'  rational  principles  of  organization,  the  gods  must  nevertheless  be 
293  On  the  collapse  of  Creon's  reasoning  see  also  Nussbaum  (1986:  62-3). 
294  Cf.  Segal  (1981:  161):  "In  defining  the  polis  in  terms  of  its  man-made,  rational 
structures,  Creon  in  fact  exposes  their  fragility.  "  Cf.  also  Gellie  (1972:  52),  Bing 
(1974:  98),  Benardete  (1975a:  175,176,183),  Else  (1976:  40),  Dalfen  (1977:  17),  Jordan 
(1979:  91  n.  150),  Segal  (1986:  143-4)  and  see  further  above  n.  69. 
295  Cf.  Benardete  (1975a:  195):  "The  city  uneasily  exists  between  the  gods  who 
support  it  and  the  same  gods  who  cannot  sanction  its  unpurifiable  impiety.  " 
296  Cf.  Dalfen  (1977:  15). 
297  On  this  second  blasphemy  see  further  Bing  (1974).  I  disagree  with  Steiner 
(1984:  275-6)  that  this  blasphemy  reveals  Creon's  (momentary)  insight  into  the 
transcendental  character  of  divinity. 436 
incorporated  into  its  framework  -  an  element  of  a-rationality  in  constant 
dialectic  tension  with  the  rationally  defined  categories  of  the  polls.  This,  to 
be  sure,  is  a  paradox,  which,  exploited  by  tragedy,  can  become  a  deadlock, 
as  it  does  in  our  play;  and  from  this  deadlock  the  Antigone  (as  well  as  the 
rest  of  Sophocles)  provides  no  way  out.  298  All  we  can  do  is  admit  that  our 
intellectual  resources  do  not  allow  us  to  proceed  beyond  the  simple 
realization  that  human  and  divine  laws  seem  to  be  irreconcilably  different 
and  that,  worse  still,  abiding  by  either  of  them  does  not  guarantee 
avoidance  of  catastrophe.  The  theme  of  late  learning  with  which  the  play 
ends  (e.  g.  1270  'SE  Tv  8LKK  v  18Ety,  and  1353  y11pa  TO'  4povEty 
E8t8(1ýav)  is  a  reminder  that  knowledge  comes,  painfully  (if  at  all!  ),  only 
when  it  is  too  late  and  when  no  profit  can  be  made  of  it.  299  Thus,  it  is 
obvious  that,  despite  the  Chorus'  assertion  at  1347-8,  TO'  4povEiv  can  be  no 
real  guarantee  for  happiness.  It  can  simply  provide  a  measure  of  human 
blindness.  300 
298  Cf.  Steiner  (1984:  262-63).  For  this  deadlock,  with  emphasis  on  its  ethical  aspect, 
see  Trapp  (1996:  80-2). 
299  Cf.  Dawe  (1968:  113),  Coleman  (1972:  26-7),  Reinhardt  (1979:  91-2);  more 
analytically  Di  Benedetto  (1983:  6-9);  excellent  treatment  in  Oudemans  &  Lardinois 
(1987:  200). 
300  That  the  unknowability  of  divinity  is  a  central  theme  in  the  Antigone,  as  it  is  in 
Greek  religion  generally,  has  been  emphasized  also  by  Sourvinou-Inwood  (1989a: 
137,148),  (1989b:  164),  (1990:  303)  and  by  Oudemans  &  Lardinois  (1987:  198-9);  cf. 
also  Goheen  (1951:  93-8),  Porter  (1987:  64-5).  For  a  different,  but  very  interesting 
approach  see  Rohdich  (1980:  221-3). CHAPTER  SEVEN 
EPILOGUE: 
HUMAN  RATIONALITY 
AND  DIVINE  SUPRA-RATIONALITY 
IN  THE  OEDIPUS  TYRANNUS 
Der  nig  Oedipus  hat  ein  Auge  zuviefvieffeiclit 
F.  ýföfder(in 
7.0.1  Preliminary  remarks 
This  thesis  has  dealt  primarily  with  a  specific  aspect  of  Sophoclean 
tragedy,  namely  the  limitedness  of  human  knowledge  as  manifested 
especially  in  its  juxtaposition  with  the  transcendent  and  essentially 
unknowable  divine  noos.  At  the  same  time,  however,  I  have  tried  to  offer 
a  more  or  less  comprehensive  interpretation  of  Sophoclean  tragedy  as  a 
whole.  This  is  mainly  because  the  problem  of  the  relationship  between 
human  and  divine  knowledge  is  so  pervasive  in  Sophocles,  that  it  can  be 
examined  only  in  its  wider  context,  in  the  framework  provided  by  the 
plays  taken  both  as  individual  entities  and  as  parts  of  a  more  or  less 
coherent  dramatic  universe,  of  a  tragic  world  view. 
The  Oedipus  Tyrann  us,  however,  is  in  this  respect  an  exception,  as 
the  problem  in  question  is  presented  in  it  in  such  a  glaringly  obvious 
manner  that  it  can  be  separated  from  its  context  and  studied  relatively 
independently;  so,  a  full  analysis  of  the  play  may  (thankfully)  be 
omitted.  References  to  relevant  secondary  literature  will  also  be  limited  to 
a  minimum,  as  my  aim  is  not  to  offer  a  complete  picture  of  the  status 
quaestionis  regarding  this  play,  but  merely  to  offer  a  brief  account  of  the 438 
epistemological  aspects  of  the  OT  in  an  attempt  to  round  off  my 
discussion  of  the  relation  between  human  and  divine  knowledge  in 
Sophoclean  tragedy. 
7.1.1  Human  rationality  and  divine  knowledge:  temporary 
illusion  and  ultimate  truth 
One  of  the  major  driving  forces  of  the  Oedipus  Tyrannus  is  the  clash 
between,  on  the  one  hand,  the  limitedness  of  rational  modes  of  thought 
(deductive,  analytical,  etc.  )  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  overwhelming 
superiority  of  knowledge  acquired  `apocalyptically',  as  it  were,  i.  e. 
through  a  conferment  of  divine  vision  upon  a  human  agent;  such 
knowledge  is  entirely  independent  of  human  logic,  and  goes  far  beyond 
the  domain  of  human  ratio.  '  Ugolini  (1987:  26)  speaks  of  "due  grande 
modelli  gnoseologici":  on  the  one  hand  "il  modello  `razionalistico', 
antropocentrico,  indiziario,  sicuro  delle  proprie  possibilitä";  it  is  the 
model  adopted  by  Oedipus  and  Jocasta.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  "il 
modello  sacrale-diviantorio"  represented  by  Teiresias  and  ultimately  by 
Apollo.  The  human  intellect  tends,  as  if  by  default,  to  enshrine  the  whole 
of  reality  within  its  logically  and  systematically  constructed  categories  - 
to  make  sense  of  the  entire  world  by  way  of  those  categories.  In  order  to 
maintain  the  stability  of  this  subtly  articulated  system,  the  human  mind 
must  not  allow  into  it  any  supra-rational  /  praeter-rational  elements  - 
that  is,  any  elements  that  might  transcend  those  categories  and  thus 
undermine  their  purportedly  all-encompassing  character.  Thus,  the 
1  For  the  antithesis  "seeming  vs.  being"  ("Schein  vs.  Sein")  in  the  play  see 
Reinhardt  (1979:  94-134  passim);  further  relevant  literature  and  criticism  in 
Ugolini  (1987:  24-6).  For  the  centrality  of  the  theme  of  knowledge  in  the  play 
see  the  extensive  treatment  of  Hay  (1978),  notwithstanding  its  unnecessarily 
heavy  psychoanalytical  slant. 439 
human  ratio  will  simply  dismiss  such  elements  as  non-existent:  that  was 
the  way  of  Parmenides,  who  pronounced  that  what  can  be  talked  of  and 
thought  of  must  necessarily  exist  (28  B6D.  -K.  )  -  the  obvious 
implication  being  that  what  cannot  be  known  simply  does  not  exist  2 
There  are  many  instances  of  this  tendency  of  the  human  mind  in 
the  OT.  The  most  striking  of  them  is  probably  the  Teiresias  scene  in  which 
the  `seeing'  Oedipus  (413,419),  an  embodiment  of  human  intelligence  at 
its  best,  3  becomes  involved  in  a  struggle  to  subsume  the  unknowable 
under  a  rationally  constructed  mental  framework.  First,  he  attempts  to 
elicit  information  about  the  gods'  plans  from  an  unwilling  Teiresias,  the 
prophet  who,  though  blind,  "sees  the  same  things  as  Apollo"  (284-5). 
When  this  attempt  fails,  Oedipus,  instead  of  admitting  defeat,  is  led  by 
his  over-confidence  in  the  power  of  his  ratio  to  presume  that  his 
intellectual  excellence  can  dent  the  validity  of  the  `apocalyptic',  supra- 
rational  knowledge  conveyed  by  oracles  and  prophecies  4  In  support  of  his 
contention  he  has  a  particularly  strong  argument:  his  intelligence  has 
saved  Thebes  from  a  terrible  crisis  -  the  Sphinx,  an  embodiment  of 
2  This  stems  from  Parmenides'  position  that  only  the  knowledge  of  the  Being  is 
genuine,  whereas  what  does  not  exist  cannot  be  known  (28  B2D.  -K.  );  in  other 
words,  knowledge  without  an  existent  referent  is  impossible  (28  B  8.34:  TavTo'v 
S'  EQTt  VOEtV  TE  KaL  OÜVEKEV  EQTL  vöriµa; 
28  B  3:  TO  'YaP  a  lTO  VOELV  E(TT'LV  TE 
Kai  E',  vai;  28  B  2.7:  ob  yap 
av 
YVolrls  TO  YE  µrl  ý 
EÖv...;  28  B  6.1:  XPý  TO'  %EYELV 
TE  voEty  T'  EÖV  EµµEVaL).  The  last  passage  is  correctly  translated  by  Kirk, 
Raven  &  Schofield  (1983:  247)  as  "what  is  there  to  be  said  and  thought  must 
needs  be",  whereas  Coxon  (1986:  ad  locc.  ),  followed  by  Wyatt  (1992:  113  n.  2,118- 
9),  construes  the  passages  in  a  manner  that  seems  to  me  unduly  to  strain  the 
Greek.  For  further  analysis  see  Gallop  (1984:  7-9,26-7),  Barnes  (1979:  170-1);  cf. 
Ugolini  (1987:  28  with  n.  23). 
3  On  Oedipus'  rational  intelligence  see  Knox  (1957:  18-20);  Ugolini  (1987:  24-31 
passim);  for  a  detailed  examination  of  the  relevant  vocabulary  see  Vegetti  (1983: 
24-5). 
4  On  the  "distanza  impermeabile"  separating  Oedipus  and  Teiresias  from  the 
epistemological  point  of  view  see  further  Ugolini  (1987:  28-30). irrational  forces  indomitable  by  human  intellect.  And  that  was  an 
OYt 
occasion  iq  which  Teiresias'  mantic  powers  failed  conspicuously  to  render 
their  badly  needed  services  to  the  community  (390-96).  The  riddle  was 
solved  neither  with  divine  help  nor  with  the  use  of  oracular  signs,  but  by 
the  sheer  intelligence  of  Oedipus  (cf.  398  yvc4  u  Kupl  cras  o1')8'  än' 
oLwvCov  µa0c'v)  -a  blatant,  and  often-noted,  departure  from  the  Priest's 
attribution,  in  the  prologue,  of  Oedipus'  success  to  divine  succour  (38): 
Trpoa6i  q  OEOÜ.  S  However,  as  the  audience  already  know,  and  Teiresias 
points  out,  this  very  salutary  act  has  in  fact  been  the  origin  of  another 
crisis,  namely  the  plague  caused  by  the  presence  in  the  land  of  the 
polluted  killer  of  Laius  (cf.  e.  g.  Teiresias'  remark  at  442).  The  apparently 
city-saving  intellectual  excellence  of  Oedipus  turns  out  to  be  a  deceptive 
veneer  that  can  barely  conceal  his  utter  ignorance  (of  his  origins,  of  his 
deeds  concerning  his  parents)  -  ignorance  that  ultimately  proves 
potentially  detrimental  to  the  city.  ' 
Significantly,  as  well  as  ironically,  the  Sphinx's  riddle  is  said  by  the 
Chorus  to  have  been  oracle-like  (cf.  1200  Xpi  a  iq)8öv)  -  the  tertium 
comparationis  being,  evidently,  the  human  intellect's  fundamental 
inability  fully  to  comprehend  modes  of  communication  that  do  not 
exactly  conform  with  the  established  categories  of  human  rationality. 
Conversely,  Teiresias'  prophetic  utterances  come  across  as  riddles  (cf.  439 
S  See  further  Segal  (1995:  149). 
6  The  theme  of  the  intelligent  saviour  of  the  city  who  turns  out  to  be  its 
ignorant  destroyer  is  recalled  at  the  final  tag  of  the  Chorus  (1524-30):  89  'Tä, 
KXELV'  a'viyµaT'  T18et 
... 
Admittedly,  Dawe  (following  Ritter  and  Teuffel)  has 
powerfully  argued  for  the  excision  of  these  lines:  (1973:  266-73);  (1982:  ad  124- 
30).  But  the  theme  is  already  present  in  the  (undoubtedly  Sophoclean)  lines 
1198-1200;  and  it  is  not  unlikely  that  1524-30as  we  have  them  now  preserve  the 
spirit,  if  not  the  letter,  of  the  original  (probably  anapaestic)  lines.  Lefevre 
(1987:  47)  rightly  defines  the  play's  gist  as  "auch  der  Klügste  irrt",  but  unduly 
tries  to  demonstrate  Oedipus"Irrtum'  by  resorting  to  rigorous  logical  scrutiny, 
as  if  OF  were  a  detective  story.  For  a  similar  error  cf.  Bröcker  (1971:  28-34). 441 
a;  see  also  483-6),  which  Oedipus  conspicuously  fails  to  solve  and 
'LVLKTa 
thus  to  live  up  even  to  his  partial  and  illusory  success  in  outwitting  the 
Sphinx  (cf.  440-43).  '  "Riddle  and  oracle  come  increasingly  to  look  like 
mirror  images  of  one  another".  8  In  both  cases  Oedipus  is  faced,  and  fails 
to  come  to  grips,  with  what  lies  beyond  the  boundaries  of  human  mental 
categories,  whether  that  is  the  riddle  of  the  Sphinx  or  the  prophecies  of 
Teiresias.  For  even  his  success  in  defeating  the  Sphinx,  far  from 
demonstrating  the  superiority  of  his  exceptionally  acute  yv6[ill  over  such 
praeter-rational  elements,  only  confirms  their  (rationally  unverifiable, 
but  all  too  real)  validity:  ironically,  Oedipus'  reward  for  his  intelligence 
was  a  (potential)  reminder  of  his  complete  and  utter  ignorance  -  the 
hand  of  the  queen  of  Thebes  -  which  simultaneously  brought  about  the 
oracle  foretelling  incest.  The  time-old  predictions  concerning  Oedipus' 
own  and  his  family's  fate  (predictions  hammered  in  afresh  by  Teiresias  at 
408ff.  and  449ff.  )9  come  to  pass,  with  a  horrifically  rigorous  precision,  in 
spite  of  Oedipus'  confidence  that  he  can  avert  them  by  utilizing  his  prime 
intelligence.  No  matter  how  consistently  he  has  tried  to  prevent  the 
realization  of  the  Delphic  predictions  by  deploying  his  intellectual 
resources  in'  full  (note  especially  his  description  of  how  carefully  he 
shunned  Corinth  by  calculating  its  location  by  the  stars:  795),  10  he  has 
Cf.  further  Calame  (1996:  20,22-3). 
8  Segal  (1981:  238)  with  further  interesting  remarks.  Cf.  also  Segal  (1993:  106-7). 
9  For  a  sensitive  (and  representative  of  `Tychoism'  at  its  best)  solution  to  the 
problem  why  Oedipus  does  not  immediately  integrate  the  knowledge  imparted 
by  Teiresias  in  this  point  see  Bain  (1979).  The  majority  of  scholars  -e.  g.  Weil 
(1968:  243-4),  Lefevre  (1987:  41  with  n.  18)  -prefer  to  see  here  self-delusion  or 
intellectual  blindness. 
10  The  Greek  TEKµapovgcvog  (Nauck:  EKRETpovµEvoc  codd.;  see  Lloyd-Jones  & 
Wilson  [1990b:  98])  specifically  suggests  careful  calculation;  on  its  rationalistic 
connotations  in  the  intellectual  milieu  of  the  5th  century  see  below  n.  18. 
Jebb's  (ad  794ff.  )  exegesis  (keeping  the  MSS  reading)  is  misleading  ("visiting  it 
[sc.  Corinth]  no  more,  but  only  thinking  of  it  as  a  distant  land  that  lies  beneath 442 
only  managed  to  bring  them  to  pass,  down  to  the  last  detail:  he  has 
murdered  his  true  father  in  an  accidental  (i.  e.  incalculable!  )"  meeting. 
Thus,  despite  his  seemingly  clear  sight,  he  proves  to  be  blinder  than  the 
(only  physically)  blind  seer  (302;  370-3;  412-13;  419);  12  and  his  carefully 
calculated  attempts  to  invalidate  the  workings  of  fate  intimated  by 
oracles  and  prophecies  turn  out  actually  to  have  been  but  vehicles 
carrying  out,  in  an  entirely  unconscious  way,  the  inscrutable  plans  of  the 
gods. 
Another  significant  feature  of  the  play  is  that  the  revelation  of  the 
horrendous  truths  about  Oedipus  extends  over  two  successive  stages  that 
coincide  with  equal  nodal  points  of  the  plot;  at  both  these  points  a 
character  (notably  Jocasta)  attempts,  in  a  mood  of  triumphant  (but 
woefully  misguided)  rationalistic  self-confidence,  to  disprove  the  validity 
of  the  `apocalyptic'  knowledge  imparted  by  oracular  divination.  13  The 
first  of  these  structural  junctures  is  at  707ff.:  Jocasta  tries  to  calm  her 
alarmed  husband  by  pointing  out  to  him  that,  as  no  human  being 
possesses  prophetic  power,  Teiresias'  revelations  that  make  Oedipus 
culpable  of  the  murder  of  Laius  should  cause  no  concern.  Ironically,  she 
prefaces  this  attempt  by  saying  that  she  will  provide  QilµE  to  (710) 
against  the  trustworthiness  of  oracles  -  arj  i¬  to  being  precisely  the  mode 
of  communication  used,  according  to  Heraclitus  (22  B  93  D.  -K.  ),  by  the 
the  stars  in  this  or  that  quarter  of  the  heavens"):  Even  if  the  phrase  contains 
grim  humour,  as  Dawe  (ad  795)  thinks  (keeping  the  MSS  reading  too)  -which  is 
but  a  hypothesis  based  on  modem  taste  -  it  is  still  indicative  of  Oedipus' 
intellectual  struggle  to  prove  the  futility  of  oracles.  -  For  an  intelligent 
reconstruction  of  Oedipus'  ratiocination  in  fleeing  Corinth  see  most  recently 
Gregory  (1995:  142-43).  I  disagree  with  scholars  like  Weil  (1968),  Lefevre  (1987), 
or  Erbse  (1993)  who  see  self-delusion,  or  even  mere  dullness,  in  Oedipus' 
attempts  to  evade  the  oracle. 
11  Kane  (1975:  196). 
12  Cf.  on  this  paradox  W.  C.  Heimbold,  AJPh  72  (1951)  293-300. 
11  See  on  this  matter  Kane  (1975:  195,201). 443 
Delphic  god  himself!  14  Evidently,  Jocasta's  implication  is  that  the  praeter- 
rational  knowledge  imparted  by  oracles  can  be  substituted  by  human 
rationality:  as  Bushnell  (1988:  79)  has  put  it,  "Jocasta's  semeia  [...  ] 
amount  to  a  kind  of  anti-oracle.  ""  Indeed,  she  adduces  seemingly 
irrefutable  corroborative  evidence:  Laius  himself  once  received  an  oracle 
that,  predicted  death  at  the  hands  of  his  own  son  -  but  the  oracle  proved 
wrong,  since  the  child  was  left  to  die  shortly  after  his  birth,  while  Laius 
was  killed  by  bandits  at  a  crossroads;  and  if  the  oracles  proved  to  be 
wrong  once,  why  should  they  be  trusted  on  the  present  occasion?  The 
mention  of  the  crossroads,  however,  only  increases  Oedipus'  alarm,  as  it 
comes  dangerously  close  to  constituting  incriminating  evidence  against 
him.  Thus,  Jocasta  has  in  fact  achieved  exactly  the  opposite  of  what  she 
intended  to  achieve,  namely  a  demonstration  of  the  unreliability  of 
praeter-rational  knowledge:  Oedipus  seems  for  the  first  time  to  take 
seriously  into  account  the  fact  that  the  divine  plans  extend  immensely 
beyond  the  all  too  narrow  confines  of  human  knowledge  (cf.  his  agonizing 
question  at  738,  esp.  the  keyword  ßE  ßovXE  ucai)  . 
16  Hence  his  suspicion 
lest  the  blind  seer  be,  after  all,  the  one  who  has  clear  vision  (747  ßX  Trwv  ), 
and  lest  it  have  been  in  fact  upon  himself  that  Oedipus  heaped,  unawares 
(745  oüK  EWvat),  all  those  dread  curses  he  pronounced  against  the 
murderer  (cf.  246-5117)  . 
14  Cf.  further  Segal  (1995:  149).  On  v-µalvELv  as  indicating  especially  the 
communication  of  an  inner  vision  from  a  superior  vantage  point  (notably  that 
of  the  supreme  authority,  God)  to  humans  see  Nagy  (1990b:  164-66). 
is  Cf.  also  Kane  (1975:  208). 
16  See  further  Segal  (1995:  186-7)  for  the  use  of  ßov)ElcoOaL  here.  Oedipus  of 
course  has,  as  yet,  no  idea  about  the  full  implications  (patricide  and  incest)  of 
the  inscrutable  divine  plan. 
17  Lines  246-51  are  deleted  by  Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990a)  after  Wecklein;  see 
Lloyd-Jones  &  Wilson  (1990b:  86).  I  would  rather  follow  Dawe,  however,  who 
transposes  these  lines  with  269-72:  for  detailed  argumentation  see  Dawe  (1973: 
221-6);  (1982:  ad  222-75). Jocasta,  nonetheless,  insists  on  her  attempts  to  disprove  the 
validity  of  praeter-rational  (oracular  and  prophetic)  modes  of  cognition 
(943ff.  ).  Her  ratiocination  is  basically  the  same  as  previously:  if  Oedipus, 
she  complains,  had  been  able  to  make  good  use  of  his  mental  faculties  (cf. 
916Evvous),  he  would  have  easily  inferred  that,  since  the  oracles  proved 
wrong  once,  they  can  have  no  claim  on  universal  validity  (cf.  915-16,  and 
esp.  that  watchword  of  5th  century  rationalism,  namely  TEKpaLpETaL);  18 
therefore  Oedipus  should  not  worry  about  a  seer's  intimations  of  his  being 
the  murderer.  That  this  rationally  constructed  argument  should  occur  in 
the  context  of  a  prayer  to  Apollo  is  not  only  ironical,  but  also  very 
significant:  Jocasta  has  come  to  the  god's  temple  not  in  fear  lest  the 
oracle  given  to  her  husband  come  true,  but  only  because,  as  she  says,  her 
own  attempts  to  talk  him  out  of  his  (supposedly)  irrational  fears  have 
failed  (918-21);  and  in  wishing  for  some  "release  free  from  pollution"  (921 
XI  YLV  ...  Eüayfi)  she  does  not  ask  the  god  to  prove  Oedipus  free  from  the 
miasma  of  committing  patricide  and  incest  (for  this  possibility  has 
already  been  rationally  excluded,  as  the  relevant  oracles  have  been 
`proved'  wrong),  but  rather  to  free  him  from  the  (seemingly)  baseless  fears 
that  make  him  blind  to,  and  prevent  him  from  taking  effective  steps 
18  Cf.  Ugolini  (1987:  27).  Thukydides  and  the  Hippocratic  corpus  provide  the  most 
brilliant  instances  of  the  logical  process  of  TEKµaipEaOaL:  see  most  recently  G. 
Rechenauer,  Thukydides  and  die  hippokratische  Medizin  (Hildesheim  1991),  20- 
3  (with  examples  also  from  Alcmaeon  and  Herodotus).  To  the  instances  there 
cited  one  may  add  e.  g.  Hippocr.  deArte  ch.  12  (6.24.6,11,15  Littre);  see  further 
J.  -H.  Kühn  &  U.  Fleischer,  Index  Hippocraticus  (Göttingen  1989),  777-78  (s.  v. 
TEKµaipoµaL)  and  cf.  Knox  (1957:  122-4),  Kane  (1975:  197-8,206-8  with  n.  26), 
Vegetti  (1983:  26-7,30).  Ironically,  the  8UOTEKµapTO9  character  of  the  identity  of 
Laius'  murderer  was  established  by  Oedipus  himself  already  at  the  outset  (109); 
this  should  severely  qualify  Jocasta's  claims  to  be  able  to  make  logical 
inferences  about  such  matters.  -  For  other  watchwords  of  5th  century 
rationalism  in  the  play,  such  as  CTITELV,  QKOnEtV,  LaTOpEty,  etc.  see  Knox  (1957: 
116-38). 445 
against,  the  very,  real  pollution  that  besets  Thebes  -  the  plague  (cf.  her 
similar  concerns  at  635-6).  In  other  words,  what  Jocasta  asks  Apollo  to  do 
is  to  negate  himself  by  confirming  the,  rationally  `proven',  erroneousness 
of  his  own  prophecies!  Her  prayer,  while  apparently  evincing  an  upsurge 
of  religious  qualms,  paradoxically  appears  as  the  extreme  manifestation 
of  her  a-religious  rationalism:  it  self-consistently  divests  the  divine 
domain  of  its  transcendental  character  and  subordinates  it  (or,  at  best, 
annexes  it)  to  the  taxonomic  framework  created  by  human  rationality. 
Indeed,  this  parody  of  a  prayer  seems  to  be  answered:  Jocasta's 
argumentation  regarding  the  untrustworthiness  of  `apocalyptic',  oracular 
knowledge  receives  unexpected  support  from  the  tidings  of  Polybus'  death 
which  `prove'  that  the  oracles  predicting  Oedipus'  killing  of  his  father 
were  wrong  (again,  the  the  crucial  piece  of  information  that  seemingly 
undermines  the  authority  of  oracles  is  referred  to  by  the  term  arIia(vE  Lv 
[933  a-%i  jval;  957  vtlµýjvas]!  ).  Quite  self-consistently,  then,  she  proceeds 
to  quell  Oedipus'  fears  that  he  may  unwittingly  commit  incest,  by 
suggesting  (albeit,  admittedly,  in  not  too  clear  a  fashion)  that,  since  one 
half  of  the  oracle  has  proved  wrong  (Oedipus  did  not  kill  his  father), 
there  are  no  reasonable  grounds  to  believe  that  the  other  half  should 
come  true  (cf.  984-7).  19  Again,  however,  Jocasta's  syllogism  proves 
precisely  the  opposite  of  what  she  intended  to  prove:  for  it  is  exactly  the 
Corinthian  messenger's  eagerness  to  join  Jocasta  in  allaying  the  king's 
anxiety  that  leads,  eventually,  to  the  revelation  of  Oedipus'  true 
parentage  -  especially  after  the  final  stage  of  Oedipus'  investigation, 
namely  the  cross-examining  of  the  Herdsman  who  exposed  him.  This 
19  As  Winnington-Ingram  (1980:  182)  aptly  remarks,  the  Messenger  from 
Corinth  appears  to  answer  Jocasta's  prayer  to  Apollo  (911ff.  )  -and  in  the  most 
paradoxical  way,  by  the  destruction  of  Apollo's  credit!  Reinhardt  (1979:  257  n. 
23)  points  out  that  Jocasta's  logic  is  faulty;  but  the  almost  polemically  rational 
tone  of  her  argument  is  probably  an  indication  that  we  are  not  meant  to  note  its 
speciousness. final  stage  which  most  definitely  demonstrates  the  illusory  character  of 
human  knowledge  is,  not  surprisingly,  prefaced  by  ar  n  .  'a9'  (1050).  The 
ar!  µE  to  (1059)  provided  so  far  will  lead,  so  Oedipus  thinks,  to  a  happy 
revelation  of  his  true  identity  -  an  anticipation  reflected  in  the  jovial 
mood  of  the  last  stasimon,  1086ff.,  in  which  the  Chorus  (ironically)  view 
themselves  as  `seers'  (1086),  i.  e.  agents  of  divine  knowledge!  "  Nonetheless, 
divinity  remains  as  inscrutable  and  unknowable  as  ever;  and  the 
attempts  of  us  humans  to  decipher  the  divine  aq!  iE  La,  our  only  hope  for 
an  insight  into  genuine  knowledge,  are  bound  to  remain  problematic.  To 
quote  Segal  (1995:  149),  "the  interpretation  of  `signs'  or  `evidence'  brings 
human  °  knowledge  into  its  most  problematical  juxtaposition  with  divine 
knowledge.  The  noun  semeia,  `signs',  and  the  verb  semainein,  `designate 
by  signs',  occur  throughout  the  play  at  the  points  where  communication 
among  men  brings  something  unknown  and  potentially  dangerous  from 
the  gods.  "  Thus,  almost  as  soon  as  Jocasta  has  exclaimed:  c.  º  6ECvv 
µavTEÜµaTa  I  'Lv'  EOTE  (946-7;  cf.  also  953,964-72),  exulting  over  the 
triumph  of  her  rational  argumentation  (cf.  973),  her  mental  construction 
collapses,  as  she  realizes  the  horrendous  truth.  That  she,  a  champion  of 
human  rationality,  should  come  to  discourage  Oedipus  from  pursuing 
any  further  his  rational  investigation  into  his  origins  (1056-7,1060-1, 
1064,1066,1068)  -  cf.  the  similar  attitude  of  Teiresias,  the  vehicle  of 
supra-rational  knowledge  (316ff.  )!  -  Is  an  indication  of  her  tremendous 
internal  change  now  that  she  realizes  the  futility  of  her  best  attempts  to 
subordinate  (in  an  avant  la  lettre  Cartesian  fashion,  as  it  were)  the  divine 
to  the  categories  created  by  the  human  intellect  21  The  human  intellect  is 
20  Cf.  El.  472ff. 
21  The  often-quoted  977-83  do  not  (pace  Knox  [1957:  48,155,176-80],  Segal  [1981: 
211],  Vegetti  [1983:  30]  and  others)  show  an  irrational  Jocasta  who  believes  in 
nothing  but  chance  (977  T'Xrc,  979  EtKc  ).  For  one  thing,  what  Jocasta  denies 
here  is  (pace  Buxton  [1996:  41-2])  not  the  reliability  of  human  rationality,  but  of 447 
inherently  limited,  and  cannot  possibly  cram  within  its  confines,  let 
alone  invalidate,  the  transcendent,  all-encompassing  divine  noos. 
We  are,  therefore,  presented  with  a  paradox  essential  to  the  OT. 
human  rationality  struggles  to  create  a  fully  intelligible  world,  where  all 
non-rational  elements  (such  as-  a  transcendent  divinity)  would  be 
excluded,  so  that  reality  would  be  accommodated  in  neat  logical 
taxonomies  and  categories;  still,  in  this  struggle  the  human  ratio,  instead 
of  establishing  a  self-contained  mental  framework  with  which  fully  to 
make  sense  of  the  world,  ends  up  functioning,  unawares,  as  the  agent  or 
vehicle  of  the  transcendent  supra-rationality  of  divinity.  As  Knox  (1957: 
48)  has  put  it,  "the  man  who  rejected  prophecy  is  the  living 
demonstration  of  its  truth:  the  rationalist  at  his  most  intelligent  and 
courageous  the  unconscious  proof  of  divine  prescience.  "  This  is  a  measure 
of  how  limited  the  human  knowledge  is  in  the  Sophoclean  dramatic 
universe.  22 
foreknowledge  (978  1TpövoLa),  which  in  this  specific  context  comes  down  to 
prophetic  /  oracular  foreknowledge  (cf.  857-8).  For  another,  ELK7j  (979), 
qualified  by  özrcx  8vvaLTÖ  TL9,  by  no  means  precludes  the  employment  of 
rational  means;  cf.  Reinhardt  (1979:  124):  "ELKI  means,  not  `frivolously',  but 
disregarding  the  mysterious  and  obscure,  not  opening  up  the  depths  which 
make  life  problematic,  for  it  is  the  gods  who  make  man  problematic".  As  for 
Oedipus,  even  when  at  1080  he  calls  himself  "child  of  Chance",  he  nonetheless 
goes  on  rationally  to  investigate  his  origins:  see  Kane  (1975:  204  n.  24),  pace 
Bowra  (1944:  208),  Knox  (1957:  179-81),  Kitto  (1961:  142-3).  Burkert  (1991:  25)  is 
much  closer  to  the  truth  when  he  remarks  that,  in  this  unintelligible  world,  all 
Man  can  do  is  to  construct  his  own  interpretative  models  and  then  inevitably  to 
discard  them. 
22  The  paradox  of  the  characters'  impeccable  logic  leading  them  away  from  the 
truth  due  to  their  limited  perspective  is  further  explored  by  Kane  (1975:  190- 
92).  See  also  (from  a  slightly  different  angle)  Buxton  (1996:  43  with  n.  16). 448 
7.1.2  The  collapse  of  dichotomies 
To  repeat:  rational  scrutiny  of  divinity  is  a  self-defeating  process. 
We  have  just  seen  how  over-confidence  in  human  rationality  ends  in  all 
the  starker  a  realization  of  its  limitedness.  We  shall  now  see  how  this 
excessive  rationalism  can  lead  to  a  subversion  of  the  very  categories  the 
human  ratio  itself  has  set  in  order  to  organize,  and  make  sense  of,  the 
world.  Rational  intelligence  can  wreak  chaos  as  easily  as  it  can  create 
order.  the  line  that  separates  these  two  fundamental  opposites  is  an 
extremely  fine  one. 
Relatively  early  in  the  play  (447-62)  Teiresias  describes  how 
Oedipus'  past  deeds  have  caused  fundamental  dichotomies  to  collapse:  to 
begin  with,  Oedipus  has  thrown  the  orderly  structure  of  his  family  into 
utter  disarray  and  confusion.  Family  structure  (in  exogamous  societies)  is 
normally  a  rigorous  system  constituted  of  quite  sharp  distinctions, 
whereby  each  member  is  allowed  to  have  one,  and  one  only,  kind  of 
relation  ('value')  with  each  one  of  the  other  members  of  the  system;  thus, 
if  a  member  is  e.  g.  father  to  another  member,  he  cannot  have  any  other 
`value'  in  relation  to  that  particular  member  -  e.  g.  he  cannot  be  his  /  her 
brother.  Oedipus,  however,  has  anomalously  acquired  a  double  `value'  in 
relation  to  each  and  every  member  of  his  family:  he  is  both  a  father  and 
a  brother  to  his  own  children-siblings  (457-8);  both  a  son  and  a  husband 
to  his  mother-wife  (458-9);  finally,  he  is  both  issued  from,  i.  e.  structurally 
subsequent  to,  his  father  and  functionally  identical  with  him:  for,  by 
annihilating  his  father,  Oedipus  replaces  him  both  in  his  function  as 
Jocasta's  husband  (459-60  Toü  TraTpös  1  %16QTrop0s  TE  Kai  4ov¬Üc) 449 
and  in  his  function  as  father  of  Jocasta's  children  (cf.  also  260-2).  23  This 
anomalous  fusion  of  the  paternal  with  the  filial  identity  is  brought  up,  in 
a  tour  de  force  of  Sophoclean  irony,  by  Oedipus'  own  remarks  at  137-41 
(note  especially  the  telling  combination  abT6g  avTOÜ  at  138  and  the 
reflexive  E  µavTOv  at  141)  and  at  258-65;  besides,  the  recurrent  use  of 
aWTÖXELP  (231,266)  to  designate  the  murderer  of  Laius  "points",  as 
Bernadete  (1966:  110)  perceptively  remarks,  "to  the  murderer  as  one  who 
killed  in  his  own  family".  24 
Nevertheless,  the  distinctions  that  constitute  the  family  structure 
are  not  the  only  ones  that  have  been  irretrievably  confounded  by 
Oedipus'  deeds:  the  confusion  extends  to  the  most  fundamental,  even 
elementary  constituents  of  human  reason,  namely  numbers,  and 
especially  the  self-evident  bi-polar  distinction  between  one  and  many,  or 
singular  and  plural.  This  is.  especially  well  exemplified  in  the  question  of 
the  exact  number  of  the  person(s)  who  killed  Laius.  `One',  Oedipus  argues, 
cannot  be  the  same  as  `many'  (the  so-called  `law  of  non-contradiction'), 
so  if  it  is  true  that  Laius  was  killed  by  a  multitude  of  highwaymen,  then 
he  may  rest  assured  that  he  is  free  of  the  charge  of  regicide  and  of  being 
the  miasma  destroying  Thebes  (839-47).  That  Oedipus'  future  should 
depend,  as  Dawe  (ad  845)  puts  it,  on  elementary  mathematics  is  one  of 
the  most  striking  and  significant  features  of  the  play  25  Still,  even 
elementary  mathematics  do  not  seem  to  work:  paradoxically,  the  killer 
appears  to  be  both  `one'  and  `many',  as  the  question  is  confusingly 
clouded  by  ambiguity  and  self-contradiction.  The  matter  is  introduced  in 
a  deliberately  ambivalent  manner:  at  122  Creon  mentions  "bandits"  in 
the  plural  (cf.  107),  whereas  at  124  Oedipus  speaks  of  only  one  bandit;  cf. 
23  See  further  the  excellent  analysis  by  Bernadete  (1966:  110). 
24  I  have  offered  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  implications  of  the  use  of  arTÖXE1p 
and  other  a1To-words  in  Chapter  Six,  passim,  esp.  section  6.1.1. 
25  Cf.  also  Knox  (1957:  151  with  n.  141,154  with  n.  148);  Buxton  (1996:  45). 450 
also  139  ö  KTaVt  v;  225  QVBpÖS  EK  TLVOS;  231,266  TO'V  aÜTÖXELpa;  236 
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ToOTOV;  etc.  And  whereas  the  Herdsman  had  mentioned  a 
plurality  of  highwaymen  (cf.  122-3,715-6,839-51),  it  transpires  that  the 
murderer  of  Laius  was  only  one.  `one'  and  `many'  appear  again  to  be 
bafflingly  interchangeable. 
This  constant  shift  from  singular  to  plural  and  vice-versa  makes 
little  sense  unless  we  realize  that  in  Oedipus'  case  `one'  does  indeed 
become  `many':  26  we  have  just  seen  how  Oedipus  acquires,  anomalously,  a 
double  `value'  in  the  system  of  his  family  relations  (both  a  father  and  a 
brother  of  the  same  children,  etc.  ).  The  flashback  on  Oedipus'  supposed 
origins  at  771ff.  serves  further  to  play  up  the  antinomic  tension  between 
`one'  and  `many'  in  Oedipus'  identity:  his  certainty  about  what  he 
considered  to  be  his  true,  and  only,  identity  (son  of  Polybus  and  Merope), 
is  seriously  challenged  when  a  drunken  man  jibes  him  as  a  `false', 
`supposititious'  (780  7rXaQT0S)  son.  As  Oedipus  can  never  allay  the  doubts 
caused  by  that  remark  (785-86),  27  he  can  never  be  sure  whether  he  really 
is  who  he  thought  he  was  or  whether  he  is  someone  else;  his  formerly 
single  identity  now  splits  into  a  double  identity  -  or  two  alternative 
identities  both  of  which  are  (to  Oedipus'  mind)  equally  false  and  equally 
true.  So,  again  Oedipus  can  be  both  `one'  and  `many'  -  which  means  that 
he  actually  belongs  to  neither  category.  Ironically,  when  his  painstaking 
rational  investigation  leads  him  to  establish,  at  last,  a  single  identity  (he 
discovers  that  he  is  beyond  doubt  the  son  of  Laius  and  Jocasta),  the 
26  See,  most  recently,  Segal  (1981:  214-16  with  n.  21)  with  the  extensive 
literature  there  cited;  also  Segal  (1993:  101,103).  Segal  (1981:  216)  offers  a 
conclusion  similar  to  mine:  "Oedipus  founds  his  innocence  on  a  basic  law  of 
noncontradiction,  the  fundamental  logic  in  man's  apprehension  of  reality. 
Here,  however,  noncontradiction  gives  way  to  a  fantastic,  irrational  `logic'  of 
paradoxes  in  which  opposites  can  in  fact  be  equal  and  `one'  can  simultaneously 
be  'many";  cf.  also  Zeitlin  (1990:  139);  Segal  (1993:  118). 
27  See  further  Gregory  (1995). 451 
mind-bending  vacillation  between  `one'  and  `many'  does  not  end:  for  as 
soon  as  the  new  single  identity  emerges  out  of  the  previous  double 
identity  confusion,  it  becomes  clear  that  this  single  identity  is  in  fact 
constituted  by  a  series  of  dedoublements  of  roles  (father  and  brother, 
husband  and  son  etc.  ).  Thus,  a  paradigmatically  rational  procedure  (the 
investigation  for  Laius'  murderer)  causes  the  very  foundations  of  human 
logic  (such  as  the  simple  assumption  that  `one'  cannot  be  `many')  to 
collapse  into  chaotic  disarray;  in  this  respect,  the  OT  could  be  justly 
named  an  `anti-detective'  story,  insofar  as  it  very  seriously  questions, 
instead  of  celebrating,  human  rationality.  "'  It  is  one  of  the  many  ironies 
of  this  play  that  the  man  who  could  solve  the  riddle  of  the  Sphinx  by 
discerning  the  `oneness'  behind  the  apparent  multiplicity  (what  appears 
to  be  triple  -  four-footed,  two-footed,  and  three-footed  -  is  in  essence 
only  one)29  proves  unable  to  establish  a  single  system  of  family  relations, 
and  thus  becomes  entangled  in  a  destructive  multiplicity  of  family  roles 
28  Burkert  (1991)  is  thus  justified  (partly,  at  least)  in  comparing  CF  with 
Umberto  Eco's  The  Name  of  the  Rose,  where  Man's  use  of  intellectual 
constructions  in  order  to  comprehend  the  supposed  order  of  the  universe  is 
pronounced  a  useful,  but  meaningless  tool. 
29  True,  the  content  of  the  riddle  is  never  mentioned  in  the  play.  Still,  it  is 
relatively  safe  to  assume  that  the  riddle  as  it  is  known  to  us  had,  by  the  time  the 
OF  was  written,  become  integrated  into  the  traditional  story:  to  the  famous 
Vatican  cup  (ca.  470  BC)  depicting  the  Sphinx  addressing  Oedipus  and  beside  her 
the  words  [K]ai  Tpi[lrov]  (ARV  451,1;  LIMC  VII.  1,  p.  4  no.  19;  cf.  Fraenkel  on  A. 
Ag.  1258,  Bremmer  [1987b:  57  n.  26])  add  now  the  even  earlier  (520/10  BC) 
hydria  from  Bale  (coll.  Cahn  855)  discussed  by  Moret  (1984:  I.  39-40  and  II.  pl. 
23).  Edmunds  (1981b:  passim,  esp.  18-21)  has  argued  that  the  Sphinx  is  a  late 
addition  to  the  Oedipus  legend;  this  view,  however,  has  been  effectively  refuted 
by  Bremmer  (1987b:  46-7  with  n.  26),  and  even  if  one  accepts  it,  this  does  not  in 
the  least  diminish  the  Sphinx's  importance  for  the  intepretation  of  the 
Sophoclean  play.  After  all,  as  Edmunds  (1981b:  20)  himself  remarks,  "[the 
Sphinx]  motif  served  to  characterize  Oedipus  as  a  man  of  intelligence,  and  this 
characterization  had  special  significance  in  the  Athens  of  Sophocles'  day". 452 
and  functions,  thereby  creating  utter  chaos  out  of  what  should  have  been 
a  carefully  articulated  and  organized  structure.  As  Kirk  (1986:  17)  says,  a 
propos  of  the  paradox  implicit  in  the  name  `Oedipus',  "the  man  who 
knows,  oide,  the  truth  about  the  three  ages  of  man  as  contained  in  the 
Sphinx's  riddle  is  the  very  one  who  rejects  that  truth  by  confounding  the 
three  ages  in  his  own  case...  1130 
The  extensive  use  of  verbal  ambiguity  and,  especially,  of  dramatic 
irony  in  this  play  is  a  corollary  of  this  anomalous  fusion  of  distinctions 
essential  to  our  making  sense  of  the  world.  Ambiguity  and  irony  consist 
in  a  collapse  of  the  correspondence  between  signans  and  signatum, 
between  what  the  characters  mean  by  what  they  say,  and  the  true 
application  (graspable  only  by  an  informed  audience)  of  what  they  say  - 
which  is  a  reflection  of  that  deepest  and  most  disturbing  collapse  of 
fundamental  categories  and  dichotomies  that  define  human  life.  31 
7.2.1  Conclusion:  riddles.  oracles,  and  dreams 
It  is  significant  that  the  Chorus,  with  their  common-sense  frame  of  mind, 
react  to  Teiresias'  revelations  about  Oedipus  with  horrified  disbelief  (483- 
511)  and  utter  äTropLa  (486);  they  even  doubt  the  trustworthiness  of 
`apocalyptic'  knowledge  as  communicated  through  human  agents  (499- 
30  On  this  confusion  of  the  three  ages  see  also  Benardete  (1966:  116)  and 
especially  the  brilliant  article  by  J.  -P.  Vernant,  "From  Oedipus  to  Periander: 
Lameness,  Tyranny,  Incest  in  Legend  and  History",  Arethusa  15  (1982),  19-38; 
cf.  also  Goldhill  (1986:  212),  Segal  (1995:  141).  On  the  collapse  of  distinctions  in 
general  see  the  exhaustive  discussion  of  Segal  (1981:  207-48  passim).  Further  on 
the  connotations  of  the  name  of  Oedipus  see  Knox  (1957:  149,183-4);  Hay  (1978: 
27-35). 
31  Cf.  also  Reinhardt  (1979:  103-4),  Bushnell  (1988:  3-4).  Probably  the  most 
thought-provoking  treatment  of  the  siginificance  of  ambiguity  in  this  play  is 
Segal's  (1981:  241-44,  esp.  242),  who  also  provides  further  bibliography. 453 
506)  -  not  unreasonably,  since  what  the  Delphic  oracle  prophesied  (and 
Teiresias  reiterated)  is  simply  beyond  the  boundaries  of  human 
understanding.  32  Oedipus'  reputation  (496  06TL9)  for  aoO(a  (Cf.  509), 
continues  the  Chorus,  has  been  established  by  means  of  rational  proof 
(510  ßaaävgq),  and  this  fact  could  be  assailed  by  no  rational  proof  (494 
ßaaävq))!  33  Even  more  significantly,  Jocasta  (980-2)  points  out  that  such 
acts  as  the  incest  prophesied  by  the  Delphic  oracle  are  most  likely  to 
occur  in  dreams,  i.  e.  on  a  plane  of  consciousness  wholly  different  from 
the  one  dominated  by  rational  thought.  In  other  words,  the  kind  of 
knowledge  contained  in  oracles  is  of  such  an  alien  order  that  the 
common  processes  of  the  human  intellect  are  incapable  of  grasping  it  in 
its  fullness.  It  is  a  different  kind  of  consciousness  (such  as  the  one 
manifesting  itself  in  dreams)  that  is  required  for  the  praeter-rational 
knowledge  of  oracles  to  be  properly  comprehended.  But  dreams 
(regardless  of  the  fact  that  they  may  come  true)  are  also,  in  Greek 
thought,  stock  symbols  for  things  utterly  immaterial  (see  ISJ  s.  vv.  övap  I. 
2;  äVELpos  I.  2):  human  rationality,  in  its  tendency  to  accept  as  true  only 
what  fits  into  its  neat  categories,  is  unavoidably  tempted  to  dismiss  the 
praeter-rational  as  merely  immaterial,  unreal  and  unsubstantial  like  a 
dream  -  i.  e.  to  do  exactly  what  our  `Cartesian'  (or  `Parmenidean')  Jocasta 
does.  34 
To  conclude:  the  essence  of  the  Oedipus  Tyrannus  as  seen  from  an 
epistemological  point  of  view  can  be  summarized  in  a  typically 
Sophoclean  paradox  (already  intimated  on  p.  447):  divine  signs  (oracles, 
prophecies  and  such  like)  are  the  only  way  for  humans  to  gain  insight 
32  Or,  as  Segal  (1981:  241)  has  put  it,  "too  horrifyingly  specific  to  be  understood". 
33  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  the  word  ßäQavoc  per  se  carries  any  rational 
connotations;  but  surely  in  our  context  such  connotations  must  be  recognized. 454 
into  genuine  and  unimpaired  knowledge.  These  signs  are  reminders  that 
there  is.  much  more  to  reality  (even  everyday  reality)  than  its  purely 
rational  aspect:  wherefore  pure  Vernunft  -  the  means  predominantly 
used  by  humans  in  order  to  make  sense  of  the  world  -  cannot  possibly 
provide  a  sufficient  tool  to  organize  and  comprehend  reality.  But  even 
when  the  only  alternative  mode  of  cognition  available  to  humans, 
namely  divine  knowledge,  is  communicable  to  them,  the  human  mind, 
precisely  because  of  its  fundamental  limitedness,  proves  unable  to  grasp 
the  essentially  alien  order  of  that  knowledge:  such  knowledge  is  as  little 
susceptible  to  rational  scrutiny  as  dreams  -  which  automatically 
consigns  it  to  the  realm  beyond  the  boundaries  of  human  intellect,  or 
rather  beyond  the  boundaries  of  existence,  since  the  human  mind  tends 
to  regard  as  inexistent  what  cannot  be  rationally  accounted  for.  When, 
however,  Oedipus  witnesses  what  he  has  established  as  inexistent  come  to 
existence,  as  his  horrendous  deeds  are  finally  revealed,  then  the  very 
foundations  of  human  logic  collapse:  the  non-Being  becomes  Being.  35 
What  appeared  unreal  up  to  this  point  turns  out  to  have  been  only  too 
real  all  along.  The  truth  has  come  to  light  despite  the  rationally  and 
empirically  constructed  certainties  that  the  human  mind  rests  content  to 
regard  as  the  sole  realities.  Oedipus  therefore  has  to  discard  the  faculties 
of  sense  and  thought  that  create  such  disastrous  illusions:  his  self- 
blinding  indicates  his  desire  to  disable  other  sensory  avenues  as  well  (cf. 
34  On  Parmenides  cf.  above  n.  2.  That  Sophocles  should  make  his  deluded  heroine 
express  quasi-Parmenidean  thoughts  is  argument  enough  against  Champlin's 
(1969:  342-45)  attempt  to  detect  Parmenidean  influences  in  Sophocles. 
31  That  the  Being  cannot  coincide  with  the  non-Being  was  most  emphatically 
proclaimed  by  Parmenides  (28  B7D.  -K.  )  -significantly,  the  only  Presocratic 
who  (in  a  thoroughly  un-Greek  fashion)  claimed  to  have  insight  into  the  realm 
of  divine  knowledge  (28  B  1),  and  was,  it  seems,  criticized  for  that  by  Empedocles 
(31  B  3).  See  further  Introduction  (section  0.2.4). 455 
1386-89),  36  while  it  seems  to  blunt  his  thinking  (#ovTLs)  too  (1389-90)37 
-a  bitter  reversal  of  his  earlier  taunts  against  Teiresias'  blindness  as 
affecting  also  the  seer's  mind  (voüs)  and  ears  (WTa)  too  (371).  38  In  the 
end  of  Oedipus  Tyrannus  the  limitations  of  human  knowledge  are 
painfully  demonstrated,  as  its  elementary  constituents  (the  functions  of 
perceiving  and  thinking)  disintegrate  into  nothingness;  whereas  genuine 
knowledge,  possessed  exclusively  by  divinity,  remains  as  remote  and 
inscrutable  as  ever. 
36  Cf.  Calame  (1996:  23-5). 
37  That  thought  and  knowledge  are  necessarily  preceded  by  vision  ('eye- 
witnessing',  as  it  were),  so  that  `seeing'  is  sometimes  almost  equivalent  to 
`knowing'  (cf.  e.  g.  LBEiv-LBEVai),  is  hardly  a  new  concept  (a fact  that  Benardete 
[1966:  119]  seems  to  have  failed  to  realize):  see  in  the  first  instance  Snell  (1924: 
26-7);  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  this  equation  in  Sophocles  see  Coray  (1993:  11- 
18);  in  the  CF  :  Champlin  (1969:  339-42).  An  identification  of  seeing  with 
knowing  is  indicated,  according  to  Segal  (1995:  150),  by  the  paronomasia  J8E  - 
Et8üc  at  119.  Lefevre's  (1987:  48)  -and  others'  -interpretation  of  Oedipus'  self- 
blinding  as  a  metaphor  of  his  intellectual  blindness  ignores  how  this  act  is 
justified  by  Oedipus  himself  in  e.  g.  1386-90. 
38  Cf.  Vegetti  (1983:  25  with  n.  1). 456 
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